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Regardless of how sophisticated 
it may be, no spacecraft is of any 
value unless it can be tracked 
accurately to determine where 
it is and how it is performing.
At the height of the space race, 6,000 
men and women operated NASA’s Spaceflight 
Tracking and Data Network at some two dozen 
locations across five continents. This network, 
known as the STDN, began its operation by track-
ing Sputnik 1, the world’s first artificial satellite 
that was launched into space by the former Soviet 
Union. Over the next 40 years, the network was 
destined to play a crucial role on every near-Earth 
space mission that NASA flew. Whether it was 
receiving the first television images from space, 
tracking Apollo astronauts to the Moon and back, 
or data acquiring for Earth science, the STDN was 
that intricate network behind the scenes making 
the missions possible. Some called it the “Invisible 
Network,” a hallmark of which was that no NASA 
mission has ever been compromised due to a net-
work failure. 
Read You Loud and Clear! is a historical 
account of the STDN, starting with its formation 
in the late 1950s to what it is today in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century. It traces the 
roots of the tracking network from its beginnings 
at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico 
to the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System 
(TDRSS) space-based constellation of today. The 
story spans the early days of satellite tracking using 
the Minitrack Network, through the expansion 
of the Satellite Tracking And Data Acquisition 
Network (STADAN) and the Manned Space 
Flight Network (MSFN), and finally, to the Space 
and Ground Networks of today.
Written from a nontechnical perspec-
tive, the author has translated a highly techni-
cal subject into historical accounts told within 
the framework of the U.S. space program. These 
accounts tell how international goodwill and for-
eign cooperation were crucial to the operation of 
the network and why the space agency chose to 
build the STDN the way it did. More than any-
thing else, the story of NASA’s STDN is about the 
“unsung heroes of the space program.”
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PREFACE
Much of what has been written on the topic of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) tracking and data networks 
has been on the Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s Deep Space Network, the DSN. 
This is perhaps understandable as the DSN has played and continues to play 
a central role in many of America’s most high-profile exploration missions. 
These have included the early Pioneer probes, the Mariner missions of the 
1960s and 1970s, Viking and Voyager, and most recently, Galileo, Cassini-
Huygens, and the new generation of Mars explorers that will prepare the way 
for eventual human voyages to the Red Planet.
The intent of this volume is to present a history of NASA’s “other” 
network, the one established and run by the Goddard Space Flight Center 
(GSFC). The Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network, or STDN, was—in its 
various incarnations throughout the years—the network that tracked the first 
artificial satellites around Earth. It tracked Apollo astronauts to the Moon and 
back. Today, a network based in space called the Space Network, along with a 
much reduced Ground Network, work together to support the United States 
and international partners in all near-Earth space communications and space-
flight activities. The history of the STDN is not unlike a microcosm of the 
history of NASA itself. It spans 50 years. It has seen its share of triumphs and 
tragedies, and it is playing a major role in setting the pace for space exploration 
in the twenty-first century.
When considering sources for this history, the author searched for 
scholarly works that have been published on the subject of NASA’s STDN. 
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There has been some coordinated effort to document NASA’s human space-
flight and near-Earth communications networks throughout the years. Starting 
in the late 1960s, the GSFC saw the need to begin documenting this history. 
From that start, most of the literature on the subject has been independently 
commissioned reports sponsored by the Center itself. 
The seminal work was by William R. Corliss in 1969 called History 
of the Goddard Networks. Corliss updated it five years later, expanding the sub-
ject to the end of the Apollo program. These initial works were relatively 
general, based primarily on secondary research—assimilation of information 
put out by the GSFC in the form of information pamphlets, brochures and 
public affairs news releases.
NASA historian Alfred Rosenthal drafted, in 1983, an unpub-
lished work titled Vital Links: The First 25 Years of NASA’s Space Tracking, 
Communications and Data Acquisition 1958–1983. Vital Links was a new work 
on the subject, taking the timeline up through the early part of the Space 
Shuttle program. A key part of Rosenthal’s work was his interview of some 
20 people whom he identified as principals on the subject. These were not 
formal oral histories but rather, topic-specific statements made by people who 
were major contributors on the STDN over the years. The interviews were 
done in 1982 and 1983 but never published. Many of these people are now 
deceased. The author drew heavily on these interviews and many of the quotes 
are used throughout this book. The draft of Vital Links was turned over to 
the NASA History Division where it is archived. It was a primary reference 
for this work.
In 1992, GSFC published the Contractor Report Keeping Track: 
A History of the GSFC Tracking and Data Acquisition Networks 1957 to 1991.
It was edited by Kathleen M. Mogan and Frank P. Mintz. The report listed 
them as editors rather than coauthors because Keeping Track was, for the most 
part, edited together from Corliss’s 1974 and Rosenthal’s 1983 works. A final 
chapter was added which provided a very brief overview of the STDN in the 
1980s. Mogan and Mintz included excerpts from about half of Rosenthal’s 
interviews at the end of the report in a section called “Personal Views.” They, 
in addition, conduct half a dozen interviews with key network personnel who 
were at Goddard in 1990. The material was then published by the GSFC as 
a reference report where it has circulated since. Copies have also been dis-
tributed to other NASA locations. Therefore, through Rosenthal, Mogan, 
and Mintz, over two dozen people who shaped NASA’s STDN from 1960 
to 1990 were interviewed. This was an invaluable resource. Taken together, 
Vital Links and Keeping Track served as the primary reference, the updating of 
which was an impetus for this book. 
The most important archival materials were undoubtedly the Historical 
Reference Collection at the History Division of NASA Headquarters. There, 
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correspondences and memoranda on the subject were found dating back to 1958. 
Letters between key Administrators and managers like Edmond C. Buckley,
Gerald M. Truszynski, and Ozro M. Covington—early movers of the pro-
gram—explained why certain decisions were made and how they arrived at 
those decisions. Files were found all the way to the present. Organized by 
subject and key words, files addressing a specific topic with regard to the 
Networks were found in the form of Congressional testimonies, news articles, 
technical presentations and photographs. These included those published by 
the Agency over the years as well those from open literature such as newspa-
pers, magazines and professional journal articles. 
Technical briefings and presentations provided to the author by 
NASA was another good source of firsthand information. Most of these came 
from the Office of Space Communications in Washington and some from the 
GSFC. The author also interviewed current and former NASA managers and 
others who worked with the Network, both inside the government and con-
tractors, both U.S. and foreign. They brought unique, personal perspectives 
that answered questions or helped clarify ambiguities uncovered in the course 
of the research. These personal perspectives also provided stories which sim-
ply could not have been found anywhere else. NASA Oral Histories—most 
of which are now available online—provided much insight to this end. They 
complimented, and in certain cases, supplemented the histories obtained from 
other sources. Most of these Oral Histories were conducted by the Agency as 
part of the ongoing Johnson Space Center ( JSC) Oral History Project start-
ed in 1998. Interviews from three groups of people were reviewed: NASA 
Administrators and high level managers, flight controllers and operations per-
sonnel, and astronauts. This produced a broad and diverse set of viewpoints 
from which a story could be weaved together, supplementing the material 
uncovered from other sources.
Books on the subject of tracking networks, space communications, 
space exploration, and political history in general provided good background 
information within which the topic was framed. Even though these gener-
ally lacked the details necessary to delve in-depth into the actual history of 
Networks, they provided the general science and historical background which 
complemented this history, and which in fact, allowed the story to be told 
from a popular point of reference. Other books of a more technical nature 
provided the material needed to explain some of the finer scientific points in 
layman terms.
Transcripts such as Administrator testimonies before Senate and 
House subcommittees and White House letters were examined. The World 
Wide Web provided convenient material, but they required verification from 
other sources. Most could be validated by authenticating or tracing back to the 
original Web site. Those from dubious sources were either not used at all or 
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if used, clarified in more detail in the Endnotes section of this book. Internet 
sites were especially helpful for general historical information on topics such 
as history of a country, the climate of an island, or the evolution of a country’s 
governing body and its political relationship to the United States.
A diverse range of photographs and pictures are included in this book. 
When discussing the topic of tracking stations and communication networks, it is 
easy to fall prey to reproducing pictures of big antennas and buildings page after 
page. After all, those are probably the most prominent components of a ground 
station. Some of those are included. But what paints a more interesting and com-
plete picture are the people involved and the environment that they operated in. 
Therefore, a deliberately chosen mix of seldom before seen photographs along 
with better-known, more frequently reproduced pictures are included.
The history of NASA’s STDN is a 50 year story, from its birth in 
the late 1940s to where it stands today in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. The story is told here from a historical and not a technical point of 
view, although explanatory passages are present when warranted. The author 
hopes that in doing so, the chapters will appeal not only to the trained subject 
expert but also to a lay audience or just the space enthusiast at large who may 
simply have always been curious as to how NASA tracked the Lunar Rover on 
the Moon, for instance.
Since the beginnings of the STDN are inextricably tied to the for-
mation of NASA as America’s civilian space agency, a brief synopsis of how 
the Agency came about—the nuances of which affected how it would oper-
ate its tracking networks for years to come—is included in Chapter 1. For a 
comprehensive look at the establishment of NASA, the author recommends 
starting with NASA’s Origins and the Dawn of the Space Age, Monographs in 
Aerospace History number 10, by David S. F. Portree, 1998.
Similarly, the history of the STDN is tied to the Space Shuttle. 
After the Apollo lunar missions, the Network turned its focus on support-
ing the reusable Shuttle. Much has been written on the history of the Space 
Transportation System (STS), so much so that in 1992, NASA’s History 
Division published a monograph summarizing the vast amount of literature 
on the subject. The reader is encouraged to reference that work for more 
information. (Launius, Roger D. and Gillette, Aaron K., The Space Shuttle: An 
Annotated Bibliography, Monographs in Aerospace History, Number 1, 1992)
Finally, this book does not address the Deep Space Network DSN 
except where it overlaps and affects the STDN. Works on the Deep Space 
Network include A History of the Deep Space Network by William R. Corliss 
from 1976, and the 2001 NASA Project Histories publication SP-2001-4227, 
Uplink-Downlink: A History of the Deep Space Network 1957-1997 by Douglas J. 
Mudgway. The latter work is a very comprehensive description of the DSN 
from a technical perspective. Mudgway followed this volume with a less tech-
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nical but more historical look in his 2005 publication Big Dish. Since it is dif-
ficult to fully segregate the two networks, the following is an overview of the 
DSN which the reader may find beneficial as he or she delves into the history 
of the STDN in the coming chapters. Much of this description can be found 
in the 1989 Jet Propulsion Laboratory publication JPL400-326 Goldstone Deep 
Space Communication Complex:
Scientific investigation of the planets and interplanetary space has 
been carried out for over four decades by NASA mainly through the use of 
automated space probes and robotic vehicles. Although engineered to operate 
independently in the far reaches of space, these intricate and highly autono-
mous craft are dependent upon Earth-based DSN for guidance, control and 
reception of the vast amounts of scientific information they acquire and trans-
mit back to Earth.
NASA’s DSN is today among the largest and most sensitive scientific 
telecommunications and radio navigation networks in the world. Its principal 
responsibilities are to support unmanned planetary missions and radio and radar 
astronomy in the exploration of the solar system and the universe. The DSN is 
managed, directed and operated for NASA by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
( JPL) of the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena, California. It per-
forms several, wide-reaching functions, all relating to the deep space environ-
ment: 1) Receive telemetry signals from space probes; 2) Transmit commands 
that control the spacecraft; 3) Generate radio navigation data to locate and 
guide the spacecraft to their destinations; 4) Perform radio science, radio and 
radar astronomy; 5) Perform highly sensitive Earth geodynamics measurements; 
and 6) Participate in the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence.
The history of the DSN dates back to 1958 when JPL deployed 
three ground communication stations to help receive telemetry and determine 
the orbit of Explorer 1, the first successful American satellite. Before that, 
engineering research into the tracking requirements for lunar and planetary 
spaceflight had been in progress for some time at JPL. Following Explorer 
1, JPL developed a ground communications and navigation network for the 
Pioneer 3 and 4 missions, the first U.S. spacecraft to be launched beyond 
Earth orbit. On 3 December 1958, shortly after the establishment of NASA, 
JPL was officially transferred to the new space agency from the U.S. Army. 
Since then, it has grown with the U.S. space program into a world network 
consisting of 12 deep-space stations located at three communication com-
plexes on three continents: Goldstone in Southern California’s Mojave Desert; at 
Robledo near Madrid, Spain; and at Tidbinbilla on the outskirts of Canberra, 
Australia. These three locations allow the DSN to maintain around-the-clock 
communications with spacecraft traveling anywhere in the solar system.
The network consists of several key components. One is the 
Network Operations Control Center (NOCC), which controls and monitors 
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the three complexes. Located in Pasadena, the NOCC is the operations hub 
for the DSN. Its functions include monitoring operations at the three com-
plexes, validating the performance of the network for spaceflight project users, 
providing information for configuring and controlling the network, and plan-
ning and participating in network testing and mission simulations.
The Ground Communications Facility provides the necessary 
communication circuits that link the complexes to the control center at JPL and 
to the remote flight project centers in the United States and overseas that man-
age and operate the space probes. “Comm” traffic between these places can be 
sent in various ways, such as via land lines, ocean cables, terrestrial microwave, 
and communication satellites. These circuits are leased from commercial carri-
ers by the NASA Integrated Support Network, commonly referred to as 
NISN—jointly managed by the Goddard and Marshall Space Flight Centers—
which provides circuits as needed to all NASA centers and facilities.
The most visible arm of the DSN is of course the three Deep Space 
Communication Complexes that are dominated by a suite of large parabolic 
dish antennas. At each complex are two 34-meter (111-foot) diameter anten-
nas, one 26-meter (85-foot) antenna, and one gigantic 70-meter (230-foot) 
antenna. A centralized Signal Processing Center remotely controls the 70-and 
34-meter antennas, generates and transmits spacecraft commands, and receives 
and processes the spacecraft telemetry. These antennas form separate subnets 
according to their respective sizes, and each subnet has a different communica-
tion capability. For example, the 70-meter antenna subnet—which is the most 
sensitive—supports deep space missions while the 26-meter subnet supports 
spacecraft in near-Earth orbit. The two 34-meter antenna subnets support both 
types of missions.
The 26-meter systems were originally part of the Goddard STDN. 
They were consolidated into the DSN in 1985. The merger led to significant 
operational efficiencies by consolidating like maintenance, operations, and 
field support activities for tracking stations located geographically close to 
each other. From a mission’s perspective, it also allowed the DSN to now track 
spacecraft in highly elliptical, high apogee Earth orbits.
In the United States, the DSN is staffed by JPL personnel, assisted 
by contractor engineers and technicians who are primarily responsible for 
operating and maintaining the Goldstone complex, the NOCC and the 
Ground Communications Facility. The two overseas complexes are operated 
entirely by the local government agency (the National Institute of Aerospace 
Technology, or INTA, in Spain and the Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organization, or CSIRO, in Australia) and their contrac-
tors under NASA funding. The international staff totals over 1,000 people.
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Since its beginning, the DSN has provided principal tracking, telem-
etry, and command (TT&C) support for every unmanned lunar and planetary 
spacecraft that NASA has launched (plus secondary support on Apollo). The 
resumé is quite impressive. Moon exploration began with the Pioneer 3 and 
4 probes in 1958 and 1959. This was followed in the 1960s by the Ranger 1 
through 9 lunar television missions (1961–1965); the Lunar Orbiter 1 through 
5 photographic surveys for Apollo landing sites (1966–1967); and Surveyor 
1 through 7 lunar landers (1966–1968). Support for inner-planet explora-
tion began in 1962 with JPL’s Mariner series of missions to Venus, Mars and 
Mercury that encompassed six planetary flybys and the first planetary orbiter 
around Mars in 1971. Concurrent with these Mariner flights were the NASA 
Ames Research Center Pioneer missions, Pioneer 6 through 9 between 1965 
and 1968. Mars exploration culminated in 1975 with the much-heralded land-
ings of Viking 1 and 2.
The first JPL probe to explore the outer planets was Pioneer 10,
which flew by Jupiter in 1973. Six years later, Pioneer 11 became the first 
spacecraft to flyby Saturn. Two Voyager probes performed a grand tour of 
the outer planets following their launch in 1977, passing Jupiter in 1979 and 
Saturn in 1980 and 1981. Voyager 2 then went on to make close approaches 
to the seventh planet, Uranus, in 1986 and three years later Neptune. In both 
cases, stunning close-up photographs of these distant planets were beamed 
back to Earth. They are now far beyond Pluto’s orbit and astronomers antici-
pate they will venture beyond our known solar system in the next few years.
More recently, the DSN is supporting the Cassini-Huygens mis-
sion, exploring Saturn and its largest moon Titan. The latter is one of the 
most intriguing objects in the entire solar system. The second largest of any 
of the planetary moons (only Jupiter’s Ganymede is larger), Titan is actually 
larger than Mercury and Pluto. It, in fact, has a planet-like atmosphere which 
is denser than those of Mercury, Earth, Mars, and Pluto. Composed predomi-
nantly of nitrogen with other hydrocarbon compounds, such elements are the 
essential building blocks for amino acids necessary for the formation of life. 
This has led some scientists to postulate that Titan’s environment may be sim-
ilar to that of Earth before life began putting oxygen into the atmosphere.
Finally, the DSN is once again supporting new NASA missions 
to our nearest planetary neighbor, this time with the Mars Reconnaissance 
Orbiter along with the Spirit and Opportunity robotic rovers. This is a pre-
lude to eventual human exploration of the planet that is slated for the 2030 
to 2040 timeframe. Pluto remains the only planet (dwarf planet) not having 
been visited by a manmade spacecraft. But that will change by the year 2015 
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as the New Horizons spacecraft—launched on 19 January 2006—is sched-
uled to encounter our solar system’s most distant planet. It will then make 
an extensive study of as many Kuiper Belt objects as it can, a mysterious disk 
shaped zone beyond Neptune containing thousands of planetary-like objects, 
before permanently leaving the confines of the solar system to travel into 
interstellar space.1
FOREWORD
“Invisible” is an adjective often used to describe NASA’s space 
communications and tracking programs. Behind this is the implicit charac-
terization of the associated systems as collectively providing “infrastructure:” 
necessary support capabilities essential to the achievement of primary objec-
tives. Infrastructures are by nature seldom noticed, with recognition nor-
mally reserved for those unfortunate occasions when it falls short and limits 
accomplishment of desired objectives. 
The electronic highways linking orbiting spacecraft with their 
associated control and information handling capabilities on Earth were (and 
remain) absolutely essential to the spectacular successes of NASA’s space pro-
grams. Yet many, commonly including the spaceflight programs themselves, 
take the existence and performance of NASA’s communications and tracking 
infrastructure for granted. The thousands of dedicated and capable people 
who have devoted much of their careers to making this capability a success for 
nearly five decades understand and accept the fact that their success is mea-
sured by remaining invisible.
Those of us who have participated in this program are proud of 
our individual contributions and collective accomplishments, and greatly wel-
come this history being documented. We also hope a broader understanding 
of the unique challenges we faced, and of our solutions for these challenges, 
will prove helpful to those blazing similar new trails.
Infrastructures are notoriously tricky to manage, due in large part 
to funding issues associated with “taken for granted” resources. Customers, 
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or users, of infrastructure assets and capabilities are usually detached from 
capital, operating and maintenance funding concerns, and seldom get excited 
about contributing! Those managing NASA’s space communications program 
very successfully surmounted these challenges.
Supplying NASA’s communications and tracking infrastructure 
also presented unique challenges. Unlike more traditional infrastructures such 
as roads and bridges that rely on established technologies, the technologies 
needed for space communications and information handling were in their 
infancy and needed to be appreciably advanced. NASA’s leaders had to antici-
pate the direction and pace of the underlying technologies—predicting future 
capabilities, risks, and costs. 
This evolving technology added yet another challenge: vaguely 
defined requirements. As these same technologies were integral to the devel-
opment of user spacecraft and instrumentation, the development period for 
providing new space communications and tracking capabilities has been com-
parable to the design periods for its customers’ spacecraft. The net result was 
that the tracking and data organization needed to evolve its enabling capabili-
ties in advance of having defined user requirements. 
The early leaders of NASA’s space communications program 
deserve special recognition for their success under these conditions. In ret-
rospect, they were extremely successful, synergistically integrating NASA’s 
needs with those of the broader society. The tremendous advances in com-
munications and information handling experienced over the four decades of 
NASA’s space program were not coincidental. It is quite a tribute to early lead-
ers such as Edmond Buckley and Gerald Truszynski that essential tracking and 
data capabilities have been there when needed, enabling NASA’s impressive 
accomplishments!
A general characterization of NASA’s space communications orga-
nization may help explain the associated program. This program relied heav-
ily on support service contractors—people with needed skills provided under 
level-of-effort contracts—along with foreign nationals at overseas stations. 
Contracts were usually competitively awarded. The direct use of U.S. govern-
ment civil service personnel was quite limited. Although numbers varied over 
the years, in general (prior to the 1996 reorganization) only about 1 percent 
of program personnel were civil service personnel at NASA Headquarters. 
About 10 percent were civil service (or corresponding JPL employees) at the 
Field Centers—primarily GSFC and JPL—and approximately 90 percent 
were support contractors reporting to the Field Centers. 
The focus of the program was operations, and images of control 
rooms crowded with consoles suggest a large staff directly participating in 
operations. The reality is that only a small percentage of the people occu-
pied console positions. The majority were devoted to supporting roles—plan-
Foreword xix
ning and scheduling, maintenance, logistics, preparing to meet new mission 
requirements, management, and overhead duties.
As demonstrated by results, NASA has successfully and cost-effectively 
met the space communications needs of the Agency’s ambitious space programs 
throughout its history. This did not happen by accident, but was effectively 
orchestrated by leaders grasping both the needs and possibilities. Regrettably 
slighting numerous dedicated people who made significant and vital contri-
butions to NASA’s space communications program over the years, I mention 
three leaders whom I feel merit special recognition: Edmond C. Buckley at 
Headquarters, Ozro M. Covington at Goddard, and Murray T. Weingarten at 
Bendix. Not just very competent managers, they were leaders—able to envi-
sion future possibilities and inspire others, especially subordinates, to pursue 
their visions. Personally, I feel very fortunate to have been able to work with 
and learn from them. 
From NASA’s establishment in 1958, Edmond Buckley headed 
NASA’s network operations at Headquarters. As described in this history, 
Buckley’s approach of consolidating management and funding in a single 
organization reporting directly to the Administrator prevailed. This feat 
must be recognized in the context of convincing very competent, territo-
rial-minded peers to agree his approach would best serve NASA. NASA’s 
networks—STADAN, MSFN and DSN—were consolidated under him to 
form the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition (OTDA) in November 
1961. Consolidating tracking and data activities also took better advantage of 
the limited pool of personnel knowledgeable of relevant technologies. 
NASA’s Centers have notoriously acted as independent fiefdoms, the 
drumbeat of “one NASA” periodically coming from various Administrators 
notwithstanding. Many at the Manned Spacecraft Center (renamed Johnson 
Space Center in 1973) especially resented GSFC being given responsibility 
for the Manned Space Flight Network. Ozzie Covington deserves special 
recognition for developing a cooperative relationship between Goddard and 
JSC, and especially with Chris Kraft, during the Apollo era. Ozzie strongly 
promoted a culture in which JSC was recognized as the MSFN’s customer. 
Although this legacy was lost in later years, one must not underestimate its 
contribution to Apollo’s successes.
Similarly, by force of his personality Murray Weingarten created a 
cooperative and professional relationship with NASA as his customer. Murray 
was especially attentive and responsive to changes in NASA’s needs. BFEC was a 
dominant contractor in the early days of the Network, and its culture permeated 
much of the contractor community. After Murray departed and BFEC owner-
ship transitioned to Allied Signal and then Honeywell, the contractual relation-
ship with NASA became especially bottom-line oriented and more contentious. 
Again, the program had been well served by Murray’s contributions. 
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Although much of the history of NASA’s Spaceflight Tracking 
and Data Network focuses on the execution of the program, primarily by 
GSFC and its contractors, NASA Headquarters was also a key participant. 
Headquarters not only provided leadership within the Agency, but was also 
responsible for external coordination, program advocacy and—especially 
essential—securing needed funding. Thus, the history of the Headquarters 
component is inextricably intertwined in the history of the program.
NASA Headquarters normally has had only a half-dozen or so 
Program Offices—offices responsible for funding and executing Agency pro-
grams—with OTDA/OSC (Code T/O) being one. In 1990 the Associate 
Administrator for Space Operations (Code O) was designated as fifth in line 
of succession to the Administrator.1 The roles and responsibilities of most 
Headquarters Program Offices changed over the years, but that of OTDA/
OSC remained largely unchanged until 1996, organizational name changes 
notwithstanding. 
For example, a post-Challenger organization review headed by 
Sam Phillips observed that ongoing operations were fundamentally differ-
ent than occasional operations done as part of an R&D program. Phillips 
recommended NASA recognize differences, and manage operations in an 
organization experienced with continuing operational activities even while 
evolving in response to multiple changing requirements, technical upgrades, 
and continual maintenance. NASA’s only organization experienced with 
such continual operational activity was OTDA (Code T), and in response to 
the Phillips’ recommendation NASA renamed OTDA as the Office of Space 
Operations (Code O)—in preparation for moving all on-going operational 
activities, including STS operations, into this new organization.
However, the Shuttle program had no intention of transferring its 
operations to Code O—whatever its name—and Space Operations was in real-
ity only a continuation of OTDA. Thus Code T became Code O in the mid 
1980’s, with essentially no change in its roles and responsibilities. It was again 
renamed in 1990, this time as the Office of Space Communications (OSC).
Gerald Truszynski, who followed Buckley as OTDA Associate 
Administrator in 1968, was equally capable and continued Buckley’s philoso-
phies for another decade. Truszynski very eloquently described the impor-
tance of Buckley’s approach during an interview with Alfred Rosenthal in 
1982. This interview is included herein (in Chapter 9), and the reader’s atten-
tion is especially directed to it.
This structure endured and served NASA well for thirty-five years, 
cost-effectively providing the similar communications services necessary to 
the conduct of most agency missions. By understanding this fast-changing 
technology and the evolving industry associated with it, OSC has successfully 
delivered these essential services at costs which have decreased almost linearly 
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from some 10 percent of the Agency appropriation down to about 5 percent 
over the first three decades.
History has repeatedly shown that societies are far more success-
ful at adapting technologies developed for other purposes for general benefit, 
often military, than in envisioning these broader purposes first. For example, 
the Romans first paved roads for military purposes to be able to control the 
empire with a smaller army by being able to redeploy it rapidly. The signifi-
cant boost to commerce of being able to rapidly move goods and services to 
distant markets over these paved roads was totally unanticipated. 
Located at the intersection of the infant computing and communica-
tions technologies, NASA’s space communications needs drove many commu-
nications and information handling advances—advances which have since been 
widely adapted, changing our daily lives extensively. NASA’s leadership was 
not only in identifying needs and advancing necessary technologies, but also in 
knowing when to back off and capitalize on industry-funded advances. 
A characteristic of synergistic relationships: it is seldom possible 
to isolate and credit contributions of individual participants. Advances are 
a collective product of all. As noted in Chapter 9, OSC’s participation in 
advancing relevant technologies has served NASA and the nation very well. 
For example, global communications by satellite became a reality when it 
did partly because my predecessors chose to become anchor tenants, rather 
than providing a NASA infrastructure. Enabling capabilities such as the DSN 
64-meter antennas and TDRSS came on-line ahead of defined requirements. 
TDRSS was implemented as a cost-effective alternative to expanding the 
ground stations to meet STS requirements, but greatly increased productivity 
of low-Earth orbiting science programs by enabling essentially “any-time” 
communications. 
TDRSS was an early user of a technique for spectrum sharing, 
enabling simultaneous support of several spacecraft transmitting on a com-
mon frequency. This technique (Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum Code 
Division Multiple Access, or DSSS CDMA) now enables every teen and his 
or her parents in the United States to have their own cell phone. CDMA has 
now evolved to become essential in the U.S., and NASA’s early role in foster-
ing CDMA was substantial. (A different sharing technique is used in other 
parts of the world.)
The globe-spanning nature of NASA’s tracking and communica-
tions activities led the program to develop relationships with counterparts 
internationally. For example, OSC-led delegations visited Soviet tracking sta-
tions in Eupatoria (Yevpatoria, on the shores of the Black Sea) and Ussuriysk 
(near Vladivostok) even before the Soviet Union collapsed. Such experiences 
both facilitated international understanding in themselves, and provided expe-
rience and models later adopted for broader space relationships. 
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Other allied responsibilities, such as spectrum management, were 
also vested in OTDA. Radio spectrum is a finite natural resource, spawn-
ing increasingly fierce battles over allocations as technology greatly expands 
utility. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) had been estab-
lished in 1865, and recognizing radio waves do not respect political boundar-
ies expanded its charter to include allocating radio spectrum globally in 1927. 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) serves a similar role for 
U.S. domestic commercial uses, while the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA) coordinates U.S. government uses.
OTDA was designated NASA’s spectrum management represen-
tative, routinely participating in government, commercial and international 
forums seeking equitable allocation of this resource. The Lewis (now Glenn) 
Research Center in Ohio has been NASA’s center of expertise for this very 
specialized activity. An example of NASA’s contributions: OSC played a major 
role in obtaining the international spectrum authorizations for commercial 
low-Earth orbit satellites at the World Administrative Radio Conference in 
Spain in 1992, invaluable to the commercial communications industry. 
The world’s space agencies understood that the use of standard-
ized approaches for handling space data would be beneficial to all. A pri-
mary objective of standards is to reduce costs and enable interoperability by 
adopting compatible systems and procedures. Although space data formats 
were somewhat similar, the standards activity for space data is more complex, 
involving designing or adopting systems and procedures that can utilize these 
standardized data formats. 
On its own initiative, NASA OTDA became a founding member of 
the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS), which is now 
supported by more than 30 space agencies and their associated industrial bases 
distributed across the world space community. Acting as a technical arm of 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), CCSDS generates 
world standards in the field of space data and information transfer systems. 
In recent years, NASA has sought to play an anchor tenant role and 
facilitate development of private, commercialized remote tracking and commu-
nications assets. Success has been limited, as a major commercial space industry 
has yet to materialize. But even in the absence of significant private revenues, 
costs have been reduced by sharing assets with other space agencies.
A less appreciated element of President Kennedy’s challenge to send 
humans to the Moon and back was his rapid time scale: “before this decade 
is out.” Not only did this schedule add an inspiring sense of urgency for the 
Agency, it also saved costs! Had he said “two decades,” the cost of the endeavor 
would undoubtedly have doubled. However, this also spawned a culture of 
“technical excellence at any cost,” an attitude extending well beyond priori-
ties such as human flight crew safety.
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Although many STDN contracts included incentives, these incen-
tives were primarily used to reward technical performance, and occasionally, 
for meeting schedules. Seldom have they been used to motivate cost sav-
ings. In my view, failure to develop an effective means to balance contract 
performance with costs throughout the program has been a shortcoming of 
OTDA/OSC leadership. Adequate funding was generally obtained, and con-
trols to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse were effective. But stewardship of 
public funds could have been improved by adopting lower cost approaches.
Progress towards reducing costs was steady but neither smooth nor 
assured, with social challenges greatly dominating technical ones. Although 
early on the STDN program was on the leading edge of relevant technolo-
gies, the program was often surprisingly slow keeping pace with these fast 
changing technologies. For example, NASA was not only one of the first cus-
tomers for IBM’s “big iron” mainframe computers, it was also one of the last 
mainframe customers as the world moved on to powerful mini-computers, 
workstations and desktop computers. Altruistically, program managers were 
hesitant to change from ways that had proven successful. 
Other factors certainly came into play. Mid-level civil service man-
agers often equated their own importance to the size of their budgets, and 
in turn the size of “their” support contractor staff. Some contractors were 
particularly effective resisting changes. As they generally held “level of effort” 
contracts, adopting more efficient systems and streamlining operations would 
reduce the size (and revenues) of their contracts. I certainly recall contractors 
making end-runs to influential members of NASA’s appropriations commit-
tees in Congress with greatly exaggerated stories of how many voters’ jobs 
could be adversely affected by proposed changes.
The “contractor marching army” working new mission needs also 
had an insidious side: these people were basically inventors, and often tended 
to invent new solutions rather than adapt old approaches or increasingly avail-
able commercial alternatives.
The point is that constraints on modernizing and streamlining were 
much more complex than simply taking advantage of advancing technology to 
reduce costs. Obtaining capital funding for modernization was only a minor 
impediment. There were two ways to view progress in this environment. On 
the plus side, operating costs have been continually reduced even while output 
metrics increased substantially. On the other hand, technology offered addi-
tional cost savings opportunities, accompanied by improved operational per-
formance from streamlining and modernizing the systems architecture. OSC 
pressures to do better resulted in acrimonious relations between Headquarters 
and the GSFC/contractor communities.
OSC fell into a trap that plagues many confronting change—not 
appreciating the full dimensions of inertia and resistance. Technically edu-
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cated managers naivély assume the predictable behavior of the laws of physics 
also apply in the arena of human behavior. When egos, profits, and even jobs 
are threatened with change, resistance can be formidable.
In 1995, NASA sought more effective ways to operate, rejecting 
Buckley’s model in favor of a “new” management and funding arrangement. 
As described in Chapter 8, OSC responded unreservedly to this call, and 
prepared to shift major responsibilities to JSC and a newly created office: 
SOMO (Space Operations Management Office). Operating costs had already 
been reduced by one-third over the first five years of the 1990s, even while 
output metrics such as the number of passes supported and data delivered 
had more than doubled as NASA’s spaceflight programs grew rapidly. By 
early 1996 the OSC organization had been reduced substantially. After I 
retired, OSC was abolished, with management and funding fractionated 
across Headquarters. 
Certainly money factored into this excursion—it is easy to idealis-
tically underestimate effort needed to successfully provide “invisible” services 
and conclude doing better is a “slam dunk.” The SOMO staff was extremely 
naïve as to the challenges of managing the space communications program, 
but little interested considering old ways. The consolidated contracting struc-
ture which became CSOC (Consolidated Space Operations Contract) was 
advocated directly to the Administrator by a contractor very familiar with the 
space communications program. 
This recommendation was that by consolidating all contracts into 
a single large contract and giving the contractor overall responsibility, NASA 
could save $1.4-billion. One can only speculate as to why a contractor very 
aware of the dynamic nature of STDN support requirements—space missions 
lasting past projected lifetimes, launch delays, spacecraft degradations—would 
recommended an approach certain to result, as it did, in massive, cost-increasing
change orders. 
In retrospect this excursion was ill-conceived and short-lived, with 
SOMO and CSOC lasting barely five years, and the old structure restored 
within a decade. Generally, performance suffered and cost savings failed to 
materialize. Undoubtedly a major factor in the SOMO/CSOC fiasco was the 
same failure to comprehend the full nature of change that had initially plagued 
OSC. In October 2006 NASA restored Buckley’s organization and funding 
structure, although reporting in at a slightly lower organizational level—a de 
facto reaffirmation of Buckley’s wisdom a half century earlier. 
An independent review of NASA’s space communications program 
by the National Research Council in 20062, in explicitly addressing the SOMO/
CSOC excursion, recommended future major realignments in top-level man-
agement, funding and contracting structures be preceded by a transition plan 
outlining objectives, ensuring past corporate knowledge is considered. 
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The bottom line: as I am quoted herein, I believe our nation has 
been well served by the STDN program. Not only have all mission support 
requirements been met, but advanced enabling capabilities have been there 
when needed. Being at the juncture of communications and computing tech-
nologies, the program has played an influential role their amazing advances 
over the past half-century—benefiting all. Our performance, speaking from a 
Headquarters perspective, has not been perfect; the primary shortcoming has 
been failure to appreciate social impacts of changes, and effectively counteract 
resistance to streamline, modernize, and reduce costs even further.
I am especially pleased to see this history documented, and con-
gratulate both the NASA History Division and the author for an excellent, 
objective, and scholarly work. Well done! 
Charles T. Force
February 2007
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INTRODUCTION
INVISIBLE NETWORK
Capcom: 3, 2, 1, 0.
00 00 03 Glenn:  Roger. The clock is operating. We’re underway.
00 00 07 Capcom:  Hear loud and clear.
00 00 08 Glenn:  Roger. We’re programming in roll okay . . . Little 
bumpy along about here.
00 00 16 Capcom:  Roger. Standby for 20 seconds.
00 00 19 Glenn:  Roger.
00 00 20 Capcom:  2, 1, mark.
00 00 23 Glenn:  Roger. Backup clock is started . . . Fuel 102-101, oxy-
gen 78-100, amps 27.
00 00 39 Capcom:  Roger. Loud and clear. Flight path is good, 69.
00 00 43 Glenn:  Roger. Checks okay. Mine was 70 on your mark . . . 
Have some vibration area coming up here now.
00 00 52 Capcom:  Roger. Reading you loud and clear.
00 00 55 Glenn:  Roger. Coming into high Q a little bit; and a little con-
trail went by the window or something there.
00 01 00 Capcom:  Roger.
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00 01 03 Glenn:  Fuel 102-101, oxygen 78-101, amps 24. Still okay. 
We’re smoothing out some now, getting out of the 
vibration area.
00 01 16 Capcom:  Roger. You’re through max Q. Your flight path is . . . 
00 01 19 Glenn:  Roger. Feels good, through max Q and smoothing out 
real fine . . . Cabin pressure coming down by 7.0; okay; 
flight very smooth now . . . Sky looking very dark out-
side . . . Cabin pressure is holding at 6.1 okay.
00 01 46 Capcom:  Roger. Cabin pressure holding at 6.1.
00 01 49 Glenn:  Roger. Have had some oscillations, but they seem to be 
damping out okay now. Coming up on two minutes, 
and fuel is 102-101, oxygen 78-102. The g’s are build-
ing to 6.
00 02 07 Capcom:  Roger. Reading you loud and clear. Flight path looked 
good. Pitch 25. Standby for . . . 
00 02 12 Glenn:  Roger. BECO, back to 1.25 g’s. The tower fired; 
could not see the tower go. I saw the smoke go by the 
window.
00 02 21 Capcom:  Roger. We confirm staging on TM.
00 02 24 Glenn:  Roger . . . Still have about 1.5 g’s. Programming. Over . . . 
There the tower went right then. Have the tower in sight 
way out. Could see the tower go. Jettison tower is green.
00 02 48 Capcom:  Roger.
00 02 50 Glenn:  1.5 g’s.
00 02 53 Capcom:  Roger, Seven. Still reading you loud and clear. Flight 
path looks good.
00 02 56 Glenn:  Roger. Auto Retro-Jettison is off; Emergency Retro-
Jettison Fuse switch, off; Retro-Jettison Fuse switch, off.
00 03 03 Glenn: UHF/DF to normal.
00 03 19 Capcom:  Flight path looks good; steering is good.
00 03 22 Glenn:  Roger. Understand everything looks good; g’s starting 
to build again a little bit.
00 03 30 Capcom: Roger.
00 03 32 Capcom: Friendship Seven. Bermuda has you.
00 03 34 Glenn:  Roger. Bermuda standby . . . This is Friendship Seven. 
Fuel 103-101, oxygen 78-100. All voltages above 25, 
amps 26.
00 03 48 Capcom:  Roger. Still reading you loud and clear. Flight path is 
very good. Pitch -3.
00 03 53 Glenn:  Roger . . . My pitch checks a -7 on your -3.
00 04 00 Capcom: Roger, Seven.
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00 04 08 Glenn:  Friendship Seven. Fuel 103-101, oxygen 78-100, amps 
25, cabin pressure holding at 5.8.
00 04 20 Capcom:  Roger. Reading you loud and clear. Seven, Cape is Go; 
we’re standing by for you.
00 04 25 Glenn:  Roger. Cape is Go and I am Go. Capsule is in good 
shape. Fuel 103-102, oxygen 78-100, cabin pressure 
holding steady at 5.8, amps is 26. All systems are Go.
00 04 44 Capcom: Roger. 20 seconds to SECO.
00 04 47 Glenn: Roger . . . Indicating 6 g’s . . . Say again.
00 04 53 Capcom: Still looks good.
00 04 54 Glenn: Roger . . . SECO, posigrades fired okay.
00 05 10 Capcom: Roger, stand . . . 
00 05 12 Glenn:  Roger. Zero-g and I feel fine. Capsule is turning around 
. . . Oh, that view is tremendous!
00 05 21 Capcom: Roger. Turnaround has started.
00 05 23 Glenn:  Roger. The capsule is turning around and I can see 
the booster during turnaround just a couple of hundred 
yards behind me. It was beautiful.
00 05 30 Capcom:  Roger, Seven. You have a go, at least 7 orbits.
00 05 35 Glenn:  Roger. Understand Go for at least 7 orbits . . . This is 
Friendship Seven. Can see clear back; a big cloud pattern 
way back across towards the Cape. Beautiful sight.
00 05 54 Capcom:  Roger, still reading you loud and clear. Next transmis-
sion, Bermuda.
00 05 58 Glenn: Roger. Understand next transmission, Bermuda . . . 1
Bermuda, Canary Island, Kano, Zanzibar. The list goes on: Muchea, 
Woomera, Canton Island, Guaymas. Reading like a who’s who from National 
Geographic, these obscure spots from around the world became astronaut 
John H. Glenn, Jr.’s only links back to Earth on that historic day in 1962 as he 
circled the globe at 27,350 kilometers per hour (17,000 miles per hour) inside 
Friendship 7. Completing an orbit every 90-minutes, ground stations that the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had constructed at 
these and other places around the world anxiously tracked the progress of 
Glenn in his tiny, Mercury capsule. Not unlike runners in a relay, as Friendship 
7 passed from station to station, each Capsule Communicator—known as 
Capcom—handed him off to a waiting colleague down the line.
Even though the momentous flight of 20 February 1962 lasted only 
4 hours and 55 minutes, the United States had prepared for it since before 
NASA even opened its doors as America’s space agency some three and a half 
years earlier. By the time Glenn became the first American in orbit, NASA 
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had in fact already established no less than 30 ground stations on five conti-
nents and several islands, along with ships in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific 
oceans. At the time, about half of these stations were devoted to tracking sci-
ence and application satellites while the other half played a unique role in the 
then-burgeoning arena of human spaceflight, an arena which seven years later, 
would culminate with mankind’s first steps on the Moon.
Connected by over two million circuit miles of land and ocean-
floor cables, America’s spaceflight network spanned just about every corner of 
the globe, from desolate volcanic atolls like Ascension Island to metropolitan, 
capital cities like Madrid and Canberra.2 In the United States, stations could 
be found spanning the cold north of Alaska to the lush hillsides of North 
Carolina. Like the deep-sea diver who relies on his harness and cable to com-
municate with and find his way back to the mother ship, NASA’s spaceflight 
tracking and data network was—and is—that electronic link to the satellites, 
spacecraft, and astronauts in space.
More than that, it is also an electronic link to the past.
Through the ages, communications have been the key to discovery. 
Whether by foot messengers or highspeed electronics, communications have 
been essential to the exploration of new frontiers. Take the 1960s, for exam-
ple, where radio communication with probes preceded man to the Moon. 
Regardless of how sophisticated it may be, no spacecraft is of any value unless 
it can be tracked accurately to determine where it is and how it is performing. 
Only in doing so can the data it is collecting—whether pictures of celestial 
objects or television broadcast signals—be transmitted, received and used on 
the ground. This data, reduced into useful information by computers and 
electronics on the ground, enable the user here on Earth to analyze data from 
space. In the case of human spaceflight, the stakes are much higher. A failed 
communications link potentially compromises not just the success of a mis-
sion but also puts the lives of astronauts at greater risk.
These electronic downlinks—called telemetry—carry everything 
from astronauts’ pulse-rate to so-called “housekeeping” data, which give an 
indication of the health and status of the spacecraft. Conversely, uplinks trans-
mit commands from mission controllers, scientists and engineers up to the 
spacecraft. These radio frequency or RF links bridge the expanse of space, 
tying the spacecraft and Earth to each other. Without tracking, telemetry, 
command, and control, satellites would merely be inanimate objects in space 
and astronauts would be beyond the reach of the thousands who support their 
mission back on the ground.3
William C. Schneider, NASA’s former Associate Administrator for 
Tracking and Data Systems from 1978 to 1980, commented on the vital role 
that space communications played, for example, during tense moments on 
Apollo. “Very few people really understand and appreciate the importance of 
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reliable tracking and communications to all of NASA’s programs, particularly 
when it comes to manned missions. Sitting in Mission Control in Houston 
during a lunar flight, there was a communications blackout when the space-
craft was behind the Moon. This also happened to be a period when the 
spacecraft has to fire its engines to start its descent to the lunar surface. Not 
having communications during this critical phase made us all feel very ner-
vous and anxious, and the relief, when the capsule was able to confirm that all 
was well, was almost indescribable.”4
In the early days of space exploration, prominent engineers, sci-
entists, and astronauts were certainly at the forefront of public attention and 
acclaim. These professionals in a way became the new Magellans and the 
new Columbuses, the new breed of modern-day explorers and map makers. 
Instead of crossing oceans at the mercy of the wind, astronauts now traveled 
the vast expanse of space in craft designed by engineers. Whether a mission 
was the flight of a communications satellite or the exciting journey of an 
astronaut, all were supported by a unique team of men and women on vir-
tually every continent who operated an intricate system of ground stations, 
computer facilities, and communication centers. These, tied together, made 
up NASA’s Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN).
John T. Mengel, one of the “founding fathers” of America’s 
spaceflight tracking networks, once commented on this behind-the-scenes 
criticality: 
True, tracking and data acquisition were support functions, but 
this support, going back to the early days of the space effort, was 
critical to success in the competition-charged arena of the sixties 
and seventies, when the ability of the United States to succeed in 
the field of space travel and space research was being questioned. 
We proved it could be done.5
To operate a network, teamwork and cooperation were essential. 
This was true not just for those working at a station on some remote island but 
also on the much larger, agency-to-agency level. For instance, over the years, 
cooperation among the triad of NASA, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
and the Department of State, has been crucial. To NASA, the Air Force, with 
its launch facilities and worldwide network of radar installations, was a huge 
asset. Help from the Navy was important too, providing tracking and recov-
ery ships in all three major oceans. However, like most big projects where 
different organizations have to depend on each other to get the job done, the 
NASA/DOD cooperative was not without its share of problems. One example 
was that the space agency’s desire to work with the Air Force was tempered 
sometimes by the fear that the DOD might try to “elbow in” on the fledgling 
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Agency’s new, and in many ways, more glamorous programs. Congress, too, 
was sensitive to the NASA/DOD relationship. Questions about duplication 
of facilities, for instance, often came up during budget discussions. Influential 
members on the Hill played the role of watchdogs to make sure that NASA 
remained true to its civilian charter. Despite constant budget and political 
battles, Congress, nevertheless, generally understood that NASA and other 
government offices simply had to work closely together in order for America 
to succeed in space. 
To maintain communications with an orbiting spacecraft, a track-
ing network has to be global in nature. Therefore, international cooperation 
is not only important but absolutely necessary in getting stations established at 
optimal locations around the world. Whether dealing with strong allies like 
Australia and Great Britain or venturing deep into Africa for the first time, the 
role of the State Department was indispensable as a facilitator to help the space 
agency intermediate discussions at the highest levels of government. With this 
liaison, officials could more effectively manage NASA operations in the face 
of geopolitical unrest around the world. For example, during the pioneering 
flights of Project Mercury, the Guaymas tracking station in Mexico often had 
to be surrounded by troops to protect it against unruly mobs espousing anti-
U.S. sentiment.6
The diff erent persuasions of different governments sometimes 
require delicate diplomacy on the part of the United States. In particular, the 
ability to cater to the sensitivities of diverse cultures is important. NASA has 
found that the single, best way to accomplish this is to invite foreign nationals 
to join in the operation of the tracking network, providing them with a sense 
Edmond C. Buckley was NASA’s ﬁrst 
Associate Administrator for Tracking 
and Data Acquisition, leading the new 
Ofﬁce of Tracking and Data Acquisition 
(OTDA) at Headquarters from 1961 to 
1968. In this role, Buckley dealt directly 
with Congress, the DOD and the State 
Department to oversee the space agen-
cy’s tracking needs. Prior to becoming 
the Associate Administrator, Buckley 
was NASA’s Assistant Director for 
Space Flight Operations. (Rensselaer 
Polytechnic Institute photograph, 
copy in Folder 10/1/1 NASA Australian 
Operations Ofﬁce, Yarralumla, ACT)
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of ownership to become partners in the space effort. This “nationalizing of the 
stations” from the early days of the network would leave an indelible legacy 
around the world that continues even today.
Such international cooperation could in fact make or break a sta-
tion. Putting a site in Havana, Cuba in the late 1950s presented a volatile situ-
ation. Conversely, other places such as Australia—where as many as 10 sites 
were active during the 1960s—enthusiastically embraced the opportunity 
to participate in this new frontier, adopting the American space program as 
their own. Australia’s Parkes Observatory was selected by NASA (with great 
national fanfare), to help receive the Apollo 11 moonwalk telemetry. Indeed, 
the Canberra Deep Space Communication Complex (CDSCC) on the out-
skirts of the Australian capital remains active to this day as part of NASA’s 
DSN. In fact, the 85-foot antenna at nearby Honeysuckle Creek (HSK) that 
actually received video of Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin’s first steps on the 
Moon is still used at the CDSCC in Tidbinbilla, having been moved from 
The 85-foot tracking 
antenna which received 
signals of mankind’s 
ﬁrst steps on the Moon 
on 24 July, 1969 still 
operates today at 
the Canberra Deep 
Space Communication 
Complex in Tidbinbilla, 
Australia. The antenna 
was moved from its 
original Honeysuckle 
Creek site some 30 
kilometers (20 miles) 
away in 1985. Clearly 
visible are the two large 
yokes which allow the 
antenna to be moved 
in two “X-Y” axes as 
it tracks a spacecraft. 
(Photograph by the 
author)
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HSK when it closed in 1984. The years have not changed this. International 
cooperation is just as vital today as it was then, as the space agency routinely 
works with the Europeans, Russians and Japanese on a diverse range of pro-
grams including the International Space Station, Earth science research, and 
planning of future space communication needs.
As much as the story of NASA’s spaceflight tracking networks is 
about the stations and the technologies, it ultimately boils down to the individ-
uals, the workers in the trenches who made it happen. From Administrators, 
to Station Directors, to the teams of contractors, all did their jobs because they 
believed in it and put their hearts into it. Even though space is often associated 
with “high-tech,” it is still the people involved who were movers of the pro-
gram, who ran the day-to-day operations of the facilities, and who left behind 
their legacy. This emphasis on people especially characterized the early years 
of the Agency’s tracking networks. There were no notebook computers in 
1957 when the first satellites were launched. In fact, there were no digital 
computers of any kind. Instead of clicking on a “mouse” to retrieve data, 
technicians would interrogate lines drawn on graph paper from mechanical 
strip chart recorders. Whether one was the head of a station or just feeding 
teletype printouts to the engineers, everyone had a job to do.
While those working with the communication networks of today 
certainly get their share of excitement, those who were around for the early 
human flights and satellite launches fondly remember the “glory days.” As one 
former official at the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recalled:
I didn’t geographically know the world then in the detail I do 
today. Not only was it educational and exciting just to learn the 
names of all the remote tracking stations, but there was also the 
excitement of talking to the people at all the different tracking sta-
tions and ships.7
Former Flight Director Christopher C. Kraft—who wrote 
the Foreword to Hamish Lindsay’s book Tracking Apollo to the Moon on the 
Australians’ perspective of working on the Apollo Network—recalled fondly: 
I have a very soft spot in my heart for the network and the 
people who operated it. These people were as much a part of the 
success of our efforts as were the flight controllers and the other 
people at Houston and the Cape. Whatever we did was in large 
measure dependent on the reliability of the worldwide tracking 
and communications network. . . . This is truly one of the unsung 
accomplishments of the space program.8
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As the network expanded in the 1960s and early 1970s, so did the 
team of people who ran it. It was during this time that contractors from the 
aerospace industry, like Bendix Field Engineering Corporation (BFEC), made 
an indelible mark on the history of the spaceflight network. So close was the 
relationship that station workers were often called the “badgeless controller” 
because it didn’t matter if they were government civil servants or contractor 
employees. The two could work side by side and one would not know which 
was which unless you looked at his badge.9 For many, working the networks 
became a way of life. For some, entire careers were spent working in remote 
places around the world.
An examination of the history of America’s spaceflight tracking 
network is not unlike driving down a long and winding road—with many 
turns and twists. Much of its early fate was tied to the Cold War and the 
Space Race borne from it. In the mid-1950s, even before NASA was formally 
established, the United States began building a network to track what it hoped 
was to be the world’s first artificial satellite. However, that network—called 
Minitrack—ended up as its first test tracking Sputnik 1, which the former 
Soviet Union shocked the world with on 4 October 1957.
Minitrack next set the stage for a greatly expanded network called 
the Satellite Tracking and Data Acquisition Network, or STADAN. Led 
by the new Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) in Greenbelt, Maryland, 
this much more expansive network soon became the centerpiece of all near-
Earth tracking and space communications activity for the United States. The 
STADAN supported not only NASA’s own science and application satellites 
but also the world’s first commercial satellites which were just then being 
launched, including the COMSAT Early Bird, the world’s first electronically 
active, commercial, communications satellite.10
However, even as the sophistication of satellites was rapidly evolv-
ing and launches were taking place on a more regular basis, something even 
more dramatic was about to change the very fabric of the Goddard network. 
This something was the world of manned or human spaceflight.
To support this new national priority, engineers at Goddard, along 
with the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, Texas, developed a network 
that ultimately tracked astronauts to the Moon and back. Initially called the 
Mercury Space Flight Network, or MSFN (the word “Mercury” would later 
be replaced with the word “Manned”), it quickly became just as expansive as 
the STADAN, even surpassing the latter in terms of capability, locations and 
new technology. Much of its early requirements were based on experience 
gained from aircraft and missile testing and from the tracking of lunar and 
planetary probes such as the unmanned Surveyor spacecraft which preceded 
man to the Moon. From this, cadres of network planners worked out solutions 
to the high data rate requirements needed to send humans into space.
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As both the STADAN and the MSFN matured, the ever increasing 
demand for data in the right amount (bandwidth), at sufficient speed (data rate) 
and at the right time (timing accuracy) drove their evolution. Real time opera-
tions at ever-increasing data rate became the prime consideration. “To know 
accurately where the spacecraft was at any given moment was extremely impor-
tant to us,” said Kraft. “A review of the early history, particularly of the Mercury 
flights, reveals that we often had to make some very delicate decisions whether 
to continue some of these flights or not. Determining the orbital trajectory and 
providing tracking and communications support to meet these parameters from 
launch to reentry was certainly no easy job for the Goddard team.”11
To this end, Kraft recalled a specific problem that the network had 
to deal with involving the critical “Go/No Go” decision as whether to con-
tinue a flight or initiate an abort. During the launch of an Atlas rocket—an 
Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile which NASA used to launch the 
Mercury astronauts and the Agency’s early, large, satellites—there was only a 
30- to 120-second window after its main engine had cutoff to decide whether 
to continue or to abort. This was all the time controllers (or the astronaut) 
had to turn the spacecraft around and fire its retrorockets so that its trajectory 
would allow the spacecraft to reenter in the Atlantic recovery area before its 
impact point reached the African coast. Kraft recalled:
Initially, there were very few people who believed that this 
would be possible. . . . We called it the ‘short arc’ solution. People 
like John Mayer, Bill Tindall, Lynwood Dunseith and Goddard’s Jim 
Donegan deserve credit for giving us the know-how to solve this 
critical problem, a problem which many mathematical and trajec-
tory experts believed could not be solved. By analyzing the data 
generated by the Cape, Goddard and the Bermuda tracking sta-
tion, we were able to get the answers, even within the very limited 
timeframe available.12
During NASA’s first man-in-space program Project Mercury, the 
network was not well centralized and relied on the not always reliable teletype 
communications. For mission assurance, flight controllers were dispatched to 
most of the primary tracking stations so that they could maintain immediate 
contact with the spacecraft from the ground on a given pass. Astronauts too 
were sent as capsule communicators or Capcoms to the various sites. Here, 
something interesting happened within the NASA culture. For unmanned sci-
ence and application satellites, there was no debate as to who was in charge. 
Goddard was clearly the lead and the STADAN was centralized at the Network 
Operations Control Center (NOCC) in Greenbelt. However, things were not 
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so clear-cut when it came to the “manned” side of the house. Here, both 
Goddard and Houston’s Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) had a stake.
Despite the fact that there was not always full agreement even 
within Goddard’s own top management (who thought the center should be 
devoted to scientific exploration of space and questioned whether it should 
be in the business of tracking human missions), Headquarters in due time 
delegated Goddard with the full responsibility for running the MSFN. This 
decision by Headquarters was fairly logical as MSC (renamed the Lyndon 
B. Johnson Space Center, or JSC, in 1973) certainly had enough on its plate 
as NASA’s lead center for human spaceflight to be worried about also hav-
ing to run a worldwide tracking network. Nevertheless, the decision did not 
eliminate Houston’s concerns about the network; the “Not Invented Here” 
mindset was not something that easily went away.
As history has shown, JSC did not have to worry about the 
Goddard-run network, as not a single mission—manned or unmanned—has 
ever been compromised due to network failure. This “invisible network” as 
Artist rendition of a Tracking and Data Relay Satellite providing communications 
support from Earth orbit. The long and winding road has taken NASA’s Spaceﬂight 
Tracking And Data Network from a handful of ground stations in the late 1950s to the 
Space Network of the twenty-ﬁrst century. (NASA Lithograph LG-2001-8-033-GSFC)
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it has been called, operating behind the scenes, has always been there. Like a 
light switch, it’s there when needed. In the final analysis, much of the success 
on what could have been a very divisive issue was due in no small part to some 
very effective personal relationships between people who understood what 
was needed to get the job done at both centers, people like Ozzie Covington, 
Bill Wood, Tecwyn Roberts, and Chris Kraft.
Following the incredible journeys of Apollo to the Moon and 
America’s first space station Skylab, as well as the world’s first international 
spaceflight in the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, human spaceflight became sud-
denly very quiet in the late 1970s. Although the GSFC was busy supporting 
Earth science and application satellites, in the cost-conscious days following 
Apollo, the wisdom for having a separate network specifically for human 
spaceflight was questioned. It was in this era of change that Goddard merged 
its two networks (the STADAN and the MSFN) in 1975 into a single, leaner, 
and ostensibly more cost-effective network called the Spaceflight Tracking 
and Data Network, or STDN.
A chronology of NASA’s near-Earth Spaceﬂight Tracking and Data Network. (Figure by 
the author) 
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But no matter how large or small a ground network is, due to “line-
of-sight” limitations imposed by the curvature of Earth, it is still located on the 
surface of Earth and can thus only provide coverage for some 15 percent of an 
Earth-orbiting spacecraft’s ground track—limited to brief periods when it is 
within the line-of-sight over a given tracking station. To overcome this, NASA’s 
network for tracking and communicating with near-Earth spacecraft (that is, 
the STDN but not the DSN) had to move into space. Thus, the Tracking and 
Data Relay Satellite System, or TDRSS, was born.
With the advent of TDRSS in the 1980s, America’s spaceflight track-
ing and communications network evolved into a full-fledged Space Network 
(SN) constellation of relay satellites and ground terminals along with a greatly 
reduced Ground Network (GN). Today, many Earth-orbiting spacecraft rely 
primarily on the SN for their tracking, telemetry and control needs with many 
missions that do not require continuous contact with the ground opting, mainly 
for cost reasons, to transmit their spacecraft science data via the GN. Digital 
and telecommunications technology have also evolved significantly in recent 
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years to impact space communications. The ever increasing demand for higher 
bandwidths (traffic capability) and lower “bit-error rates” (higher accuracy) in 
the modern information age explosion have led to the complete transformation 
of how space communications are done. Such is the trend in spaceflight com-
munications that started in the 1990s in which NASA historically set the prece-
dence but is now heavily influenced by the commercial sector. In this new age 
of information technology and international teamwork, the Agency’s role is no 
longer the same as it was when the Space Shuttle first flew into space in 1981 or 
even when the International Space Station was first being built in the 1990s.
Aside from geopolitics, the root cause driving such change can almost 
always be traced to two factors: technology and cost reduction. Few would be 
surprised that the demand for better technology is always a driver. But in addition 
to better technology, as space moves from the realm of government sponsorship 
to a commercial commodity, cost reduction in today’s world of real-time global 
communications and data demands is perhaps more important than ever before.
In the 1990’s, “Faster, Better, Cheaper” also drove much of the way 
business was conducted in the space industry, both commercially and at NASA. 
This approach impacted the space program in ways ranging from economics to 
performance and, some would say, safety. New ground and space communica-
tion networks such as Universal Space Network (USN) entered the playing field. 
This network provided multi-mission ground terminals which offered users the 
advantage of low cost services: pay only for what you use. They targeted not 
only commercial users of satellite services but also government users, including 
NASA. As we broach the twenty-first century, satellite users now routinely 
rely on the internet for data access and file transfers. This access extends to such 
remote locations as the South Pole, where NASA was instrumental in providing 
internet access to researchers.
When one speaks of space exploration, “high technology” usually 
comes to mind. To this end, the aphorism “If NASA can put a man on the Moon 
. . . ” has become a part of the English vernacular, perhaps even to the point of 
being somewhat trite. Satellite and spacecraft—some human, some robotic—sent 
on their missions into space, are there to make the unknown known. But what-
ever data that astronauts and instruments record, the information is of no value if 
it cannot be returned to Earth. At its height, over 6,000 men and women—from 
network engineers to field technicians to NASA managers—were committed to 
this vast undertaking. As former Station Director and later Associate Administrator 
for Space Communications (1989 to 1996) Charles T. Force says of this invisible 
network, “The nation was well served.”13
This is the story of that invisible network.
CHAPTER 1
THE EARLY YEARS
Tracking, in the context of spaceflight, refers to the collection of 
spacecraft position and velocity measurements so that its motion on orbit may 
be determined. The roots of modern day tracking and data acquisition can 
be found in the immediate years following the Second World War when the 
United States entered into a period of intense research to develop a viable bal-
listic missile technology. Science, and in particular, the development of sound-
ing rockets (small rockets launched into the upper part of the atmosphere for 
research and experiment), played a part in this advancement. However, its 
pace was clearly driven by national security. 
World War II had just forced the United States and the Soviet 
Union to become reluctant allies. With the war now over, the potential for 
an armed conflict between the two superpowers was something that both 
governments took careful steps to avoid while at the same time, and in no 
uncertain terms, prepared for. Even in the last days of the war, both countries 
postured to shape the political landscape that would soon emerge after Nazi 
Germany and the Imperial Japanese governments had been defeated. It was 
in this Cold War atmosphere that a major concern arose in the American 
military leadership, one that fueled the perception that the United States not 
only trailed, but trailed badly, the Soviet Union in the area of ballistic mis-
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sile technology.1 Much of this concern could be traced to that fact that much 
larger missiles were then needed by the Soviets to carry their nuclear war-
heads which were, at the time, bigger and much heavier than their American 
counterparts.2 Also capitalizing on this state of apprehension was the very 
effective use of propaganda by the Soviets, as the usually secretive society 
openly and routinely paraded these large rockets in Red Square during times 
of state celebrations.
As the pace of missile testing accelerated, the Department of 
Defense (DOD) converted several former War Department weapon proving 
grounds in the continental United States into missile ranges. Key among these 
was the Whites Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in southern New Mexico. 
Here, captured German V-2 rockets were brought and flown after the war. In 
a move called Operation Paperclip, German rocket scientists, under the direc-
tion of Wernher von Braun, brought over 300 boxcar loads of missile mate-
rials to White Sands where they were tested as sounding rockets equipped 
with atmospheric sampling devices and telemetry transmitters.3 It was in New 
Mexico where America’s first suborbital rockets were launched above Earth’s 
atmosphere in 1946 when the WAC Corporal ventured some 80 kilometers 
(50 miles) up, almost into the ionosphere.4
Other pioneering work at the Army range included the “Albert 
monkey flights” and the Navy’s Aerobee sounding rockets.5 In 1950, the Air 
Force converted the Long Range Proving Ground at Cape Canaveral, Florida 
into the Atlantic Missile Range, which it later renamed the Eastern Test Range 
(ETR). With a corridor that extended all the way from the Florida coast, over 
the Caribbean to Ascension Island in the South Atlantic, ETR was perfect for 
testing the early long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) in the 
Air Force arsenal such as the venerable Atlas. Located on the coast of Florida, 
easterly launches out of “The Cape” also enjoyed the enormous benefit of 
having the velocity from Earth’s rotation “kick start” a rocket’s journey into 
space. On the other coast, the Navy established the Pacific Missile Range 
(PMR), tracking missiles launched out of Point Mugu, California and later, 
Air Force launches from Vandenberg Air Force Base, on intercontinental tra-
jectories to Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands some 10,000 kilometers (6,200 
miles) away in the South Pacific.
In those days, there were essentially two proven methods for 
tracking vehicles into the upper atmosphere: optical and radar. Optical tracking
has been around since humans first studied the stars and sailed the seas. As 
the name implies, visual sightings from ground-based, high-power telescopes 
were used to provide measurements of a satellite’s position against the back-
ground stars. In April 1956, the Working Group on Tracking and Computation 
(WGTC), as part of the National Academy of Sciences’ Space Science Board, 
approved a plan by the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO) in 
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Cambridge, Massachusetts, to establish an optical tracking network to pho-
tograph very small objects in anticipation of tracking the International 
Geophysical Year (IGY) satellites. The IGY was an 18-month ( July 1957 
through December 1958) scientific undertaking sponsored by the International 
Council of Scientific Unions designed to promote and stimulate a broad, 
worldwide investigation of Earth and the near-Earth cosmic environment. 
At the time, it was quite the watershed event in terms of fostering scientific 
interest on an international basis when East-West tensions were dominating 
the news. 
To prepare for U.S. IGY activities, the SAO was given $3,380,000 
by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to implement an optical net-
work. This network, proposed by Harvard astronomer Fred L. Whipple 
and Ohio State University professor J. Allen Hynek, featured sophisticated 
Baker-Nunn high precision telescopic cameras that had unusually large aper-
tures. These high-resolution cameras were named after its principal creators, 
James G. Baker, consultant to the Perkin-Elmer Corporation of Norwalk, 
Connecticut, and Joseph Nunn of South Pasadena, California. Built by the 
Boller and Chivens Company of South Pasadena and instrumented with optics 
fabricated by Perkin-Elmer, the Baker-Nunn was basically an f/1 Schmidt 
camera with a 20-inch (50.8-centimeter) focal length and a wide 5º by 30º 
field-of-view so as to accommodate star-field photography for the purposes 
of optical tracking. (A Schmidt camera is a high-powered telescope with a 
film plate holder instead of eyepiece at its focus. It is typically used as a survey 
instrument in which a large amount of sky is covered.) Another key compo-
nent of the camera was its film. Manufactured by the Kodak Corporation, 
film for the Baker-Nunn used high speed Royal X-Pan emulsion, standard 
for high grain black and white resolution at the time. The 55.625-mm film 
size was, however, unique to the needs of the SAO. To achieve the required 
resolution, a single frame was rather large, measuring 2.2 inches by 18 inches 
(5.6 centimeters by 45.7 centimeters). It required close to an hour to process 
and dry the film in preparation for making position measurements.6
The camera operated by alternately tracking a satellite and the star 
background. Superimposed on the same strip of film was the image of a crys-
tal-controlled clock from a separate optical system which was periodically 
illuminated by strobe lights. This was done to establish a precise time refer-
ence. From the photographs, the position of a satellite could be accurately 
determined by comparison with the position of the background star field.7
The instrument was sensitive enough; under favorable lighting conditions, it 
could photograph a 16th magnitude object, which corresponds to something 
that is 25 times dimmer than the faintest star visible to the naked eye.8
By the late 1950s, the Smithsonian’s optical network was global in 
scope and was concentrated in a geographical band of about 40° north and 
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south of the Equator. There were 12 stations located at sites selected, among 
other things, for their year-round mild weather:
North America
Haleakala, Maui
Jupiter, Florida
Organ, New Mexico
South America
Arequipa, Peru
Curacao, Dutch Antilles
Villa Dolores, Argentina
Australia
Woomera
Africa
Olifantsfontein, South Africa
Europe
San Fernando, Spain
Asia 
Mitaka, Japan
Naini Tal, India
Shiraz, Iran9
Although optical tracking could be effective, it had its drawbacks. 
In particular, its usefulness was limited by something known as the acquisi-
tion problem. Simply put, in optical tracking, there was no way to initially 
find what it was supposed to track. Before the optical network could be put to 
use, the SAO had to come up with a plan to address the acquisition problem. 
Here, Whipple had an idea. To encourage participation and popular interest 
in this new field, Whipple’s plan was to use a network of amateur volunteers 
worldwide to literally serve as eyes to visually find—or acquire—a satellite. 
The strategy was rather simple. After surveying the night sky and finding the 
satellite, these participants would pass the “acquisition data” on to one of the 
12 Baker-Nunn stations that was closest to them.
Not surprising, the intention to use amateurs in this fashion was 
initially ill-received by the NAS Space Science Board’s technical working 
group who thought the work “too technical” for just anyone to perform. 
But just as Whipple had anticipated, the announcement of the formation of 
Operation Moonwatch in early 1956 brought an enormous response. Visual 
observation teams sprang up in North and South America, Africa, Europe, 
Asia, in the Middle East and even at such remote places as Station C and 
Fletcher’s Ice Island T-3 in the Arctic Basin. In the Washington, DC area, 
the first Moonwatch station equipped with 12 telescopes was set up in an 
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apple orchard in Colesville, Maryland. The orchard was owned by a Mr. G. 
R. Wright, a Weather Bureau employee who ended up chairing the national 
advisory committee in charge of planning the unusual network.
Dry runs to test the ability of spotters to actually sight a tiny sphere 
hurling through space began in June of 1957. An imitation of the proposed 
IGY satellite flew over Fort Belvoir, Virginia. This test satellite was defini-
tively “lo-tech,” a makeshift device made up of a tiny flashlight bulb fastened 
to a plumber’s suction plunger that was towed at the end of a clothesline 
behind an airplane flying at 1800 meters (6,000 feet). Light output from this 
object was calculated by Whipple to be about the same as that reflected off a 
metal sphere on orbit from a rising or setting Sun. The contraption worked 
though, and the experiment went off without a hitch. Soon, variations of the 
technique were used to train Moonwatchers from around the world. Two 
years later, some 250 teams with approximately 8,000 members were func-
tioning under Moonwatch. Teams came from all walks of life, organized by 
An optical satellite tracking 
network using Baker-Nunn 
cameras established by the 
Smithsonian Astrophysical 
Observatory was in place by 
the late 1950s. The camera 
would alternately track a 
satellite and the star back-
ground to obtain a ﬁx on its 
location. Baker-Nunn camer-
as were also used extensive-
ly by the Air Force to track 
military satellites. (http://
history.nasa.gov/SP-4202/
p9-151.jpg)
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universities, public schools, government agencies, private science clubs, and 
amateur astronomers. The United States alone accounted for 126 groups.10
The endurance of Operation Moonwatch was a testament to its 
true popularity, as more than 5,000 volunteers equipped with telescopes and 
binoculars continued scrutinizing the skies over the next two decades (long 
after the original need had been met). More than 400,000 satellite observations 
were recorded. Whipple would praise the infectious enthusiasm of these early 
space buffs, saying, “Quite a number have gone into science or space programs 
because of their amateur involvement in Moonwatch.”11 After the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration was formed in 1958, it would continue 
to fund Moonwatch at a low level through the SAO—at about $30,000 per 
year—until the organization was officially disbanded in July of 1975.
Despite its relatively good accuracy, optical tracking had inherent 
disadvantages in addition to acquisition. For instance, in order to get good 
photographs, the weather must be favorable and lighting must be correct. The 
latter condition meant that a site must be in darkness while the satellite being 
tracked was in sunlight. The problem with that though, is a satellite spends a 
significant portion of its orbit either in Earth’s shadow where it is not illumi-
nated, or in sunshine where there is not enough contrast to see it (like trying 
to see stars during the day). Thus optical tracking could only be used during 
a short window just before and after sunrise or sunset. Therefore, from any 
given station, it was usually impossible to get more than a few good observa-
tions of the orbit per pass.12
Besides optical systems, there was radar, an electronic system. 
Radar—or Radio Detection and Ranging—in which the location of an 
object is precisely determined by measuring returns on electromagnetic waves 
reflected off the object back to the transmitting station, had been a topic of 
research by scientists and engineers since the late 1800s when German physicist 
Heinrich Hertz first began experimenting with radio waves in his Frankfurt 
laboratory. Research continued throughout the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury on both sides of the Atlantic. But it was not until World War II when the 
allies first used it to great advantage for early warning—in particular during 
the Battle of Britain—did radar come into its own. By the end of the war, it 
was standard operating equipment on Navy ships and aircraft on both sides.
Towards the end of the war, missile testing activities soared, and 
along with it, the need for reliable tracking techniques. In the fall of 1944, 
Major General G. M. Barnes, then Chief of Research and Development 
Service, U.S. Army Office of Ordnance, recognized the urgency for the Army 
to establish a research program in the field of guided missiles. To this end, he 
was convinced that as a vital part of such a program, it was necessary to have 
somewhere within the limits of the continental United States, a range where 
test firings of such missiles could be conducted routinely and safely. With this 
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in mind, military and civilian engineers from the Ordnance Department and 
the Corps of Engineers conducted surveys of all open areas in the United 
States to find a place suitable for such firing activities.
Certain fundamental requirements were set forth, such as: extraor-
dinarily clear weather throughout the preponderance of the year; large amounts 
of open, uninhabited terrain over which firings could be conducted without 
jeopardy to civilian population; accessibility to rail and power facilities; and 
to whatever degree possible, proximity to communities to provide for the cul-
tural needs of personnel to be employed at such an installation. The result of 
these studies indicated that a relatively desolate area around the White Sands 
Desert and the Alamogordo Bombing Range in southern New Mexico nearly 
filled all of the specifications.13 While it was recognized that both the length 
and width of the range were not as large as might be desired, it could be uti-
lized efficiently for the early types of missiles that were being developed and 
Diagram of Operation Moonwatch showing the vital role of amateur star gazers in this 
schematic from an original set of NRL plans. (Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton 
Lomask, Vanguard: A History. [NASA SP-4202, 1970])
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for the reduced-scale prototypes of the later and larger types that the Army 
then had in mind. In this way, White Sands quickly became the hub of activ-
ity for U.S. missile development, and with it, tracking technology.14
Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, radar was increasingly 
used to supplement optical tracking. This work, at a time when the accepted 
practice was that optics were the primary way for data recovery, was not 
received with open arms by all. In spite of this initial reservation, it did have 
the momentum of technical advancement on its side.15 It was at White Sands 
during this time that a young engineer named Ozro M. Covington began 
developing the concept of centralized networks for tracking and communica-
tions, honing skills which would later be used to lead NASA’s human space- 
flight network. After working in the field of communications and radars as a 
civilian in Europe and at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey during World War II, 
Ozzie Covington became the Technical Director of the Army Signal Missile 
Support Agency at White Sands in 1946 (a position he would hold until leaving 
for NASA in 1961.) Here, Covington and range engineers tested and refined 
networking communications and data processing techniques and developed 
what was, in essence, the forerunner to the mission control concept. 
The idea of a worldwide communication complex to support space-
flight was not a new concept to many at White Sands. By the time Covington 
came onto the scene, it had already been the subject of study and a number of 
possible approaches had been considered. 
We supported the firing of V-2 rockets brought to the U.S. 
from Germany after World War II and, of course, our own U.S. 
developmental missiles, [said Covington] to monitor these flights, 
which could reach 100 miles (160 kilometers) in altitude and some 
100 miles downrange. We established a chain of five radar tracking 
stations. These were linked to our ‘C’ Station, which also contained 
early computer capabilities to give us a real-time data system. We 
really had an early mission control center from which we not only 
monitored these flights but also sent guidance signals to the mis-
siles. While we developed our electronic capabilities, we also used 
the real-time data to guide an array of optical instruments to keep 
an eye on these firings. After a V-2 went south to Juarez, Mexico, 
instead of north, these radars and their associated display equipment 
became the primary source of data for the range safety officer.16
Among these first networks was the very successful tracking sys-
tem developed at the range using an elaborate chain of FPS-16 C-band, 
single-object tracking radars made by the Radio Corporation of America 
(RCA) to track missiles launched on extended horizontal flights. The units 
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were networked to transmit data to a control center where consoles displayed 
information on the radar returns for the test engineers. Operating either on 
commercial line power or generators, these transportable radars could be 
moved from one place to another or to undeveloped sites using prefabricated 
transportable pads so as to provide support from different locations all around 
the range. A modernized version of this radar tracking system continues to be 
used at White Sands today.17
Still, a third approach for tracking emerged in the late 1940s: radio 
interferometry. Like most electronic tracking techniques then in use, radio 
interferometry required the presence of a signal source, or transmitter bea-
con, on the object being tracked. Despite its somewhat intimidating name, 
the basic operating principle of radio interferometry is relatively straight for-
ward. Since radio signals—like sound—travel in waves, separate antennas will 
receive the waves at slightly different times. Knowing that electromagnetic 
waves propagate at the speed of light, measurements of the different arrival 
times of the waves, called phase differences, can then be used to calculate 
position solutions for an object. This technique had the advantage of yielding 
highly accurate tracking angles and could be used under virtually any atmo-
spheric condition, even underwater. Given its potential, a number of groups 
were involved in its research after World War II. A significant milestone was 
reached in 1948 when engineers of Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation 
(Convair) created the first working application for the U.S. Army on the 
Azusa missile tracking system.
To understand how this technique was utilized and eventually 
developed into what would become the Minitrack Network—the progenitor 
to the STDN—one has to go back to the year 1955. That summer, plans were 
drawn up by the United States to launch the first artificial satellite as President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower announced on 29 July that the United States would 
participate in the upcoming IGY by orbiting a 9-kilogram (20-pound) satel-
lite. In keeping with the spirit of the IGY, Eisenhower announced that the 
American satellite program would be civilian in nature. Despite the announce-
ment, it was well understood by the science community that assistance from 
the military was going to be required, since at the time, it alone possessed the 
capability to launch a rocket large enough to orbit a satellite.
Following this announcement, a Committee on Special Capabilities 
was appointed by the DOD to select the appropriate organization to lead this 
effort. This committee would end up selecting a proposal submitted by the 
Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) as the one which seemed best qualified to 
promote the civilian nature of the project while at the same time support mili-
tary interests in space technology development. The NRL was a good choice. 
It was well qualified, having already conducted research in this field for nearly 
a decade, even developing an underwater tracking system using sound inter-
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ferometry. By the early 1950s, the NRL detachment at White Sands had built 
and fielded a rudimentary tracking system for the development of the Viking 
short range guided missile.
In this way, the effort selected by the committee, called Project 
Vanguard, thus became the United States’ official IGY entrant in September 
1955. The project was led by Milton W. Rosen, Chairman of the NAS 
Advisory Committee on the IGY, and was managed jointly by the Office of 
Naval Research and the NAS Committee on the IGY.18
Once Vanguard was given the go-ahead, a significant portion of 
the early work was devoted to solving the problem of just how to track such 
a small object in space, since the Vanguard satellite would only be 15 cen-
timeters (6 inches) in diameter. Most atmospheric research scientists were 
advising Rosen’s team to rely on optical tracking; it was, after all, the tried 
and proven method. In addition, camera observations of meteoroids entering 
Earth’s atmosphere had demonstrated that modern terrestrial optical instru-
ments could indeed spot small objects weighing only a few pounds that moved 
at high velocities in the upper atmosphere.
Rosen was well aware of the limitations of optical tracking—in 
particular, the acquisition problem—and wanted something better. In other 
words, optical instruments could see a satellite, but could they find it? To get 
a better handle on the problem, he had Richard Tousey at the NRL verify 
visibility computations that had been performed earlier. Tousey’s answer con-
firmed what Rosen had already suspected. In his opinion, the probability of 
successful optical acquisition of a Vanguard-sized satellite on the first visual 
pass was only 1x10-6, that is, literally one in a million.19
Thus, convinced from the beginning that his team must look else-
where for a solution, Rosen asked John T. Mengel and his NRL Tracking and 
Guidance Branch to develop an electronic system for use in conjunction with 
an optical one. For ballistic missile guidance, Mengel had led the develop-
ment of the mentioned Azusa system at White Sands. For tracking a satellite, 
however, that system was out of the question as it required an onboard trans-
mitter weighing 13.6 kilograms (30 pounds), far too large for a small satellite. 
Mengel’s team immediately went to work and within a year came up with an 
interferometer system that, although based on the techniques developed for 
Viking, required only a 0.37-kilogram (13-ounce) transmitter using a differ-
ent operating frequency and antenna pattern. It was, in essence, a pioneering 
new system.20
Hired by nuclear submarine pioneer Hyman G. Rickover a year 
after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Jack Mengel, who later became 
the first Director for Tracking and Data Systems at the Goddard Space Flight 
Center, began his career for the NRL working on antisubmarine devices. “At 
first, I was responsible for telemetry and radio control systems in the Rocket 
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[Sound] Branch, which used V-2 rockets of World War II fame for scientific 
observations in the near-Earth regions. This was followed in 1950 by work 
on a Viking missile project and its possible use in submarine warfare.”21 Here, 
his work in developing an X-band interferometry system that operated at the 
centimeter (one inch) wavelength provided the high precision missile guid-
ance that the U.S. military was looking for.
Expounding on this initial work, he and his team then converted 
this system into a 108 megahertz (MHz) system for tracking satellites. This 
new radio interferometry satellite tracking system had the catchy name 
Minitrack, which Mengel derived from “minimum-sized tracking system.” 
The name was fitting, as tracking was accomplished using a small oscillator 
onboard the satellite that illuminated pairs of antennas at a ground station 
with which angular positions of the satellite was derived using the radio inter-
The RCA FPS-16 radar has been widely used at missile ranges since the 1950s. It is 
transportable, Single-Object Tracking Radar which operates in the C-band of the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum. The photograph shows a FPS-16 at Patrick Air Force Base used 
in 1961 to track launches out of Cape Canaveral. (Photo courtesy of Patrick Air Force 
Base Ofﬁce of History)
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ferometry technique. “What apparently had sold the Defense Department on 
our proposal was the fact that it consisted of a good radio system which would 
be infallible in picking up the satellite in orbit,” explained Mengel.22 This 
pioneering tracking network was to become operational in 1957 at a cost of 
only $13 million.23
Despite the low price tag, America’s first spacecraft tracking net-
work had to overcome several key technical hurdles in order to achieve a level 
of tracking accuracy never before attempted. Angle measurements and accu-
rate timing were vital. One had to know precisely at any given instant in time 
where a satellite was in orbit. From the very beginning, the ability to ascertain 
precise timing, in particular, was crucial. Chesley H. Looney, Jr., the former 
Head of the Time Measurement Branch for Minitrack at the GSFC said: 
In the early days of the space program, prior to the establish-
ment of NASA, we had to develop a reliable, low-frequency phase-
measurement system to track our Vanguard satellites. While a high 
frequency interferometer system had been used at White Sands 
Missile Range, New Mexico, to track military rockets, this system 
was inadequate to meet the needs of low-powered satellites then 
being planned. Thus, a new system at a different frequency and 
with a different antenna layout to provide the proper precision and 
signal resolution had to be designed . . . In those days, our bud-
gets were very tight and we were forced to use low cost hardware. 
Yet, the equipment had to be capable of phase-angle measurements 
with an accuracy not attempted before. In the process, we devel-
oped an elegantly simple, filter-inductor system. In our related time 
measurements, we achieved an accuracy of 10-milliseconds per day 
and broke new ground in phase-angle tracking later embodied in 
commercial designs.24
As eventually implemented, Minitrack used a 10-milliwatt, 370- 
gram quartz crystal controlled oscillator transponder aboard the satellite which 
operated at the fixed frequency of 108 MHz. It had a battery life of 10 to 14 
days, sufficient for a planned Vanguard mission. The new tracking network 
was considered quite revolutionary for its time and was thus subject to much 
scrutiny by the general scientific community. In a series of papers and speeches 
over the next two years, Mengel and his colleagues—notably Roger L. Easton, 
his assistant at NRL, and Paul Herget, Director of the Cincinnati Observatory 
and a consultant on Project Vanguard—responded to this scrutiny by present-
ing the difficulty of tracking and its importance in the U.S. satellite program.
In a March 1956 paper, Mengel explained the challenge of tracking 
an artificial satellite to fellow scientists and engineers. In it, he said:
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The final realization of man’s efforts to place a satellite in orbit 
about the Earth will immediately pose a new series of problems: 
How to determine the precise orbit that it is following and how 
to measure what is happening within the satellite from the vantage 
point of a ground station. The immensity of the first of these pro-
grams, how to prove that the satellite is in fact orbiting—the acqui-
sition phase—can be realized by an analogy. Let a jet plane pass 
overhead at 60,000 feet (18,000 meters) at the speed of sound, let 
the pilot eject a golf ball, and now let the plane vanish. The appar-
ent size and speed of this golf ball will approximate closely the size 
and speed of a satellite three feet in diameter at a height of 3,000 
miles (4,800 kilometers). The acquisition problem is to locate the 
object under these conditions, and the tracking problem is to mea-
sure its angular position and angular rate with sufficient accuracy 
to alert nonacquiring tracking stations, those trying to follow the 
satellite by optical means, as to the time and position of expecting 
passage of the object.25
In describing how Minitrack worked, Mengel and Herget likened 
the antennas of a station to human ears. In short, it used stereo-phonics to pin-
point the location of a given signal source. For instance, a person locates the 
source of a sound by virtue of the phase difference in the sound waves which 
arrive at slightly different times at each of his ears. The antennas of a Minitrack 
station functioned much like ears. The electronic receivers of the Minitrack 
system were connected to pairs of receiving antennas set at a known distance 
apart, which indicated the direction of the signal by phase differences in the 
radio wave that it received from the satellite. The direction to the satellite, 
measured relative to the baseline vector between the two antennas, could then 
be calculated from the phase difference using triangulation.
For example, if the waves arriving at two antennas were out of 
phase by one-third of a wavelength, the extra distance they traveled to the far-
ther antenna could be deduced and the angle to the baseline calculated using 
trigonometry. However, in order to find the actual length (that is, magnitude) 
of the extra distance, it must be known whether this phase difference was only 
one-third of a wavelength or some multiple thereof. To resolve this ambigu-
ity, other pairs of antennas were set up but spaced closer together at distances 
of less than one wavelength. These arrays provided shorter fractional phase 
differences, and on the basis of whether the resulting directions fell within the 
reception pattern of the antenna system, the number of wavelengths involved 
could be determined.
A Minitrack antenna array was quite large, consisting of a 150- 
meter (500-foot) cross of eight linear dipole antennas (metal frame antennas 
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with many elements like the traditional rooftop, television antenna) mounted 
above 18-by 3-meter (60-foot by 10-foot) ground screens which served to 
eliminate multipathing, or interference, from ground reflection. In the north-
south direction, three pairs of antennas spaced 150, 20 and 4 meters (500, 64 
and 12 feet) apart, respectively, were used; in the east-west direction, two 
pairs with spacings of 150 and 20 meters were used. The resulting reception 
pattern was a fan-shaped beam spanning 100° north-south by 10° east-west, 
measured at the 6 decibel (dB) reception power point, a common demarcation 
used to measure antenna reception strength.26
In this setup, the north-south and east-west determinations provided 
the two angles needed to locate the actual direction to a satellite. However, 
more information was still needed. To verify precise antenna alignment (that 
is, its orientation with respect to a fixed celestial coordinate system) and timing, 
calibrations had to be done. This was done periodically by having an airplane 
equipped with a Minitrack transmitter and flashing lights fly over the station 
at night at an altitude of 6,100 meters (20,000 feet). An optical system called 
MOTS—Minitrack Optical Tracking System—was used for this purpose.
MOTS was one of the lesser known tracking systems implemented 
early in the network. Developed under the direction of Edmund J. Habib at 
the GSFC, stations used it to calibrate and determine position misalignments 
in the Mintrack system. It worked something like this: A time-coded lamp on 
the belly of the airplane, operating simultaneously with an onboard 108-MHz 
Minitrack transmitter, allowed for precise observation of the airplane’s posi-
tion against the background star-field as the Minitrack array on the ground 
recorded the movement of the Minitrack beam. In this way, a precise compar-
ison between the optical position (aircraft belly light) and the radio frequency 
position (aircraft transmitter) could be made for calibration purposes.27 Precise 
optical and radio fixes could then be made to correct for any misalignment of 
the antenna. Using this setup, Minitrack was sophisticated enough to record 
phase differences to an accuracy of one-thousandth of a wavelength and the 
time of observation to one millisecond, which in turn produced a direction fix 
to the satellite accurate to within 20 arc-seconds (1/180th of a degree). Such 
was the kind of resolution that was needed in order to track Vanguard.28
As implemented, the Minitrack stations were all very similar. Their 
principal antennas consisted of the large arrays for angular tracking, one fixed 
antenna array for telemetry reception, and a single rhombus (diamond shaped) 
antenna for communications. Three trailers housed the ground station core 
electronics consisting of telemetry recording equipment and communications 
hardware. Site selection had to consider many factors. Due to the size of the 
main array, a station required a large plot of land, at least 23 acres in an area 
that was relatively smooth, with a gradient of less than 1°. To maximize the 
observation time during each pass, Minitrack specifications called for the ter-
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rain adjacent to a station to not exceed an elevation angle of 10° for at least 
800 meters (one-half mile), and 20° for 8,000 meters (5 miles). Finally, to 
minimize interference, engineers selected locations away from electric power 
plants and even airports (although this recommendation was not followed at 
many of the sites eventually constructed).29
The final decision by the IGY selection committee on the U.S. sat-
ellite project came down to two proposals: the Navy’s Project Vanguard and 
a competing concept called Project Orbiter submitted by Army scientists—
including Wernher von Braun. The latter, however, originally contained no 
provision for electronic tracking. While it may be too simple to say that the 
NRL proposal was selected because it had provisions for electronic tracking, 
it is clear that the inclusion of a Minitrack Network in the NRL proposal 
undoubtedly had a direct bearing on the committee’s decision in August 1955. 
Mengel later supported this claim, saying, “What apparently sold the Defense 
Department on our proposal was the fact that it consisted of a good radio sys-
tem which would be infallible in picking up the satellite in orbit.”30
In addition, NRL also described in their proposal a somewhat 
less elaborate version of the Minitrack system as eventually implemented. 
Developed by Roger Easton, this toned-down system became known as the 
“Mark II,” or unofficially, the “Jiffy.” Some in the halls of NRL referred to 
it as the “Poor Man’s Minitrack.” Using less-sophisticated radio frequency 
phase-comparison (instead of interference), the Mark II, nevertheless, went on 
to become the nucleus of Project Moonbeam, a program sponsored by NRL 
to encourage amateur radio enthusiasts and their clubs to build their own 
ground stations to track satellites.31
With its selection accomplished, design and construction-prepara-
tion of the Minitrack Network began in the fall of 1955. From its inception, 
Minitrack was a project that had to have cooperation amongst all the stake-
holders. Considering all the technical and administrative requirements that 
were needed to coordinate the work of various military units, university labo-
ratories, individual experts and private contractors, its progress was remark-
ably smooth. Years later Mengel was able to recall “a few personality clashes” 
but in his opinion, those were “par for the course for a program that made use 
of some of the best astronomers in the country.”32
During initial development and construction, the U.S. military played 
the decisive role. Three Army agencies—Corps of Engineers, Map Service and 
the Signal Corps—were responsible for most of the actual construction. The 
Air Force’s main role was the installation of tracking radars at Patrick Air Force 
Base in Florida and on Grand Bahamas Island. Overall program management 
was under the Naval Research Laboratory. In addition, the Navy’s Bureau of 
Yards and Docks obtained use of the land needed to construct the prototype 
station at Blossom Point, Maryland. Outside of the military, the Department of 
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State provided the much-needed assistance to the Navy as the executing agent 
for foreign affairs, conducting negotiations for land leases on foreign soil. This 
cooperation between the various departments of the U.S. government was a 
testament to the priority of Project Vanguard. There was with it a definite 
sense of urgency. Chesley Looney recalled years later that, “While our budget 
was low, . . . [we] had high priority which allowed us to push ahead without 
administration hurdles. All of us were anxious to succeed.”33
Things moved quickly. In the spring of 1956, a project advance 
team led by Commander Wilfred E. Berg, surveyed 17 Latin American sites 
from which six were selected. They were:
Batista Field in Havana, Cuba
Paramo de Cotopaxi near Quito, Ecuador
Pampa de Ancon at Lima, Peru
Salar del Carmen at Antofagasta, Chile
Peldehue Military Reservation near Santiago, Chile
Rio Hata in the Republic of Panama.
Minitrack antenna arrays were large, spread over an area one and a half times the size of 
a football ﬁeld. (Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, Vanguard: A History.
[NASA SP-4202, 1970 ﬁle 6589 NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History 
Division, Washington, DC 20546])
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One of the lesser-known tracking systems developed by GFSC was the MOTS—
Minitrack Optical Tracking System—which was used to obtain precise, position calibra-
tion and  misalignments in the Minitrack system. The photograph shows David W. Harris 
(who later became a Deputy Associate Administrator at NASA Headquarters) operating 
the camera at Blossom Point in 1963 after it was modiﬁed to photograph passive satel-
lites such as Echo. Note the photographic plate at the bottom of the camera. MOTS was 
used until the 1970s. (NASA Image Number G-63-826)
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Shortly after Berg’s group returned in early May, NRL eliminated 
the Panamanian site based on studies indicating that a station at San Diego 
would be more useful for early orbit determination. This decision would 
make the station on the coast of California the first to receive confirmation 
from Vanguard that it indeed had successfully attained orbit.34
As the network began to take shape, there emerged basically three 
categories of stations. The first type involved three tracking units located 
immediately downrange of Cape Canaveral on the islands of Grand Bahamas, 
Antigua,  and Grand Turk, networked with a radar installation at Patrick Air 
Force Base, Florida. These monitored the launch, ascent, and orbital insertion 
The antenna system of a Minitrack station was made up of eight individual antennas 
connected to form three pairs in the north-south direction and two pairs in the east-
west. The outermost pairs in each direction were 152 meters (500 feet) apart while the 
inner north-sourth pairs were separated by distances of 19.5 and 3.7 meters (64 and 
12 feet). The spacing of the inner east-west pair was 19.5 meters. (Mengel and Herget, 
Tracking Satellites by Radio. Folder 8800, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA
History Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington DC)
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(“early ops”) of the Vanguard vehicle. In the second category were the so-
called primary stations located roughly on a north-south line along the east 
coast of North America and the west coast of South America so as to form a 
“picket line” across the expected path of satellites. To preclude over-flight of 
the Bahamas, launches out of the Cape were limited to orbital inclinations of 
35° or less (in other words, the ground track of satellites were bound between 
35° in latitude north and south of the Equator). With this picket line, radio 
signals from a satellite could be intercepted as it crossed the 75th West merid-
ian on each orbit. Seven primary stations formed this line:
Blossom Point, Maryland
Fort Stewart, Georgia
Antofagasta, Chile
Santiago, Chile
Quito, Ecuador
Lima, Peru
Havana, Cuba35
Lastly, there were other stations outside of the picket line in loca-
tions around the world at San Diego, California; Hartebeestpoort outside of 
Johannesburg, South Africa; and Woomera, South Australia. This last group 
of stations was needed to help determine the initial orbit of the satellite. With 
this arrangement, Mengel estimated that there was a 90 percent chance of 
capturing every pass of a satellite which was at an altitude of 500 kilometers 
(300 miles) or higher.
The first station established was on a 23 acre NRL managed site 
in the U.S. Army Blossom Point Proving Ground, Maryland, some 60 kilo-
meters (40 miles) south of Washington, DC. The Army had specifically per-
mitted this portion of the range to the Navy in 1956 for use as a Vanguard 
support site. Bordering the Potomac River, Blossom Point provided an ideal 
setting for a ground station, with horizon-to-horizon look angles along with 
an interference-free, low-noise environment. As the network developed, 
this prototype station functioned somewhat like a test station for the rest of 
the network. Here, engineers, scientists, and station operators received their 
training, and procedures were developed for system tests, simulations,  and 
checkout, including use of the MOTS cameras.
When it was first conceived, NRL engineers envisioned using only 
four sites, along with the test-bed at Blossom Point. By the time Vanguard 
was ready to issue its first full progress report in December of 1955, however, 
Mengel’s team was thinking in far more elaborate terms. By the time it was 
completed, the Minitrack Network would consist of 14 sites, including the 
DOD launch support radar stations. With the obvious need to place ground 
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stations in other countries, the ability to secure foreign cooperation became 
paramount. In fact, the ability to work effectively with local governments and 
foreign nationals would play directly into how well stations could accomplish 
their missions in the years to come. This NASA hallmark began in the days of 
Minitrack. As B. Harry McKeehan, Chief of International Operations at the 
GSFC from 1963 to 1980, explained: 
Very early in our planning for the tracking network, there 
emerged a definite commitment that our foreign tracking stations 
were to be conceived carefully and operated with the full sup-
port  and active cooperation of the foreign governments involved. 
Thus, even in times of political turmoil, we were usually able to 
continue our operations without serious interference. . . . [In] 
instances when stations had to be closed because of political con-
ditions within the country, even in those cases, we continued to 
recognize and honor our commitments to the host government 
and our local employees.36
McKeehan soon found that one of the best ways to secure inter-
national cooperation was to involve local nationals in station operations. “A 
major stabilizing factor in our foreign operations was our policy of maximum 
utilization of local people in station positions. This proved to be cost effective 
as well as giving the local government and population a feeling of having a 
stake in the NASA missions.” McKeehan explained how this “nationalizing 
of the stations” was done. 
Our efforts normally started after the technical requirements
for a specific program had been identified and the tracking cover-
age determined. Then, we explored with our colleagues in NASA 
Headquarters and the appropriate officials of the Department of 
State, the country to be approached for a ‘tracking partnership’. We 
considered the country’s geographic features, accessibility, political 
stability and available logistic support. Also, we looked into possible 
sources for local employees to reduce the number of U.S. person-
nel. Then, we would work through the U.S. embassy, establish-
ing contacts with representatives of the foreign governments and 
explaining our needs to their leaders. This approach, together with 
the worldwide excitement of the U.S. space effort, opened doors 
and usually assured us of the support needed.37
To meet technical standards, NASA provided training and other 
educational programs for local employees which ultimately ended up also 
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broadening the scientific base in those countries. “With concern for the sensi-
tivities of other countries, we learned to manage responsibly the resources and 
manpower needed to assure our success in exploring space. It helped create a 
great reservoir of goodwill throughout the world for the U.S. space effort and 
. . . proved to be a valuable future investment,” said McKeehan.38 Even today, 
as the space agency continues to promote international goodwill—albeit in a 
very different global environment—the lasting effect of this policy can still be 
felt, the roots of which date back to this time.
As site construction finished, all three military branches also con-
tributed to their operation and maintenance. Army personnel operated the 
five prime Minitrack stations in Latin America plus the one at Fort Stewart, 
Georgia. Meanwhile, the Naval Electronic Laboratory operated the station at 
San Diego, Blossom Point, and the tracking units on Grand Bahama Island, 
Antigua, and Grand Turk. The Air Force operated their radar installations 
at Patrick and Grand Bahama. In Australia, the method of operation was 
somewhat different. There, the Weapons Research Establishment (WRE), an 
agency of that commonwealth’s Department of Supply (DOS), constructed 
and operated the station just outside of the village of Woomera. Under agree-
ment with the Australian government, the DOS supplied the land, power, 
facilities, and workers. In return, the United States furnished all the technical 
equipment, trained the WRE personnel, and installed the initial equipment. 
Half way around the world, an agreement was reached with the South African 
government allowing for the National Telecommunications Research Center 
to staff the station just outside of Johannesburg with South African nationals.
Finally, the NRL contracted with Bendix Radio in Towson, 
Maryland, a Division of Bendix Aviation Corporation, to build the station 
electronics. Being the equipment supplier for the DOD, Bendix was a logi-
cal choice to provide this service. (After NASA was formed and operation 
of Minitrack was turned over by the DOD to the new space agency, Bendix 
would quickly assume operations of the stations in addition to just providing 
the hardware.)
One of the early challenges of Minitrack was the need for rapid data 
processing in order to compute and determine a satellite’s orbit. To this end, 
NRL began working to implement a solution very early on in the network 
design process. As early as September 1955, Paul Herget met with Cuthbert 
C. Hurd, then Director of Electronics Data Processing Machines, and other 
officials of International Business Machines (IBM), to discuss the computa-
tional requirements of the Earth satellite program. In March of the following 
year, the Office of Naval Research issued a request for proposals for the rent-
ing of computer facilities and the furnishing of mathematical and program-
ming services for Project Vanguard. IBM and two other companies responded 
with IBM winning the contract at a bid of $900,000.39
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Under the contract, IBM was to supply personnel to operate, 
around-the-clock, its 704 computer for six weeks after installation and check-
out, and then to provide, free of charge, orbital computations over the life 
of the first three successful satellites or lifetime of the Minitrack Network—
whichever occurred first. In July 1956, NRL’s new Vanguard IBM Computing 
Center opened in downtown Washington, DC. John P. Hagen, Director of 
Project Vanguard, appointed a committee led by Joseph W. Siry, Head of 
the Theory and Analysis Branch at NRL, to oversee the orbital computation 
work. Joining Siry on the committee were Gerald M. Clemence and R. L. 
Duncome of the Naval Observatory, and Paul Herget from the University of 
Cincinnati.40 Since this was a new center, Siry had IBM network the facility 
via a transceiver to a backup site located at the company’s Research Computing 
Center in Poughkeepsie, New York. This ensured computational redundancy 
and reliability that the NRL felt it needed.41
Network operations could be summarized as follows: Within min-
utes after a satellite pass, observations from a station were transmitted by tele-
type to the Vanguard Control Center. After being (manually) inspected for 
errors, the data was recorded onto reel-to-reel magnetic tapes where they 
were taken by courier to the Computing Center. There it was transferred onto 
punched cards and fed into an IBM-704 analog computer (better known at the 
time as an “electronic calculator”). The machine was programmed with math-
ematical calibration formulas and correction factors for each station to account 
for certain systematic errors such as atmospheric conditions and refraction of 
the radio signal as it passed through the ionosphere. Distances and directions 
from the given ground station to the satellite were then computed.
As observations on various points along the trajectory were collected, 
the calibration formulas were updated and the satellite path calculated (a process 
known as differential correction and orbit determination). Adding higher order 
corrections to account for parameters such as atmospheric drag and nonuni-
formity of the Earth gravitational model—for example its nonspherical “pear 
shape”—and variations in geographical mass concentrations, the IBM-704 was 
able to compute (and predict) a satellite’s position and velocity 150 times faster 
than the actual progress of the vehicle. This was certainly no small feat in an era 
before the digital computer. In this manner, the orbit of the satellite was steadily 
refined as it made more and more revolutions around Earth.42
E E E
By September 1957, Minitrack was in place. To the disbelief of its 
builders, however, the network would begin its operations by tracking not an 
American satellite but a Russian one. Just three days after completing a check-
out the network, on 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union shocked the world 
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by announcing the launch of Sputnik 1 (the name meant “satellite” or “fel-
low traveler”). Once they were sure that their 45-kilogram, beach ball-sized 
sphere had indeed made it into orbit, the Soviet news agency Tass announced 
from Moscow that radio signals from the satellite could be heard by receiv-
ers set at 20 and 40 MHz. Amateur radio operators from all over the world 
scrambled to pick up the steady beep of the transmission.
The unexpected Soviet announcement disrupted Minitrack prepa-
rations as all the equipment had been set up to operate at the planned American 
satellite frequency of 108 MHz. In the words of one space pioneer, the United 
States was “caught with its antennas down.”43 Stations had to quickly con-
vert their Minitrack receivers to operate on the new frequency and to put as 
many stations as possible into operation before Sputnik’s transmitter gave out. 
Unlike today where receiver frequencies can be changed by the mere turn of 
a knob, entire racks of equipment had to be changed out. Instructions sent 
by teletype and equipment flown in by the Army enabled stations at Blossom 
Point, San Diego, Antofagasta and Lima (and later at Santiago and Woomera) 
to convert to operating at 40 MHz within a few days.
Although the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been fully 
aware that the USSR. was planning to put something into space, the actual 
launch nevertheless still caught American space planners off guard. Chesley 
Looney illustrated just how much so: 
When the Soviet Union launched its Sputnik in 1957, we were 
totally demoralized initially. This lasted for about 24 hours. Then 
we pulled up our socks and quickly put together a 40 megahertz 
system and three boxes of antenna gear which we flew to Lima, 
Peru, and to Antofagasta and Santiago, Chile, and quickly started 
to track this new bird. Unfortunately, it was not ours, but while we 
were not happy, we gained some valuable experience for the first 
Vanguard vehicle tests expected to follow in December 1957.44
Before its batteries died some 14 days later, the Naval Research 
Laboratory was able to collect some very useful tracking information on 
Sputnik 1 (and later Sputnik 2). Despite the obvious American disappoint-
ment, the whole experience gained tracking the first two Soviet satellites 
ended up being very useful for Minitrack, in essence providing a “real world” 
opportunity to check out communication lines, time references, clocks and 
data transmission accuracy. The United States had chosen a frequency of 108 
MHz because it would give a more accurate indication of direction than the 
lower frequencies. For example, a radio signal transmitted on a carrier fre-
quency of 40 MHz is bent approximately seven times more sharply than one 
at 108 MHz; for 20 MHz, it is 29 times. Therefore, a scientific fallout from 
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tracking Sputnik was the U.S. realizing a large amount of data from which 
new knowledge about the electrified layer of the ionosphere and its effect on 
radio wave propagation was gained.
Two months after the stunning blow of Sputnik 1, the United States 
was ready to attempt orbiting its own satellite. On 6 December 1957, the 
Navy’s Vanguard rocket, with a tiny 1.5-kilogram (3.3-pound), grapefruit-
sized satellite inside the nosecone, rose a few feet off its launch pad at Cape 
Canaveral, and then to the dismay of those watching, promptly crashed back 
down on itself erupting into a huge ball of fire. Unlike the Soviet Union’s 
delayed announcement of Sputnik, the launch attempt of Vanguard was seen 
on American television. The psychological impact of this spectacular failure 
could not be understated. Just one month earlier, the Soviets had succeeded 
in orbiting a dog on the 450-kilogram (990-pound) Sputnik 2. Five days after 
the failed attempt, President Eisenhower, who up until then had been publicly 
endorsing the Navy’s Vanguard as the official U.S. satellite program, reluc-
tantly (and quietly) granted the Jet Propulsion Laboratory under the direction 
of the Army the approval to attempt a satellite launch.
Three months later on 31 January 1958, the Army came through. 
Explore 1 was launched into orbit atop a Jupiter C ICBM to become America’s 
first artificial satellite. In addition to a 108 MHz transmitter (which operated 
for a remarkable 113 days), the 68-kilogram (31-pound) satellite had onboard 
an experiment devised by Professor James A. Van Allen of the University of 
Iowa to detect charged particles in Earth’s magnetic field. In time, telemetry 
downlinked from the first four Explorer satellites led to the discovery of the 
Van Allen Radiation Belts, hailed as the single most important discovery of 
the IGY.
Seven weeks later on 17 March, the Navy—on its third attempt—
finally followed Explorer 1 into space with the launch of Vanguard 1. Although 
its success was delayed, the satellite and its all-important accompanying track-
ing network were to pay great dividend almost immediately. Utilizing the pre-
cise tracking capability afforded by Minitrack, telemetry provided by this tiny 
sphere, which when analyzed, showed Earth’s geode to be slightly pear-shaped 
rather than a perfect sphere—a fact verified some 10 years later in beautiful 
color photographs taken by Apollo astronauts on their way to the Moon.
E E E
Spurred on by the sudden urgency brought about by Sputnik, 
President Eisenhower in early 1958 revisited an initiative that up until then 
had not exactly occupied high priority on his administration’s agenda. That is, 
a national governing agency whose charter was to develop, direct and coordi-
nate all American space-related activities.
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NASA, as it turned out, was not to be a completely new creation, 
but was instead, transformed from a predecessor organization, the National 
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, or NACA. Founded in 1915, NACA 
was a civilian U.S. government agency whose original charter was to advise 
on and coordinate research that was being conducted by other organizations 
in the (then) new field of aeronautics. However, it quickly established itself as 
the leading research organization in the field, pushing back the envelope of 
flight, from supersonic flight in 1947 to high altitude experimental aviation 
that would set the foundation for eventual human flight into space.
After Sputnik—throughout the remainder of 1957 and into 1958—
the status and progress of existing U.S. space activities was reexamined by 
Congress, Eisenhower, and the military. The nature, scope, and organiza-
tion of long-range space goals were debated. The principal issue at hand was 
not whether there should be an organized space program but rather the extent 
of military involvement. To settle the issue, Congress conducted several hear-
ings by the Military Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on 
Armed Services from November to January. Eisenhower himself advocated 
civilian control of existing space related activities but showed little progress in 
resolving the broader, long range issues. However, Congress soon forced the 
administration’s hand.
In January 1958, it introduced a bill authored by New Mexico 
Senator Clinton D. Anderson on behalf of the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy. The bill amended the Atomic Energy Act by giving the Atomic Energy 
Commission a major share of the nation’s space program. Not surprisingly, the 
Administration decidedly opposed this bill. But it was put in a position where 
it had to propose an alternative. On 4 February 1958, President Eisenhower 
announced that he was assigning James R. Killian, Jr., the responsibility of 
developing a definitive solution. (Killian, who was at the time President of 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, took a leave of absence between 
November 1957 and July 1959 to serve as the first presidential science advisor.) 
Following the Sputnik crisis, Eisenhower established the President’s Science 
Advisory Committee (PSAC) of which he appointed Killian chairman.
A month later, on 5 March 1958, President Eisenhower received 
the answer he had wanted, approving the recommendations of the PSAC that 
the “leadership of the civil space effort be lodged in a strengthened and redes-
ignated National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and that legislation be 
enacted to give NACA the authority and flexibility” to carry out its expanded 
responsibilities.45 Politics aside, the recommendation was not unexpected. 
NACA had begun posturing itself in January of that year by proposing an 
interagency space program made up of leadership from its own organization, 
the DOD, the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the NAS. Meanwhile, 
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NACA’s leaders—in particular Hugh L. Dryden—had close ties to many on 
the President’s advisory committee, including Killian himself and World War 
II aviation hero, General James Doolittle.
Killian called the President’s 5 March endorsement the conclusive 
act with respect to building a civilian space agency upon the NACA structure. 
Several factors favored into this decision: 1) NACA was already an established 
research Agency with a large technical staff and sizable research facilities; 2) 
NACA had been progressively moving into space research; 3) If NACA would 
not be allowed to move further into the space field, its whole future would be 
in jeopardy; 4) NACA had a long history of close cooperation with the DOD; 
and 5) NACA’s liabilities could be overcome.
This last point was important as the committee specifically identi-
fied what these liabilities were: 1) NACA did not have an across-the-board 
space competence nor did it have much experience in the administration of 
large-scale developmental contracts; 2) Most of the nation’s space work had 
been done by or for the DOD, and NACA would have had to tap this com-
petence without impairing the military space program; 3) NACA was not in a 
position to push ahead with the immediate demonstration projects which may 
be necessary to protect the nation’s world prestige; 4) NACA was limited by 
the somewhat inflexible hiring and pay provisions of civil service regulations; 
and 5) NACA’s organization and procedures were geared to a much lower 
level of expenditure than would be the case after its expansion. Nevertheless, 
the advisory committee concluded that these liabilities could be overcome—
or at least be mitigated—by enacting appropriate legislation.
Towards this end, four specific recommendations were pro-
posed. First, NACA should be renamed the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. Second, it should be permitted to establish pay rates in excess 
of those of the Classification Act of 1949. Third, the Agency Head should 
be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.46
Finally, the composition of the 17-member NACA governing committee 
should be changed.47
By far the most important point to come out of the 5 March 1958 
Presidential memorandum was the clear emphasis on the civilian nature that 
the new U.S. space agency should have. Language to the effect permeated the 
memorandum, such as “entail increased expenditures and the employment 
of important numbers of scientists, engineers, and technicians,” and that “an 
aggressive space program will produce important civilian gains in general 
scientific knowledge and the protection of the international prestige of the 
United States,” and straight to the point that the “long-term organization for 
the federal space program . . . should be under civilian control.”48
In making the recommendation, the PSAC cited several other 
options which were considered but in the end did not have the advan-
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tages that transforming NACA would have. For example, the DOD was 
not recommended because its deep involvement in the ballistic missile pro-
gram conflicted with the desired civilian scientific emphasis. The Atomic 
Energy Commission was not recommended because its charter was not the 
space program. Finally, putting the civil space program under a proposed 
Department of Science and Technology was not recommended due to the 
delays and the process that would have been required with creating a brand 
new government department, something that the Administration did not 
want to have to go through.
On 2 April, one month after President Eisenhower approved the 
plan, the White House set the process in motion. A draft legislation establish-
ing NASA was sent to Congress by the Bureau of the Budget, and a White 
House directive was issued to NACA and the DOD instructing them to take 
certain preparatory actions pending congressional approval on the draft leg-
islation. This draft to Congress was accompanied by a personal message from 
Eisenhower to congressional members urging them to enact appropriate leg-
islation in order to promptly establish a national space program which he 
deemed was essential to the general welfare and security of the nation. He 
added that the space program should be given high priority and, of course, be 
soundly organized.
In summarizing its civilian nature, the President said: “I recom-
mend that aeronautical and space science activities sponsored by the United 
States be conducted under the direction of a civilian Agency, except for those 
projects primarily associated with military requirements. . . . The civilian 
Agency should be a new one and include aeronautical activities as well.”49
In anticipation of congressional approval and to pave the way for the new 
Agency, the White House initiated a series of preparatory actions under the 
supervision of Dr. Killian and the Bureau of the Budget.  
In May 1958, it instructed NACA to prepare a full explanation of 
the proposed legislation for presentation at congressional hearings. NACA 
was to also make plans to reorient its programs. Internal organizations and 
management structure were changed to carry out the functions to be assigned 
to the newly formed National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and as 
such, to lay the groundwork for whatever expansion might be necessary in 
order to implement the legislation when enacted. Along these lines, the White 
House directed the DOD and NACA to jointly review current Defense space 
programs to determine which ones should be transferred to the new Agency, 
and of those transferred, which would require continued military support. 
Finally, Killian wanted NACA officials to meet with the NAS, the NSF and 
the country’s academic community so as to ascertain how one might best 
secure their participation at large.
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By the time the draft legislation reached Congress, the ground 
work had been done. It was received with enthusiasm on both sides of the 
aisle. On 6 February 1958, the Senate created the Special Committee on 
Space and Astronautics. In a statement confirming its priority, Lyndon B. 
Johnson, the Senate Majority Leader from Texas, was named chairman. The 
House mirrored the move when on 5 March, it created a Select Committee 
on Astronautics and Space Exploration, naming the Speaker of the House 
John W. McCormack from Massachusetts as the chairman. Hearings got 
underway in April and three months later on 16 July, Congress passed the 
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (Public Law 85D568) that 
NACA would become NASA after 90 days, unless the transition was pro-
claimed sooner by the new NASA administrator. Thus, less than six months 
after signing off on the proposal to Congress, the piece of legislation estab-
lishing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration as a legal United 
States government organization returned to Eisenhower’s desk where it was 
signed on 29 July 1958.
Thus in one move, NACA and its 8,000 employees were absorbed 
intact into the new space agency. Its three research Centers (Ames Aeronautical 
Laboratory, Langley Aeronautical Laboratory and Lewis Flight Propulsion 
Laboratory), along with the Army’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, formed the 
space agency’s first Field Centers.50 NACA’s meager $100 million annual oper-
ating budget would soon pale in draconian fashion to the funding that the new 
Agency would begin receiving as America committed itself to the space race.
On 1 October 1958, just three days shy of the one year anniversary 
of Sputnik, NASA officially opened it doors as the nation’s space agency.
CHAPTER 2
EVOLUTION OF A 
NETWORK
The formation of NASA had an immediate, galvanizing effect on 
United States space activities. One major effect was bringing together orga-
nizations and programs that up until then had been functioning as separate 
entities. Consolidated along with the NACA were: Earth science satellite and 
lunar probe programs from the DOD’s Advanced Research Projects Agency; 
the Army’s JPL in Pasadena, California;1 the Army Ballistic Missile Agency’s 
Development Operations Division in Huntsville, Alabama including the 
important Saturn launch vehicle project; the IGY Vanguard and Explorer 
satellite programs, and with it, the Minitrack Network.2 Within weeks, 
Minitrack shifted from military control to NASA management. As part of this 
reorganization, contracts to industry were expanded to allow contractors to 
begin assuming the day-to-day network operations that had previously been 
performed by the military.
One such contractor was Bendix. Murray T. Weingarten, 
President and Chairman of the Board for Bendix Field Engineering 
Corporation (BFEC) from 1973 to 1989, would recall that in this arrangement, 
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The contractor forces were able to respond quickly, yet under 
control, to the many needs of NASA, whether they involved man-
ning a far-off tracking station or chartering and flying a Douglas 
DC-3 aircraft to calibrate these tracking stations. . . . The word 
went out, if you had a problem, whether it involved calibrating a 
tracking station or a need for unique equipment, call ‘Hunter 6-
7700’, which was Bendix’s local phone number in Maryland. It was 
a fast and cost effective means to operate, a fact confirmed many 
years later through numerous congressional oversight hearings.3
NASA depended on a large contingent of contractors to operate 
its tracking networks. This government/contractor “marriage” was a crucial 
ingredient as to why its tracking and data network has been as successful as it 
has been. Weingarten would attribute this long-term success to an infectious, 
esprit de corps of those who made the network happen. 
Whatever needed to be done, we did in an efficient and cost 
effective manner. The spirit was there. We were there to assist 
NASA in helping the United States become the first nation to 
land a man on the Moon. In those early days, NASA had many 
talented, strong, dedicated people who were decision makers 
gathered from other government agencies. We in industry became 
part of that team and were able to participate in the planning 
and the execution of those plans. The program had top priority 
and the team concept prevailed. Of course, there were problems, 
but we did not allow them to fester. They were discussed openly 
and resolved on a timely basis and the program moved forward. 
The program was a pioneering effort, and new program tech-
niques, such  as award fee concepts, were developed, all help-
ing to move the program forward effectively and efficiently. This 
enabled us to break new ground, establish new policies, practices 
and procedures to have effective operations in all parts of the 
world, including such exotic places as Kano, Nigeria; Zanzibar, 
and Madagascar.4
To see how this “can do” attitude shaped the network, one needs to go 
back and examine how things began to change soon after NASA was established.
Soon after the Agency’s formation in the fall of 1958, many of the 
people directly responsible for the Minitrack Network transferred from the 
Office of Naval Research and the White Sands Missile Range to what would 
become the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). Even before NASA offi-
cially opened, Congress authorized in August of 1958, $3.75 million for a 
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“Space Projects Center” to be located near the Capital. On 1 August, Senator 
J. Glenn Beall of Maryland announced that the new Center would be located 
in Greenbelt just outside of Washington, DC on land that was already owned 
by the Agriculture Department’s Agricultural Research Center. Plans for the 
new Center were approved by NASA’s first Administrator T. Keith Glennan 
in November. To accomplish this transfer with as little disruption as possible 
to Project Vanguard, an agreement was reached between NASA and the Navy 
that provided for the continued use of Naval Research Laboratory facilities 
until the new Greenbelt facility could be completed.
It was around this time that Wesley J. Bodin, a sonar researcher 
with NRL, became curious about the new space program, enough so that 
he transferred into the first group at the new Goddard Center. “When I say 
transferred, it was more than people,” said Bodin. “We transferred people, 
equipment, and functions. We had a network already built with the Army 
Corps of Engineers [Minitrack]. . . . This operating network was transferred—
completely—into NASA.”5
Initial personnel transfer took place on 30 November with 157 
members from the NRL being designated to what was temporarily the 
Vanguard Division of the yet unnamed space center. A month later another 
46 persons were moved to form the core of the Space Sciences Division. Over 
American rocket pioneer 
Robert H. Goddard in a 
1932 photograph. (NASA
Image GPN-2000-001336)
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the next three months, 73 additional people transferred to various new divi-
sions. Major construction in Greenbelt soon began in April 1959.6
On 1 May, NASA officially announced that the Center would be 
named the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) in honor of American rocket 
pioneer Robert H. Goddard who on 16 March 1926 launched the world’s 
first liquid propellant rocket. Construction of the new Center continued over 
the next 18 months. Although the Center bustled with activity as soon as 
NRL personnel were transferred, NASA waited until 16 March 1961—the 
35th anniversary of Goddard’s pioneering launch—to officially dedicate the 
Center. In the meantime, NASA found office space wherever possible in the 
area to house the growing contingent of engineers and scientists. To maxi-
mize work space, Jack Mengel’s people in the Space Communications Branch, 
even turned barracks into offices at the nearby Naval Station in Anacostia.7
Organizational changes soon followed. From the two groups that 
came over to NASA—the Vanguard group and a Space Sciences group—Jack 
Mengel formed a new networks division while John Townsend headed up the 
sciences division. (Mengel served as the first Director for Tracking and Data 
Systems at GSFC until retiring in 1972. Townsend became the Goddard Center 
Director from 1986 until his retirement in 1990.) Mengel would recall that: 
The excitement of the space program became a virtual mag-
net which attracted the very best people to handle the many new 
functions which had been assigned to the Goddard Center. This, 
of course, included tracking, data processing, computer opera-
tions, and worldwide communications which were needed to tie 
the system all together. Fortunately, we were able to assemble a 
truly priceless team of very dedicated and talented people.8
Part of the new Center’s early organization included the Space Task 
Group (STG), a cadre of engineers and scientists out of Langley Research 
Center who were responsible for planning NASA’s “manned satellite” activi-
ties. Although located at Langley, the STG was actually part of Goddard’s 
early responsibilities as it assumed the lead for NASA’s new space projects. It 
was a busy time. The Center grew so rapidly that most of the people working 
human spaceflight—commonly known as manned spaceflight—also had to 
move off-Center for a while into a rented facility some five miles away because 
the Greenbelt Center literally ran out of space.9 In its multirole function, 
the Center was assigned the broad scope of managing scientific, communica-
tions, and meteorological satellite projects, and developing sounding rocket 
and spacecraft experiments. To support these activities, NASA’s first real-time 
computer complex was built at the Center. The building that housed this new 
computer facility was among the first to be constructed at Goddard. Some 
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recall that it was still under construction and surrounded by a sea of mud even 
as IBM contractors installed interfaces to Cape Canaveral.10
In January 1961, four months before Alan B. Shepard, Jr. became 
the first American in space, some 670 people from the STG separated from 
the Goddard organization to form the nucleus of what went on to become the 
Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) in Houston, Texas. In a move that would 
engender dissension between Houston and Greenbelt for years to come, 
Goddard still retained responsibility for managing and operating the tracking 
and data network for the human spaceflight program. It thus became the focal 
point from which all network activities (excluding the DSN which remained 
with the JPL) were coordinated and directed, and where data from the indi-
vidual field stations were collected and processed.
While Minitrack continued to track Explorer and Vanguard satel-
lites using radio interferometry, changes were being made during this time to 
accommodate technology advancements rapidly occurring in the field of RF 
transmission.11 In 1960, Minitrack equipment was adjusted by network engi-
neers to receive satellite transmissions in the Very High Frequency (VHF) part 
of the electromagnetic spectrum at 136 MHz. This modification greatly allevi-
Dedication of the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland on 16 March 
1961. (NASA Image No. 022)
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ated low frequency interference at many of the sites and was implemented by 
NASA so as to conform with new international standards being recommended 
by the International Telecommunication Union in the burgeoning field of 
space communications. In addition, telemetry reception at many network sites 
was improved with the addition of nine and sixteen yagi antenna arrays.
As launch vehicles became steadily more reliable in the early 1960s 
and satellites were being launched into higher inclination orbits (the tilt of 
a satellite’s orbit measured with respect to the Equator), their ground tracks 
went well outside the ±35° latitude window that Minitrack had been designed 
to support. For the first time, polar orbits, where the ground track of a satel-
lite covered the entire globe (ideal for weather observation and surveillance), 
came onto the scene. For this reason, Minitrack stations were soon added in 
A VHF double-stacked, yagi antenna, similar to common rooftop antennas used to 
receive over-the-air television signals, but much larger. The antenna consists of both 
vertical and horizontal dipoles which collect signals from a satellite, passing them to a 
preampliﬁer which boosts their strength for processing by a telemetry receiver. The pho-
tograph show an antenna now at the Canberra Deep Space Communication Complex 
in Tidbinbilla, Australia, that is used to support the Interplanetary Monitoring Platform 8 
(IMP-8) satellite. (Photograph by the author)
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northerly and southerly locations outside the original “picket line,” this even 
while some stations were being shut down. From 1959 to 1960, Minitrack 
reached a plateau in terms of the number of network stations.
By the early 1960s, a whole new generation of scientific and appli-
cations satellites boasting capabilities well beyond those of the IGY satellites 
sprang to the forefront. These ranged from weather, communication, surveil-
lance, and Earth science spacecraft to lunar and planetary deep space probes. 
The orbit mechanics of these higher altitude satellites meant slower angular 
rates with respect to a given location on the ground as a satellite circled the 
globe. Elliptical orbits also meant that fewer stations could observe a satellite as 
it circled the globe. Some, like the Interplanetary Monitoring Platform (IMP), 
were on extremely high eccentricity orbits with apogees out to 240,000 kilo-
meters (150,000 miles). Since interferometer effectiveness depended on mea-
suring angular differences, the data that Minitrack could provide for precise 
orbit determination became increasingly inadequate. On top of that, modula-
tion techniques also advanced to accommodate the ever increasing demand 
for higher communication data rates, more complex ground command opera-
tions, and higher bandwidth digital telemetry items such as television.
To accommodate this new generation of artificial satellites—soon 
to be followed by something even more ambitious in “manned satellites”—an 
evolution in NASA’s tracking network had to take place. “While the Vanguard 
program was intended to plow new ground, show new rocket technology and 
develop new guidance and control systems,” said Ches Looney when recalling 
the importance of these changes that were seemingly taking place overnight, 
“the manned space flight program, including its tracking system, required the 
use of proven, off-the-shelf hardware, to offer maximum reliability, because 
after all, human lives were [going to be] at stake.”12
Looney, who was the Associate Division Chief for Advanced 
Development at Goddard from 1959 to 1966, added: 
We began to realize that while Minitrack was a marvelous 
system and absolutely essential in its time, the basic approach used 
was leading us into a blind alley. As things progressed, we were 
able to improve satellite trajectories and orbits as well as orbit cal-
culations, which together with a new S-band ranging system [a 
higher frequency capable of handling higher data rates], allowed 
us to use large parabolic antenna dishes without independent 
acquisition aids such as Minitrack.13
In another sign of the changing times, computer telemetry process-
ing facilities were installed at the field stations to directly feed into Goddard 
computers. This was a far cry from Minitrack, when tracking data was recorded 
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and had to be shipped to Goddard by air or surface courier, a process that took 
anywhere from two weeks to a month. Although coarse determination of the 
orbit track could be done at a station, precise orbit computations would be 
unknown for a couple of weeks.14
The genesis of these changes can be traced back to December 1959 
when NASA formulated its first comprehensive program plan as the country’s 
new space agency in a document simply entitled “NASA Long-Range Plan,” 
prepared by its Office of Program Planning and Evaluation. The report that 
the Agency came up with was essentially a forecast of what it could do within 
certain budgetary constraints and reasonable extrapolations of the state-of-the-
art in launch vehicles—the pacing facet of space technology at the time. Plans 
such as this were being modified continually, particularly in the face of Soviet 
space “firsts,” which at the time seemed to be occurring at an alarming pace.
Satellite launches over the coming two to three years were fore-
casted as part of this plan. These projections provided Goddard engineers 
with a set of requirements from which specific approaches for comprehensive 
tracking, telemetry, and command (TT&C) design were selected, developed, 
tested, and eventually turned into operational hardware. One of the first items 
of business began in 1960 when the GSFC started a process to upgrade the 
TT&C equipment at existing Minitrack stations. In addition to modernizing 
these old Minitrack sites, new stations were established. The network that 
emerged became known in the space community as the Satellite Tracking 
And Data Acquisition Network, or STADAN.15
Over the next two years, large aperture, high gain circularly polar-
ized, parabolic antennas replaced the less efficient, linearly polarized, yagi 
antennas so as to accommodate communications using the more bandwidth 
efficient S-band frequencies (2,100 MHz). The Minitrack approach gave way 
to far better equipped 12-meter (40-foot) and 26-meter (85-foot) dishes. The 
large 26-meter parabolic dish antennas, in particular, were designed to sup-
port the Nimbus meteorological satellite program with its flood of high data 
rate telemetry cloud cover photographs. In addition to receiving downlinked 
telemetry, these antennas could transmit satellite commands from a single 
disc-on-rod uplink antenna mounted on the side of the dish connected to a 
high power amplifier at the base of the antenna. At the same time, a somewhat 
scaled down, 12-meter version of the same antenna type was installed at a 
number of stations to circumvent the cost of the larger dishes.16
A 26-meter pointing antenna system was a pricey item, costing some 
$910,000 (in 1961) to design, engineer, fabricate, and erect. Mengel was to 
recall that in 1961, NASA Administrator Keith Glennan said never to ask him 
again for any more such pricey equipment.17 However, this was only a harbin-
ger of things to come as more advanced spacecraft and elaborate missions soon 
called for the use of even more sophisticated systems in the STADAN.
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Just as critical to the STADAN mission of downlink telemetry 
acquisition and uplink satellite commanding was the tracking function. It had 
become a great deal more difficult as NASA’s programs broadened to embrace 
satellites in high eccentricity, high apogee orbits all the way to geosynchro-
nous orbits. In these orbits, angular rates with respect to a ground station 
changed very slowly (virtually none in the case of geosynchronous). Because 
of this, interferometry effectiveness was greatly reduced and sometimes elimi-
nated altogether.
These tracking problems were anticipated by NASA early on. 
Addressing the issue, Edmund J. Habib at Goddard and Eli Baghadady of 
Adcom, Inc., devised a solution called the Goddard Range And Range Rate 
(GRARR) system. GRARR differed from Minitrack in that it was an active
rather than a passive tracking system. In Minitrack, a beacon aboard a satellite 
continuously sent out a signal which was received on the ground when it came 
into range of a station. With the GRARR, a concept called “side-tone rang-
ing” was used. In side-tone ranging, range tones were sent from the ground 
station up to the spacecraft on a VHF carrier separate from the S-band uplink 
carrying the command signal. An onboard transponder then returned these 
VHF tones along with the downlinked S-band telemetry. At the ground sta-
tion, the precise time delay between the transmitted and received tones was 
measured to determine the range (and its rate of change) from the site to 
the spacecraft. With similar information from other STADAN stations from 
around the world, the orbit in which a satellite is traveling could thus be 
determined very precisely. When the system was first set up around the net-
work, ranges out to 400,000 kilometers (250,000 miles or approximately the 
distance of the Moon from Earth) could be measured. Typical ranging accu-
racy was ±25 meters (82 feet), impressive for its time; range rate accuracy was 
just as good at ±15 centimeters (6 inches) per second.18
In describing the complexity of ranging systems, George Kronmiller, 
former Goddard GRARR Project Manager explained: 
During the early VHF years, our commanding and telemetry 
units were the same as the spacecraft’s. We never took telem-
etry through the ranging system, not because we couldn’t receive 
the signal, but because we didn’t have the data handling gear 
to capture telemetry data and transmit it to NASCOM [NASA 
Communications Network] lines. Actually, until the STDN 
[Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network which Goddard formed 
in 1975], commanding and telemetry were kept separate from 
range and range rate, even with S-band. With the development 
of USB [Unified S-band], ranging and commanding could be 
handled on the same carrier. After the MSFN [Manned Space 
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Flight Network] and the STADAN combined to form the STDN, 
VHF remained the same, but the S-band system combined into a 
unified command, ranging and telemetry system using the same 
NASA standard near-Earth transponder on the spacecraft.19
GRARR equipment was usually housed in two trailers, one 
accommodating receiving and the other transmitting equipment. It operated 
in two different frequency bands: VHF (Very High Frequency) at around 
150 MHz and an Ultra High Frequency (UHF) band at about 2,500 MHz. 
Two antennas were used, one for VHF and the other for UHF. Each was used 
for both transmission and reception. Angular tracking measurements could 
also be made by this equipment, but its accuracy was only good to within 
±0.1 degree in elevation and azimuth, sufficient for the tracking of distant 
spacecraft but not always good enough for following spacecraft whose angular 
rates changed more rapidly. Thus, the angular information was often used as 
pointing or acquisition information for other instruments. Each of the two 
uplink transmitters radiated at 10,000 watts of power—about 5,000 times the 
power of an outdoor “walkie-talkie” hand radio. Since it continuously radi-
ated while the equipment was on, station staff had to be cautious so as to avoid 
Women operators, such 
as Melba Roy at the 
Goddard Space Flight 
Center in a picture 
taken in 1964, were a 
big part of the tracking 
workforce. (NASA Image 
GPN-2000-001647)
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exposure, particularly at the microwave frequencies. A system of flashing red 
warning lights could be found around a station so that people knew when the 
transmitters were on.20
By 1962, the initial GRARR ground elements were installed in 
trailers at Rosman, North Carolina; Tananarive, Madagascar; and Carnarvon, 
Wester Australia. The system was continually improved and used throughout 
the 1960s, supporting numerous Goddard satellite programs to provide range 
and range rate data whose accuracy would not be surpassed until the use of 
lasers a decade later. On Explorer 35—a so-called “Anchored Interplanetary 
Platform” orbiting the Moon—its range was measured to within 1,500 meters 
(4,900 feet) and the range rate accurate to within 65 centimeters (25.5 inches) 
per second at the lunar distance. Goddard engineers eventually considered the 
system reliable out to 1.3 million kilometers (800,000 miles), or three times 
the distance from Earth to the Moon. This was quite an accomplishment for 
1960s technology.21
Yet a third improvement had to do with the dramatic increase in the 
data transfer volume that the Goddard network began to experience in the 
early 1960s. The observatory class of satellites such as the Infrared Space Obser-
vatory (ISO 1 in 1962) and the Orbiting Geophysical Observatory (OGO 1 in 
1964) ushered in an era of information explosion. Meteorological satellites, 
like the Television Infrared Observatory Satellite (TIROS 1 in 1960) and 
Nimbus 1 in 1964, also required large amounts of telemetry to be downlinked 
to the ground during any given data pass over a ground station.
To meet these high “data dump” requirements, Satellite Automatic 
Tracking Antennas (known by the unflattering acronym SATAN) were installed 
throughout the network so as to supplement the telemetry reception work-
load of the parabolic dishes. These were essentially smaller, automatic track-
ing or “auto-track” replacements for the fixed Minitrack yagi antenna arrays. 
Operating in the VHF-band, SATANs were less sensitive (lower antenna gain) 
than their larger S-band counterparts, but were much less expensive to pur-
chase, install and operate than the large dish antennas. Eventually, 30 SATAN 
antennas were installed throughout the STADAN during the 1960s.22
As the technology of NASA’s global tracking network migrated 
from one of using radio interferometry and optics of the late 1950s to the more 
sophisticated STADAN of the 1960s, requirements on the locations of the sta-
tions changed with it. When the original Minitrack Network was developed, site 
selection was driven (and constrained) primarily by the short range of the tiny 
Vanguard transmitter, the technology of the receiving electronics and the gen-
eral lack of precision tracking available during the satellite’s early orbit. In other 
words, no one was exactly sure just where a satellite might appear over the hori-
zon. Thus, Minitrack stations were originally spaced rather closely along a longi-
tudinal line roughly following the 75th meridian (the “picket line”). Later, with 
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downrange tracking ships and much better ascent and orbit injection tracking, 
rough ephemerides (position-time information from which orbital elements are 
derived for orbit determination) were available even before booster burnout.
As a result, the three original “early ops” stations in the British West 
Indies—Antigua, Grand Bahama and Grand Turk—just downrange of Cape 
Canaveral were shut down in 1961. In some cases, actions by the DOD were a 
factor. A year earlier, for example, the Chula Vista station on Brown Field near 
San Diego had to be moved to Mojave when the Navy closed down that air sta-
tion.23 (It was at this new location that the Mojave Station went on to become 
the STADAN side of NASA’s Goldstone Communication Complex.)
The picket line also changed. Take the Minitrack station in Chile 
for example. It had been located since 1957 at a spot called Salar del Carmen 
in the Pacific port town of Antofagasta on the northern part of the coun-
try. Initially operated by the U.S. Army, it was operated by a joint NASA/
University of Chile team under contract NAS5-1925 when the space agency 
was established in 1958. However, with the improved capabilities of the 
nearby stations at Santiago and Lima, Antofagasta became redundant and was 
closed in July 1963. Some University of Chile personnel were transferred 
to the improved Santiago site (actually at nearby Peldehue) while most of 
the American contractors returned to the United States for reassignment. 
Telemetry equipment was redistributed, largely to the stations at Santiago and 
Lima. However, heavy equipment like power generators and air conditioners 
were returned to the U.S. for use at other stations.
While the Antofagasta site was being shut down, the neighbor-
ing station at Santiago underwent a $1.2 million improvement to include the 
installation of a 12-meter (40-foot) medium gain antenna, a 370-square meter 
(4,000-square foot) operations building and a new collimation tower (a tower 
located a few miles from the main antenna equipped with an RF emitter used 
as an aim point to checkout and calibrate the automatic tracking capability of 
the antenna). Under the original contract with the University of Chile which 
allowed the United States to put a station on Chilean soil, the school had 
“agreed to provide . . . land as may be necessary for the effective operation of 
the station.”24 Since the entire reservation on which the station was located 
was used only for pasteurization, obtaining the additional 10 acres that was 
needed for modernizing the station did not present a problem.
The station staff at Santiago almost immediately doubled in 1963, 
from 38 (16 Americans and 22 Chileans) to 62. Under the contract with the 
university, NASA eventually replaced half of the additional 24 people with 
trained Chileans. Said Wes J. Bodin, the Associate Chief of the STADAN 
Engineering Division at the time, this was just an example of the rapid growth 
that the STADAN saw during this time. “When a requirement came in, we 
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added to the network.” Permanent or temporary sites were added as mission 
requirements called for. Bodin cited a couple of examples: 
When NASA started launching spacecraft into polar orbits, 
the second injection burn . . . was too far east of Johannesburg, 
so we added Tananarive. When we needed stations with large 
high-gain antennas, and this was a new requirement, we installed 
our first 26-meter (85-foot) antenna in Alaska. It wasn’t too bad 
working there, so long as you were finished construction work by 
December when the temperature could hit 60 below!25
This time period also saw what would be the first of several episodes 
in the political environment of the host country that would directly affect 
NASA’s operation of its stations. Up until the 1950s, Cuba was a relatively 
stable independent island, enjoying strong agricultural trade with the United 
States and serving as a popular tourist destination in the western Caribbean. 
The U.S. had occupied this largest of the Caribbean islands in the Spanish-
American War of 1898 until its independence was granted in 1902. After that, 
the United States continued to have a major influence in Cuban affairs, even 
occupying it briefly a second time from 1905 to 1909.
In 1940, Fulgencio Batista was elected president and over the next 
four years, began a series of idealistic reforms. Not surprisingly, the Cubans 
did not see eye-to-eye with his isolationist views and voted him out of office 
in 1944. In 1952 however, Batista regained power in a bloodless coup three 
months before the planned election. This time, he instituted a dictatorship. 
As a result, many factions and guerrilla groups began opposing him. One 
such group was led by Fidel Castro Ruz who had participated in a failed 
attempted to overthrow the Dominican Republic government in 1947. He 
was a staunch nationalist known for his opposition of American influence in 
Cuba. In 1953, Castro attacked the Moncada barracks, the main provincial 
garrison of Batista’s army, but was captured and exiled to Mexico. However, 
he returned to Cuba in November of 1956 and over the course of the next two 
years, his “26th of July Movement” gathered strength and influence, eventu-
ally to the point where Batista finally had to flee the country on 31 December 
1958. The next day, Castro established a one party communist state in Cuba, 
the first of its kind in the Western Hemisphere.
At the time of Batista’s ouster, 75 percent of Cuba’s farmable land 
was owned by foreign interest (mostly U.S.). The new government adopted 
land reforms and confiscated all the private property owned by upper class 
Cubans and foreign companies. Although Castro did not officially reveal his 
Marxist leanings until 1961, the United States had recognized the intentions 
of the new government, and as a result, relations rapidly deteriorated. On the 
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day that Castro seized control of the Cuban government, the Minitrack sta-
tion, which was located at Batista Military Airfield, was shut down even as 
the American Embassy scrambled to learn the fate of NASA Station Director 
Chester ‘Chet’ Matthes and his family, as well as that of the military per-
sonnel assigned to the tracking station.26 By noon the next day, confirma-
tion was received that all were safe. Station personnel were then told by the 
State Department to follow instructions from the American Embassy and that 
the station would reopen when the Embassy received word and considered it 
advisable. But that word never came. Instead, they were told to close out the 
station, remove the assets and leave the country.27
In events unrelated to Cuba during this time, operations at the 
Fort Stewart Station in Georgia underwent some reorganization. When the 
Minitrack station was established there in 1957, the site was primarily an 
Army anti-aircraft training facility. After the Korean cease fire, the Army 
recognized that it needed to maintain a ready and able armor force that could 
be deployed at a moment’s notice to deal with threats that may suddenly 
erupt. As a result, Fort Stewart was turned into an Armor and Artillery Firing 
Center since its old anti-aircraft ranges and impact areas were better suited for 
this purpose than for the new age of missiles. Because of this realignment, the 
NASA tracking station no longer fit the bill for the post’s new mission and the 
Fort Stewart Station was phased out of the Minitrack Network.28
With the abrupt shut down of two primary stations, a gaping hole mate-
rialized in the middle of the picket line. NASA had to quickly find a replacement. 
Attention focused on Fort Myers, Florida. Situated essentially midway between 
Fort Stewart and Havana, it was a logical choice, geographically. Equipment was 
immediately relocated to Florida from the two sites that had shut down and satel-
lite pass responsibilities redesignated and combined at the new site.
From 1960 through 1963, most of the early Minitrack stations were 
refurbished and transitioned into the STADAN. For example, Johannesburg, 
Quito and Santiago received 12-meter (40-foot) antennas, and all acquired 
dual receive/command SATANs. Santiago was modified into a GRARR site, 
as well. The South American stations, in particular, continued as a centerpiece 
in the evolved network, providing NASA with a tracking and data acquisition 
capability in the southern hemisphere.29
With satellite ground tracks now extending well beyond the origi-
nal ±35˚ latitude window, new stations at locations outside that latitude 
range had to be built. From 1960 to 1966, the GSFC oversaw the build up of 
eight additional STADAN stations on four continents. These were the most 
advanced stations to date. In North America, they were located at Fairbanks, 
Alaska; East Grand Forks, Minnesota; Rosman, North Carolina; and Saint 
John’s, Newfoundland, the eastern-most point of Canada.30 In Europe, 
the Winkfield Station was erected in Berkshire, England. The addition of 
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these sites greatly expanded satellite coverage in the northern hemisphere, 
increasing the observation window from 35º latitude to 65º. In the south, the 
Johannesburg Station was joined by a new one at Tananarive in the Malagasy 
Republic on the island of Madagascar.
Fairbanks and Rosman soon became the most extensive stations 
in the system. In March 1962, Gilmore Creek, on the outskirts of Fairbanks, 
received the first of the large parabolic dishes, featuring both the 12- and 26-
meter (40-and 85-foot) dishes, along with the GRARR and a full comple-
ment of SATAN equipment. In November 1966, in what was essentially 
a cost saving move, the STADAN site in College, Alaska, still operating 
Minitrack equipment, was consolidated with the nearby Fairbanks Data 
Acquisition Facility (DAF) at Gilmore Creek for an estimated annual savings 
of $292,000.31 This was a relatively easy decision by Goddard as these sites in 
the vicinity of Fairbanks were less than 40 kilometers (25 miles) from each 
other. With this move, the last of the remaining Minitrack antenna arrays 
was transferred to Gilmore.
The Fairbanks Station—also known officially as “Alaska”—was 
located in the central part of the state 22 kilometers northeast of Fairbanks at 
a well-known landmark where Rose Creek joined Gilmore Creek. Being the 
most northerly of all the stations, Alaska provided crucial support for polar 
and high eccentricity, elliptical orbiting spacecraft such as the Nimbus weather 
satellites and the Alouette. (On 29 September 1962, Canada became the third 
country to orbit an artificial satellite with the launch of the Alouette, a science 
satellite to study the affect of aurora borealis, or the Northern Lights, on radio 
frequency (RF) signal propagation in the upper ionosphere and its effect on 
communications.) Conditions at the station were at times harsh, characterized 
by cold winters of below -60ºF and summers in which the temperature could 
rise above 90ºF. During the winter months for example, the station had to 
operate a steam boiler system to forestall the spread of glacier formations 
around the site.
Even though work conditions for personnel assigned to remote 
locations such as Alaska could at times be trying, severe injury or death in 
the field was not a common thing. A case in point, though, was recorded on 
3 May 1969 at the Fairbanks Station. At approximately 4:30 p.m., a RCA 
Service Company (the station’s maintenance and operations contractor) 
employee named George Matilla was found crushed to death beneath his car 
at the station’s garage. Since it was a weekend, no one knew exactly what had 
happened. His death was later ruled as an accident by the Alaska State Patrol 
who concluded that the jack had slipped as he worked alone under his car, 
fatally crushing him.32 Throughout the years, there have been other stories as 
well, particularly at the more desolate locations, of those who wandered out-
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side the station compound to check on equipment or simply “went fishing” 
who were never heard from again.33
In the Southern Hemisphere, cooperation between Australia and the 
United States in the field of space research began in 1957 with construction of 
facilities at Woomera, South Australia, for the IGY. In a formal exchange of notes 
in February 1960, the two governments agreed on a cooperative space program:
The object of such further and extended cooperation would 
be to facilitate spaceflight operations contributing to the advance-
ment of our mutual scientific knowledge of man’s spatial envi-
ronment and its effects; the application of this knowledge to the 
direct benefit of man; and the development of space vehicles of 
advanced capabilities, including manned space vehicles.34
The Australian ground stations were established and run by the 
Department of Supply, or the DOS. In this agreement, construction and 
Orroral Valley (ORR), nestled some 50 kilometers southwest of Canberra in the Namadgi 
National Park, was one of 10 NASA stations in Australia at one time. The most com-
prehensive Satellite Tracking And Data Acquisition Network station in the Southern 
Hemisphere, ORR operated from 1965 to 1984. Clearly seen are the 26-meter antenna 
adjacent to the main Operations Building and the 2 SATAN antennas. Note the Minitrack 
array in the foreground. (Photo courtesy of CSIRO)
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operation of the stations were financed by NASA while the DOS provided 
management and staffing, either from its own resources within the Weapons 
Research Establishment or through Australian industry contractors. In this 
way, Australia had the most autonomy and independence in running the 
NASA stations outside of the United States. Unlike most stations where the 
local staff reported to an onsite, NASA-appointed Station Director, the DOS 
in Australia appointed its own people. In this way, a great sense of ownership 
was promoted—one which prevails to this day.
The Australian government welcomed space activities as intrinsi-
cally good and providing a medium for strengthening diplomatic cooperation 
with the U.S. It viewed such activities as having strong spin-off potential to 
Australia in such fields as defense, communications, and astronomy. From the 
beginning, Australia was sensitive to the importance of retaining indepen-
dence and having a substantial share in the control of network activities on its 
soil. Robert A. Leslie, who headed Australia’s network operations—a “father 
figure” in the commonwealth’s space work—stated its position very clearly 
in a 1974 letter to the Minister of Science in which he reiterated this right of 
Australian ownership:
1  The employment of foreigners where Australians could be 
employed would be undesirable.
2  Control of the activity in foreign hands might have been a mat-
ter for question on security grounds and would have been a 
matter of national controversy.
3  The maximum spin-off to Australia—for example, to industry, 
universities and government agencies—could best be affected 
by Australians.
In return for what could be viewed as granting of Australian auton-
omy, the DOS made an annual contribution to NASA, a subsidy of $140,000 
for operations of the Australian Tracking Stations. Although insignificant in 
terms of absolute dollar amount to NASA’s budget (measured in the billions of 
dollars), this token sum has nevertheless been viewed importantly by the U.S. as 
a sign of goodwill and good faith on the part of the Australian government.35
In August 1960, the Minitrack station at Satellite Tracking Centre 
just northwest of Woomera was moved to the nearby Island Lagoon dry lake 
bed 22 kilometers (14 miles) to the south and its operations combined with 
the new Deep Space Network (DSN) site there. A station was also opened at 
Carnarvon, Western Australia, collocated with a Mercury Space Flight Network 
station that was then being constructed. However, the largest STADAN site in 
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A vintage 1960s Antenna Control Unit (ACU). Graphical computer displays, touch 
screens and joysticks have, for the most part, replaced the lights and buttons of the old 
ACUs. Shown is a control unit on display at the Space Museum at the Canberra Deep 
Space Communication Complex in Tidbinbilla. (Photograph by the author)
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the Southern Hemisphere officially opened on 24 February 1966 at Orroral 
Valley 50 kilometers (30 miles) southwest of Canberra.
The Orroral Station was needed as Woomera (officially closed on 
22 December 1972) was no longer a cost-effective location for NASA. Situated 
in the quiet valley of Namadgi National Park, Orroral provided an RF-quiet 
area to meet requirements for the new 26-meter (85-foot) antennas that were 
being installed across the STADAN. The rolling hills surrounding the area 
made Orroral an ideal environment for a tracking station by naturally shield-
ing the site from man-made radio frequency interference. When the station 
site was chosen, the isolated valley located deep in the “Land of the Echidna 
and Platypus” was accessible only to light and off-road vehicles. Even today, 
one needs to cross the 100-year-old Tharwa Bridge just to reach the site. 
Before construction could start, suitable roads had to be paved for the passage 
of heavy construction equipment and antenna hardware. As at sites around the 
world, NASA provided this as part of its construction.
Six months after the station became operational, network respon-
sibilities at Island Lagoon were phased out and what was left of the Minitrack 
equipment was moved to the new location. The net effect of this growth 
was to more than double the time that high inclination orbiting satellites 
could be in contact with the ground. Orroral became the most comprehen-
sive STADAN site in the Southern Hemisphere. Construction of the station 
began in November 1964 and was completed in July of the next year at a cost 
of £1,000,000 (about $1.5 million U.S. dollars in 1964).36
The layout of the station was fairly typical of the new, larger DAF 
across the STADAN. Equipment was contained within an area of about 40 
acres and laid out so as to minimize interference to the receiving systems 
from buildings, support structures and other antennas. The centerpiece of 
the station was the 26-meter diameter parabolic tracking antenna. Weighing 
with its support structure and hydraulic gimbal-drive mechanism some 400 
metric tons (882,000 pounds) and standing 36 meters (120 feet) high, it was 
easily the most prominent structure on site. From the Operations Building, 
the antennas were controlled and all tracking activities coordinated with the 
rest of the network.
During acquisition, the antenna—directed by data passed from 
Goddard—searched a specified area of the sky until it picked up the beacon 
signal transmitted by the satellite. The antenna data system then measured and 
encoded the look-angles and fed this information into a servo control system 
and an Antenna Control Unit (ACU) in the control center at the Operations 
Building. The information was also recorded on teletype punched tape and 
passed to the control center for orbit determination.
To receive telemetry downlink from a satellite, a command signal 
was encoded and transmitted using one of two 2,500 watt transmitters feed-
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ing a small command antenna that was attached to the rim of the main dish. 
Signal from this uplink activated a transmitter in the satellite and data stored 
onboard the satellite could be transmitted to the ground station. Data and 
timing signals were then processed for recording onto 14-track reel-to-reel 
magnetic tapes and, in the case of time-critical information, for transmission 
by teletype back to Goddard. Backup receiving was usually provided by an 
onsite steerable Yagi antenna which could be directed by information from 
any of the primary tracking dish antennas.37
A continuous electrical power supply to a station was obviously 
vital to its operations. Even a brief outage could cause loss of data or compro-
mise the mission if it were to occur at a key moment. If available, network 
stations used commercial line power backed up by its own diesel power gen-
Layout of the Orroral Valley STADAN Station. Note that the Minitrack array transferred 
from Woomera was eventually placed further west of the SATAN receivers than shown 
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erators. If line power was not available—as was the case at ORR—then power 
was generated onsite exclusively using dual-redundant generators with suffi-
cient capacity to provide full backup should one unit fail. At Orroral, for 
instance, two 250,000-watt and two 500,000-watt units were used. Sites usu-
ally had two separate power distribution systems, one to run the station core 
electronics and tracking equipment and the other for utilities, air condition-
ing, lighting, and facility electricity needs.38
Finally, a DAF was not cheap to operate, requiring a staff of about 
150 technical, administrative and maintenance workers rotating in shifts. 
The operating cost was about $1.2 million a year in the mid-1960s, almost as 
much as the onetime cost to build a station. NASA spent over $140 million 
in Australia alone in the 1970s. Besides just getting the technical job done, 
in the diagram. (STADAN Facility, Orroral Valley, ACT: Information Brochure. Folder 
680/5/23 NASA Australian Operations Ofﬁce, Yarralumla, ACT)
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such international cooperation also yielded social benefits. For example, by 
the mid-1970s, seven of the ten stations which had been built in Australia 
since 1958 had become popular tourist attractions, often offered as stops by 
touring companies. The Department of Science officially estimated that from 
1965 to when it closed in 1974, the Carnarvon Station was visited by 7,000 to 
10,000 people every year (this, in a continent of around 12 million in 1970). 
Similarly, the DSN site at Tidbinbilla on the outskirts of Canberra was draw-
ing some 8,000 visitors annually.39
In addition to the permanent sites at Orroral and Carnarvon, several 
project-specific (temporary) stations were also added by Goddard in Australia. 
One reason that the Southern Hemisphere played host to most of the tem-
porary sites was because that was where the critical Earth-injection phase of 
a mission to send satellites into high-inclination orbits usually took place. 
Key among these places was Darwin, a transportable station on the northern 
shores of Australia, selected specifically to support the Orbiting Geophysical 
Project missions, and Cooby Creek near Toowoomba in Queensland, which 
was added to support the Applications Technology Satellites (ATS). Kano, 
Nigeria in 1965 provided another temporary site for STADAN, briefly hous-
ing equipment supporting the International Satellite for Ionospheric Studies 
(ISIS). Goddard even ventured into Pakistan where a site was set up for a 
while to observe LANDSAT.40
As STADAN grew, one of its requirements was to receive high 
bit rate digital telemetry from a new observatory-class of large, science satel-
lites. These included the Orbiting Geophysical Observatory (OGO), Orbiting 
Astronomical Observatory (OAO), Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO) and 
the Nimbus weather satellites. While the facility in Alaska could support polar 
orbiting and high inclination satellites, it could not support this new class of 
observatories, which orbited Earth at lower inclinations.
For these missions, Goddard needed a wideband DAF at a latitude 
that was suitable for a high percentage of data recovery on these orbits. Dubbed 
internally as Project 3379, network engineers began looking for a suitable loca-
tion for their newest station in 1962. Site surveys eventually whittled the num-
ber of possibilities down to two: Fort Valley, Georgia and Rosman, North 
Carolina. Rosman—the actual station site was some 15 kilometers northwest 
of the town itself—was eventually selected. The choice was due in part to 
Rosman being closer to Greenbelt which expedited experimenters with evalu-
ation and control of their projects. Located 55 kilometers southwest of Asheville 
on the grounds of Pisgah National Forest, the site had an advantage of the nat-
ural setting of the surrounding hills which provided shielding from electro-
magnetic interference. Because it was on national forest land, the location also 
lacked high voltage transmission lines and commercial circuits in its vicinity 
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and, in the early 1960s, had an absence of commercial airline routes directly 
over the station.41
NASA invested $5 million in 1962 to build the station, filling a criti-
cal need as the network modernized from Minitrack to STADAN.42 Rosman 
was established specifically as a full service Data Acquisition Facility and was 
among the first not to have the old interferometry tracking system. The site was 
well equipped to handle the new network mission, providing a full suite of the 
most up-to-date equipment for its time: telemetry reception with two 26-meter 
antennas that could autotrack at 1.7 and 2.29 GHz; a 3 kW command uplink 
system; a SATAN 16-element automatic yagi antenna array; S-band GRARR; 
a 1,200-square meter (13,000-square foot) operations building; a 420-square 
meter (4,500-square foot) power and service building housing four 200-kilovolt 
diesel generators, garage, and utilities; a 140-square meter (1,500-square foot) 
building to house the antenna hydraulic drive system; and a collimation tower 
with a small transmitter building located 2 kilometers (1.3 miles) west of the 
main antenna to serve as a boresight (beam center) for calibration and testing of 
the main tracking antennas. The first 26-meter system became operational in 
Two 26-meter tracking antennas dominate the skyline of the Rosman STADAN station 
in the hills of the Pisgah National Forest, North Carolina in this undated photograph. 
(Unnumbered photograph. Folder 8820, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA
History Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington DC)
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July 1962 followed by the second unit in August 1964. These were immediately 
used to support S-band communications, which began earlier that year with the 
launch of the Hughes-built Syncom 1, the world’s first geosynchronous com-
munications satellite, on 14 February 1963.43
The Tar Heel state embraced its new scientific venture enthusi-
astically. On 26 October 1963, Rosman was officially dedicated with a cer-
emony replete with VIPs. Principal speakers included Governor J. Terry 
Sanford; U.S. Senators Sam J. Ervin, Jr. and B. Everett Jordan; Dr. George 
L. Simpson, Jr., NASA Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization 
and Policy Planning; Edmond C. Buckley, Director of the Office of Tracking 
and Data Acquisition; and Dr. Harry J. Goett, GSFC Center Director. U.S. 
Representative Roy A. Taylor served as master of ceremonies.44
Although small compared to the 70-meter (230-foot) antennas 
used at the time by the DSN, the 26-meter (85-foot) dishes used in STADAN 
were nevertheless massive in their own right. Their movement was controlled 
by two large hydraulic motors that enabled three kinds of operation:
1  Manual operation in which the antenna was guided by an opera-
tor, who sitting at his control console, actually steered the antenna 
by sending electrical servo-signals to the motors.
2  Computer operation in which commands were sent by a com-
puter that predicted the path of the satellite. Due to its large 
aperture, the 26-meter (85-foot) antenna had a rather narrow 
beamwidth (the direction in front of an antenna in which RF 
signals can be reasonably detected and focused). Consequently, it 
must be pointed near the horizon in the vicinity in which the 
satellite was expected to rise before the signal could be acquired 
(the acquisition process). By predicting the path of a satellite 
in orbit, the antenna could be pre-positioned by the computer 
thereby reducing the search time.
3  Automatic operation, or autotrack, in which a satellite’s move-
ment across the sky was automatically tracked by the antenna 
as it moved across its field-of-view. In this mode, the ACU 
converted the position of the satellite relative to the antenna 
boresight into electrical control signals which were sent to the 
antenna. In autotrack, the antenna was usually pointed just above 
the horizon at an azimuth where the satellite was expected to 
break horizon. Once acquired, autotracking enabled the dish to 
follow a spacecraft from horizon to horizon. During this pro-
cess, the station computer converted the angular position of the 
Chapter 2 \ Evolution of a Network 53
antenna into electronic code which was automatically punched 
on teletype tape. This data was then transmitted to Goddard via 
the NASCOM where it was processed along with pass data from 
other stations for use in orbit determination calculations.45
Output from each of these antennas was fed to a telemetry receiver 
located in a nearby control and operations building. The job of the receiv-
ers was to convert the radio frequency signal from the antenna into a lower 
frequency signal which could then be recorded onto reel-to-reel magnetic 
tape—a process known as down converting. The output of the receiver con-
tained many individual pieces of information, not unlike, for example, the 
picture and sound for television received on a single channel. The magnetic 
tape recorders used to record the telemetry operated on the same principles as 
everyday-use home tape recorders but were much more robust in terms of the 
amount of data and speed they could record at. In addition to the telemetry 
itself, a precise time reference, the signal strength and operator voice annota-
tions, if any, were all recorded simultaneously onto the tapes. Once packaged, 
the tapes were shipped to Goddard for processing.
In spaceflight communications, precise timing data, in particular, is 
of the essence. A spacecraft in circular orbit at 480 kilometers (300 miles) 
above the surface of Earth travels at a speed of 7,600 meters-per-second (25,000 
feet-per-second), or roughly 27,300 kilometers-per-hour (17,000 miles-per-
hour)! Therefore, accurate timing information is of the utmost importance so 
that computation of the spacecraft’s position in space can be made and that 
timing of various scientific events as downlinked to the ground can be pin-
pointed. In the STADAN, DAF timing was synchronized to the U.S. Bureau 
of Standards Time Standard Radio Station—WWV in Boulder, Colorado—
to an accuracy of ±0.001 seconds, or one one-thousandths of a second. While 
this level of accuracy may not seem like much in the age of the Global 
Positioning System, where timing accuracies are measured not in terms of 
milliseconds but microseconds (one millionth of a second), it was quite the 
accomplishment in the analog era of the 1960s. These time-code generators 
produced electronically coded pulses which were recorded onto magnetic 
tapes simultaneously with the tracking and telemetry signals to provide the 
needed timing reference. Finally, to compliment the new, large, parabolic 
antennas, Rosman, along with the other DAFs at Gilmore Creek and Orroral 
Valley, continued to use the SATANs. Even though older, they still provided 
the much larger field-of-view needed to track the older generation satellites 
that still operated on VHF frequencies.46
During this time, the STADAN also saw the addition of one of 
the few network additions not in the English-speaking world. In 1964, a 
transportable station was set up on the island of Madagascar just off the east 
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African coast. A common language was obviously desirable from the stand-
point of working with local nationals and with the local government. This 
was always one of the factors NASA considered when choosing locations for 
its ground stations. However, a station was required in the western part of the 
Indian Ocean for tracking highly elliptical, high apogee orbit injections that 
occurred over that part of the world. Also, NASA had to look for another 
location when it became apparent that the South African station would not be 
able to cover some of these critical events.
On 19 December 1963, the U.S. entered into a 10-year agreement 
with the Malagasy Republic allowing for the installation of a transportable 
ground station outside the port city of Majunga in northwest Madagascar. 
This agreement was reached in accordance with the spirit of a United Nations 
resolution calling for the application of results of space research to benefit 
all peoples. In addition to benefiting that region of the world by generat-
ing much-needed weather forecasts (especially during hurricane season), the 
station provided jobs for some 200 local residents in nontechnical positions 
for handling of day-to-day station maintenance. In reaching this agreement, 
NASA sent a delegation to the capital city of Tananarive where they were 
“received by the president, Mr. Philibert Tsiranana, most graciously in an 
office decorated with space memorabilia.”47 He soon gave the United States 
his enthusiastic support and permitted NASA to start bringing telemetry vans 
into Majunga.
The initial equipment consisted of five 9-meter (30-foot) trailers, 
each housing a 136.2-KHz and 400-MHz telemetry receiver that were geared 
to support the Nimbus, POGO (Polar Orbiting Geophysical Observatory) and 
A-12 Goddard satellite programs. Much of the equipment at Majunga came 
from the Australian sites of Muchea and Woomera, which had phased out 
at the conclusion of Project Mercury the previous May.48 An MPS-26 radar 
was also temporarily deployed to support the EGO (Eccentric Geophysical 
Observatories) satellites.49
Explanatory literature handed out to familiarize station workers 
assigned to Madagascar described the environment as an area of mild winters 
and rainy summers, a relatively expensive but charming place to live. The 
handbook noted that the people of Madagascar were not politically minded 
and were predisposed to favor America and Americans. Harry McKeehan, 
who represented GSFC in negotiations with the Republic, called “our friend-
ship with the president and the people of this island republic invaluable in 
building and operating this Indian Ocean site.”50 This cooperation was to play 
a pivotal role later when a political uprising in nearby Zanzibar created a tense 
situation, one in which American lives were put in jeopardy that required an 
evacuation to the Malagasy Republic (see Chapter 4).
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Table 2-1: Stations of the Satellite Tracking And Data Acquisition 
Network (STADAN)
Station
Latitude
Longitude From To
Equipment and 
Capabilities Remarks
North America
Alaska
(Fairbanks)
64°59’N
147°31’W
1962 1984 GRARR, MOTS, 
Minitrack, SATAN,
One each 40, 45, 
85-foot dish
College site closed in 1966 
and Minitrack equipment 
transferred to Gilmore. The most 
comprehensive of the STADAN 
stations.
Blossom Point,
Maryland
38°25’N
77°06’W
1956 1966 Minitrack, MOTS, 
SATAN
The prototype Minitrack station. 
Used as a servicing station and 
training facility. NASA ceased 
joint operations with the Navy 
in 1966. Continued to be used 
by the NRL as a satellite control 
center.
East Grand 
Forks, 
Minnesota
47°56’N
97°01’W
1960 1966 Minitrack, MOTS, 
SATAN
Located near Grand Forks Air 
Force Base, a key ICBM station.
Fort Myers,
Florida
26°33’N
81°52’W
1959 1972 Minitrack, SATAN, 
MOTS
Station formed when Havana 
and Fort Stewart shut down. 
Minitrack equipment transferred.
Mojave,
California
35°20’N
116°54’W
1960 1969 40-foot dish, 
SATAN, Minitrack, 
MOTS
Moved from Brown Field near 
San Diego in 1960. Located in 
the Goldstone complex in valley 
adjacent to DSN site.
Network Test 
and Training 
Facility,
GSFC, 
Greenbelt, 
Maryland
38°59’N
76°51’W
1966 1986 Minitrack, 59-foot 
antenna used 
for IUE support 
transferred to the 
Naval Academy. 
30-foot antenna 
moved to Wallops 
in 1986
Until 1974, the NTTF was used 
to test equipment bound for 
the network and for personnel 
training. In 1974, it became part 
of the operational STDN. Station 
responsibilities were transferred 
to Wallops in 1986.
Rosman,
North Carolina
35°12’N
82°52’W
1963 1981 Two 85-foot 
dishes,
Three SATANs, 
GRARR, ATS
The most extensive STADAN site 
along with Alaska. Designed to 
receive high bit rate telemetry 
from observatory satellites. 
Turned over to the DOD in 1981.
Saint John’s,
Newfoundland
47°44’N
52°43’W
1960 1970 Minitrack, MOTS First of the northern latitude 
stations to support tracking of 
polar orbiting satellites
continued on the next page
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Station
Latitude
Longitude From To
Equipment and 
Capabilities Remarks
South America
Lima,
Peru
11°47’S
77°09’W
1957 1969 Minitrack, MOTS, 
SATAN
One of the original Minitrack 
stations. Turned over to their 
university under contract.
Quito,
Ecuador
00° 37’S
78°35’W
1957 1981 Minitrack, MOTS, 
SATAN, 40-foot 
dish
Equipment transferred to Dakar, 
Senegal after station phase out 
after STS-2
Santiago,
Chile
33°09’S
70°40’W
1957 1988 Minitrack, MOTS, 
SATAN, GRARR, 
USB, a 30 and 
40-foot dish
Most extensive of the South 
American stations. Operated jointly 
with the University of Chile who 
continues to run the station today.
Europe
Winkﬁeld,
England
57°27’N
00°42’E
1961 1981 Minitrack, 14-foot 
dish, SATAN, 
MOTS
Operated by the British under 
agreement to the U.S.
Africa
Johannesburg,
South Africa
25°53’S
27°42’E
1957 1975 Minitrack, MOTS, 
SATAN, a 40 and 
85-foot dish
Operated by South African 
nationals. Located with DSN 
site. Phased out under political 
pressure.
Majunga/
Tananarive, 
Malagasy 
Republic
19°S
47°18’E
1964 1975 45-foot dish, 
GRARR
Transportable site erected at 
Majunga which was moved a 
year later to a more permanent 
establishment at Tananarive to 
support the MSFN. Forced out 
due to political strife.
Australia
Carnarvon,
Western 
Australia
24°54’S
113°43’E
1964 1974 GRARR, C-band 
radar, 30-foot 
USB
Co-located with a MSFN site. 
Darwin,
Northern 
Territory
12°17’S
130°49’E
1965 1969 14-foot antenna 
to support OGO 
project
Temporary mobile OGO project 
station. Antenna transferred to 
Kauai MSFN station.
Orroral Valley,
Australian 
Capital Territory
35°38’S
148°57’E
1965 1984 Minitrack, MOTS, 
two SATANs, 85-
foot dish
The 85-foot antenna was 
relocated to the University of 
Tasmania after the station closed 
where it is still in use by the 
school
Toowoomba/
Cooby Creek,
Queensland
27°24’S
151°56’E
1966 1969 SATAN, ATS Temporary site used to support 
the ATS project
Woomera,
South Australia
31°23’S
136°53’E
1957 1966 Minitrack, MOTS, 
SATAN
Closed out within 12 months 
after Orroral Valley became 
operational. Minitrack equipment 
transferred to Orroral.
Chapter 2 \ Evolution of a Network 57
Table 2-1 is a summary of the STADAN ground stations highlight-
ing their capabilities and their roles in the network. Appendix 1 shows the 
network as it appeared throughout the 1960s into the mid-1970s.
E E E
Network stations were operated by either American contractors, 
local nationals (if overseas), or a combination of both. To promote interna-
tional goodwill, NASA used local nationals to the extent possible for non-
technical positions. The staff usually worked under the direction of NASA 
civil service supervisors assigned to the station, led by a Station Director and 
sometimes a second-in-charge, the Deputy Station Director.51 While Goddard 
contracted with several companies to perform station support requirements 
that ranged from facility maintenance to transportation to administration, it 
generally relied on two commercial contractors to run the network: BFEC 
and RCA.52
As the tracking network expanded from Minitrack to STADAN, so 
did the level of contractor support provided. In FY1963, Bendix as a corpora-
tion did $32.5 million of business with NASA. Over the next five years, 
as the STADAN expanded and became more complex, more stations were 
added. By FY 1968, Bendix was doing $123.8 million worth of work for 
NASA, making it the space agency’s seventh top contractor in overall dollar 
amount obligated.53 Of this amount, $39.1 million, or about one-third, were 
two prime contracts with Goddard (NAS5-9968 and NAS5-10750) to operate 
and maintain its two networks, the STADAN and the MSFN.54
Bendix employees received a number of incentives to work at over-
seas locations. By the late 1960s, for example, an array of seven allowances, 
each tailored to the specific conditions of the locale, was being offered. One, 
the Foreign Assignment Allowance, was a 10 percent of base pay “sweetener” 
applied to compensate for the inconveniences and cultural disadvantages at 
locations where employees had to learn a foreign language and assume addi-
tional assignments due to lack of trained local personnel. The Cost of Living 
Allowance was granted in circumstances where costs of subsistence, services 
and goods exceeded comparable expenses in the Baltimore-Washington area. 
Since that particular variable allowance did not cover housing expenses, a 
separate Housing Allowance was also established. For contractor personnel 
on location with families, many companies provided an Education Allowance 
that reimbursed the cost of providing educational services to children at 
local schools who would otherwise be tax-subsidized in United States public 
schools. As the years went by, many contractor employees ended up spending 
their whole careers overseas, doing very well for themselves, moving from sta-
tion to station as the landscape of the tracking network evolved.55
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A hallmark of STADAN was the training that its people received. 
Goddard and the contractor teams hired both degreed and nondegreed per-
sonnel in various disciplines, although most were in the field of electron-
ics and electrical engineering. Technical training had been taking place at 
Blossom Point since the inception of Minitrack in 1956. In the fall of 1966, 
as NASA ceased joint satellite tracking operations with the Navy at Blossom 
Point, satellite training operations were consolidated with manned network 
training at Wallops Island. This was subsequently relocated to the Network 
Test and Training Facility (NTTF) at the GSFC itself.56
The NTTF employed about 40 contractor instructors who held 
either a Bachelor of Science degree or a teaching certificate in the appropriate 
technical field. The program was modeled along the lines of a vocational 
school, with a format for both classroom instruction and hands-on laboratory 
training. The instructional emphasis was decidedly pragmatic, fostering in 
students the capacity to quickly adjust and adapt to changing situations which 
might arise in the field. Instructors were sometimes dispatched to field sta-
tions themselves, providing the opportunity to conduct on-site training with 
foreign local nationals.
To ensure quality control and technical competency, Goddard, in 
the fall of 1967, instituted a formal job certification program for American cit-
izens assigned to field stations throughout the network. All individuals study-
ing at the NTTF were awarded primary certification in one technical area 
prior to his or her graduation. Certification was based on both academics and 
hands-on test performance in technical skill areas such as telemetry, commu-
nications, teletype operations, the IBM 1218 computer, and the FPQ-6 radar 
just to name a few. Certification tests examined the readiness of a technician 
in four fundamental areas: 1) Safety Procedures, 2) Operating Procedures, 3) 
Preventive Maintenance, and 4) Corrective Maintenance. Incumbent per-
sonnel (those veterans already serving on-site prior to the creation of the 
Certification Program) in some cases received certification by waiver based on 
their field experience; otherwise, they too had to take the test. Primary cer-
tification in a particular specialty meant that a person could practice that skill 
at any network location. The program also allowed personnel to obtain “sec-
ondary certification.” This feature allowed station staff members to receive 
a number of secondary certifications in different technical skill areas outside 
their primary area. But these were generally limited for use only at the par-
ticular station where they worked.
The program was very successful. So successful, in fact, that three 
years after it was implemented, in a move to further promote foreign coop-
eration through the hiring of local labor, the Certification Program was 
extended to include skilled positions. Initial implementation began in 1970 at 
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Chile, Ecuador, and Madagascar. It eventually resulted in more than 200 local 
nationals being certified, mostly for Electronics Technician positions.57
E E E
Ground stations and the people who operate them, however, do not 
make a network by themselves. A network requires a coherent and integrated 
communication system that enables the stations to talk to each other and to 
the GSFC. The NASA Communications Network, known as NASCOM, 
was that critical ground link which tied the system together. But when NASA 
first constructed its networks, NASCOM did not yet exist. Initially, each of 
the Agency’s three networks—the Satellite Tracking And Data Acquisition 
Network (STADAN), the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) and the 
Deep Space Network (DSN)—all had their own communication system link-
ing the ground stations to the control center. Even at Goddard, the satellite 
and human spaceflight communication organizations were in separate divi-
sions within John Mengel’s Tracking and Data Systems Directorate.
But by 1962, complexity of both the STADAN and the DSN had 
noticeably increased. With the new MSFN coming online, it became clear 
that running three separate communication systems at the same time was 
just not going to be very efficient, both technically and in cost. Technically, 
economically and logistically, a single system made much more sense. Studies 
were done to this effect which showed significant savings could in fact be 
achieved through circuit sharing and common use of field equipment. In July 
1963, the Communications Division was formed at Goddard under the direc-
tion of Lavern R. “Vern” Stelter—who later became Chief of the NASA 
Communications Division—to coordinate all Agencies’s ground communica-
tion activities. Up until then, this had been done by Headquarters.
In describing how the tracking networks worked, some have lik-
ened it to the human body. That is, if the control centers were the brain, then 
the tracking stations were the eyes and ears and the NASCOM lines the cen-
tral nervous system. The flow of information between the worldwide network 
of stations and the operations center at the GSFC during a mission was quite 
extensive. The degree of mission success often hinged on the ability of a station 
to transmit critical information quickly and accurately. The NASCOM voice 
circuits enabled Goddard to manage, exercise, coordinate and brief all stations 
simultaneously during simulations and on actual missions. It also enabled the 
stations to discuss problems and procedures among themselves.
Even before the formation of NASA, John Mengel’s Minitrack 
team at the NRL was faced with the job of getting tracking data back from 
the picket line and the other stations around the world. To develop and oper-
ate this system, Mengel recruited experienced range workers from Edwards 
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(known as Muroc at the time) in Southern California, White Sands in 
Southern New Mexico, and from industry. As personnel from the military 
ranges and surveillance networks brought their knowledge to the NRL, its 
pool of communications knowledge quickly grew. This was vital since many 
of the then proposed Minitrack stations had to be in either undeveloped parts 
of the world or at great distances like Australia.
At first, the challenge was just getting data back to NRL. Speed 
was not too important. Similarly, science data was not time critical and were 
recorded on 14-track magnetic tapes and airmailed back to the United States. 
Within the continental United States, existing teletype lines were found to 
support Minitrack stations at San Diego, Blossom Point, and Fort Stewart, 
all of which were on established military installations. Not surprisingly, the 
real communication challenges were in South America where lines had to be 
added in uninhabited rainforests and undeveloped terrain. Throughout the 
1940s and 1950s, the United States had worked with Latin American coun-
tries as part of its Inter-American Geodetic Survey (IAGS) to produce com-
prehensive maps of the entire Western Hemisphere. The U.S. government 
was able to cultivate important relationships through this endeavor which 
enabled the Army to go into some of these countries and lay communication 
lines that were needed by the South American stations. Stelter explained how 
it all worked out:
Aside from the tremendous technical advances which made 
this network possible, we had the unqualified support and 
cooperation of every foreign country involved. Without their 
support, there would have been no successful NASA Communica-
tions Network. Indeed, if we had to pay for every person involved 
in this worldwide effort, we could not have afforded it. At that, 
our phone bill during the Apollo program was $50 million per 
year! On our part, we tried our utmost to make our foreign col-
leagues full participants and they in turn provided hundreds, pos-
sibly thousands of people, to assure the reliability and performance 
of the NASCOM network on which our success, and often the 
lives of our astronauts, depended.58
All of NASA—not just STADAN and the other tracking net-
works—relied on the NASCOM for communications, everything from 
everyday telephone conference calls to high rate telemetry transmissions. To 
this end, a combination of permanently rented circuits for teletype and voice 
were used. These included commercial landlines operated by telephone com-
panies, ocean-floor cables, high frequency radio links and microwave relays, 
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and finally, NASA and commercial communications satellites. By 1969, some 
two million miles of circuits in one form or another were being used.59
Data was routed using these circuits to key switching centers at 
various hubs in different parts of the world—Canberra, London, Madrid, 
Pasadena—which piped the data back to the United States.60 Said Stelter:
Initially, we had to rely on high frequency radio and on other 
rather primitive transmission technology which was anything but 
reliable. Somehow, we were able to make it work. . . . Later, we 
added the first computerized switching facilities, developed by 
UNIVAC [UNIVersal Automatic Computer], which was a signif-
icant advance. It assured us that all data from the spacecraft would 
get to the user in a reliable manner and outbound commands 
would in turn reach the spacecraft quickly. No easy task!61
Other communication systems existed, but NASCOM was by far 
the world’s largest, real-time communications system. It was very much a pro-
totype, pioneering the broad-band communication systems of today.
As Minitrack steadily evolved into STADAN in the 1960s, the real-
time link between satellites and controllers back at Goddard also improved. 
This was still at a time when very few commandable features were actually 
built into satellites. While things like tape recorders could be commanded 
to read out the data they had stored, little else could be directed from the 
ground. With the introduction of more complex satellites, particularly the 
OGO and OAO, by the mid-1960s mission controllers possessed the com-
mand capability for controlling many more satellite functions in addition to 
just the onboard scientific experiments. Goddard controllers, linked directly 
to STADAN stations, could now in effect “drive” a satellite via commands 
uplinked through a station as a satellite passed overhead.62
For Minitrack, transmission speed was a nicety but not a require-
ment. Now, with the advent of this new class of large observatory satellites 
and their high-rate data dumps, speed became not only desired but necessary. 
In addition, with Project Mercury on the horizon calling for real-time voice 
and tracking, telemetry, and command capabilities, a change was needed to 
bring the old NASCOM links literally “up to speed.”
Preparations for the manned-satellite program, in particular, drove 
several requirements. It needed real-time, wide-band communications—the 
first for quick trajectory computations to support mission decisions and the 
second for the heavy data volume required to monitor spacecraft health and 
status and to talk with the astronaut. A most obvious requirement was that 
ground-based flight controllers, some of whom were stationed at tracking 
sites, had to be able to talk directly with the astronaut during a pass. Voice 
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circuits between the spacecraft and the ground, therefore, had to be added to 
the system for the first time. (Television coverage inside the Mercury capsule 
was also proposed but would not be implemented until Apollo, partly because 
the communication technology was just not yet ready to handle the demands 
of such a bandwidth intensive item.) Added to all this was perhaps the most 
important difference between satellite and human spaceflight communica-
tions: reliability. If communications were lost during a pass for an observatory 
satellite, some data might be lost; and on a human flight, the consequences 
could be much more severe.63
If tracking stations were the sensory organs of NASA’s communications network and 
the Goddard Space Flight Center the brain, then NASCOM (the NASA Communications 
Network) could certainly be called its central nervous system, with over 2 million circuit 
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These important differences were known to Langley engineers even 
in 1958 as they laid the foundation for a Mercury Network. It soon became 
apparent, however, that they could not just simply piece together a world-
wide, real-time communication system from existing commercial or military 
circuits. Integration with Minitrack was also not possible; the requirements 
were just too different. Communication requirements for Mercury were, at 
the time, such a leap from anything else that had been done that Langley, and 
later Goddard, knew that an entirely different network had to be designed and 
built specifically to support the new man-in-space project.
miles at its height of operations. Shown here is a layout of the circuits in 1972. Since the 
diagram was taken from a brochure describing the Madrid Station, some of the notes are 
in Spanish. (Madrid Space Station, INTA/NASA: Information Brochure, JPL P72-223)
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This network, as it finally emerged, would consist of two commu-
nication circuits, one for voice and one for teletype. Teletype would use the 
then state-of-the-art Western Union 111 Torn-Tape Relay System, limited to 
a speed of 60 words per minute. The limitation was due to capabilities of the 
terminal equipment that was already being installed at the new MSFN sites. 
Initially, oversea switching centers were located at Adelaide, Australia (sub-
sequently moved to Canberra), Honolulu, and London. Later, communica-
tion switching centers were added in Madrid, Guam, and the Kennedy Space 
Center. Goddard served as the hub and main switching center.64
“Data pipe” between Goddard and the Cape represented a substantial 
advance in wideband transmission capability over the previous generation with 
NASCOM. In 1961, for instance, four two-way, voice data circuits each capable 
of transmitting at one kilobit-per-second (1,000 bps) were installed between the 
Cape and Goddard. While this may not seem like something hardly even worth 
mentioning in today’s world where data rates are measured in gigabits-per-second 
(that is, a billion bps), it was quite the improvement over the Minitrack days; 
one of these channels could now transmit 30 times as much data. This faster 
data requirement was needed because, prior to the establishment of the Mission 
Control Center in Houston, Goddard had to control the real-time displays at 
Mercury Control, then still located at Cape Canaveral. Soon, other wideband 
data lines were installed between GSFC and the STADAN stations, most nota-
bly at the new DAF of Rosman and Alaska. Finally, in preparation for sending 
astronauts into space, another important voice link was established in 1963 with 
a newly laid ocean floor cable connecting the new station on Bermuda with the 
Cape. This link could carry 2,000 bits-per-second of digital information and 
would continue to serve the Bermuda Station well into the Shuttle era.65
E E E
As NASA began sending men to the Moon, new stations were 
added and aircraft and ships were assigned to the network. Unlike Mercury or 
Gemini, live television was going to be used on Apollo and new equipment 
accommodating state-of-the-art transmission schemes at the S-band frequen-
cies would be installed throughout the network. The role of communication 
satellites like Syncom would be called on to provide “switchboards in the sky.” 
Developed by an industry team, their success would lead to the creation of the 
Cosmsat Corporation and an international consortium to manage and market 
worldwide satellite communication services. In time, this development would 
pay great dividends as the consortium’s Intelsat ultimately ended up serving 
the very government agencies that helped to develop its technology.66
To see how sending humans into space remade the Goddard net-
works, one needs to turn the clock back to a time before there was a GSFC.
CHAPTER 3
THE MERCURY SPACE 
FLIGHT NETWORK
By the summer of 1961, the GSFC had fully established itself as 
the lead NASA center for directing science application satellite projects along 
with the communication, tracking, and data network that support them. In a 
little over two years since its founding as the first new field center established 
after the creation of NASA, GSFC’s workforce had grown from 216 to 1,900, 
accounting for 11 percent of the space agency’s total.1 The STADAN was quite 
busy. It quickly matured during this time, supporting a wide array of satellite 
projects ranging from the original Vanguard and Explorer series to the newer 
TV and weather satellites such as TIROS (Television Infrared Observation 
Satellite) and even privately built communication satellites. The first satel-
lite project which Goddard assumed full responsibility for was Explorer 6, 
launched on 7 August 1959. This began 16 years of GSFC association on this 
very successful series, which continued until 1981, with the orbital decay of 
Explorer 55. In April 1960, TIROS 1 downlinked the first ever global cloud-
cover photographs taken from orbit. Solar science satellites were launched 
beginning with Solrad 1 in June 1960. AT&T’s Telstar 1, the world’s first 
commercial satellite, was launched on 10 July 1962.
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The first Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO 1) was launched on 
7 March 1962. For years, John C. Lindsay, a former Associate Chief of the 
Space Sciences Division at Goddard, had investigated satellite designs using 
spin stabilization which enabled observations of the Sun in ways not possible 
from the surface of Earth. By 1960, the Ball Brothers Aerospace Corporation 
of Boulder, Colorado (at the time the leading developer and provider of sta-
bilized pointing control devices for sounding rockets and balloon systems) 
had produced a successful engineering prototype of a spin-stabilized satellite. 
OSO1 produced many new findings. Among them was the discovery that the 
Sun’s corona has openings (now called coronal holes) which were interpreted 
as huge, fast-moving bubbles rising through the corona.2
Even as application and science satellites were hitting full stride and 
making ever more exciting discoveries on a regular basis, events, though, were 
taking place which soon redefined NASA’s priorities and led to the establish-
ment of an all-together, different Goddard spaceflight network.
E E E
On 12 April 1961, the Soviet Union launched Yuri A. Gagarin, a 
27-year-old Second Lieutenant in the Soviet Air Force, into orbit on Vostok 
(East) 1.3 But unlike Sputnik, Gagarin’s flight did not come as a total shock to 
the United States. What the Soviet Union accomplished four years earlier with 
Sputnik was the first sign to the international community of the existence of 
a full-fledged and very robust space program, one in which they proceeded 
with at an unrelenting pace. As early as the mid-1950s, a disturbing picture of 
Russia’s growing capability in long-range, heavy payload rocketry emerged. 
The CIA, using the Lockheed U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, had 
reported in 1957 the first Soviet ICBM on its launch pad at the Baikonur-
Tyuratam space complex. Over the next two years, the world would know 
what the CIA had long suspected: the USSR was embarking on a series of 
space experiments designed to put a human into space.
In May 1960, the Soviet news agency Tass reported the launch-
ing of a “Spacecraft 1” into orbit. It weighed a massive 10,008-pounds and 
contained a “dummy cosmonaut.” This was followed by more qualification 
flights carrying dogs which took place over the next several months. By the 
following April, the veil of secrecy surrounding Soviet space activities was 
rapidly breaking down.
It began with a rumor from Moscow on 7 April that a cosmo-
naut had been launched in secret. This was followed by a message wired to 
London on midnight of 11 April quoting unidentified sources as saying that 
a cosmonaut had returned from space and was undergoing physical exami-
nation for illness, and he was “suffering from post-flight effects of a nature 
more emotional than physical.” Variations of this story immediately surfaced, 
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including one by a French correspondent who suggested that the mystery 
cosmonaut was none other than Vladimir Ilyushin, son of the famous Soviet 
aircraft designer. The White House immediately denied the authenticity of 
these reports saying that the United States had no evidence whatsoever that 
such a flight had taken place. However, the next day, Moscow released the 
following official announcement: 
The world’s first spaceship, Vostok, with a man on board was 
launched into orbit from the Soviet Union on 12 April 1961. The 
pilot space-navigator of the satellite-spaceship Vostok is a citizen 
of the USSR, Flight Major Yuri Gagarin. The launching of the 
multi-stage space rocket was successful and, after attaining the 
first escape velocity and the separation of the last stage of the 
carrier rocket, the spaceship went into free flight on a round-the-
Earth orbit. According to the preliminary data, the period of rev-
olution of the satellite-spacecraft round the Earth is 89.1 minutes. 
The minimum distance from the Earth at perigee is 175 km [109 
miles] and the maximum at apogee is 302 [188 miles], and the 
angle of inclination of the orbit plane to the Equator is 65º 4’. The 
spacecraft with the navigator weighs 4,725 kg [10,420 pounds] 
excluding the weight of the final stage of the carrier rocket.4
Although the actual implementation of a U.S. man-in-space pro-
gram had to await the creation of NASA, concept proposals for “manned-
satellites” and how to track them had been in circulation as far back as the 
early 1950s. These took on a more serious form in 1956 when the Air Force 
embarked on a study known as “Project 7969” entitled, A Manned Ballistic 
Rocket Research System, designed specifically to investigate the requirements for 
a human orbiting laboratory. The formulation of ideas in that project did not 
directly translate into an actual program, but it did push the National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics to begin its own studies of human spaceflight. 
The Secretary of Defense created, in early 1958, an Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) to coordinate civilian and military research 
for piloted and unpiloted space projects; the idea being that ARPA would act as 
an interim space agency until Congress passed the appropriate legislation estab-
lishing NASA. In this capacity, ARPA articulated the first objectives of the 
American human space program. The goal was clear: “Achieve at the earliest 
practicable date orbital flight and successful recovery of a manned satellite, and 
to investigate the capabilities of man in this environment.”5 These goals were to 
be embodied in Project Mercury, America’s first human spaceflight program. 
Within the newly created space agency, the Langley Research 
Center located in Hampton, Virginia near the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay, 
was the home to two key groups entrusted with starting Project Mercury. The 
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STG was one of these, responsible for the overall implementation of the man-
in-space program, formally designated as Project Mercury on 26 November 
1958. The STG directed the development of both the launch vehicle and 
the spacecraft as well as the recruiting of flight crews and flight controllers. 
Another cadre of personnel formed the other group, informally called the 
Tracking System Study Group (TSSG). The TSSG helped the STG establish 
network support requirements for Project Mercury. Heading it was Edmond 
C. Buckley, who was later to be in charge of all NASA tracking activities as 
the Agency’s first Associate Administrator for Tracking and Data Acquisition 
(from 1962 to 1968).
The STG was at the time under the jurisdiction of the newly estab-
lished Space Projects Center. In 1961, this center moved to Greenbelt to form 
the nucleus of the new GSFC. By fall of that year, however, the STG had 
moved on to Houston, Texas to establish the MSC. With this move, MSC 
immediately became the lead NASA center for all human spaceflight activities 
and assumed overall responsibility for executing Project Mercury. The job 
of implementing an effective worldwide tracking and data acquisition net-
work remained with GSFC. These initial shifts in center responsibilities, as 
it turned out, determined how each of these Field Centers eventually ended 
up supporting NASA’s human spaceflight activities for the next 40 years, roles 
that continue today.6
One of the principals on the TSSG was H. William Wood. A mem-
ber of Ed Buckley’s team at Langley, Bill Wood was investigating X-ray and 
gamma ray sensing instruments for possible use aboard spacecraft when he got 
the call to help plan a network for Project Mercury. Said Wood:
At Langley, we worked under the supervision of Hartley 
Soule, an assistant laboratory director who helped us cut through 
the red tape and made us realize early on that we were engaged in a 
very unique and challenging undertaking. However, the Langley 
Center did not want to become distracted from its primary role 
as a research organization. . . . In my opinion, it did not wish to 
evolve into an operational hub for space activities. Thus tracking, 
data acquisition and computer activities for Project Mercury were 
assigned to the Goddard Space Flight Center prior to the first 
manned orbital flight.7
Wood and others who agreed to help were told by Soule that they 
could return to Langley whenever they wished. Those who agreed to consider 
a transfer soon met at the new Space Projects Center with Director Harry J. 
Goett. Some ended up staying at Langley, and others transferred with the 
STG to the MSC in Houston.
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America’s ﬁrst human spacecraft was Mercury. It ﬂew six astronauts into space (two 
sub-orbital, four orbital) from May 1961 to May 1963. Weighing some 1,360 kilograms 
(3,000 pounds), the vehicle was launched into space atop the U.S. Army Redstone 
rocket and later, the Air Force Atlas-D intercontinental ballistic missile. Pictured is Wally 
Schirra’s Mercury 8 capsule Sigma 7 being readied in Hanger S at Cape Canaveral in 
September 1962. (NASA Image Number GPN-2000-001441)
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The TSSG began addressing the network issue in earnest in the 
fall of 1958. The job soon turned out to be bigger than anyone had antici-
pated. Network requirements for human spaceflight were rather different 
than those needed to support unmanned satellites. Unlike the Minitrack 
Network—which passively received spacecraft signals and did not make an 
accurate orbit determination until several orbits had been complete—human 
spacecraft tracking had a much more instantaneous contact requirement. Towards 
that end, radar tracking rather than interferometry, was essential. Telemetry 
now had to be augmented, for example, to monitor the health of the astro-
naut. The complexity of command functions also greatly increased over what 
was needed for science satellites in order to ensure the safe orbiting and, more 
importantly, return of the crew. Finally, a manned spaceflight network was 
obviously needed to establish two-way voice communication between the 
ground and the vehicle.8
By the end of the year, the TSSG had identified three major areas of 
concern associated with a Mercury tracking network, concerns which had up 
until then been widely underestimated. First, and somewhat to their surprise, 
the group found that there was no such thing in existence as either a commer-
cial or a military, real-time, worldwide communication system. Here was a 
vital ingredient of mission control that was completely missing! Second, there 
was no existence of reliable, high-capacity data links that could carry the 
large amounts of data between the computer facilities and the mission control 
center. Third, good radars were available, but they were designed primarily to 
track DOD ballistic missiles and reentry vehicles, their beams too narrow to 
expeditiously locate and keep track of a fast-moving spacecraft in orbit.9
The Space Task Group began to feel that the weight of the network 
job was diverting too much attention from its primary job of designing the 
Mercury spacecraft. In January 1959, Charles W. Mathews, a member of the 
STG, recommended to Abe Silverstein, Director of Space Flight Development 
at NASA Headquarters, that the STG be formally relieved of the responsibil-
ity for building the network and that the responsibility be given to the TSSG. 
This was a seemingly reasonable request since the TSSG had already been 
studying the network problem for nearly a year. On 16 February, Silverstein 
formally directed this change in a memorandum to J. W. Crowley, Director 
of Aeronautical and Space Research at NASA Headquarters.
Silverstein’s memorandum asked the TSSG to “complete and 
refine” network plans so as to satisfy requirements generated by the STG 
and to “place and supervise” contracts for generating procurement specifica-
tions and a final network deployment. Langley officials were to make use,
,
wherever practical, of DOD personnel and facilities in the Pacific Missile 
Range (PMR) in Point Mugu, California; the Atlantic Missile Range (AMR) 
in Cape Canaveral, Florida; the White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in 
Alamogordo, New Mexico; and the Eglin Gulf Test Range (EGTR), Eglin 
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Air Force Base, Florida. In this manner, the practice of NASA leveraging 
DOD assets wherever practical began early on in the construction of the 
Mercury Space Flight Network (MSFN).
On 16 February 1959, the Langley network study group was offi-
cially renamed the Tracking And Ground Instrumentation Unit, or TAGIU. 
Two years later, TAGIU would be relocated to GSFC when the new Center 
opened. Leadership of TAGIU was assigned to Barry Graves who had been 
part of the TSSG since the beginning. Several key participants from TSSG 
also continued their assignments on the new team. Leading their respective 
disciplines were:
George B. Graves, Jr., Electronics and Head of TAGIU
James J. Donegan, Computers
Ray W. Hooker, Site Selection and A&E (Architecture and
Engineering)
Paul Vavra, Assistant to Graves
H. William Wood, Logistics
TAGIU quickly grew to 35 people. This nucleus was in essence heir 
to Langley’s radar and high-speed flight experience, plus six months’ worth of 
network studies. Although TAGIU engineers knew roughly what a Mercury 
Network should entail, they did not yet have the detailed specifications needed 
to procure hardware and to begin building up stations. Getting industry help 
under contract and enlisting the aid of the Air Force was among the first 
items of business. (The USAF was at the time building up their own network: 
the Air Force Satellite Control Network.) TAGIU’s effort went from turning 
studies into requirements, requirements into specifications, specifications into 
hardware, and finally, hardware into stations. Even though the major functions 
of the Mercury Network had already been decided on: tracking, telemetry 
reception, voice communication, and capsule command; the team fully real-
ized that these functions could be performed in a number of different ways.
By early spring 1959, TAGIU was ready to generate detailed net-
work specifications. To this end, four contracts to industry were awarded:
1  Ford Aeronutronics, Study radar coverage and trajectory computation 
requirements
2  MIT Lincoln Laboratories, General consultation and proposal 
evaluation
3 RCA Service Corporation, Write the network specifications
4 Space Electronics, Design the Mission Control Center
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Things moved quickly. Said Wood: 
We were told that we had about two years to complete the 
job; then we would return to basic research. Of course, that is not 
the way it turned out. . . .  I was told one morning that I would 
be managing the RCA contract and that same afternoon we had 
our first meeting with the contractor. We moved pretty fast! At 
the time, a great deal of attention was being given to the Mercury 
spacecraft itself: how to get a man into orbit and how to return 
him safely to Earth. But very little attention had been given to 
communications and tracking which had to support those flights. 
So we were asked to get busy and develop a set of specifications. 
This we did by 1959. They were no thicker than an issue of the 
Aviation Week magazine.10
The network developed around 12 ground rules:
1  The launch azimuth of approximately 32.5º was fixed early on. 
It enabled maximum use of DOD range facilities and kept the 
ground track of the spacecraft over the continental United States 
much of the time to preclude over-flight of countries that might 
not cooperate. It also resulted in acceptable recovery areas close 
to U.S. Naval facilities.
2  The Atlantic Missile Range based at Cape Canaveral was to 
be employed for launch and recovery operations. This was an 
easy decision because of AMR’s already superb facilities and 
experience.
3  The network was to be worldwide, using stations in foreign 
countries where necessary, and operate on a real-time basis to 
monitor spacecraft status and astronaut health.
4  The space medicine community strongly advocated continuous 
voice contact with the astronaut, but this requirement proved 
impractical. Despite the controversy, STG and TAGIU moved 
ahead using the goal of a maximum 10 minute, loss-of-signal and 
voice contact in between stations (the so-called 10-minute “dead 
time” rule).11
5  A centralized control center was to be built, but controllers 
would be located at each ground station in case of communica-
tions difficulties.
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6  Proven tracking and communications equipment was to be 
employed to the extent possible with a minimum of research 
and nonrecurring engineering development.
7  In order to enable a go/no-go decision to be made, and to effect 
emergency reentry prior to orbit insertion before the spacecraft 
approached the African land mass, continuous tracking from 
network radars downrange of the launch site was needed to 
give the computers enough real-time data for accurate orbit 
prediction before the spacecraft passed beyond the Bermuda 
tracking station.
8  After orbit injection, intermittent tracking was sufficient. 
Continuous tracking was again to be required during deorbit 
and reentry so as to accurately pinpoint the splashdown point.
9  These existing radars would need acquisition aids because of 
their narrow beamwidths. 
10  Only computers could cope with the flood of tracking and 
telemetry data arriving from all the network stations.  A central-
ized computer facility with data link to the Mission Control 
Center would therefore be needed.
11  Frequent network simulations and exercises would be needed to 
train the operators.
12  Redundancy would be required to provide the reliability needed 
for manned flight.
The team started with the assumption that the network would 
support a three-orbit Mercury mission at an inclination of about 33º to the 
Equator. Next, it determined just how long a communication gap could be 
tolerated between stations. The first design iteration had 20 stations scattered 
around the globe; eventually, the number was reduced to 18. The procedure 
was definitely quite straight forward. As Wood put it, the team literally just 
“took [out] a world atlas and tentatively located these sites.”12
By early 1960, site surveys for the entire network had been con-
ducted and the building of the MSFN began. During Mercury, Mission 
Control was located at Cape Canaveral, Florida, adjacent to the launch site, 
while the network computer center was located at Goddard. All the computer 
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activities were handled on a remote basis with Goddard computers, for exam-
ple, to drive the displays and plot-boards at the Cape. (This would be the case 
until 1965, when starting with Gemini 4, the Manned Spacecraft Center in 
Houston acquired the necessary computer capability for human flight opera-
tions when the new Mission Control Center opened.)
Satellite programs and STADAN had already given GSFC quite a 
head start, providing the expertise and experience needed for network com-
munications, simulations and data processing. Furthermore, Goddard man-
agement under Center Director Harry Goett desperately wanted the work. 
GSFC could claim, with justification, that to expand the staff and facilities at 
Greenbelt rather than build new ones at Langley or Houston was more eco-
nomical and technically feasible. Some thought was given by Headquarters to 
locating the Mercury ground computers at Cape Canaveral. But the Cape was 
already heavily involved in Air Force and Navy launches. In addition, NASA 
wanted to keep its computing facility separate from the DOD. These factors 
all made Goddard the most logical choice to lead this work.
On a Mercury flight, the network computer facility would receive 
reams of data from its field stations. Jack Mengel, who four years earlier led 
the development of the Minitrack Network and who, along with most of his 
original Naval Research Laboratory staff now at Goddard, was asked by Graves 
to develop the MSFN computing capability. This made sense since Mengel’s 
group was still in the throes of expanding their computing facilities and had just 
taken over the Vanguard Computation Center formerly under ownership of the 
Naval Research Laboratory. Before long, some 60 Goddard and IBM contrac-
tors were assigned to support the MSFN under Niles R. “Buck” Heller who 
became Chief of the Manned Space Flight Support Division at Goddard.13
The network relied on proven C-band and S-band radars for track-
ing; for redundancy, some stations used both. Radar skin-tracking (which uses 
direct reflections of radio waves transmitted from the ground to the target) 
while fine for tracking ballistic missiles, was not considered reliable enough at 
orbital altitudes to be used in the Mercury program. Instead, two radar-trig-
gered onboard beacons (or transponders) at these wavelengths were located on 
the spacecraft to provide the ground with more robust radar returns. 
The C-band FPS-16 and the S-band VERLORT (Very Long 
Range Tracking) radar built by the Reeves Instrument Corporation were 
specifically stipulated by the TAGIU, as both were considered proven systems, 
having been used for years by the DOD. Manufactured by RCA and used 
by the Army at White Sands since 1957, the FPS-16 was a 3.6-meter (12-
foot) dish, high-precision radar capable of tracking to an accuracy of seven 
meters at a range of 925 kilometers (500 nautical miles). The VERLORT, a 
3-meter (10-foot) transportable dish operated by trailer-housed equipment, 
had a slightly longer range of 1,300 kilometers (700 nautical miles). It was a 
radar developed in World War II for tracking aircraft. Limited in range and 
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accuracy, it did have a reputation for being able to acquire an object with great 
reliability and begin tracking in a very short amount of time.
The only new piece of major tracking equipment specified was 
an Active Acquisition Aid (AAA) required for spacecraft acquisition by the 
narrow-beam radars. The acquisition antenna was actually an array of 18 
small antennas mounted on a screen. By locking onto a radio signal transmit-
ted from the spacecraft, this arrangement allowed it to begin coarse track-
ing to an accuracy of about half a degree. This pointing information was 
then made immediately available via a cable and switching system called the 
“Acquisition Bus” to aim the other antennas. The AAA, made by the Cubic 
Corporation, had a very wide beam of 20º, effective out to 1,500 kilometers 
(800 nautical miles).14
Proven equipment was also stipulated for other elements of the 
ground-to-space link, which included telemetry, command, and voice. 
TAGIU selected systems that were already available or, as a minimum, not 
too difficult to adapt from existing hardware. Telemetry from the Mercury 
spacecraft was downlinked at 226.2 MHz using the analog modulation tech-
nique of Pulse Amplitude Modulation (PAM)/Frequency Modulation (FM), 
a scheme commonly used for ballistic missile and aircraft testing work. Two 
separate telemetry links between network sites and the spacecraft were uti-
lized for redundancy. Each station had dual-redundant FRW-2 transmitters 
for command uplink. These were commonly used by the military for high 
performance aircraft testing. The FRWs were connected to a 10 KW high 
power amplifier to give them the needed range to send commands to a space-
craft in low-Earth orbit. This capability enabled ground controllers at the 
MSFN sites to issue commands to a spacecraft in the event the astronauts 
were to somehow become incapacitated. Common VHF radio was used for 
two-way, air-to-ground voice communication; a backup was operated on the 
international military aircraft emergency frequency.15
A seminal ground rule that TAGIU stipulated was that nonrecurring 
engineering costs for equipment research and development could be minimized 
through reliance on off-the-shelf hardware. Radars, radios and computers 
existed, but no one had ever tried to mold them together into a cohesive, real-
time network on a global scale. Not unlike a jigsaw puzzle, when TAGIU tried 
to put the electronic puzzle together, it found that most of the available pieces 
did not fit well together. And most did not have the requisite reliability to sup-
port human spaceflight. Modification of available equipment also became a 
frustrating problem. Modifications were often made after equipment had been 
fielded just to bring them up to MSFN standards. Equipment that could not 
be modified had to be backed up with 100 percent spares to ensure operating 
redundancy. Network equipment reassigned from the DOD was considerably 
more reliable than common off-the-shelf equipment, not surprising as military 
specifications were more rigorous and based on operating environments similar 
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to those of the MSFN. However, obtaining priority military equipment was, 
for the most part, difficult due to availability.16
Before the MSFN could be used to support a mission, it of course 
had to be checked out, first on a station by station basis and then as an integrated 
network. One of the most valuable testing methods during network shakedown 
was simulated spacecraft tracking using aircraft flyovers. Although ground sta-
tions had a collimation tower at the edge of the antenna field, it was used only 
to get a first order calibration. Calibration airplanes, or “cal planes,” flying at 
7,600 meters (25,000 feet) were needed for final system calibration and verifica-
tion of an antenna’s ability to actually track a moving object. Graves had asked 
Bill Wood to develop a “real world” method to accept the stations after they 
were constructed. Wood’s people came up with a variety of ideas, ranging from 
using balloons to devices mounted on towers. Each had its technical advantage 
as well as disadvantage, and there was really no clear-cut choice. During initial 
discussions at Goddard, there were, in fact, as many votes against using calibra-
tion planes as there were for it. When Barry Graves finally pressed for a recom-
mendation, Wood would later say, “I suppose in self defense, I said airplanes.”17
To do this, NASA procured a Douglas DC-3, two DC-4s and later a Lockheed 
L-1649A Super Constellation (known both affectionately, and sometimes not so 
affectionately by those who had to track them, as “Connie”) and outfitted them 
with Mercury TT&C flight-qualified electronics.18
Calibration aircraft were used in different ways to test the status of 
network stations. For STADAN, they were used to calibrate the Minitrack 
system and to conduct acceptance testing for new antennas. The DC-3 and 
DC-4 primarily supported the STADAN while the L-1649A supported the 
MSFN. Calibration of the Minitrack sites for instance, was performed by fly-
ing at 7,600 meters and making East-West crossings of the main Minitrack 
beam in 10 percent steps north and south of the station zenith. The RF (at 
108MHz, and later, 136MHz) crossings of the main beam were electronically 
compared with the positions obtained from the flashing lamp on the belly of 
the aircraft and measured against the stellar background. Flyovers were done 
for a period of up to six weeks prior to a scheduled mission and usually took a 
couple of hours. The aircraft made multiple passes at predetermined altitudes, 
speeds and directions to simulate a spacecraft passing overhead. The antenna 
would attempt to autotrack the calplane during each pass. These station simu-
lations (“sims”) were designed to uncover any hidden anomalies and to help 
prepare station operators for their upcoming mission. Unlike a spacecraft 
orbiting Earth, however, the calibration airplanes did not fly in well-defined 
trajectories. As such, they actually turned out to be more difficult to track 
than the spacecraft. After a few exercises, the prevailing thought was that “if 
you could track the cal plane, you could track the real thing.”19
Since the DC-3 was not pressurized, the crew had to go on oxy-
gen bottles when flying over 3,600 meters (12,000 feet). Later, Hal Hoff at 
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Goddard required all NASA members of the calibration team to undergo high 
altitude chamber orientation at Andrews Air Force Base. This turned out to 
be smart. Former Goddard engineer Dave Harris recalled an episode where a 
crew member monitoring the transmission equipment suffered from a classic 
case of oxygen deprivation and the response of the others “was quite rapid.”20
There were also simulated ditching sessions held to prepare for any contin-
gency. Besides serving as a flying target for tracking tests, another benefit 
of these calibration planes was to ferry necessities to the foreign sites. Toilet 
paper was a frequent cargo when heading to South America.
In addition to these site-specific exercises, computer-based simula-
tions were used to exercise the entire network. The principal tool of comput-
erized simulation was the Computation and Data Flow Integrated Subsystem, 
or CADFISS, developed by James Donegan and Goddard’s IBM contractors. 
During an “integrated-sim,” CADFISS interrogated the various stations via 
the Mercury ground communications network (and later the NASCOM) while 
GSFC computers analyzed the response and determined the status of each ele-
ment in the dataflow. In this way, stations could be checked simultaneously, 
faults isolated and debriefings held with Goddard engineers directly “over the 
loop” immediately after a simulation session. As a mission date approached, 
these integrated-simulations were conducted with increasing frequency.21
E E E
When the STG was officially formed on 7 October 1958, it fell 
under the jurisdiction of GSFC rather than LRC because NASA Headquarters 
had every intention of moving the group to the new Greenbelt Center. As 
the human spaceflight program expanded, however, it became apparent that 
Goddard would no longer be able to absorb STG responsibilities while still 
carrying out its prime responsibility of directing unmanned satellite pro-
grams. It was also evident that human spaceflight was going to continue well 
beyond just Project Mercury and that it required a new center of its own. Due 
to its very charter and the work it was already doing on Mercury, the STG was 
identified as the nucleus of the proposed MSC and in the fall 1961, the group 
literally picked up and moved to Houston (the location having recently been 
selected by Capital Hill as the site for the new Field Center).
The official word on delegating MSFN network responsibility to 
GSFC was given in a 3 April 1961 letter from Abe Silverstein, Head of the Office 
of Space Flight Programs at Headquarters, to Harry J. Goett, the first Director 
of Goddard, entitled “Mercury Network Operating Responsibilities.” On 12 
May 1961, Langley center director Floyd L. Thompson and Harry Goett met 
at Greenbelt to arrange the transfer of network operating responsibility. They 
established a committee (with a Langley chairman) to oversee the transfer 
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which was scheduled to take place during the third quarter of calendar year 
1961. To help meet this new directive, Goett brought in Ozro M. Covington 
to Goddard from the WSMR where he had been the Technical Director of 
the Army Signal Missile Support Agency. His experience in organizing the 
White Sands range instrumentation was exactly what Goett was looking for, 
experience that soon proved invaluable in the buildup of the MSFN.22 This 
was a strategic move on Goett’s part as Covington brought with him a very-
abled manager named Henry Thompson from White Sands to serve as his 
deputy.23 Thompson, in turn, recruited George Q. Clark from White Sands. 
(Clark later became the first Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System Project 
Manager at GSFC, responsible for both the pioneering technical solution and 
the innovative procurement approach. See Chapter 7.)
In addition to his tangible technical abilities, Covington had unique 
intangibles which were greatly needed to soothe rifts that immediately began 
developing between Greenbelt and Houston. It was in the midst of these orga-
nizational changes that “turf wars” between the two NASA Field Centers 
appeared regarding ownership and the role that the network was going to play 
in the upcoming human space program. Commenting on this touchy issue, 
Covington recalled: 
During those early days there were many debates and conflicts 
as to the assignment of the manned spaceflight program. There 
was a time when the Goddard Center was to be its base of opera-
tion. The center had already been charged with major unmanned 
flight programs, all of which also required sophisticated track-
ing and communications support. But soon it became evident 
that a separate NASA organization had to be created to plan and 
direct America’s man-in-space efforts. It was, after all, a mam-
moth undertaking, particularly after President John F. Kennedy 
had told the world that the United States would send a man to the 
Moon and return him safely to Earth in the 1960–1970 decade. 
Indeed, this was not the only conflict as to who would be respon-
sible for the manned missions. There were similar conflicts as to 
who would be charged with the difficult and challenging tracking 
and communications tasks supporting these flights. There was the 
U.S. Air Force which was launching and tracking its missiles from 
Cape Canaveral. It certainly wanted the job, and always there 
was the question of the wisdom of separating the mission control 
center and the network. As Goddard’s representative for manned 
space flight, I attended many of those early planning sessions, and 
it was during one of those meetings that I had occasion to spend 
some two hours with Dr. Christopher Kraft who was then plan-
ning some of the early Mercury missions. We met in a hotel room 
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near Cape Canaveral and discussed at length the difficulties aris-
ing from the separation of mission and network responsibilities. 
We developed a very productive relationship which continued 
throughout the years, ranging from the Mercury and Gemini 
through the Apollo programs.24
The “Not Invented Here” syndrome was by no means unique to 
GSFC and MSC. In developing the Mercury Network and its Control Center, 
it was clear early on that NASA was conducting a very different kind of launch 
than what the Cape was used to. Besides the obvious presence of having a 
man on board, the payloads that NASA was launching were generally active 
in all phases of a launch, from prelaunch countdown through insertion into 
orbit. This was generally not the case, though, for DOD payloads which were 
mostly dormant and were powered up only after orbit insertion. NASA thus 
had to install its own network equipment at the Cape and at key downrange 
stations. The DOD and its contractors were naturally not very happy when 
TAGIU insisted that all equipment used to interface directly with the manned 
payload were to be designed and controlled by MSFN engineers and that they 
be operated in accordance with NASA procedures. Happy or not, there was 
really no other way to reliably implement the network.25
There was also not always complete agreement as to the GSFC role 
when it came to manned tracking. Goett questioned the wisdom of commit-
ting his people and resources to a major program not entirely under his control. 
But Covington would explain years later, Goett came to see it the other way: 
When he saw the impressive team we had assembled for the 
tracking job, he agreed and relented. ‘Let’s go after it’, he agreed, 
and the Center did indeed, becom[ing] the nerve center of NASA’s 
worldwide manned spaceflight tracking network, just as it was also 
supporting major unmanned missions in the near-Earth regions. 
We assembled a team of some 350 top flight people, supported by 
a large number of contractor employees. Goddard’s administra-
tive staff under Dr. Michael J. Vaccaro gave us the critical support 
services we required to tackle the job, from personnel recruiting 
to budget planning and contract administration. We needed this 
support very badly.26
Covington, for one, realized the importance of open communications 
between the two Centers and treated MSC as a customer rather than a rival: 
I considered it to be my primary function to maintain the clos-
est possible liaison with our ‘customer’, the Manned [Spacecraft] 
Center in Houston. We created a reliable system of tracking sta-
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tions around the globe along with communications links and 
computer facilities all designed to provide the mission controllers 
with the information they needed to get our men into space.27
At the conclusion of Project Gemini in 1967, Covington was 
named Goddard’s Director for Manned Flight Support, overseeing all net-
work activities in preparation for the Apollo Moon program. The manage-
ment structure at NASA Headquarters also shifted during this time so as to 
meet the changing requirements of human spaceflight. Since leaving Langley 
in early 1958, Edmond C. Buckley, as Director of Space Flight Operations, 
had headed NASA’s network operations, reporting directly to Abe Silverstein. 
To streamline operations, one of the first things Buckley did was to consoli-
date all of NASA’s tracking and data networks (STADAN, MSFN and DSN) 
under him to form the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition (OTDA) on 
1 November 1961.28
On 21 May 1959, Graves and his team sent out requests for pro-
posals formally soliciting industry bids to build a manned spaceflight tracking 
network for NASA. On 30 June, a team led by Western Electric Company, Inc. 
was awarded the prime contract. Of the roughly $80 million spent in construct-
ing the MSFN, about 85 percent ($68 million) went to the Western Electric 
team. The company named Rod Goetchius as Program Manager. In addition to 
Western Electric, four major subcontractors were on the team. Their roles were: 
Western Electric: Overall program management, procure-
ment, production, transportation, installation and testing of equip-
ment. Design and implementation of the ground communication 
subsystem. Training of maintenance and operating personnel.
Bell Telephone System: Analysis and development of opera-
tion plans and tests. Design of command and control displays at 
Cape Canaveral and Bermuda. (Bell selected Stromberg-Carlson 
to build and install the flight control displays.) Provide a sim-
ulation system for flight controllers and astronauts.
Bendix Corporation: Design and fabricate of telemetry and 
tracking display equipment. Systems design, fabrication and 
integration of radars not already furnished by the government. 
(Bendix obtained new radars from RCA and Reeves Instrument 
Corporation.) Design and fabrication of all Mercury spacecraft 
communication equipment.
IBM: Computer programming and operations at GSFC and 
Bermuda. Maintenance and operation of the launch and display 
subsystem at Cape Canaveral.29
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Construction of the Mercury Space Flight Network ground sta-
tions proceeded swiftly in 1960 and 1961. Site surveys had established a set of 
minimum requirements for geographical locations:
No physical obstructions to the transmission and reception of sig-
nals greater than 1˚ elevation angle
Existence of adequate separation distance between receiving and 
transmitting antenna to prevent electromagnetic and physical 
interference
Minimum outside radio interference (a quiet RF location)
Existence of housing and utilities
Availability of good roads30
One of the first stations to be established on foreign soil was also 
one of the most critical. With the exception of Cape Canaveral, Bermuda, 
some 1,450 kilometers (900 miles) due east of the Carolina coast, was the most 
complex and important of the 15 MSFN ground stations. This was because 
the flight path of the Mercury Atlas took it almost directly over the island, 
providing a short but crucial 25 second window to track and make decisions 
on its status during ascent into orbit.
As Bill Wood explained, the station was important at the time for 
these and several other reasons: 
The first station to be definitely decided upon was Bermuda. 
It was needed because of the high failure rate of the Atlas booster 
which in those early days was about 50 percent, and since an abort 
situation was a highly probable reality, we needed Bermuda to 
keep an eye on the Cape Canaveral launches and the first critical 
phases of the flight downrange. We planned a control center there 
as well as at the Cape to give us reliable communications and con-
trols should we be forced to make abort decisions. We were, after 
all, dealing with manned missions and unproven, even unreliable 
communications.31
Lynwood C. “Lynn” Dunseith, one of the original MSFN engi-
neers who in 1982 became the Director of the Data Systems and Analysis 
Directorate at the Johnson Space Center, also recalled that in those days: 
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We had great difficulties with our communications from 
Bermuda, a key station during the launch phase of any mission. 
So, a control center was established there in the event Bermuda 
had to enter the picture for launch and abort decisions.32
The schedule was tight. On 15 March 1961, less than two months 
before Alan Shepard’s scheduled suborbital flight, Washington finally reached 
a formal agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland to operate a tracking station on the island.33 The main site was on 
Cooper’s Island, a small 77-acre rock-coral shelf just off of Saint David’s Island 
on the northern shores of Bermuda. The station was located on an eastward 
extension of Kindley Air Force Base, on land already managed by the United 
States Air Force. Its use dated back to a World War II agreement between 
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. Another site was in Town 
Hill on the main island. The station cost $5 million to build in 1961.34
NASA employed a large workforce to operate this station—60 con-
tractors along with 20 Bermudians. Since the tracking network (as well as the 
space agency itself ) was still young, everyone was put to work immediately. 
Robert E. Spearing, who today is the Director of Space Communications at 
NASA Headquarters, was 22-years-old when he began working at the GSFC 
to help get Bermuda up and running. He recalled:  
When I started, I was placed with another engineer who was 
fairly experienced working on what we call UHF command sys-
tems. . . . These are high power transmitters that are used to 
actually send information to the spacecraft and are also used for 
what we call command destruct range safety options. About three 
or four months after I started, the fellow I was working with 
informed me that he was leaving the Agency for another job. I, 
of course, went to see his supervisor and asked him what I should 
do since this fellow was leaving. He looked up at me and he said 
‘You’re it!’ . . . That is the way NASA operated back in those days. 
We were not heavily populated. We were definitely not over-
staffed and everyone was given a lot of responsibility to get things 
done in the best way you could.35
The criticality of the station to make the key go/no-go call was 
not lost on the Bermudians. When construction began in April 1961, the local 
island newspaper headlined “Bermuda Tracking Station Has Vital Part to Play 
in First Manned U.S. Spaceflight,” going on to boast that “an order from here 
could bring it down.”36 For fiscal reasons (along with perhaps more importantly, 
diplomatic expediency and promotion of international goodwill), maximum 
use of the local workforce was exercised in Bermuda. This worked out well, for 
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the most part, not only in Bermuda but in other places as well. Some problems 
did arise, particularly in nonindustrialized countries where work was mostly 
done by hand. Even in more advanced places such as Australia, contractors 
often ran into “specifications and standards” discrepancies where, for instance, 
electromechanical devices made in the USA did not interface correctly with 
local, European-based standards like voltages and the imperial versus metric 
systems—something that any traveler can relate to even today.37
Even as construction was underway on Bermuda, an agreement 
was reached to build another critical station, this one in the South Pacific. 
On 6 April 1961, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, H. C. Hainworth, 
exchanged signatures with Walworth Barbour, Charge d’Affaires ad interim 
Designated as Site No. 11, the Canton Island tracking station was located four and 
one-half miles southeast of the airport terminal in an area used as a ﬁghter strip during 
World War II. Designed only for telemetry and voice communications, the site was rather 
sparse with no radar or spacecraft command capability. Communication was main-
tained with the Mission Control Center by the Goddard teletype and voice loop networks 
while communication with the Hawaiian area was maintained over a teletype circuit and 
by a limited trafﬁc single sideband circuit. The island was staffed by 47 U.S. contrac-
tors.39 (Unnumbered photograph. Folder # 8810, NASA Historical Reference Collection, 
NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington DC.)
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of the British government, formally establishing a tracking station on the small 
island of Canton. This was the culmination of planning by NASA which first 
started in 1959. When LRC was first delegated by Headquarters with the 
responsibility for establishing the Mercury network, a chief aim was to iden-
tify locations that maximized communication coverage over three orbits, this 
being the then planned duration of the Mercury orbital missions.
As the TAGIU examined the ground track map, it was found that 
a large gap existed from the time when the spacecraft left the Australian sta-
tion at Woomera to when signals could be acquired by the Hawaii Station on 
Kauai. During the first orbit, the ground track of the Mercury capsule took 
it well south of the Hawaiian Islands such that acquisition-of-signal would 
not have been possible until the capsule was over the North American con-
tinent—a communication gap of over 25 minutes! A loss-of-signal of this 
duration was not considered at all acceptable when Mercury was first being 
planned (even though longer quiet periods were to become common place on 
later missions). A site had to be found to close this gap. It turned out that the 
ground track of the Mercury spacecraft took it almost directly over Canton 
Island in the Kiribati Republic.
Canton (also known by its Kiribati name of Kanton or Abariringa) is 
the largest and most northern of the Phoenix Islands, located in the middle of 
the Pacific Ocean just south of the Equator. It is a volcanic atoll, made of a low, 
narrow rim of land surrounding a large shallow lagoon. As with most atolls in 
this region, it is relatively small, only seven kilometers (four and one-half miles) 
wide on the west, from which it narrows to a southeast point some 14.5 kilo-
meters (nine miles) away. Since its discovery by independent sailors in the early 
1800s, mostly American whalers, the island served mainly as a stopping point 
for American and British ships traversing the Pacific shipping lanes. Canton 
broke into the news in 1937 when American and New Zealand astronomers 
chose it as a spot from which to view the total solar eclipse of 8 July; enough 
publicity was generated to at least put the tiny spot on the map. Prior to this, 
about the only news coming out of the island was the continual British efforts 
to reassert their jurisdiction over the Phoenix Islands and the speculated role 
Canton may have played in the disappearance of Amelia Earhart and her navi-
gator Fred Noonan. In 1938 and 1939, Pan American Airways developed an 
extensive airport on the island, deepening and clearing the lagoon to initiate air 
travel to New Zealand using Canton as one of their ports of call.
On 9 August 1959, NASA Administrator Keith Glennan wrote a let-
ter to the Department of the Interior proposing to establish a tracking station on 
the island. (At the time, the United States had codominion status along with the 
United Kingdom for the island.) In a reply to Mr. Glennan, Interior Secretary 
Fredrick A. Seaton granted permission, saying “We wish to assure you of any 
further cooperation your Administration may require of this Department in 
furtherance of this most important project.”38 In December, Langley sent a del-
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egation to the island for a site survey and to begin negotiations with the local 
authorities. Construction began the next year, and the station was well prepared 
by the time John Glenn orbited Earth on 20 February 1962.
Located 3,200 kilometers (2,000 miles) northeast of Canton are the 
Hawaiian Islands. Situated in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, Hawaii provided 
an ideal setting for a network ground station, picking up spacecraft as they 
emerged from the South Pacific. Construction of the Kokee Park Tracking 
Station on the southwest hills of Kauai began in May 1960. Eleven months later, 
the station was completed, coming online in time to support the first unmanned 
orbital Mercury Atlas test flight (MA-4) in September 1961. Five months later, 
Glenn completed the first U.S. human orbital mission on MA-6.39
Even though Hawaii was designed to support the human spaceflight 
program, it was also frequently tasked to support Goddard’s unmanned sci-
ence satellites because of its good location and full compliment of equipment. 
In fact, multitasking of this station went beyond NASA. Hawaii was a shared 
effort between the space agency and the Navy’s Pacific Missile Range (PMR). 
Beginning with its construction, the Kokee Station was a joint venture between 
the two departments, with the Navy operating a tracking and data acquisition 
facility on the grounds of what had been Bonham Air Force Base on the west-
ern side of the island. When construction was finished in August of 1961, it was 
integrated into the PMR command at Kaneohe, Oahu. In this arrangement, the 
Barking Sands (U.S. Navy) and Kokee (NASA) facilities operated as a single, 
integrated station even though they were separated by some 3.5 kilometers (2.2 
miles) and 1,200 meters (4,000 feet) in elevation.40
In the spring of 1965, the DOD transferred control of the facility 
to the Air Force Western Test Range, headquartered at Vandenberg Air Force 
Base in Lompoc, California. According to Virg True, former Station Director, 
there was little change as result of this reorganization other than adding one 
more scheduling office into the mix. True himself, though, transferred to the 
Air Force in order to remain in what he felt was the more exciting space pro-
gram as opposed to the Navy’s missile programs. Such was the appeal of human 
spaceflight in the 1960s.41
It should come as little surprise that squabbles existed between NASA 
and the Air Force. Disagreements often existed on things ranging from opera-
tions control and information flow to daily responsibilities, particularly during 
human spaceflight operations. At Hawaii, these disagreements quickly magnified 
in a short amount of time soon after the station became operational. By late 
summer of 1965, something had to be done. The problem was eventually settled 
in sweeping fashion and in NASA’s favor: the station was transferred to NASA. 
Again, daily operations at the station level changed very little. All range users 
received support on a priority basis, allotting first priority to NASA human 
flight activities, second priority to Air Force ICBM launches, followed by naval 
fleet missile evaluation and training exercises, and lastly, support of Nuclear Test 
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programs. All scheduling was coordinated through the Station Director who did 
his best to accommodate all users. In this arrangement, all agencies eventually 
became very cooperative and service was virtually never denied to any legiti-
mate user.42
Contractors were relied upon throughout the network. At Hawaii, 
the Chance Vaught Aircraft Company and its Hawaiian subsidiary, Kentron 
Hawaii Limited, initially played the major role. But in 1971, the operations 
and maintenance effort of all network stations was combined under a single 
contract. Bendix, already the major NASA contractor for tracking and data 
acquisition, was awarded the contract, one which it would keep until the station 
closed in 1989.43
Hawaii was, by all accounts, the busiest station in the worldwide 
network, due primarily to its location. First, launches from the Cape at a 28º 
inclination (that is, launches directly due east from the Cape) yielded more 
Cultural dichotomy was very evident in this 1962 photograph of the Kano tracking sta-
tion in Nigeria. Security was not an issue as the station was an object of curiosity for the 
local Hausa villagers. (Unnumbered photograph, Folder Number 8819, NASA Historical 
Reference Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington DC.)
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visible passes at Bermuda, Carnarvon, and Hawaii than at any other station. 
Second, its location on a path from Vandenberg Air Force Base to the Kwajalein 
atoll provided an ideal location for midcourse tracking of Air Force ICBM tests. 
Third, PMR operations in the surface-to-air and air-to-air missile test programs 
required a large and rather continuous demand for radar and telemetry services. 
Fourth, periodic nuclear weapons testing in the South Pacific brought signifi-
cant workload in support of Sandia Corporation and its subcontractors. Finally, 
the demands of the Pacific Fleet for support of weapons testing as an adjunct to 
the Vietnam War at the time called for significant resources from the station. All 
this yielded the heaviest workload experienced by any of the NASA stations.44
As the Mercury network took shape, ground station locations were 
determined by a number of factors. These ranged from geography to the 
willingness and political alliance of the local government, and to language. 
Perhaps no other station in the MSFN better illustrated a dichotomy in cul-
tures than the one that sat among the shrubs and parched red clay on the out-
skirts of the ancient city of Kano in central Nigeria. On 19 October 1960, an 
agreement was reached in the capital city of Lagos, allowing the United States 
to construct “NASA Tracking Station 5” in the Federation of Nigeria. This 
news was announced with great fanfare to the Nigerians. The local Hausa vil-
lagers living around Kano described the site as “the place the Sardauna built 
to get the message from the stars.”45
A NASA ground station often provided the most visible and some-
times the only tangible look into America’s space program on foreign soil. 
Because of this, the station staff was often looked upon as unofficial ambassa-
dors of international goodwill to the native populace, representing American 
goodwill and know-how in these countries. Kano exemplified this more than 
any other station. It was quite the “hi-tech” tourist attraction of its time, where 
open-door was the norm, drawing the curious from all parts of Nigeria. An 
unguarded gate leading to the station welcomed visitors. Albert E. Smith, the 
first Station Director said at the time, “There’s nothing here that’s classified; 
we are at home to all visitors.”46
Life in Kano was simple, unchanged for centuries. Touareg war-
riors still lived in pressed-earth dwellings; naked children played along the 
roadside; camel caravans presided over by nomads shared the dusty wash-
board roads with donkey-drawn wagons and automobiles. Such was the set-
ting for NASA’s first tracking station in central Africa. Although the station 
would be short lived—officially closed down on 18 November 1966 just one 
week after Gemini 12 splashed down, a victim of technology evolution as 
NASA revamped the MSFN in preparation for Apollo—it met a crucial need 
at the time. Depending on the orbit, Kano provided anywhere from a three 
to six and a half minute communication window with the Mercury (and later 
Gemini) spacecraft as it passed over the continent after leaving the Grand 
Canary Island coverage area.
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The station was also important because it could monitor (but not 
remotely trigger) a retrofire over Africa for an Indian Ocean recovery in the 
event of an emergency. It was operated and maintained by 30 Bendix and 
General Electric workers along with 10 technicians from the British Cable and 
Wireless Company who maintained the cross-continent and trans-Atlantic 
ocean floor cable between Kano and Cape Canaveral. The Air Force also had 
on-call a 30-person rescue team there to aid in ocean or land recovery opera-
tions if needed during Mercury and Gemini.
As the infrastructure of the MSFN was being established, inter-
national cooperation was just as crucial as it had been back in the Minitrack 
days. This was best illustrated at Guaymas, Mexico where diplomacy played 
the major role in getting the station built. The establishment of the Guaymas 
Station could best be described as a labored process, one that required great 
patience and perseverance. NASA considered a station in Mexico very impor-
tant since it would be the first North American land station to establish con-
tact, and if needed, enable the ground to command a first orbit retrofire 
for an Atlantic Ocean recovery in case of an emergency with the Mercury 
spacecraft.
In the spring of 1959, NASA presented to the State Department a 
list of foreign locations for tracking stations. The Department told NASA that 
it was reasonably optimistic about the chances to obtain entry to all areas but 
Mexico where, it felt, the space agency would have extreme difficulty due 
to internal political strife and anti-American sentiments. The Department 
agreed to provide assistance in every way possible in getting approval in 
Mexico. Initial overtures by the U.S. embassy in Mexico, however, received 
no response.
In the summer of 1959, Milton S. Eisenhower, advisor to his older 
brother President Dwight D. Eisenhower, on a trip to Mexico, made a per-
sonal appeal to President Adolfo Lopez Mateos to open negotiations. This 
resulted in at least an expression of interest. It was followed by discussions at 
a White House dinner attended by NASA Administrator Glennan during the 
visit of President Lopez Mateo and Mexican Ambassador Antonio Carrillo 
Flores later that summer. Again, interest was at least verbally expressed by the 
Mexican government to, at a minimum, consider the proposal. There then 
ensued a lengthy period of inactivity in which nothing constructive hap-
pened. NASA could not get an answer from anyone on where Mexico stood. 
It was emphasized by the U.S. Embassy throughout this process that the polit-
ical climate in Mexico at that time was questionable at best. By then, planning 
of the Mercury network was well underway and the Mexican situation was 
beginning to impact the schedule. Great pressure came from the Langley team 
assigned to lead in the planning and implementation of the Mercury ground 
network to get an answer, either a yes or a no.
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Edmond Buckley and E. J. Kerrigan made a visit to Mexico in January 
1960 in a final effort to determine whether the Mexican government was really 
interested at all. With the very active cooperation of U.S. Embassy officials, dis-
cussions were finally held with the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and other 
top Mexican officials. The talks were deemed favorable, enough so to gain 
approval from President Lopez Mateo for further negotiations. Arrangements 
were made by Mexico City for meetings to be held between the University 
of Mexico and NASA on the basis of mutual scientific cooperation. This was 
the breakthrough that NASA had been looking for. Doing so provided the 
scientific impetus that Mexico deemed essential to provide the public support 
needed for any cooperative effort between the two countries. It was personally 
obvious to Edmond Buckley, though, that the actual possibility for mutually 
beneficial scientific cooperation of the sort desired by the Mexicans would be 
for projects other than Mercury. But he also felt that collaboration was necessary 
considering the importance of a Mercury station in Mexico. 
Operating in this not entirely ideal but at least workable framework, 
negotiations proceeded over the next four months of 1960. The Mexican gov-
ernment presented several guidelines around which they felt the talks should 
be centered. These were designed primarily to assuage the prevailing negative 
American public sentiment:
1  Great care must be taken in all actions and public announce-
ments so that the Mexican people not misunderstand the scien-
tific and peaceful nature of the activity.
2  It was important that the military not participate in the opera-
tion of the station.
3  It was desirable that the activity be described as an international
cooperative activity of many nations and not as a bilateral agree-
ment between the United States and Mexico.
4  To further emphasize wide international participation, it was 
desirable that Australians or other nationals be present at the 
Mexican station; that Mexicans be present at other stations, for 
example, at Cape Canaveral.
5  It was preferable to have the agreement negotiated between the 
president of an American university and the president of the 
University of Mexico.47
A formal agreement between Mexico and the United States estab-
lishing the tracking station at Guaymas was finally signed on 12 April 1960. 
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With great fanfare, an inauguration ceremony officially opening the sta-
tion was held 14 months later on 26 June 1961, presided by NASA Deputy 
Administrator Hugh Dryden, the Mexican Foreign Minister and others in a 
large Mexican delegation. The cost to establish the station was $2.25 million 
in 1960, one of the biggest projects in that area at the time.48 The significance 
of an agreement establishing a spaceflight tracking station in Mexico was no 
small matter. Scientific and cost reasons aside, it was the first real cooperative 
project between the two neighboring states since before World War I and, as 
such, was quite momentous. Both the State Department and the U.S. Embassy 
made it clear that this represented a big step to bettering relations with its 
neighbor to the south, one that went beyond merely space exploration and 
Project Mercury.
One of the first actions taken during these negotiations was the 
establishment of the Mexico-U.S. Commission for Space Observations. The 
decision to establish a commission was not arrived at in a cavalier way. The 
U.S. State Department and General Counsel at the time required a good deal 
of thought before agreeing to such an arrangement, since intergovernmen-
tal commissions generally tend to establish rules which are binding on the 
countries involved, and thus require congressional approval. It was recognized 
that in this case, though, the commission would be established primarily to 
provide assurance to the Mexican people that this was truly a cooperative, 
civilian, scientific project in which their government was fully informed at 
the highest levels. Without the appointment of this commission, the tracking 
station in Mexico likely would not have materialized on schedule, if at all.
Mexico City’s emphasis that, in their view, this was primarily a sci-
entific and not political cooperative was reflected in the makeup of the com-
mission. The Mexican Section was led by Ing. Ricardo Mongas Lopez, former 
Dean of the Institute of Geophysics at the University of Mexico. Mongas 
Lopez was a well renowned scientist with diverse experience in multiple fields 
who had served on many government panels. He was joined by Dr. Eugenio 
Mendez Docurro, Director of the National Polytechnic Institute and Ing. 
Jorge Suarez Dias, a former Dean of the Polytechnic Institute.
Their carefully selected counterpart, the U.S. Section, was com-
posed of Edmond C. Buckley, Assistant Director for Space Flight Operations, 
NASA Headquarters; Ralph E. Cushman, Chief of Field Installations, NASA 
Headquarters Procurement Office; and G. Barry Graves, Head of the Langley 
TAGIU team responsible for planning and implementing the Mercury network. 
The U.S. also appointed Raymond Leddy, Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in 
Mexico City, as the permanent liaison officer for the U.S. Section of the com-
mission. This last appointment was done so as to comply with Mexican wishes 
to have someone in their country who could handle day-to-day affairs.49
But the appointment of a commission did not translate into imme-
diate progress. It was actually quite the contrary. Originally, meetings were to 
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be held every two months. In reality, however, the commission only convened 
when pressure from the U.S. Embassy forced its scheduling. The Mexican 
government still tended to proceed cautiously and kept a close watch over the 
actions of the commission. This caution was evident when, in the first official 
meeting, Ambassador Oscar Rabasa, Director in Chief for American Affairs, 
kept a firm control of the proceedings until he was satisfied that the direction 
of the meeting was headed where it was supposed to: science; only at that point 
did he relinquish control to Chairman Mongas Lopez. This was somewhat of a 
sobering process for the United States in general, and NASA in particular.50
Mexico has always had (and still has) a deep government bureau-
cracy based on Latin American heritage. Thus, NASA needed real assistance 
to properly work with the Mexicans so as to avoid becoming snared in bureau-
cratic and jurisdictional entanglement. Take for example that as many as five 
to seven separate Mexican bureaus ordinarily had to approve imports into the 
country. The use of this commission, backed by the President of Mexico and 
his Foreign Affairs Office, proved crucial to help cut through bureaucratic red-
tape so that real work could get done. Although interbureau difficulties still 
arose, the United States did not become involved in them, but rather, utilized 
the Mexican Section of the commission to work out the often thorny issues.
In addition to dealing with governmental bureaucracy, an intan-
gible and even more volatile issue was also at work, an issue that really called 
for careful diplomatic attention. Anti-American sentiment in Latin America 
was high at the time and strong feelings about the United States were ram-
pant among the Mexican populace. In June 1960, Dr. Glennan invited mem-
bers of the Mexican Section to Washington, at NASA’s expense, to visit the 
Goddard, Wallops, and Langley facilities. Even though only two members 
came, they returned to Mexico with invaluable publicity from the traveling 
Mexican press. Over time, the Mexican Section of the commission turned 
out to be extremely helpful by giving wholehearted support to the station 
and keeping unfavorable press and perhaps possible demonstrations about the 
“United States Missile Station” at a minimum.51
The commission produced many favorable television and radio 
spots promoting the American tracking station and provided newspaper inter-
views in support of the project. Patience and perseverance paid off for NASA 
in Mexico. It was very apparent as the station finally opened that the commis-
sion (on both sides) had served its purpose well. Even Ing. Mongas Lopez and 
Raymond Leddy doubted that the Mexican government would ever allow it 
to be dissolved. “The assurance desired by both governments that the pro-
cedures be carried out in a manner that would promote good will between 
Mexico and the U.S. seems to have been observed,” Edmond Buckley was to 
reflect years later on the effort it took to build up the Guaymas station. Simply 
put, “Different approaches were needed in different countries.”52
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While it was quite true that different approaches were indeed 
needed in different places, one common denominator generally permeated 
all negotiations regardless of the country involved. In setting up its network, 
NASA took great care to always emphasize the civilian nature of the project 
to the host country. The Agency’s stance was that 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is a civil-
ian scientific organization and that Project Mercury is a scientific 
experiment being conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the 
problems of man’s existence in space. Furthermore, the results 
from this experiment will be made available to all the world.53
The promotion of the peaceful nature of the work and the shar-
ing of results had worked well back in 1957 during the IGY when the NRL 
was first setting up Minitrack. Fueled by increasing East-West tensions, this 
The Mercury Control Center was located near the launch area at Cape Canaveral, apart 
from the computers which in those days were still centralized at the Goddard Space 
Flight Center in Maryland. Unlike the high resolution, computer graphical displays of 
today, the ground track of the capsule on the ‘big board’ was moved mechanically by 
wires. This picture was taken on 20 February 1962 during America’s ﬁrst human orbital 
ﬂight, Mercury Atlas 6. (NASA Image Number 62-MA6-161)
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approach was needed all the more as suspicion tended to exist among many 
countries as to the true nature of the American space program. This was 
especially true of African states. Ray W. Hooker, Assistant Chief of Langley’s 
Engineering Service Division, reported following a trip to Africa in rather 
blunt and sobering terms that 
In the case of the Kano and Zanzibar sites, the British have 
sold the local government on the fact that this is an American 
experiment, harmless in nature and would contribute to the sci-
entific knowledge of the world. [But] In both the Nigerian and 
Zanzibar governments, there is the general native population 
which is capable of believing almost anything and getting quite 
excited about it. A rumor was circulated in Kano at the time of 
the site team’s visit there to the effect that the team was tied in 
with the French atomic bomb experiment in some manner.54
Such gross misconceptions on the part of the local government had to 
be resolved diplomatically. In the Nigerian situation, personal assurance to the 
Emir of Kano by the Langley advance delegation was done. To do this, NASA 
had to enlist someone the Emir trusted, in this case Arnold W. Frutkin from 
the National Academy of Sciences who had established considerable positive 
reputation with foreign countries during the days of the IGY.55 The American 
Embassy or Consulate usually served as a good starting point for such nego-
tiations, enabling dialogue with the right officials who were in a sufficiently 
high position to initiate action. The case of Nigeria was especially sensitive as 
the British were at the time trying to end their rule in that country on good 
terms and most of their actions had that particular goal in mind. This turned 
out to benefit NASA as the British helped to clarify the peaceful intent of the 
Americans.
While it is entirely true that NASA’s charter has always been civil-
ian in nature, the Agency nevertheless, and from the onset, has had to work 
closely with the DOD to accomplish certain missions. Still true today, this 
was inescapable in the early 1960s: the DOD owned all the launch facilities 
and had a wealth of experience and knowledge in the areas of missiles and 
rockets. It was also in the midst of setting up its own satellite network (the Air 
Force Satellite Control Network, or AFSCN). Securing the “high ground” 
was (and is) a national security objective for the DOD.
No where else did NASA rely on the DOD more than at Cape 
Canaveral, Florida, where launches took place. To manage this interface, the Air 
Force created the position of a Department of Defense Manager for Manned 
Spaceflight (DDMS). DDMS was given the job of interfacing with the civilian 
space agency’s newly created Project Mercury representatives to work through 
common problems. When Mercury came onboard at the Cape, the DDMS sup-
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ported NASA in such areas as launch operations, range safety, contractor support 
services and the construction of a new control center at the launch facility.
It was in this capacity that Henry H. Clements (Associate Director 
of the Johnson Space Center from 1981 to 1984) began his association with 
NASA. As a Captain in the Air Force, he was reassigned to the DDMS, 
becoming the first Network Controller (NC) during the suborbital Mercury 
Redstone missions. “This was really a one-man operation, keeping tab on 
some 15 remote sites, verifying that they were ready to support the mission 
and that the capsule communicators stationed at various tracking sites were in 
position and linked to the control center at the Cape via Goddard,” Clements 
recalled in 1982 the rudimentary setup that was Mercury Control. 
Much of the equipment and technology used in those early 
days was rather rudimentary. We had a display map on which the 
capsule was simply moved by wires and the status of our tracking 
stations was merely indicated by red or green lights. Our track-
ing stations often found it difficult to stay on the radar beacon—a 
beeper signal generated by the orbiting space capsule. Then, there 
was the problem of a smooth handover from station to station as 
the spacecraft circled the Earth. There were also problems when 
sunspots caused microwave dropouts in ground communications 
and pipe layers accidentally cut vital telephone cables. Yet, despite 
it all, we had extremely high reliability due to the outstanding 
support from NASA’s civil service team and our contractors. 
They all were very anxious for this program to succeed and for 
our astronauts to return safely. In this effort, reliable tracking, 
computer and communication support was vital.56
The State Department was instrumental in helping to secure inter-
national cooperation not only with third-world countries but also with estab-
lished United States allies. An agreement with Spain was needed, for example, 
for a Grand Canary Island station. A good telemetry and radar capability in 
the Canaries was considered critical by mission managers for orbit establish-
ment, particularly in the case of an abort.
The Canary Islands are an archipelago of seven volcanic islands 
located 180 kilometers (110 miles) off the Moroccan coast of northwest Africa. 
These islands were known from antiquity. Prior to their conquest in 1402 by 
Spain, they were inhabited by the Guanches, native peoples related to the early 
Berbers of North Africa. The conquest of the Canaries took almost 100 years 
and set a notorious precedent for the conquest of the New World. Due to the 
terrain and staunch resistance of the native Guanches, this conquest was not 
completed until 1496 when the Canaries were incorporated into the Castilian 
kingdom. The Spanish imposed a new economic model based on single-crop 
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Table 3-1: The Mercury Space Flight Network (Three Orbit Conﬁguration)57
* FA: fully automatic    SA: semiautomatic  M: manual    ** CAPCOM: capsule communicator
Station A
bb
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at
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n
Location S-
Ba
nd
 R
ad
a
C-
Ba
nd
 R
ad
ar
Ac
qu
is
iti
on
*
Te
le
m
et
ry
Co
m
m
an
d
CA
PC
OM
**
North America
Cape Canaveral, Florida CNV 28°28’N   80°34’W t t FA t t t
Corpus Christi, Texas TEX 27°39’N   97°23’W t FA t t
Eglin AFB, Florida EGL 30°46’N   86°53’W t FA
Guaymas, Mexico GYM 27°57’N   110°43’W t FA t t t
Point Arguello, California CAL 34°39’N   120°36’W t t FA t t t
White Sands, New Mexico WHS 32°21’N   106°22’W t FA
Australia
Muchea, Western Australia MUC 31°35’S    115°56’E t FA t t t
Woomera, South Australia WOM 31°23’S    136°53’E t FA t t
Africa
Kano, Nigeria KNO 12°03’N    08°31’E SA t t
Zanzibar ZZB 06°13’S    39°13’E SA t t
Atlantic
Bermuda, United Kingdom BDA 32°15’N    64°50’W t t FA t t t
Grand Bahamas, British West Indies GBI 26°38’N    78°16’W t M t t
Grand Canary, Spain CYI 27°44’N    15°36’W t FA t t
Grand Turk, British West Indies GTK 21°28’N    71°08’W M t t
Paciﬁc
Canton Island, Kiribati Republic CTN 02°50’S   171°40’W SA t t
Kauai, Hawaii HAW 22°07’N   157°40’W t t FA t t t
SHIPS
Atlantic Ship (Rose Knot Victor) ATS FA t t
Indian Ocean Ship 
(Coastal Sentry Quebec) CSQ FA t t
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cultivation, first the sugar cane followed by wine, an all-important trade item 
with England. The islands eventually became an important stopping point in 
the trade routes with the Americas, Africa and India, and the port of La Palma 
turned into one of the most important ports in the Spanish Empire.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the English introduced a 
new cash-crop, the banana, and the islands prospered. In 1936, Francisco Franco 
traveled to the Canaries as General Commandant from where he launched 
the military uprising of 17 July. He was able to quickly take control of the 
archipelago. Despite the fact that there was never actually a war in the islands 
during the 1940s, it was one of the places where post-war repression was most 
severe. Organized opposition to Franco’s regime did not begin to materialize 
until the late 1950s, when groups such as the Spanish Communist Party and 
various nationalist, leftist and independence factions such as the Free Canaries 
Movement came onto the political scene.
When NASA approached Madrid about Grand Canary Island on 
10 September 1959, Mr. William Fraleigh, First Secretary of the Consul 
Political Office, was told that the situation was “rather delicate.” Evidently, a 
South American leftist newspaper that was run by exiles of the Spanish gov-
The staff at Canary Island about 1967. Standing: John Adams, Chuck Rouillier 
(Station Director), Tom White, Percy Montoya, Matt Harris, Ed Bender, Ed Crough. 
Sitting: Clay Krugman, Dick Kelly, Roger Lee, Glenn Smith, Russ Lutz. (Photograph 
courtesy of Gary Schulz)
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ernment had published a misleading article disclosing the fact that Madrid 
was in the midst of negotiating with the United States to give a portion of 
the Canary Islands in order to establish an airbase. Madrid was rather sensi-
tive about the matter since the Spanish Moroccans were already beginning 
to talk about the independence of the Canaries following the example set 
by the French Moroccans in 1956. The Spanish government quickly advised 
the State Department that care must be taken to clearly delineate that the 
MSFN station was not going to be related in any way to the U.S. airbase 
already there. Otherwise, Madrid could not guarantee permission to use the 
station. This bit of warning was passed down through Headquarters such 
that by the time formal negotiations were held, the civilian versus military 
nature of the station project did not become the showstopper that it easily 
could have been.58
NASA always tried, to the extent possible, not to disturb the every-
day lives of the local populace when building its foreign stations, but relocat-
ing the local tenants was sometimes unavoidable. This was the case on Grand 
Canary Island. Here, three groups of transient dwellings housing migrant 
farmers were located within the site of the station boundary. NASA was at 
first inclined to leave these dwellings alone, intending that they continue to 
be used after the station was up and running. But as construction progressed, 
it became clear that this arrangement was probably not going to be in the best 
interest of the Agency; that leaving the structures in their present locations 
and allowing people to occupy them were going to inevitably interfere with 
station operations. The houses had to come down.
Whenever it was necessary to displace or disrupt local property, 
it was NASA’s standard policy to determine the removal and replacement 
cost prior to starting any actual work. Alternatives were pursued if the 
cost was deemed unacceptable. In the case of Canary Island, an agreement 
was reached—with the assistance of the U.S. Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command—to replace the structures in kind but just outside the boundary of 
the tracking station.59
E E E
Construction of the MSFN began in April 1960; by mid-summer, 
all stations were under construction. The last one, Kano, Nigeria, was com-
pleted in March 1961. On 1 July 1961, 24 months after awarding contracts, 
NASA officially accepted the new MSFN. It was quite an impressive achieve-
ment, considering that the first American human orbital flight was not 
scheduled for another six months. A significant amount of research and 
development and nonrecurring engineering went into the effort. That also 
included all the land and ocean-floor cable links between the GSFC core, 
the Cape Canaveral launch site and the individual field stations. Table 3-1 
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presents a summary of the MSFN as it appeared during Project Mercury, 
and Appendix 1 shows the network on a world map.
The standard or baseline Mercury network was set up initially 
to track three orbits. This was augmented during the program so that by
Mercury Atlas 8 (the fifth piloted flight), missions had been extended to six 
orbits. In order to accommodate the additional three orbits, the Atlantic Ship 
was equipped with command uplink transmitters, redesignated the Pacific 
Command Ship (PCS) and repositioned south of Japan. Three Navy ships 
(American Mariner, Huntsville and Watertown) also supported the mission from 
the vicinity of Midway Island in the north-central Pacific.
These were not the only augmentations. To support the final 
Mercury mission—L. Gordon Cooper, Jr.’s MA-9 launched on 15 May 1962 
which was 22 orbits, the standard, three-orbit Mercury network had to be 
modified significantly as follows:
Indian Ocean Ship Coastal Sentry Quebec was moved south of Japan.
Atlantic Ship Rose Knot Victor was moved to the South Pacific near 
Easter Island.
DOD ship Range Tracker was stationed northeast of Midway Island.
DOD ship Twin Falls Victory was stationed between Bermuda and the 
U.S. East Coast.
The DOD Eastern Test Range station on Ascension Island and 
Puerto Rico provided FPS-16 radar and telemetry recording.
 The new MSFN Gemini/Apollo station at Antigua was turned on to 
record telemetry and voice.
 Temporary voice communication sites were erected on Kwajalein 
Island, San Nicholas Island and Wake Island.
 DOD aircraft were assigned to provide voice and telemetry relays
Also starting  with this mission, the radio link between Bermuda and Cape 
Canaveral was supplanted by submarine cable and the GSFC computers were 
upgraded to IBM 709s.60
Stations had different roles and different equipment depending on 
their roles. Not all stations used flight controllers for instance. Sites like White 
Sands and Eglin were used only for tracking. The primary stations with full 
TT&C capabilities were the Mercury Control Center (MCC) at Cape Canaveral, 
Florida; Bermuda; Muchea, Western Australia; Kauai, Hawaii; Point Arguello, 
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California; and Guaymas, Mexico. At these stations, commands—still few in 
number—could be transmitted up to the spacecraft as combination of tone 
pulses. Telemetry was received, demodulated and displayed in the form of strip 
charts and analog meter readings for flight controller evaluation. They read the 
health and status of the spacecraft, for example, marking readouts with different 
color grease pencils, each denoting the different times at which readings were 
taken. Between passes, summaries and reports were sent to the MCC via tele-
type; few telephone voice circuits were available at the time.61
The relative importance of a given site varied depending on what 
was happening during a flight. Cape Canaveral and Grand Bahamas, for exam-
ple, provided vital telemetry, tracking, command, and voice coverage during 
launch and ascent. Conversely, Grand Turk Island provided radar tracking 
during Atlantic Ocean reentries. Bermuda bore the responsibility of deter-
Panoramic view of Launch Complex 14 as Mercury Atlas 9 is readied for ﬂight in this 
picture taken eight days before its launch as the last Mercury mission. (NASA Image 
Number GPN-2000-000609)
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mining whether a mission should continue or be aborted. Should Bermuda 
order a “no-go”, Grand Canary Island then provided the crucial tracking 
needed for an emergency reentry. Finally, Kauai could transmit command 
tones up to the spacecraft to set off the timers used to fire deorbit retrorockets 
in the event of crew incapacitation.62
One capability that was common to just about all the stations was, as 
one would expect, air-to-ground voice communications. Not all stations used 
astronaut Capcoms, though (which by tradition is always an astronaut).63 For sta-
tions where a NASA Capcom could not be assigned, a Communication Technician 
(or Comm Tech) handled voice calls to the astronaut. Before September 1962, the 
“Original 7” were all the astronauts that NASA had, so being able to speak with 
an astronaut on a space mission in those pioneering days was beyond privilege 
and quite an honor. The communications console at the Muchea station, for 
instance, was memorialized for years with a plaque which read:
This plaque is to mark the spot where an Australian first 
spoke to a space traveler. The Australian was the communication 
technician at Muchea, Mr. Gerry O’Connor, and the space trav-
eler was astronaut John Glenn.64
A key to maintaining network reliability was the utilization of 
built-in operational redundancy using spares and backup equipment (plus fre-
quent exercise of that equipment). During the first piloted orbital flight on 
Mercury Atlas 6, controllers worst fears came true when the prime computer 
used for orbit determination at GSFC “crashed.” But the built-in redundancy 
of the system had another computer available which was immediately brought 
online. Station personnel and equipment were kept sharp through exercises, 
simulations and frequent system checkouts. Although not part of the active 
network of stations when it first started, Wallops Island, just off the Virginia 
coast, served as a personnel training and network equipment test facility. This 
network training center was established by GSFC in July 1961 shortly after 
its networks became operational. There, equipment was prepared, tested and 
checked-out prior to shipment and field installation. At Wallops, all NASA 
and most of the contractor supervisory, maintenance and operation personnel 
were trained before their deployment overseas. Students at the Center were, 
for the most part, new engineering college graduates or electronics techni-
cians in their 20s or early 30s. By 1963, the final year of Project Mercury, 
enrollment at the Center had reached 255 students.65
E E E
A hallmark of the NASA spaceflight tracking networks has been 
the simple but distinguishing fact that a mission has never been compromised 
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because of network problems, an enduring value that Covington espoused to 
the men and women who worked under him. The MSFN, nevertheless, did 
have its share of drama during Mercury:
Mercury Atlas 5 (MA-5): On the flight of Enos the chimpanzee, 
a tractor accidentally plowed up cable outside Tucson, Arizona, cut-
ting off communications with the Hawaii and California stations. 
Unfortunately, the alternate DOD circuit that had been provided 
in case something like this happened was also severed at the same 
time. To compound the situation, telemetry revealed that fuel was 
literally boiling away from the capsule, thus vapors—not fuel—was 
getting to the spacecraft thrusters needed to control the orienta-
tion of the spacecraft in the weightlessness of space. An inordinate 
amount of fuel was being consumed based on the data obtained by 
the MSFN. Mission Control decided to cut the flight short by one 
orbit and commanded retrorocket fire from Guaymas (exactly what 
the station was there for). AT&T, who owned the ground cables, 
worked frantically to come up with a solution. Just as the space-
craft approached North America, NASA communications traffic 
was rerouted around the cable break. Mission Control had just 12 
seconds left in the window to initiate reentry. Enos was saved.
MA-6: As mentioned before, during astronaut John H. 
Glenn, Jr.’s pioneering flight, the backup computer at GSFC came 
in handy, performing computations for three minutes while the 
prime computer was being rebooted.
MA-7: Using radar data from Point Arguello, California 
immediately following retrofire, the Goddard computers cor-
rectly determined that astronaut M. Scott Carpenter had overshot 
the intended splashdown point by 386 kilometers (240 miles). 
Mercury Control was at first skeptical when informed of this and 
the news was received with disbelief. Subsequent network tracks 
at Whites Sand and Corpus Christi confirmed Goddard’s initial 
prediction of the overshoot.
MA-8: Solar activity was high and serious communication 
problems were experienced by the MSFN. Navy instrumentation 
ships were also used to augment the ground stations. On the next 
to last orbit, a power failure occurred at Point Arguello and a 
backup DOD site on San Nicholas Island was used to provide 
radar tracking. As an experiment, astronaut Walter M. Schirra, Jr. 
turned off the tracking beacon on his spacecraft during the fourth 
and part of the fifth orbit to see if ground radars could skin-track 
the Mercury capsule reliably. They could not.
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A problem also developed on the flight with the onboard 
thermal control system that was due to, of all things, wax buildup. 
The problem was serious enough that after the first orbit, MCC 
had to decide whether to bring Schirra back or give the problem 
a chance to correct itself on the next orbit, which it did. During 
this critical period, flight controllers had a constant flow of data 
on which mission-critical decisions were made for example, tem-
perature measurements from the spacecraft to assure them that 
Schirra would not become dehydrated by excessive heat.
MA-9: On the last flight of Project Mercury, 15 incidents of 
radio interference were reported by the network. Bermuda, for 
example, reported hearing the Voice of America and that of a 
Greenville, North Carolina, amateur radio operator. DOD fre-
quency controllers were able to contact the offending operator and 
clear the NASA channels. On several occasions, however, amateur 
radio operators actually succeeded in contacting astronaut Gordon 
Cooper! (He was directed by Mercury Control Center not to 
respond.) More serious were instances where industrial equipment 
generated excessive radio interference around ground stations. 
NASA, for the most part, was able to convince local equipment 
owners to shut off the equipment on station passes during the 34 
hour flight.66
Mercury Atlas 9 splashed down on 16 May 1963, bringing 
America’s first human space adventure to a successful end. Particular praise 
for the unsung heroes of the invisible network came from Cooper himself 
at the Project Mercury summary conference in October 1963. When asked 
about his experience and the people who made the program a success, Cooper 
paused and then replied: 
It would be difficult to single out any one group or organiza-
tion for special praise because they were all a wonderful team and 
a smooth blending of extraordinarily competent technical skills. 
However, I do think that if one could be mentioned organization-
ally, certainly I would have mentioned the worldwide network. It 
is certainly comforting to know when you are out there, that the 
world’s finest communications network and the finest electronic 
facilities that man can devise are functioning with a fantastic 
computer complex that will allow the onboard systems specialists 
to break out their diagrams and tell you immediately what your 
situation is in the event of trouble, and this is indeed what hap-
pened on several occasions. Without this marvelous organization, 
it might have been a little more difficult to get back home.67
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By the end of Project Mercury, there was little doubt that the 
MSFN had more than met the expectations of its designers. In a span of less 
than five years, NASA’s manned spaceflight network went from a concept 
on  the drawing board of the Tracking System Study Group to a $125 mil-
lion global network that safely brought four Americans back from orbit. This 
price tag—of which $53 million went into network facilities and $72 mil-
lion to operating cost—came out to just under one-third of the $400 million 
total that NASA spent on Project Mercury. The yearly budget just to operate 
NASA’s tracking stations stood at $225 million. To illustrate the changing 
times, just six years earlier, the entire Minitrack Network was constructed and 
operated for a mere $13 million.68
As 1963 turned into 1964, Goddard’s two networks, the STADAN 
and the Manned Space Flight Network (note the name change from “Mercury” 
to “Manned”) were a key and proven part of the five year old space agency. 
Workforce at the GSFC now accounted for 11 percent of the NASA total. 
Stations had been established spanning Alaska to Australia. Conceived as 
a “manned-satellite” program, Project Mercury was just the beginning. It 
allowed America to not only send astronauts into space for the first time, but 
also to man-rate its worldwide tracking and data acquisition network. This 
network matured quickly to become the dependable safeguard that NASA 
was counting on. Changes would soon be coming as the United States picked 
up its pace, sending more astronauts into Earth orbit and beyond in a deter-
mined race that would culminate with humans on the Moon.

CHAPTER 4
PREPARING FOR 
THE MOON
Despite the significant progress made during Project Mercury, in 
1963 the United States still trailed (and trailed badly) the Soviet Union in terms 
of flight hours spent in space. The six Mercury missions flown between May 
1961 and May 1963 had only accumulated a total of 53 hours in space. Thirty-
four came on Mercury Atlas 9, Gordon Cooper’s 22-orbit program finale. 
Of the six flights, two were suborbital. In contrast, Soviet Vostok cosmo-
nauts had accumulated a total of 382 hours in space on six missions. Valentina 
Tereshkova, a 25-year-old textile worker from Yaroslavl who became the first 
woman in space in June 1963 on Vostok 6, was in orbit 17 hours longer than 
all the American astronauts put together.
It was clear by now that space had become the new global high 
ground for ideology and Cold War international prestige. “Now let the other 
countries try to catch us. Let the capitalist countries catch up with our coun-
try which has blazed the trail into outer space,” was the unabashed challenge 
from Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev upon Gagarin’s triumphant return 
from space.1
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A week after the Gagarin flight, in a White House correspondence 
dated 20 April 1961, President John F. Kennedy gave Vice President Lyndon B. 
Johnson a directive. It had a definite sense of urgency. The President wrote: 
I would like, for you as Chairman of the Space Council, to be 
in charge of making an overall survey of where we stand in space. 
Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory 
in space, or by a trip around the Moon, or by a rocket to land on 
the Moon, or by a rocket to go to the Moon and back with a man? 
Is there any other space program which promises dramatic results 
in which we could win?2
Kennedy wanted results. Even more so, he wanted something dra-
matic, something that would capture the imagination of Americans everywhere 
to allow the U.S. to regain, in no uncertain terms, the upper hand in space.
To answer the President’s directive, Johnson and Dr. Jerome 
Wiesner, Kennedy’s science advisor, turned to NASA. Anticipating this, 
the Agency’s top management triad of James E. Webb, the new Kennedy-
appointed Administrator, Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden and 
Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr. had been working to pri-
oritize a list of Agency objectives since the previous fall. To this end, they 
commissioned a study on 6 January 1961, chaired by George M. Low of the 
Manned Lunar Landing Task Group, to determine the technical, schedule, 
and cost requirements of a human lunar program. Table 4-1 lists the conclu-
sions reached by the Low study.
Spurred on by these generally encouraging findings, Kennedy 
went forth with the commitment before a joint session of Congress on 25 
May 1961, of “achieving the goal before the decade is out, of landing a man 
on the Moon and returning him safely to the Earth.” This was a bold move 
by a young President who had been in office for just five months. While the 
Table 4-1: Results of the Low Study on a Manned Lunar Program3
Mission Spacecraft Launch Vehicle Date
Earth Orbiting
1 Man, Short Duration
Mercury Atlas 1961
Earth Orbiting
3 Men, Long Duration
Apollo “A” Saturn C-1 1965
Circumlunar, Lunar Orbit
3 Men
Apollo “B” Saturn C-2 1967
Manned Lunar Landing
Orbital Operations
Direct Approach
Apollo “B”
Apollo “B”
Saturn C-2
Nova
1968–1969
1970–1971
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The Gemini spacecraft was basically a two-seat version of the Mercury capsule. It did, 
however, have an equipment section which enabled it to stay in space for up to two 
weeks. Gemini allowed NASA to gain the necessary experiences and man-hours in 
space needed before an attempt to the Moon was possible. Here, astronauts James 
McDivitt and Ed White train for their Gemini 4 mission in May of 1965. 
(NASA Image Number GPN-2000-001018)
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technical basis for his decision came from the NASA study, Kennedy felt that 
this gamble was one in which the United States had a chance to win and that 
it was sufficiently bold and dramatic enough to invigorate the nation and place 
America once again on the world center stage.
Before astronauts could fly to the Moon, many questions still had 
to be answered. For instance, what features of the Mercury spacecraft needed 
to be improved? Can a spacecraft be made with greater endurance so it can 
orbit Earth longer to find out the physiological affects of long-duration mis-
sions required to travel to the Moon and back? Can two spacecraft rendezvous 
and dock in space? Can astronauts work effectively outside the protection of 
his spacecraft? Even though America had decided to go to the Moon, NASA 
was not yet ready. To bridge the rather significant technology gap between 
Mercury and the emerging Apollo program, the Agency endorsed plans for 
a two-person spacecraft program called Mercury Mark II in December of 
1961. The following spring, the name was changed and the program was offi-
cially christened Project Gemini—after the twin gods of Greek mythology—
befitting of NASA’s new two-person spacecraft.4
GSFC engineers made their first presentation to the newly formed 
Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) on the outskirts of Houston in the first 
week of June 1962. The topic was technical requirements they would like to 
see implemented in a Gemini network. These included:
Unification of all command, telemetry, and radio signals onto a single 
carrier frequency.
Conversion from analog to the newer and much more bandwidth 
efficient Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) digital telemetry.
Use of two acquisition aids at each tracking station (one for the 
Gemini spacecraft and one for the unmanned Agena docking target) 
and the ability to slave the radar to either vehicle.
Modification of network station computers to accommodate pro-
cessing both command uplink and telemetry downlink.5
Consumed with their primary job of developing the new two-seat 
Gemini spacecraft, MSC was lukewarm to the proposed changes. In their mind, 
they were just too much of a departure from what had just been done success-
fully on Mercury. Houston’s thinking was correct. The Goddard suggestions, 
taken collectively, did in fact represent a major change in the way tracking and 
data acquisition would be done. The proposed technique was a harbinger of 
the (Unified S-Band) system that would later be used on the Apollo spacecraft. 
USB was revolutionary in its time, enabling spacecraft command, telemetry, 
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voice, and television to all be transmitted using a single, combined data link. 
The technique was not entirely new, however, to NASA as the DSN had used 
USB since 1958.
The proposed changes broke ground with the conservative reli-
ance on time-tested technologies such as analog telemetry, which had been 
in use since the 1940s. By the mid-1960s, digital systems had been under 
research at the White Sands Missile Range for some time. NASA had even 
tried it experimentally at the Bermuda Station on the final Mercury mission. 
After initial discussions, Houston agreed to make the switch to PCM telem-
etry but objected to the others on the grounds that complete dependence 
upon a single TT&C link could lead to total mission failure if just part of the 
system failed.
Most of the Goddard proposals were in effect rejected. Despite this 
initial disagreement, GSFC knew what they had and was convinced it would 
work. The two NASA Centers held a series of technical interchange meetings 
and working groups to discuss the changes over the next 12 months, with 
Greenbelt making its case for the new tracking and communication tech-
nique. By June 1963, Houston was persuaded for the most part, agreeing to 
the proposed changes but with one important stipulation: that computers at 
network stations be employed only for telemetry processing but not for com-
manding. The idea was to preclude inadvertent or erroneous commands from 
being uplinked to the spacecraft in the event of a computer anomaly.6
One Gemini guideline that had a significant effect upon the MSFN 
was the relaxation of the 10-minute “dead-time”, which was now relaxed to 
one primary ground contact per orbit. Astronaut performance and the Mercury 
spacecraft had shown that having the ability to remotely send commands to 
the spacecraft from every network outpost, while nice, did not turn out to be 
the necessary requirement that it was thought to be. With this decision, the 
MSFN no longer had to spread its valuable resources equally over the globe. 
It could now concentrate on a limited number of primary sites supplemented 
with a number of secondary stations. In this arrangement, primary stations 
were those that had command uplink capability in addition to voice, radar and 
telemetry while secondary stations did not have command capability.7
Another change in network philosophy was network centralization 
in terms of mission control and mission computing. Back before John Glenn’s 
first orbital flight, many had simply presumed, even at Goddard, that some of 
the communication links between Mission Control and the tracking stations 
would be lost, at least intermittently. But this did not turn out to be the case 
at all as Mercury proved that reliable network communications were the rule, 
not the exception. NASA then had the confidence to remove flight control-
lers from the network stations and centralize all control activities at the new 
MCC in Houston. As a precaution, Capcoms remained at a few of the primary 
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ground stations where there was still lingering skepticism on the part of MSC 
about the reliability of communications.
At least this was the official position coming out of Houston. It was 
well known within NASA circles that such assignments were a way for Donald 
K. “Deke” Slayton, head of Flight Crew Operations at MSC, to give his astro-
nauts some much needed rest and relaxation at attractive places. As former Flight 
Director Eugene F. Kranz put it, “Slayton would send astronauts out at the very last 
moment to all of the sites that were generally good locations to go to—Bermuda, 
Hawaii, California, Australia.”8 This was generally not a problem for those work-
ing at the station, except when the astronaut crossed the line and began “throwing 
his weight around” as happened when Pete Conrad showed up in Australia on 
Gemini 3 saying that Slayton wanted him to be in charge during the mission.
The other network centralization implemented by GSFC involved 
the computer system. On Project Mercury, computing was performed in 
Greenbelt, Maryland. The only other network computers were at the Florida 
launch site itself and at Bermuda. This architecture—identical to what was 
used on Mercury—continued through the first Gemini mission (Gemini 3) in 
March 1965. As preliminary telemetry processing plans were first being laid 
for Gemini, this was the computing baseline computer that engineers worked 
from. A rather limited architecture, it was capable of processing and sending 
only four groups of spacecraft health and status parameters back to the MCC 
for monitoring and evaluation. To meet the increased data requirements of the 
more complex Gemini spacecraft, the MSFN now had two UNIVAC 1218 
computers installed at each primary outpost. Additional submarine (ocean-
floor) cables were also laid to meet the increased data flow demands. These 
improvements had the aggregate effect of greatly improving real-time data 
decommutation and processing allowing much more spacecraft information 
to now be sent to Mission Control than was possible on Mercury. Former 
MSC network chief Lyn Dunseith captured it succinctly when he said, “Voice, 
telemetry, command, and tracking data acquired by the Goddard managed 
communications and tracking network represented some of the most critical 
information available to the flight controllers at their display consoles”9
As network changes continued and Gemini missions took place, 
Houston gained more and more confidence in the network. Take the role 
of computers. Two U1218 computers were originally set up in dual redun-
dant mode, operating in parallel to process telemetry data. As they began 
demonstrating their reliability and as spacecraft TT&C burdens increased, 
MSC relented, finally agreeing to let computers handle both telemetry and 
command (“fire retro rockets,” “turn on telemetry transmitters,” “ring astro 
alarm,” etc.). The digital processing capability of the U1218s made a dra-
matic jump during Gemini, increasing from 2 input/output lines to 32, with 
transmission rates reaching the then state-of-the-art 50,000 bits-per-second. 
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Eventually, one computer was tasked entirely to telemetry while the other 
to commands.10
Project Mercury had shown mission control and mission comput-
ing to be so inter-related that the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition at 
NASA Headquarters decided that they should be best managed by the same 
Center. Since the MCC was going to be at the MSC, the MSFN computing 
system was reassigned to Houston. Gemini 4 in June of 1965 marked GSFC’s 
finale as the primary computing center for NASA human spaceflight. On this 
flight, MSC computers were placed in a so-called “ghost mode” where they 
were checked out and accepted in preparation for its upcoming assumption of 
primary computing duties. When Gemini 5 left the launch pad on 21 August 
1965, the MSC in Houston officially took over the mission computing func-
tion from Goddard. From that point on, the GSFC system was relegated to a 
backup role and employed mainly for network development, testing, and mis-
sion simulations, a role it performed until the end of Apollo.11
Mercury flights had been very basic, limited to circular, low-Earth 
orbits of less than 320 kilometers (200 miles) in altitude. Gemini, though, 
would fly many high apogee elliptical orbits, some as far as 1,600 kilometers 
The now famous Mission Control Center at the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) in 
Houston, ofﬁcially assumed mission network operations beginning with the second 
piloted Gemini ﬂight (Gemini 5) in August of 1965. Two identical Mission Operations 
Control Rooms, or MOCR, were located on the second and third ﬂoors of Building 30 
on the grounds of MSC. In 1996, the Department of Interior designated NASA’s Mission 
Control Center as a National Historical Landmark. Pictured here is Mission Control dur-
ing Gemini 5. (NASA Image Number GPN-2000-001405)
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(1,000 miles). To improve tracking at these altitudes, RCA FPQ-6 skin-track 
C-band radars were added to the network. One of the most accurate and pow-
erful tracking radars of the time, the FPQ-6 had an output power of 2.8 mega-
watts and was effective out to 60,000 kilometers (37,000 miles). All equipment 
was housed in a two story building. Its operation was fairly simple. It could be 
operated from a single console by two or three technicians depending on the 
tracking mode used. A team of at least seven people was required, however, 
for maintenance of the equipment. The reflector was an 8.8-meter (29-foot) 
dish and the combined weight of the moving parts and hydraulic drive was 
over 30 tons, controllable using a small joystick on the control console. For 
rigidity and stability, the antenna tower foundation extended nearly 10 meters 
(30 feet) underground.12 The older VERLORT and FPS-16 radars used on 
Mercury were kept in service. This provided redundancy so that, in the event 
of spacecraft beacon failure, the MSFN could still skin-track. With these com-
bined capabilities, the potential for any tracking losses or blackouts was greatly 
reduced, if not eliminated altogether.13
Lighter TELTRAC telemetry antennas and associated telemetry equip-
ment were also installed across the MSFN to serve as acquisition aid for simul-
taneous tracking of both the Gemini and the unmanned Agena docking target 
during rendezvous missions. A major objective of Project Gemini was to demon-
strate and test-out the rendezvous procedures being developed for the upcoming 
Apollo lunar missions. These missions required the Command Module (CM) and 
the Lunar Module (LM) to rendezvous with each other as the latter returned from 
the surface. On Gemini, the unmanned Agena spacecraft served as a surrogate ren-
dezvous and docking target. For command uplink, the network continued to rely 
on FRW-2 UHF transmitters using 10 kilowatt high-power amplifiers.14
Communications between the MCC and the ground stations also 
became much more efficient during Gemini. Air-to-ground voice trans-
missions, in particular, garnered special attention. Former Project Gemini 
Director at NASA Headquarters, William C. Schneider, recalled that 
Early in Project Gemini . . . we found that voice communica-
tions from the spacecraft left much to be desired. A near-perfect mis-
sion received bad notices because the people on Earth couldn’t hear 
what was happening. So we went to work to fine-tune the system to 
be ready for the more advanced Gemini and Apollo flights.15
This is true even today. Despite crystal clear digital videos from 
space, the quality of voice transmissions—which is limited by the micro-
phones worn by the astronauts—still leaves room for improvement.
The first stations to transmit telemetry back to Houston were Bermuda 
and the early-ops sites downrange of the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at Grand 
Bahama, Grand Turk, and Antigua. When Houston supported its first mission in 
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June 1965, the telemetry transmission rate from Bermuda to Houston was 2,400 
bits-per-second (2.4-kbps). Commands could be sent from the MCC to remote 
ground stations in one of two ways. In one method, used for routine or so-called 
housekeeping commands, Mission Control teletyped the command sequences 
prior to a scheduled pass over a given site which were then stored at the station. 
Later on as the orbiting spacecraft passed over the station, an onsite technician 
would uplink them up to the craft. For more urgent matters, Houston could 
send command messages over the 2.4-kbps master circuit to KSC for immediate 
relay via dedicated government priority “T-1” landlines and submarine cables to 
the next MSFN station in the spacecraft’s ground track. 
Communications between Houston and NASA tracking ships was 
enhanced whenever possible by collocating NASA vessels with Navy com-
munication ships. This provided a network of UHF daisy-chain, relay points 
from sea-to-land and vice versa. The Coastal Sentry Quebec, a converted Class 
1 World War II freighter, was usually situated in the Western Pacific covering 
the South Pacific gap between Australia and Hawaii. The Air Force Eastern 
Test Range and Western Test range operated the Rose Knot Victor and Range 
Tracker, which were moved around in the South Pacific, Atlantic, or Indian 
Oceans depending on a specific mission’s requirement.16
One final measure of the increasing capability of the ground com-
munication network was at GSFC itself, where the SCAMA (Switching, 
Conferencing, and Monitoring Arrangement) was updated. SCAMA was the 
telephone switchboard at the Center that handled all voice communications 
from around the world. In the early days of Project Mercury, it could simul-
taneously conference only 10 worldwide voice circuits. This number jumped 
Wives of Gemini 4 
astronauts James A.
McDivitt and Edward 
H. White talk with their 
husbands in orbit from 
the new Mission Control 
Center at the Manned 
Spacecraft Center on 
3 June 1965. Patricia 
White is on the left, and 
Patricia McDivitt is on 
the right. (NASA Image 
Number S65-28922)
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Table 4-2 The Manned Space Flight Network in the Mid-1960s17
Station (location) Abbreviation Network Role* Ownership**
North America
Canaveral (Kennedy Space Center, Florida) CNV Primary NASA
Texas (Corpus Christi, Texas) TEX Primary NASA
Eglin (Florida) EGL Secondary DOD
Goddard Space Flight Center
(Greenbelt, Maryland)
GSFC Secondary NASA
Guaymas (Mexico) GYM Primary NASA
Houston (Texas) HOU Primary NASA
California (Point Arguello, California) CAL Primary DOD
Wallops (Wallops Island, Virginia) WLP Secondary NASA
White Sands (New Mexico) WHS Secondary NASA
Atlantic
Antigua (British West Indies) ANT Secondary DOD
Ascension (Ascension Island, United Kingdom) ASC Secondary DOD
Bermuda (United Kingdom) BDA Primary NASA
Grand Bahama (British West Indies) GBI Secondary DOD
Grand Canary (Spain) CYI Primary NASA
Grand Turk (British West Indies) GTK Secondary DOD
Africa
Kano (Nigeria) KNO Secondary NASA
Pretoria (South Africa) PRE Secondary DOD
Tananarive (Malagasy Republic) TAN Secondary NASA
Australia
Carnarvon (Western Australia) CRO Primary WRE
Perth (Western Australia) MUC Secondary WRE
Woomera (South Australia) WOM Secondary WRE
Paciﬁ c
Canton (Kiribati Republic) CTN Secondary NASA
Hawaii (Kauai, Hawaii) HAW Primary NASA
Ships
Coastal Sentry Quebec CSQ Primary NASA
Range Tracker RTK Secondary DOD
Rose Knot Victor RKV Primary DOD
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Remarks
Launch Control Center
Located at the abandoned Rodd Naval Auxiliary Air Station; an original Mercury station
Located at the Air Force Eglin Gulf Test Range 50 miles northwest of Panama City, FL; an original Mercury station
Overall network responsibility; development and test facility
Located in northwest Mexico on the shores of the Gulf of California; an original Mercury station
Manned spaceﬂ ight Mission Control Center
Located some 40 miles north of Santa Barbara, part of the Navy Paciﬁ c Missile Range; an original 
Mercury station
Training and test facility just off the shores of Virginia
Located on the grounds of the Army’s White Sands Missile Range near Alamogordo; an original Mercury 
station
Air Force ETR station
Air Force ETR station
Go/No-Go decision site; an original Mercury station
Air Force ETR radar site
Located 120 miles off the African coast; critical abort tracking site; an original Mercury station
Air Force ETR radar site
Original Mercury station in west-central Africa
Air Force ETR station
Replaced the Zanzibar Station; last land site before crossing the Indian Ocean to Australia
Collocated with the NASA STADAN site
The original Mercury site at Muchea was used until Perth became operational; call sign was retained
Original Mercury station; collocated with STADAN site
Original Mercury station
Original Mercury station
Usually stationed in the western Paciﬁ c near Japan
Usually stationed in the central Paciﬁ c near Midway Island
Usually stationed in the south Paciﬁ c off the South American coast
*Primary stations were those that could uplink system commands to the spacecraft. Secondary stations were 
those used primarily for radar and telemetry downlink.  All had UHF air-to-ground voice capability.
**DOD: Department of Defense; NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration; WRE: Weapons 
Research Establishment, Australian Department of Supply
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to 220 when the Mercury Space Flight Network became the Manned Space 
Flight Network for Project Gemini.18
From mid-1963 into the spring of 1964, a number of tracking sta-
tions were added. Overall, the MSFN expanded from 14 land stations to 23 
(9 primary, 14 secondary) plus an additional Navy ship. As before, coordina-
tion with the DOD played a central role in this evolvement; DOD support 
was just as essential for Gemini as it had been for Mercury, the STADAN and 
Minitrack. By the time Project Gemini came around, coordination between 
the two departments at the working level was well established. The Air Force, 
in particular, remained a key player in the MSFN, providing support via 
the Eastern and Western Test Ranges. The network for manned spaceflight 
tracking was indeed a well-balanced, well-orchestrated effort between NASA 
and the DOD, with the latter even assuming primary station responsibilities 
at some places. Table 4-2 summarizes some key characteristics of NASA’s 
Manned Space Flight Network as it appeared in 1965 and 1966 when America 
flew 20 astronauts into space. (Also see Appendix 1.)
E E E
Network expansion in the mid-1960s was not designed merely to 
meet Project Gemini requirements. It prepared the MSFN for the soon to 
come, and the ultimate goal, of Apollo flights to the Moon. Since Apollo 
would be progressively more complex—first Earth orbit missions followed 
by circumlunar and finally lunar landing flights—network complexity also 
increased incrementally. Augmentation to many existing stations, along with 
new stations with totally new capabilities, was necessary. Several new sites 
around the world were founded during 1964. One of them was on Ascension 
Island, the network’s most isolated location.
Located just south of the Equator in the Atlantic some halfway 
between South America and Africa, the desolate 88-square-kilometer (34- 
square mile) island was originally discovered by the Portuguese on Ascension 
Day in 1501. Due to its remote location, it remained unoccupied until 1815, 
when it was garrisoned by the British Navy in an effort to prevent any attempt 
to snatch Napoleon Bonaparte from St. Helena some 11,000 kilometers (6,850 
miles) to the south. At the turn of the century, the British Cable and Wireless 
Company set up a relay station on the island for telegraph cables that ran 
between Britain to Cape Town and South America. Little activity took place 
on the island after that until the Second World War, when it took on more 
importance, becoming a key refueling base for cargo planes of the Cannonball 
Express which the militarized Pan Am crews flew, rushing high priority sup-
plies between Miami, Florida and Karachi, India. “If you can’t go to the 
Moon, the next best place is Ascension Island,” was ironically the airline’s 
advertising catch phrase in those days.19
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Ascension Island emerged as a key network location during Apollo 
network planning in 1964. From August 1964 to July 1965, Ed Buckley initi-
ated a series of technical notes and memorandums to Bob Seamans and GSFC 
and KSC Center Directors Harry J. Goett and Albert F. Siepert, pushing to 
establish Ascension and Antigua in time to support Apollo. A feasibility study 
was conducted. It concluded that the various program requirements in the 
planned Apollo (and Deep Space) missions confirmed the necessity of putting 
a station in the middle of the South Atlantic. Voicing their support, the JPL 
in Pasadena also independently concluded that flights of certain lunar explor-
atory probes would have to be delayed until this station came on line.20
In August of that year, the U.S. approached the British govern-
ment with a proposal to add a spaceflight tracking station on the island to 
support both piloted and unpiloted missions. No difficulties were expected 
as Ascension already played host to a U.S. Air Force radar installation. The 
island was also the mid-Atlantic relay point for data coming from and going 
to Africa via cable. An agreement was reached three months later between the 
two governments paving the way for NASA to establish a MSFN station on 
the dormant volcanic island.
To minimize construction and operating costs, as well as potential 
interference to existing and future facilities, island assets supporting the DSN 
and those for Apollo were consolidated into a single complex at a desolate area 
on the southeast side of the island aptly named Devil’s Ashpit. Engineers chose 
Devil’s Ashpit as it was in a very RF quiet location, being separated from the 
Air Force Eastern Test Range radar site and two British ground stations by the 
859-meter (2,819-foot) Green Mountain. All community support and com-
mon use facilities such as barracks, the mess hall and recreational facilities for 
the men stationed there were integrated with the existing Air Force station 
already on the island.
Under this arrangement, NASA operated and maintained all its 
technical facilities on Ascension while the Air Force provided logistical sup-
port to NASA. (A very similar agreement between the DOD and NASA was 
reached for operations on Antigua in the Eastern Caribbean.) Transportation 
of supplies was mostly provided by the Air Force Military Airlift Command. 
Potable drinking water was always a concern on the remote island. To allevi-
ate this burden, a 144,000-liter-per-day (36,000-gallon-per-day) fresh water 
desalinization plant was one of the first facilities constructed on the island.21
Civil engineering upgrades (road work, ground preparation, power) 
at Devils Ashpit began in late 1964, first on the Deep Space side followed by 
the Apollo side. Construction followed in February 1965 on the Deep Space 
9-meter (30-foot) antenna and its 55-square-meter (600-square-foot) air con-
ditioned service building. It was operational six months later. This was soon 
followed by another 9-meter antenna, this one for Apollo, with its own 37- 
square-meter (400-square) foot air conditioned service building. This power-
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ful system was to be used specifically for high gain USB communications with 
the spacecraft (2.1 GHz operating frequency with a +43 dB antenna gain) 
with a 10 kilowatt command transmitter—sufficient for sending commands to 
the Apollo spacecraft in the near-Earth portions of its journey.22
By January 1966, construction was finished for the most part, in 
time to support mission AS-201 on 26 February, the first test flight of the 
Saturn 1B launch vehicle. Not as large as its “big brother” the Saturn V, at 
68.3 meters (224 feet) the Saturn 1B was still by far the most massive launch 
vehicle NASA had ever flown, capable of delivering 18,600 kilograms (41,000 
pounds) into low-Earth orbit. In addition to the large tracking antennas, a 
30-meter (100-foot) free-standing collimation tower with a 9.3-square meter 
(100-square foot) air conditioned service building was added to support the 
autotracking antennas. NASA did not skimp in establishing the Ascension 
Station, spending some $10.8 million in 1965. When it was all done, Ascension 
(ACN) proved to be a state-of-the-art, full service station, with operations 
conducted at a brand new 1,330-square meter (14,300-square foot) air condi-
tioned operations building. Rounding out the facilities on MSFN side was a 
185-square meter (2,000-square foot) storage building and a 2,500-kilowatt 
power plant.23
With the rapid buildup on the island came traffic problems, which 
NASA had anticipated. At the request of the representative of the local British 
government on Ascension, the Agency constructed access roads on a new 
southern route to the station from the airport. The route traversed the south 
facing slopes of Green Mountain allowing traffic to bypass the area around 
Two Boats Village in the more heavily populated central part of the island. 
NASA began bringing the Ascension Station online in the spring of 
1965, phasing in approximately 10 people each month. ACN was exercised as a 
secondary tracking station during Project Gemini in preparation for its fulltime 
role on Apollo. By the following March, some 110 station workers were on the 
island. Due to its remote location and sustainment cost, normally half of the 
contingent assigned to Ascension was transient personnel who was on the island 
only during actual missions. The station was unique as it was the only “singles-
only” outpost in the network. The prime contractor Bendix apparently thought 
its remote location and harsh living conditions would pose a hardship, and so 
company employees were not allowed to bring their families.24
A particular concern on Apollo was the launch phase of its trajec-
tory. Attenuation of communication signals by the Saturn V rocket plume 
placed some limitations on the spacecraft’s S-band antenna. USB stations, 
therefore, had to be placed closer together than first planned. The problem 
was not only one of needing to be geographically positioned correctly to see 
the vehicle from the ground, but also one of being able to maintain a reliable, 
low bit-error rate and continuous telemetry link between the two. To meet 
this Atlantic Ocean Area support requirement, NASA had to have a string 
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of stations along the ground track at the Cape, Bermuda, Grand Bahama, 
Antigua, Grand Canary, and Ascension. This chain of stations was needed 
so as to provide communications coverage for the range of launch azimuths 
(the direction a rocket is launched with respect to true North) being planned 
to accommodate the various lunar landing sites. For instance, for launches of 
72º, Cape Canaveral, Grand Bahama, Bermuda, and Grand Canary provided 
support. For the more southerly launch angle of 108º, Cape Canaveral, Grand 
The volcanic landscape of Ascension Island is clearly evident in this photograph taken 
by the Ikonos satellite on 24 February 2003. The island is less than 14 kilometers (9 
miles) wide. The MSFN Apollo station was located on the eastern side of the island, 
just to the right of the center, large cloud cover on this picture. (From the NASA Earth 
Observatory Data & Images archive)
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Bahama, Antigua, and Ascension provided support. For launches in between, 
a combination of these sites was used.25
In the summer of 1965, NASA approached the United Kingdom 
to discuss adding stations on Antigua and Grand Bahama Island. Diplomacy 
was once again the key. Paving the way for formal negotiations between the 
two governments, the senior British representative to the Air Force Eastern 
Test Range at Cape Canaveral, who had earlier arranged for and participated 
in the site surveys of Antigua and Grand Bahama Island with NASA officials, 
had earlier (informally) acquainted the British Colonial Office of the proposed 
NASA needs on these two territories. This preliminary work greatly expe-
dited formal negotiations with the London Embassy when the time came. The 
selection of these two islands was by no means arbitrary and was the end result 
of surveys conducted on several South Caribbean islands including Barbados, 
Saint Incia, and Eleuthera by joint NASA and Air Force teams.26
Antigua, a 280-square kilometer (108-square mile) island in the 
British West Indies, already had an Air Force ground station which at the time 
was being used by NASA as a secondary station for voice communications with 
the Gemini spacecraft. The Antiguan government enthusiastically embraced 
the idea of establishing a “Moon Station” on their island. The rare opportu-
nity to play host to one of the tracking stations for Apollo with its publicity 
and potential economic fallout were just too good to pass up. This enthusiasm 
was shown by the actions that quickly followed the initial discussions.
On 20 July 1966 (exactly three years to the day before the Apollo 
11 lunar landing), Chief Minister Bird of Antigua signed an agreement with 
NASA making available a 168-acre plot of land near Dow Hill for NASA to 
construct a station. Since approximately one-third of this land was privately 
owned at the time, the Antiguans agreed to negotiate the purchase of this 
land from the island owners and finance it themselves. NASA would pay the 
Antiguan government a bargain sum of $336,000 ($2,000 per acre) plus inter-
est over the next eight years under the agreement, as long as NASA guaran-
teed full payment even if the station were to be abandoned prior to 1974.27
NASA, at its own expense, widened and paved the roads needed to 
access the station from the airport, the existing Air Force base and from the 
local municipalities. In this mutually beneficial arrangement, rights-of-way 
and easements needed for widening the roads and for installing communica-
tion lines were furnished by the Antiguans at no cost to NASA. It was esti-
mated by the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition that about half a mil-
lion dollars of road improvements were made on the island in 1966. 
As soon as the roads were completed, a single 9-meter (30-foot) 
USB antenna system was constructed at Dow Hill near the Shirley Heights 
region on the southern tip of the island. Logistics and site support were pro-
vided by the U.S. Air Force. All the personnel support facilities such as bar-
racks, mess hall and recreation for the new NASA station were integrated into 
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the existing Air Force base, as was done on Ascension Island. As a further sign 
of interagency cooperation and cost savings, site construction was managed 
for NASA by the U.S. Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks under a continuing 
arrangement with the Air Force Eastern Test Range. It did not take long for 
Antigua to become operational in May of 1967. The station reached its peak of 
operations two years later with 92 people, mainly Bendix and its subcontrac-
tors, assigned to the island.28
The complexity of NASA’s working relationship with other U.S. 
government agencies increased as the MSFN expanded. Take Canton Island 
in the Kiribatis. Prior to NASA assuming responsibility for Canton, three 
American agencies used the island under an agreement with the Kiribati 
government. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had 50 people on 
the island to provide refueling and communication services. Meanwhile, the 
United States Navy had 26 people on the island assigned to the Pacific Missile 
Range. In addition, there were six people who worked for the Weather 
Bureau. After the completion of Mercury Atlas 9 in May of 1963, a two 
year period of relative inactivity in human spaceflight ensued. Still, NASA’s 
expenditures on Canton was $1.2 million a year even though there were no 
missions to support.29
Original plans had called for NASA to operate Canton only through 
the first three Gemini flights, or about the middle of 1965. But during this 
hiatus in missions, the role of Canton was reevaluated by OTDA. Meanwhile, 
the FAA officially notified NASA in early 1964 of its intention to withdraw 
operations from the island. Up until that point, NASA was fully prepared to 
continue supporting Canton. With this sudden withdrawal, OTDA now felt 
like the FAA had suddenly left it “under the gun” to make a decision as to 
whether or not the Agency was going to continue supporting work on the 
island. OTDA needed additional time to consider the alternatives. In particu-
lar, it wanted to know whether the two other agencies, namely, DOD and the 
Weather Bureau, still had any requirements for the island. 
In a meeting held at the Department of Commerce on 31 July 1964, 
the various stakeholders of Canton laid out each of their agency’s position 
for the island. NASA had two requirements. One was for tracking and data 
acquisition on the first orbit after launch. Canton, as a secondary station, had 
only voice and telemetry. But it would be decisive in the event of a first orbit 
abort. Under the planned trajectories for Gemini and early Apollo, Canton 
was the last ground station that would be in contact with the spacecraft before 
retrofire sequence had to be carried out.
The second NASA requirement was one that was still several years 
away. Apollo reentry in the Pacific Ocean could be either in the Northern or 
Southern Hemisphere. Canton Island was ideally situated, being just to the 
south in one case and just north in the other. In other words, at this stage in 
Apollo planning, it appeared that Canton would be a key weather observa-
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tion site for both Pacific reentry areas. But in 1964, this requirement was still 
several years in the future, and it was difficult to justify NASA expenditures to 
keep a site operational to meet a possible future requirement that was perhaps 
as far as five years away.
At this meeting, the DOD indicated they really no longer had any 
need for Canton that was directly related to defense. It had two positions, 
though, both based on an unwritten, good-faith commitment specifically to 
support NASA. The first was the Navy’s original plan to support the Agency 
for one more year, until July 1965. The Navy was prepared to honor this com-
mitment using remaining FAA funds available for base support through fiscal 
year 1965. The Air Force then “volunteered” to pick up the support after 30 
June if NASA still had a requirement, but would do so only on a fully cost 
reimbursable basis from NASA since they no longer had a specific require-
ment for Canton. It was further made clear that NASA would have to let the 
Air Force know within the next 30 days whether Canton would be needed so 
that they could make appropriate budgetary plans.
The Weather Bureau’s position was that Canton Island was the only 
equatorial site it had which possessed a full weather balloon observation capa-
bility to above 30 kilometers (100,000 feet). It was therefore extremely impor-
tant for meteorological research purposes as well as providing data for storms 
moving northward towards Hawaii and southward towards American Samoa. 
Even though this presented a very important (almost mandatory) requirement 
to the Weather Bureau, they made it clear to the other stakeholders that the 
bureau would be forced to reconsider this requirement if it were required to 
fully support the island on its own. The bureau’s conclusion was essentially 
that they would be willing to pay its pro rata share of cost, provided “it didn’t 
cost too much.”30
The final arrangement reached between the agencies was for one 
single agency to manage and fund both the technical and administrative sup-
port on Canton, coordinating the latter with other interested stakeholders. 
NASA, with the most at stake, ended up assuming the lead role. In a letter 
written on 21 January 1965 to James Webb, Ed Buckley recommended this 
action, specifically pointed out that Bendix is also the major support contractor 
to the other agencies on Canton. To this end, he suggested that Headquarters 
could easily arrange to amend the Bendix contract to include Canton without 
significant change in technical personnel.31 Many FAA government workers 
were also receptive to on-the-job transfer to contractor employment status. 
Jurisdiction and logistical responsibility on Canton began to transition from 
the DOD to NASA with the launch of the first crewed Gemini flight in 
March of 1965. This transition was complete by the time the second Gemini 
mission took place in June. DOD operations on Canton, along with what was 
left of the FAA, were completely phased out.
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But it turned out that NASA was not to keep Canton open very long 
either. In November 1966, after Gemini 12 splashed down bringing the pro-
gram to a successful conclusion, the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition 
and the Office of Manned Space Flight jointly conducted a thorough review 
of MSFN requirements. Their conclusion was that future requirements in the 
mid-Pacific could be met more flexibly and effectively by one of the Apollo 
reentry ships. One important reason was that a ship could provide S-band 
support, something that the Canton Island ground station could not.
With its fate sealed, a step-by-step phase out of the station followed. 
Canton Island ceased participation in all network activities by July 1967. An 
advance notice was given by the State Department to the British govern-
ment followed by a final meeting held at the Department of the Interior on 
10 August. It was verified then that no other U.S. government agency was 
interested in assuming responsibilities for the island. This was soon followed 
by a FAA Notice to Airmen that, except for emergencies, the Canton Island 
Airport would be closed to all traffic on 1 September.
Station staff was immediately reduced and preparations initiated for 
assuming a caretaker status until a complete evacuation of the station could 
take place. By September 1967, the approximately $3.2 million of NASA 
equipment invested in the station had been removed and reassigned to other 
stations. Contractors and their families left the island. The final inspection 
flight left Canton on 20 December 1967, ferrying out the remaining few facil-
ity support workers, along with a handful of Standard Oil engineers and geol-
ogists who had remained on the island to finish out their scientific research.
Such joint and sometimes convoluted decisions were not uncom-
mon since NASA (a civilian organization) and the DOD (a military organiza-
tion) both had—and continue to have—a stake in the frontier of space. They 
generally served each other’s interests well. Issues relating to the sharing of 
cost and resources could be found simmering but were often easily settled 
with the stroke of a pen. They ranged from the trivial such as funding of 
recreational facilities to who would provide office equipment, to the more 
serious requirements of cooperative use of water production, transportation, 
station operations, and maintenance costs.
In the summer of 1965, for instance, a dispute over who should pay 
the cost of running the power generation equipment on Ascension Island had 
gotten quite bitter with neither the onsite DOD official nor the NASA Station 
Director budging an inch. To break the stalemate, Ed Buckley recommended 
that the KSC make available $58,500 to Patrick Air Force Base to run the 
power plant.32 Some of these conflicts could have been perceived as perhaps a 
bit petty by those looking in from the outside. But for the people stationed at 
remote locations, these otherwise “petty” issues could directly affect everyday 
quality of life where access to resources could not always be taken for granted. 
124 “Read You Loud and Clear!”
Senior management on both sides back in the States was often called on to 
keep such issues from escalating.
While interagency problems were one thing, strife between col-
located STADAN, MSFN, and DSN personnel was a different matter all 
together. It had the potential to not only be ugly but also impact the ability 
of a station to perform its mission. A case in point was Ascension Island in 
1967. As the MSFN started operations, a lack of cooperation began to develop 
between Bendix contractors working the manned spaceflight system and 
those working the unmanned planetary Deep Space program. This refusal to 
coordinate their efforts eventually led to the Goddard side of the house fail-
ing to adequately provide their assistance to help maintain and support the 
DSN antenna. The condition deteriorated to the point where Ascension was 
faced with the problem of having to refurbish the antenna which had become 
severely corroded. Most of the metal had to be refinished and the electrical 
wiring replaced.
In the spring of 1967, James Bavely, Chief of Network Operations 
at the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition, directed E. J. Stockwell and a 
representative from Goddard to the island to get first hand information on the 
problem. The detrimental effect on station maintenance eventually got to the 
point where installation of a radome to protect the antenna was considered. 
However, with the need at the time to use MASERs to support Deep Space 
missions, the real possibility existed of burning a hole in the radome. A solu-
tion would have been to remove the radome during a mission and then replace 
it afterwards. The alternative (and the one eventually implemented) was much 
more attractive: proper preventative maintenance through better cooperation 
among those working the two networks on the island.33
While this was happening, one of the most volatile episodes to 
befall the network played out halfway across the world on the eastern shores 
of Africa. The MSFN station in Tananarive, Madagascar was one in which the 
beginning and end were tied to the political unrest and instability of not one 
but two governments. Unfavorable circumstances surrounding the govern-
ment of the host country have, on just a handful of occasions, led to station 
closures. These included, for example, Cuba (see Chapter 2) and South Africa 
(see Chapter 6). None, though, were as severe and dangerous as what hap-
pened in East Africa in 1963 and 1964, where the disruption impacted opera-
tions for both the MSFN and STADAN. 
Just off the eastern coast of Africa some 5º south of the Equator is 
the island of Zanzibar. Its written history dates back to the Persian empire 
of the sixteenth century. Occupying a prominent spot along the east African 
shipping lanes, the control of Zanzibar was the object of multiple conflicts 
that occurred amongst various ruling sultans in the 1800s. The British Empire 
with its powerful Navy was also gradually taking over offshore islands in the 
area during this time. In 1890, the island became a protectorate of the United 
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Kingdom, anchoring the Commonwealth’s very important Bombay-Zanzibar 
shipping route to the Far East.
Zanzibar was needed to provide spacecraft coverage after loss-of-sig-
nal at Kano, Nigeria. It was also the last land station to see a spacecraft before it 
crossed the Indian Ocean. Despite some mistrust on the part of the local British 
client Sultan, on 14 October 1960, the United States signed an agreement with 
the United Kingdom to place a NASA station on the island. With the comple-
tion of stations in Kano and Zanzibar in 1961, the MSFN was essentially fin-
ished. The Zanzibar Station was located about 16 kilometers (10 miles) east of 
Stone Town near the village of Tunguu. Assigned in a totally foreign environ-
ment, the Americans, to their delight, were well received by the local villagers. 
Technicians and their families blended in as just another minority group in 
the ethnically diverse region. The staff usually lived in Stone Town with their 
families when they were not at the station supporting a mission.
Although the station successfully supported all four Mercury orbital 
flights without major disruption, it could not avoid operating under a con-
tinuous umbrella of scrutiny from the local authority. Zanzibar, in the early 
1960s, was a highly unstable country of some 300,000 people, ripe for strife 
with factions like the proindependence Afro-Shirazi Party and the Ittihad 
ul’Umma, pro-Peking, pro-communist party that favored Chinese expan-
sion into East Africa, all trying to seize power. Tensions had reached the 
point by 1963 where NASA was realistically concerned and keenly aware that 
hostilities could erupt with little or no warning. In July 1963, less than two 
months after the conclusion of Project Mercury, the State Department issued 
a memorandum warning of imminent potential riots in Zanzibar pending the 
outcome of national elections. In a Confidential letter (since declassified) to 
Goddard Center Director Harry Goett foreshadowing things to come, NASA 
Headquarters recommended that station personnel, as a precaution, formulate 
1) an emergency escape plan, and 2) a plan to reduce staffing of the station 
to a caretaker status that could be implemented by no later than 3 July, when 
elections were slated to begin.34
A period of political unrest did follow the elections but station per-
sonnel did not have to implement their evacuation plan, at least not yet. But 
the situation deteriorated rapidly soon thereafter. By year’s end, the British, 
who had dealt with over 70 years of factions and strife on the east African 
colony, finally granted Zanzibar its independence, establishing it as a con-
stitutional monarchy on 19 December 1963. This state of independence was 
short lived, though, as the ruling Sultan was overthrown less than a month 
later in a bloody military coup instituted by the Afro-Shirazi Party. The new 
socialist regime then went on to merge with the neighboring mainland state 
of Tanganyika to form the country of Tanzania.
Meanwhile, the original tracking network agreement had expired 
in July 1963 after the last Mercury mission. NASA was literally in the midst 
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Letter of gratitude from Bendix to NASA on successfully navigating the circumstances 
of what could have been a tragedy in Zanzibar. From a station safety standpoint, this 
was probably the most tense moment in the history of the Goddard networks.35 (Folder 
Number 8824, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Division, NASA
Headquarters, Washington DC)
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of negotiating a renewal with the Sultan when the revolt happened. With 
safety of Americans now at stake, NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. 
Seamans ordered the immediate evacuation of the station on 14 January 1964. 
The three dependents of Station Director Tom Spencer (Spencer himself was 
away on business in Malagasy at the time), along with eight Bendix workers 
and their 18 dependents were evacuated out of the country by the U.S. Navy 
as a destroyer stood by on alert offshore.36
The drama of these events (coming on the heels of Gordon Cooper’s 
triumphant 24-hours in space just six months earlier) was well publicized in the 
United States. The behind-the-scene (and, some would later say, heroic) diplo-
matic intervention of State Department officials in Zanzibar to buy more time 
making possible a rescue mission and to keep the events from escalating into an 
international incident was critical, the importance of which cannot be overstated. 
In letters of appreciation to Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze and Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk, NASA Administrator James E. Webb officially recognized 
the cooperative efforts of their departments, and credited several individuals by 
name, especially mentioning on-the-spot actions of Charge d’Affaires Fredrick 
Picard, in resolving this incident as successfully as possible without tragedy.37
After the station staff was safely home, L. F. Griffin, then President of Bendix 
Field Engineering Corporation, expressed his appreciation and gratitude in a let-
ter to the space agency, personally thanking Buckley “in behalf of our people.”
But after the staff were evacuated, there still remained the question 
of what to do with the approximately $3 million worth of communications 
equipment that was abandoned. The new Zanzibari President Abeid Amani 
Karume, who had originally given the United States a 60-day window to 
remove the assets, withdrew that offer and demanded in a meeting with Frank 
C. Carlucci, the new Charge d’Affaires, that the U.S. completely rid all sta-
tion equipment from the country by the end of that April. (It was thought at 
the time that President Karume did this as a reprisal to statements made by 
William H. Attwood, U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, that communist China was 
turning Zanzibar into “a kind of non-African state” to be used as a staging 
area for their base of operations against other governments in Africa.) Also 
to be dismantled as an adjunct to the Zanzibar tracking station was a nearby 
communication facility that relayed data to Kano, Nigeria, for transatlantic 
communications to Florida and Houston via cable.38
While the State Department deemed it necessary to physically 
remove station assets in the interest of preserving national security, NASA’s 
position was somewhat different. Norm Brockett, the Director of Network 
Operations and Facilities, thought that the actual reuse value of the equipment 
was fairly negligible when compared with the risk to Americans who would 
have to be flown back into Zanzibar, tear down, load the hardware, and then 
be flown back out again. (A team of 19 workers were, in fact, standing by in 
neighboring Nairobi for just this purpose.) With NASA making it quite clear 
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that any effort to remove station equipment would be carried out only because 
it was the desire of the State Department to do so, no attempt was ever made. 
President Karume’s deadline came and went. No retrieval team was sent and 
the station was eventually abandoned in place.39
NASA’s official stance at the time was that the loss of Zanzibar 
would have no real effect on future plans for Gemini and Apollo. These pro-
grams would stay the course. But the Office of Manned Space Flight had 
in the meantime placed a requirement on Gemini for voice communication 
and telemetry in that geographical area: on at least 50 percent of the orbits, 
Zanzibar was the last station just before the astronauts fired retrorockets for 
deorbit and reentry.
To meet this strictly technical requirement, a couple of contingency 
plans were considered, both involving the use of tracking ships. One was to 
move the Indian Ocean Ship Coastal Sentry Quebec farther west. The OTDA 
quickly eliminated this option, though, since it would have left an unacceptably 
large void over the Indian Ocean prior to acquisition-of-signal at Carnarvon, 
Western Australia. OTDA also looked into what it would take to acquire and 
configure another ship off the coast of east Africa. It was also quickly deter-
mined, however, that this could not be done in time for the first crewed Gemini 
flight, at the time scheduled for October of 1964. (It had already been postponed 
from April. Gemini 3 eventually flew in March 1965.) Fiscal constraint was also 
a factor as the annual cost to operate a ship was expensive, over twice that of a 
land station. NASA had to find a more permanent solution.
A few locations were considered where a transportable system could 
be emplaced, such as in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) or in South Africa, 
where there was already a DSN and STADAN site. Yet another possibility 
was the Malagasy Republic on the island of Madagascar. Just three months 
earlier on 19 December 1963, the U.S. had entered into a 10-year agreement 
for the installation of a transportable STADAN station outside the port city of 
Majunga in northwest Madagascar. The two countries had reached the agree-
ment in accordance with the spirit of a United Nations resolution calling for 
the application of results of space research to benefit all peoples. In addition to 
generating much needed weather forecasts, especially during hurricane sea-
son, the station would provide jobs for some 200 local residents in nontechni-
cal positions for handling day-to-day maintenance work. 40
Initial equipment consisting of five 30-foot trailers—one each hous-
ing a 136.2 KHz and 400 MHz telemetry receiver—were set up at Majunga. 
More equipment soon began arriving from the Australian sites of Muchea and 
Woomera, which were phased out at the conclusion of Project Mercury. A MPS-
26 radar was temporarily deployed prior to the addition of a FPQ-6 radar. All 
together, NASA spent some $600,000 in additional funds to finish-out a trans-
portable station in the east Africa region to replace the one lost at Zanzibar.41
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In the summer of 1964, as it became apparent that the first mission 
of the new Gemini spacecraft was not going to occur until the following year, 
Goddard officials began giving thought to moving the station to a more perma-
nent establishment. In September, construction began at Imerintsiatosika, 24 
kilometers (15 miles) outside the capital city of Tananarive (now Antananarivo) 
in the central High Plateau region of the island. By the time the move was 
completed, American staff at Tananarive had increased from 21 to 58. As 
a transportable STADAN site, the station had been one of the simplest in 
the network, requiring only 18 Bendix and Motorola contractors along with 
three GSFC-assigned supervisors. These requirements were further reduced 
in between missions when it was routinely reduced to caretaker status, requir-
ing only an American representative onsite to supervise the Malagasy nation-
als employed to take care of day-to-day maintenance. By the time Tananarive 
ramped up to support Gemini 3 on 23 March 1965, such down times were a 
thing of the past as 44 fulltime American contractor employees along with 13 
trained Malagasy nationals were reporting to the NASA Station Director.42
The disruptive environment that plagued the station at Zanzibar 
was a sharp contrast to what NASA experienced on the island of Guam. The 
Agency’s work on the island would turn out to be one of the most amicable 
and long lasting in the history of the NASA networks, one that continues to 
this day. It began in the spring of 1964 as OTDA began looking at new loca-
tions for the Apollo network. To support lunar flights, several new capabilities 
were required:
Tracking and data acquisition for Apollo rendezvous tests in 
Earth orbit
Establishing the spacecraft orbit in preparation for and to make the 
go/no-go decision for Trans-Lunar Injection (TLI)
Continuous voice and telemetry contact during the critical lunar 
injection phase
Continuation of coverage during premidcourse flight to confirm the 
“go” status of the lunar mission on the outbound trajectory
NASA needed a ground station to provide coverage in the broad 
ocean area between loss-of-signal at Australia (Honeysuckle Creek) and acqui-
sition-of-signal in Hawaii. After looking at trajectory ground tracks, mission 
planners determined that the Mariana Islands afforded the best geographical 
location from which the Apollo requirements could be met in the Pacific. 
Site survey teams were sent to Saipan, Tinian, and Guam in April 1964. They 
found that although suitable geographic locations existed on each of these 
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islands, Guam was the best for several reasons. First, an international ocean 
cable between the island and the U.S. had just recently been put into service. 
Second, radio noise in the southern part of the island was virtually nonexis-
tent (a very RF quiet, -87.5 dB per square meter). Third, Guam already had 
an established and well used logistics pipeline to the United States. Finally, it 
did not hurt that the proposed site was on a private parcel of land owned by 
U.S. citizens that could be leased.
Located in a large, flat valley some 25 kilometers (16 miles) south-
east of the capital city Agana (Hagatna), the Guam MSFN station occupied 
an area known as Dandan, which means “to knock at the door” in the native 
Chamorro language. The 550-square kilometer (212-square mile) island is 
some 6,500 kilometers (4,000 miles) west of Hawaii. It is today one of five 
well traveled insular areas of the United States (the other four being American 
Samoa, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands). The 
origin of its once primitive habitat is, surprisingly, completely obscure. The 
ancient inhabitants left no decipherable records. Latte stones found upon the 
arrival of European discoverers were so ancient that neither their origin nor 
their true purpose is known.
Spain first laid formal claim to Guam in 1565, 44 years after its 
discovery by Ferdinand Magellan, but actual occupation of the island did not 
begin to take place until 1668, when Padre Luis de Sanvitores led a group of 
missionaries onto the island. Spanish rule ended in 1898, following the Spanish-
American War when Spain ceded Guam and the Philippines to the United 
States. President McKinley then placed the administration of the island in the 
hands of the Navy and for expediency, appointed the Naval Station Commander 
as the governor. The island fell to the Japanese in World War II and became the 
scene of some of the fiercest battles of the war. It was recaptured in the sum-
mer of 1944 when U.S. marines once again raised the Stars and Stripes over the 
island in its island-hopping campaign towards Tokyo. Five years after the war, 
Congress passed an act making Guamanians citizens of the United States, giv-
ing Guam self-government under a U.S.-appointed civilian governor.
One factor that made Guam very attractive besides its excellent 
geographical location was the unabashed enthusiasm of the host. Manuel 
Flores Leon Guerrero, the 50-year old American appointed Governor of 
Guam, made it no secret to the survey delegation that there was no bet-
ter place in the Pacific to locate the first new Apollo tracking station than 
on his island. Affable and gregarious, Guerrero proactively campaigned for 
the proposed station, taking a very personal and active interest in the whole 
affair. He personally entertained the survey team and hosted a reception at 
the gubernatorial mansion so that NASA officials could meet face-to-face the 
leading citizens and merchants of Guam. He then volunteered the services of 
the government of Guam to aid the Americans in any way possible.
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Two areas of vital importance to NASA were specifically addressed 
by Guerrero. First, he offered to secure or aid in securing the land necessary 
for the Apollo station. To this end, he offered to buy the necessary land in the 
name of the government of Guam and lease it to NASA. But if that did not 
work, he offered to negotiate for the direct lease to NASA by the owner, and 
if needed, to negotiate for the purchase of the land by NASA. As eventually 
implemented, land was leased by the owners to NASA.43 The second issue per-
tained to the island’s support of the NASA contractor employees who would be 
stationed on Guam. He felt certain that private enterprises would be up to the 
economic challenge of providing housing and community services that would 
be needed, offering his personal commitment to stimulate the private sector.
Two months after the survey team’s return from Guam, Governor 
Guerrero personally visited Ed Buckley in Washington to again express his gov-
ernment’s eagerness for a Guam station. The campaigning paid off. On 10 June 
1964, the position of the OTDA was put forth in a letter to Hugh Dryden. In the 
letter, Buckley wrote, “The interest and support by the government of Guam will 
facilitate an early decision probably this week on the final site selection in south-
ern Guam,” and recommended the obligation of $170,000 in advanced funds to 
the Bureau of Yards and Boats to begin design of the Dandan site.44
Construction of the Guam Station began in January 1965. There 
was pressure to get the station operational, not only due to the pace of the 
Apollo schedule but also because there was fear on the part of the Agency that 
the DOD might, in some way, lay claim to the job first. In 1965, the Air Force 
was also building its own ground station on Guam (on the north part of the 
island, not the south where NASA was). Charles Force, Guam’s first Station 
Director, said there was a feeling that “if NASA got its Guam station up first, 
then [we] would have the role supporting the manned missions, whereas if [we] 
didn’t put one there, then the Air Force would have that role, and NASA didn’t 
want the Air Force to have a key NASA station.”45 That fear may have driven 
the pace of construction as the station was completely done by September 
1966. (As for the DOD station, it too became operational but was used strictly 
for its own purposes.)
Guam’s capabilities were second to none, including its centerpiece, 
a USB 9-meter antenna system that provided telemetry, tracking, command-
ing, and voice communications to the Apollo spacecraft. Backup TT&C func-
tions in the VHF range were accomplished using TELTRAC, SATAN, and 
Satellite Command Antenna on Medium Pedestal (SCAMP). The Dandan 
site had a large central operations building and a “diner”.46 A NASCOM 
Switching Center to handle Pacific circuits was later added on the south side 
of the building. Three other structures housed water, fire, power, flammable 
storage, and automotive equipment. The collimation tower and other support 
equipment buildings were located on a hill about three kilometers (two miles) 
from the main operations building (see figure on next page. As the station 
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The Guam Apollo Station had as its centerpiece a 9-meter USB antenna used to com-
municate with the Apollo spacecraft during the near-Earth and trans-lunar portions of 
the mission. The station was one of the longest lived in the network, operating for over 
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two decades, from 1967 to 1989. (Folder Number 8813, NASA Historical Reference 
Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington DC)
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neared completion, it was integrated without delay into the manned network 
towards the end of Gemini, checked out and declared operational in March 
1967, in time to support the historic (unmanned) first flight of the Saturn V 
on Apollo 4.
Like Bermuda five years earlier, the Guamanians were very proud 
of their station. NASA had the very active support of the community in that 
regard, from the Governor down. Force recalled a story as the station was 
about to open: 
When the station became operational, I decided it would be 
appropriate to have a dedication ceremony for the station, so I tried 
to get somebody from NASA Headquarters to participate. They 
declined. . . . [Apparently] Guam wasn’t high enough up on their 
priority list for whatever reasons that they were going to partici-
pate. But when I called the Governor’s office, they were out there 
with ‘bells on’ immediately and everything. We did have a very nice 
dedication ceremony. The Navy, who had physically constructed 
the station, heavily participated as did the government of Guam. 
Station Director Charles Force welcomes dignitaries and guests to the Guam Station 
dedication ceremony on 21 January 1967.  Seated to his right are Jose A. Leon Guerrero 
and A. W. Baumgartner, Bishop of Guam; to his left are Governor and Mrs. Guerrero; 
Marilyn Force, President of the Apollo Wives Club; and Cdr. Eugene Pickett, Ofﬁcer In 
Charge of Construction, USN; who oversaw the station construction for NASA and pre-
sented a symbolic key to the facilities. (Photograph courtesy of Charles Force)
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We had a lot of good local publicity. That was the first time I think 
it dawned on the local people that they had a future role in that 
station, and from there on out, we had very popular support.47
A bronze plaque at the station’s main entrance proclaimed:
This Apollo Tracking and Data Acquisition Facility, established by 
the Goddard Space Flight Center of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, is hereby dedicated to providing exemplary 
support for the peaceful exploration of Space as mankind, using his 
God given powers, ventures forth to other celestial bodies in his 
continuing search for knowledge48
Guam was significant in that it was the first station built from 
the ground up specifically for Apollo. Though it had to endure its fair share 
of typhoons—being located in the middle of the Western Pacific typhoon 
alley—the station went on to support all six Moon landings as well as Apollo 
13, Skylab, Apollo-Soyuz, and the Space Shuttle until 1989, plus numerous 
scientific satellite programs. Following a 10-year hiatus in the 1990s, NASA 
once again chose Guam, this time as host to the overseas ground terminal for 
the TDRSS (see Chapter 7). The establishment of the original tracking station 
is still considered one of Guam’s crowning achievements and a source of pride 
for the Guamanians. 
One of the existing stations overhauled during Gemini in prepara-
tion for the coming lunar landing program was Bermuda. As on Mercury and 
Gemini, Bermuda was a critical station immediately after launch and would 
now monitor the ascent of the Saturn V into orbit. First of the downrange 
stations to electronically see the rocket, Bermuda provided the critical go/
no-go data to Mission Control for flight continuation or abort decision mak-
ing. It was located in the right place, enabling one to observe a large portion 
of the S-II second stage burn and most of the S-IVB third stage burn at high 
elevation angles.
Apollo presented several first time technical challenges to the net-
work. Saturn launches out of KSC with azimuths between 72 to 90º required 
the addition of a C-band radar capability on Bermuda to meet Houston’s flight 
mission rules for acquisition of data needed to evaluate the spacecraft while it 
was in Earth “parking orbit” prior to the TLI burn. These evaluations served 
three primary purposes: guidance system analysis, propulsion system analysis, 
and overall malfunction analysis of the Apollo spacecraft prior to committing 
it on a trajectory to the Moon.
On 8 April 1965, Goddard awarded RCA a $4.6 million contract 
to provide an Apollo tracking and data acquisition system on Bermuda. The 
company was to install its most sophisticated long range radar, the FPQ-6, on 
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Cooper’s Island. This C-Band system was state of the art for its time, accu-
rate to within two meters (six feet) at 48,000 kilometers (30,000 miles). The 
previous system on Bermuda, the RCA FPS-16, tracked only to an accuracy 
of 5 meters (15 feet) at 800 kilometers (500 miles). It was kept as a backup. 
Bermuda was the second “Q-6” in the MSFN, the first having been installed 
earlier in Carnarvon, Australia to support Gemini and the early Saturn booster 
development tests.49
On 10 March 1965, Ed Buckley submitted a $1.6 million request 
to James Webb to consolidate and upgrade the existing MSFN facility on 
Bermuda to meet the combined requirements for projects Gemini and Apollo. 
This much needed upgrade was designed to put under one roof, the various 
telemetry facilities located in prefabricated metal structures and in trailers 
scattered about Town Hill and Cooper’s Island. The corrosive effect of sea 
salt spray and moisture had over the years taken its toll, making a facility 
construction project imperative if NASA were to entertain any thought of 
continued operations on the island.
The upgrade was very thorough. It included an air conditioned, 
1,100-square meter (12,000-square foot) Operations Building along with a 
300-square meter (3,200-square foot) Generator Building to house the diesel 
generator. Adjacent to the USB antenna was a windowless 45-square meter 
(500-square foot) building housing the hydro-mechanical equipment to point 
the massive antenna. Concrete foundations were also dug for the 9-meter (30-
foot) dish and the collimation tower. Extensive cabling between the existing 
Tracking and Communications Building and the new Operations Building 
were installed; an existing microwave terminal was relocated. Maintenance 
and administration staff increased by 30 percent. Twenty-six additional tech-
nicians were soon added as the site ramped up to support Gemini and Apollo. 
Once the Cooper’s Island upgrade was complete, the old telemetry site at 
Town Hill was dismantled.50
By far the biggest change in gearing up for Apollo was the use 
of USB. It affected, rather extensively, network operations. Adding to the 
complexity was that some USB stations had dual capability and could support 
two spacecraft—the Apollo Command/Service Module (CSM) and the Lunar 
Module (LM), for example—simultaneously if they were in the antenna beam. 
Others were “single” and could handle only one spacecraft at a time. To illus-
trate the complexity of network planning during this time, one can look at 
how USB capability was added at Grand Bahama and Grand Turk.
The first thing that GSFC and MSC did was to correlate USB 
antenna patterns with trajectories to arrive at a preliminary set of ground station 
locations. This was done for Apollo even before the first Gemini mission took 
place. The result of this preliminary investigation, along with a later GSFC/
KSC meeting held on 1 September 1964, was presented to the 11th Manned 
Spaceflight Instrumentation and Communications Panel in October 1964.
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These studies showed that because of a severe antenna pattern pull 
towards the rear of the launch vehicle, a serious gap in Apollo Saturn V com-
mand coverage would be encountered somewhere between the Merritt Island 
Launch Area (MILA, just downrange of the launch point) and at Bermuda or 
Antigua—which one depending on the actual launch azimuth. The immedi-
ate recommendation of the panel was that alternate locations at MILA and 
Cape Kennedy be considered for a USB site. Houston also suggested that 
additional stations at Grand Bahama, Grand Turk, and Vero Beach be con-
sidered. Their priorities were to be made mandatory, highly desirable, and 
desirable. But since abort requirements and antenna configurations used in the 
studies were new and still evolving at the time, the panel also recommended 
that more analysis be performed. To this end, a new sub panel was formed. 
The mission of this Subpanel on Launch Area Instrumentation was to make a 
comprehensive assessment of additional coverage requirements that were still 
needed. W. F. Varson from GSFC was appointed chairman of this subpanel.51
Its first meeting was held on 22 October 1964. At the end of the 
day, Varson’s team had reached three conclusions: 1) The need to select a gen-
erally southern MILA location for the launch area USB station; 2) Continuous 
coverage from launch to Grand Bahama Island was probably not going to be 
feasible and that a station at Vero Beach would have to be considered if contin-
uous coverage were to be made mandatory; and 3) Further analysis was again 
still necessary prior to committing to building a station at Vero Beach. The 
next meeting of the subpanel (now redesignated the “USB Implementation 
Subpanel”) was held at Greenbelt on 10 November 1964. There, a more 
definitive plan of action began to materialize. The panel gave the go-ahead for 
a transportable USB system to be placed at MILA. It also made the very key 
decision that the three stages of the Saturn V launch vehicle would not require 
continuous coverage from launch to orbit, but that additional coverage for the 
Apollo spacecraft itself (the CSM) would be required to close a two to three 
minute gap between the Cape and Bermuda. It was concluded at this meet-
ing that this additional requirement could be met by placing a transportable 
system on Grand Bahama supplemented with a planned Air Force USB station 
on Grand Turk. This action essentially took Vero Beach out of the picture.
An all-hands meeting took place 10 days later, this time with Varson’s 
panel meeting with Major General Samuel C. Phillips, then the Director of 
the Apollo Program. Solutions for USB coverage were presented advocating 
the emplacement of a station on Grand a and possibly one on Grand Turk. 
The panel also recommended that any site selected between Cape Canaveral 
and Bermuda—to ensure link closure immediately down-range of the launch 
area—be transportable so as to accommodate various launch azimuths. Based 
on these recommendations, it appeared that Grand Bahama would definitely 
be needed but that the probability of a station on Grand Turk was still “50-
50” at best. Despite this uncertainty regarding Grand Turk, launch area abort 
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coverage was considered sufficiently critical that steps had to be taken so as 
to prepare a location on the island should it be called on. The fiscal year 1965 
budget process was already well underway by this time and the Air Force in 
the mean time decided not to put its own USB system on Grand Turk. The 
Agency thus decided that the best approach was to request FY 1966 funds be 
allocated for transportable systems on both Grand Bahama and Grand Turk.
But the Grand Turk issue was still up in the air as late as March 1965. 
Engineering analysis continued at GSFC and MSC, but no definite conclu-
sions were reached. The analysis was not easy since uncertainties still existed 
in the Apollo spacecraft antenna patterns and in the predicted magnitude of 
the Saturn V booster plume attenuation. A progress report was submitted to 
the 12th Manned Spaceflight Instrumentation and Communications Panel 
A gathering of NASA Station Directors at GSFC in 1968. Front Row (left to right): Bill 
Wood (Head of the MSFN Operations Branch), Walt LaFleur (STADIR Bermuda), Bryan 
Lowe (STADIR Honeysuckle), Don Grey (Honeysuckle), Tecwyn Roberts (Chief of the 
Manned Flight Operations Division), Virgil True (STADIR Hawaii), Dale Call, unidentiﬁed; 
Second Row: unidentiﬁed, Jack Dowling (STADIR MILA), George Fariss (STADIR Gold-
stone), Fred Healey (Assistant STADIR Bermuda), Charles Force (STADIR Guam), Dan 
Hunter (Assistant STADIR Madrid), Chuck Jackson (Chief of the Logistics Management 
Ofﬁce); Back Row: Larry Odenthal (STADIR Grand Bahama), Lewis Wainright (STADIR
Carnarvon), Otto Womack (STADIR Guaymas), Hank Schultz, (STADIR Corpus Christi), 
Otto Thiele, (NASA Representative on the Vanguard), Bill Easter, Joe Garvey, (STADIR
Antigua), Chuck Rouillier (STADIR Grand Canary). (NASA Image Number G-68-206)
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on 25 February. Varson felt that conclusions one way or the other regarding 
Grand Turk could be reached by the end of March and recommended that 
the Apollo Program Office be briefed as soon as his team was ready. A month 
later, the panel was ready with its decision.
The final conclusion of the Varson subpanel was presented to Phillips 
on 1 April. It recommended that a single USB transportable system be stationed 
at Grand Bahama with the capability to support a single spacecraft. The Grand 
Turk USB site, which throughout this process had consistently been deemed 
secondary and needed only for contingencies, was duly eliminated.52
In addition to augmenting early-ops operations in the Caribbean, 
the Guaymas Station in Mexico was also upgraded to accommodate a 9-meter 
(30-foot) USB single spacecraft system (one transmitter, two receivers). The 
Gemini 5 is launched 
from Launch Complex 19 
atop its Titan II booster 
for an 8 day mission, 21 
August 1965. At launch, 
the vehicle stood 33 
meters (109 feet) tall and 
weighed 154,200 kilo-
grams (340,000 pounds). 
Although Gemini carried 
a crew of two, the entire 
vehicle was not greatly 
bigger than the single-
seat Mercury Atlas, which 
stood 29 meters (94.3 feet) 
and weighed 117,930 kilo-
grams (260,000 pounds) 
at launch. (NASA Image 
Number 65P-0160)
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United States had renegotiated with Mexico City when Project Mercury 
ended in May 1963 to expand the station for tracking of unmanned science 
satellites. International goodwill between the two governments was further 
promoted as the United States and Mexico agreed upon other areas of scien-
tific cooperation, in particular, meteorological sounding rocket programs. Just 
three weeks before Gemini 3 on 4 March 1965, an agreement was reached 
to extend operations at Guaymas to the year 1970. Over the next two years, 
upgrades were done to bring the station inline with the other primary sites 
to enable simultaneous tracking of both the Gemini spacecraft and the Agena 
rendezvous target.53
Construction began in the fall of 1965 and the upgraded Guaymas 
station was declared fully operational by GSFC in the spring of 1967. The 
$5 million expansion was a rather large project that necessitated the facility 
grounds to increase dramatically, from 30 to 114 acres. This was needed to 
ensure a noninterfering perimeter and to eliminate potential obstructions and 
personnel trespasses into the antenna beam—a real hazard when the antenna 
was transmitting. Strict perimeter control was required since the antenna 
would be, for the most part, operating at low elevation pointing angles from 
its location in northwest Mexico.54
As the first Apollo flight drew near and tracking stations were 
geared up, these foreign outposts began to take on more and more visibility on 
the international scene. The one person in charge of a station was the Station 
Director, or STADIR. As his title suggests, the STADIR was the person ulti-
mately responsible for the everyday operations of a tracking station. But run-
ning the station turned out to be only one part of the job. The STADIR of a 
foreign station had another big responsibility: act as a spokesman for NASA. 
This “other duty as assigned” made publicly representing NASA a routine 
part of the job. In this regard, overseas NASA STADIRs were part of the 
Embassy staff, subject to direction from the Ambassador.
In the 1960s, the world was watching as America prepared to send 
men to the Moon. NASA was fully aware that the country’s prestige (and 
Cold War standing in the international community) rested on the outcome. 
As Project Gemini continued to pioneer a series of American space firsts, 
international interest in the U.S. space program was intense. How a station 
was run could play a key role in influencing the public opinion in that coun-
try, being that it was often the most visible (and sometimes only) evidence of 
the space agency on foreign turf. Every local government, in addition, wanted 
reassurance that they were playing an important part in going to the Moon. 
This was especially important at locations where American sentiment may not 
have been at the best.
Sometimes a STADIR asked for guidance from GSFC manage-
ment or Headquarters on handling of public affairs; sometimes they were just 
directed as to what to say. Other times, it was a little of both, as illustrated 
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by the following letter from Ed Buckley to Morton Berndt, the Guaymas 
STADIR in 1965, on how he should convey the importance of the station to 
the local press (the word “Guaymas” appears four times in the statement; the 
word “important” six):
If it should prove necessary during the coming missions to explain 
the importance of the Guaymas Station to the press, I suggest that 
you speak along the following lines:
It is important to recognize that the data from the spacecraft 
systems and the astronaut’s performance during every orbit passing 
Guaymas is a very important piece of information to the overall 
conduct of the flight. The Guaymas site is a very important part 
of the network from a standpoint of operational control, and the 
information to be gathered from this site during all periods of the 
operation is very important to the overall program. Guaymas is 
used in many ways such as the place where important retrofire in-
formation is obtained and initial contact with the North American 
continent after long periods of silence from the spacecraft while 
over the Pacific. We should never lose sight of the importance of 
Guaymas to the conduct of the manned space flight operation.55
By 1967, the MSFN had matured into a sprawling but central-
ized structure, an interconnected framework of over two dozen ground sta-
tions spanning three continents. It supported 10 very successful Gemini flights 
from March 1965 to November 1966. These missions produced a series of 
impressive firsts: NASA’s first two-person spaceflight (Gemini 3); America’s 
first extravehicular activity (EVA) or spacewalk (Gemini 4); the world’s first 
spacecraft rendezvous (Gemini 6 and 7); the first docking (Gemini 8); and the 
highest apogee orbit to date of 1,370 kilometers (850 miles) above the surface 
of Earth (Gemini 11).56
The record was indeed impressive. By the end of the program, the 
United States had leapfrogged the Soviet Union in almost every aspect of 
human spaceflight. Americans had flown into space 16 times, accumulating 
over 1,000 hours in mission time (Gemini 7 alone completed a two-week 
marathon, 220 orbit flight). In sharp contrast, the Soviet pace slowed consid-
erably after Tereshkova’s Vostok 6. Only two Voskhod (USSR’s two-person 
craft) flights took place during this time, bringing the Soviet time spent in 
space to 432 hours.57
The bridge to the Moon had been built. President Kennedy’s goal 
of placing an American on the lunar surface by 1970 now seemed much more 
achievable.
NASA’s tracking network was ready.

CHAPTER 5
THE APOLLO YEARS
As Apollo became the centerpiece of the national space program, 
major decisions had to be made about the proposed missions before tracking 
and data acquisition requirements could be fully defined. Tracking Apollo 
was obviously going to be much more than just an extension of tracking 
Mercury and Gemini, both of which remained in Earth’s orbit. The complex-
ity of Apollo trajectories and its flight phases were many:
1  The spacecraft was launched from the KSC into a parking orbit 
around Earth.
2  The vehicle was inserted from this parking orbit into lunar tra-
jectory in a maneuver called Trans-Lunar Injection, or TLI.
3  The vehicle coasted on a ballistic trajectory for three days, from 
Earth to the vicinity of the Moon, making minor course correc-
tions when needed.
4  The spacecraft performed a braking maneuver placing it in orbit 
around the Moon.
144 “Read You Loud and Clear!”
5  A Lunar Module (LM) separated from the Command/Service 
Module (CSM) to descend to the lunar surface.
6  After exploring the surface, the Ascent Stage of the LM lifted-off 
from the Moon and rendezvoused with the CSM in lunar orbit.
7  The LM was jettisoned after which the CSM performed a burn 
to insert it into an Earth-bound trajectory in a maneuver called 
Trans-Earth Injection, or TEI.
8  The vehicle coasted in a ballistic trajectory for two days back to 
Earth, making minor course corrections when needed.
9  The CM reentered Earth’s atmosphere along a narrow corridor 
at 40,000 kilometers (25,000 miles) per hour. 
10  The Command Module parachutes to a predetermined splash-
down location in the Pacific Ocean.1
Many of the fundamental steps outlined above required capabilities 
well beyond the Mercury and Gemini configurations of the MSFN. Tracking 
and communicating with a spacecraft a quarter of a million miles away posed 
many new and different challenges for the network. For instance, ground stations 
required new equipment to expand into a USB system where tracking, telem-
etry, and command used a single carrier frequency. More powerful 26-meter (85-
foot) dish antennas such as those used by the DSN to communicate with plan-
etary space probes were added to meet the much more demanding range and 
data requirements. These were supplemented with 12-meter (40-foot) antennas 
to provide wider beamwidth coverage across this vast distance. The GRARR 
system was added to track the Apollo spacecraft while it was out of radar range. 
Rounding out the changes were new ground stations along with a contingent of 
ships and planes to fill coverage gaps and meet data relay requirements.2
Studies for the Apollo network began at Goddard in early 1962 
in the TDSD. TDSD originally envisioned a network based on the emerg-
ing Mercury and Gemini MSFN stations, supplemented by STADAN sites. 
In this early plan, MSFN radars would be used for low-Earth orbit support 
of the Apollo spacecraft prior to the Trans-Lunar Injection (TLI) burn com-
mitting it on a trajectory to the Moon. The existing sites were prepared to 
handle this role, a role that was very similar to that of Projects Mercury and 
Gemini. This ostensibly made sense as technical and cost considerations both 
advocated that an Apollo network be built around the existing Gemini net-
work of radar stations. In this way, the Apollo network would not have to be 
built from scratch.
Chapter 5 \ The Apollo Years 145
Augmentation of the Gemini network with range and range rate 
equipment along with the use of large S-band antennas for portions of the mis-
sion away from Earth were well understood early on in these Goddard trade 
studies. Table 5-1 shows the original Apollo network as envisioned in 1962. 
This plan called for three block upgrades to bring the network up 
to its final form to support the original Apollo timetable. The so-called “1B 
Network” would have been used to support early test flights of the Apollo 
spacecraft in low-Earth orbit launched on the Saturn 1B rocket (missions 
AS-111 through AS-114). This first iteration would have essentially used the 
primary MSFN Gemini sites to provide radar tracking and TT&C support. 
The “V Network” would have been an interim block upgrade to support 
Earth orbit and high apogee missions of the Apollo spacecraft launched on the 
massive Saturn V launch vehicle (missions AS-201 through AS-205). Apollo 
Ships would have started joining the network along with an upgrade of the 
This vintage 1964 drawing shows the relative sizes of the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo 
spacecraft, as well as the Atlas, Titan and Saturn V used to launch them. The combined 
weight of the Apollo Command Module, Service Module and Lunar Module at launch 
was 47,630 kilograms (105,000 pounds). By comparison, typical weight of the Mercury 
capsule was only 1,950 kilograms (4,300 pounds) and the Gemini 3,760 kilograms (8,300 
pounds). (NASA Image Number S64-22331)
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Madagascar site for full global USB capability. A third and final block upgrade 
completing the Apollo network would have added four more ships, airplanes, 
a USB site on Antigua, plus three 26-meter USB facilities to be located in 
Houston, Texas; Canberra, Australia; and Palermo, Sicily.3
As it turned out, but for use of existing MSFN radar sites, the first 
incarnation of the actual Apollo network bore little resemblance to what was 
first proposed. By the fall of 1962, TDSD had decided against using STADAN 
stations for Apollo, opting instead to collocate with major DSN sites. This rather 
significant decision was based on a combination of factors: 1) The requirement 
to have a backup for the 26-meter USB antenna; 2) Similar requirements for 
long range spacecraft communications on Apollo and deep space missions; and 
3) STADAN scheduling concerns. The STADAN was fully occupied with its 
mission of supporting unmanned application and science satellites, the number 
of which NASA continually added into Earth orbit.
Early planning had pinpointed fairly well the necessary primary 
ground stations for the near-Earth phases of Apollo missions. Secondary sites 
were added as planning progressed. Twelve-meter telemetry antennas at exist-
Table 5-1: Apollo Network as First Proposed in 1962
Station
Earth Orbit 
Missions (Early)
The “1B Network”
Earth Orbit Missions 
(Late)
The “V Network” Lunar Missions
Coastal Sentry Quebec )
Grand Canary Island )
Bermuda ) ) )
Cape Canaveral ) ) )
Carnarvon ) ) )
Guaymas ) )
Hawaii ) ) )
White Sands ) )
Madagascar ) )
Apollo Ship 1 (Atlantic) ) )
Antigua )
Canberra )
Houston )
Palermo )
Apollo Ship 2 (Indian) )
Apollo Ship 3 (Indian) )
Apollo Ship 4 (Paciﬁc) )
Apollo Ship 5 (Paciﬁc) )
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ing MSFN stations were replaced with a new generation of smaller, 9-meter 
(30-foot) USB antennas. NASA continued to pool its own MSFN equipment 
with DOD assets to fill needs where necessary. Five instrumentation ships and 
eight aircraft were also employed. By the time Gemini 12 splashed down in 
November 1966, the first of the MSFN stations to be reconfigured for Project 
Apollo had appeared. In March 1967, Guam came online as the first new site 
constructed specifically for Apollo. The process of assembling the remainder 
of the Apollo stations continued through the following year and was essen-
tially completed by February of 1968.4
During this time, the early test missions actually began before the 
network was completed. Apollo 4, the first flight of the Saturn V, took place 
on 9 November 1967 with partial participation of the emerging network. This 
flight was an important milestone that demonstrated Saturn V performance 
and verified the CM heat shield ability to withstand the 2,750ºC (5000ºF) 
searing heat experienced on reentry. The following month witnessed the 
launch of the first Test and Training Satellite (TTS-1), designed specifically to 
exercise the capabilities of the Apollo MSFN. (TTS checkouts continued spo-
radically over the next several years with TTS-2 in December 1968 just prior 
to the first circumlunar flight of Apollo 8, and TTS-3 in September 1971.)5 In 
January 1968, the network supported TT&C activities of the LM on its first 
unmanned test flight on Apollo 5.
A major difference between the earlier planned and the final con-
figuration of the network was the location of the all important 26-meter (85- 
foot) USB sites for tracking and communications during the lunar phase of the 
mission when Apollo was in the vicinity of and on the Moon. The underlying 
geographical requirement was actually very simple: provide continuous cover-
age with three stations separated by approximately 120º in longitude. In North 
America, engineers liked the original plan calling for a Houston USB site 
since it would have eliminated the need for White Sands and Guaymas. But 
TDSD’s decision to collocate the Apollo antenna with DSN made this imprac-
tical. Because Houston was only 20º east of Goldstone, California, where there 
was already a DSN station, there was really no justification to put a USB 
station near Houston—as the original plan had called for. (The Goldstone 
Communications Complex in the Mojave Desert would become the largest 
concentration of NASA tracking and data acquisition equipment in the world, 
encompassing sites for all three networks: DSN, MSFN, and STADAN.)6
Locating the 26-meter (85-foot) antenna near a backup was a writ-
ten requirement for Apollo lunar operations. Redundancy using the DSN relied 
on a microwave relay connection between the MSFN primary antenna and the 
JPL-directed DSN antenna. The DSN system was referred to as an Apollo “wing-
station” in this arrangement. With this link, the DSN antenna was slaved to and 
driven by the MSFN antenna, providing a full backup capability. At Goldstone, 
the original Pioneer site (DSS 11) served as the Apollo wing-station.
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In the Southern Hemisphere, the proposed Canberra, Australia sta-
tion (Honeysuckle Creek) was kept as in the original plan and collocated near 
the Tidbinbilla DSN wing-station some 30 kilometers (20 miles) away. That 
left a third site which had to be in the European area. Factors such as cost of 
operations, ease of accessibility, topology, and as always, cooperation of the 
foreign government involved, all went into the decision. On 28 January 1964, 
the United States and Spain reached an agreement to put the third 26-meter 
(85-foot) MSFN station at Fresnedillas some 50 kilometers (30 miles) west of 
Madrid, again located near a DSN site that was then being built (the Robledo 
DSN Station). 
These, the three most powerful primary stations, were joined in the 
network by 11 other ground locations also classified as primary but featuring 
Aerial view of the Apollo Station at Honeysuckle Creek, Australia with its 26-meter 
(85-foot) Uniﬁed S-Band antenna. At the upper left are the diesel fuel tanks for the 
power generators. Because of its remote location in a national forest, this crucial Apollo 
Station was run entirely off generator power. (Un-numbered photograph, Box 18, NASA
Australian Operations Ofﬁce, Yarralumla, ACT)
Chapter 5 \ The Apollo Years 149
the smaller 9-meter antennas. In February 1965, Goddard awarded the Dallas 
Division of the Collins Radio Company $2.74 million to install the USB sys-
tems at the three sites. It was the follow-on to the $20 million contract that 
Collins received the previous year to install the 9-meter (30-foot) systems.7
The Apollo 26-meter diameter tracking antenna was quite large, the 
biggest of its kind in the Goddard networks—only the 70, 64, and 34-meter 
(230, 210, and 111-foot) dishes of the DSN were bigger. A novel sight is seeing 
these big dishes move, almost effortlessly, as they tracked an object across the 
sky. Much of this had to do with how well the weight of the antennas was bal-
anced. Its ability to move smoothly and point accurately to within 1/100th of 
a degree directly affected how well it could stay tracked—or autotrack—on a 
spacecraft. These antennas were moved using gear-box mechanisms (gimbals) 
driven by hydraulic servos. With the large dish carefully balanced using coun-
terweights, relatively low torque electric motors could be used to drive even 
the largest antennas. Most of today’s modern tracking antennas allow for rota-
tion in all three axes. In the 1960s, however, systems could move only in two 
axes. Many, like the MSFN 26-meter antenna, had a so-called ‘X-Y mount’ 
where an X-axis gear wheel drove the antenna in the north-south direction 
while the Y-axis gear wheel (mounted above the X-axis) drove the antenna 
in the east-west direction. This design allowed horizon-to-horizon tracking 
as the antenna could be pointed on the horizon in any direction to pick up 
a spacecraft ascending into view. These largest of the MSFN antennas could 
move at a good pace, tracking a spacecraft at rates of up to three degrees per 
second in both axes.8
In addition to DSN, several STADAN and DOD stations were also 
assigned to support Apollo in a backup or standby capacity. Three STADAN 
stations in the Southern Hemisphere—Lima, South Africa, and Tananarive—
were tasked as needed. But it was the Air Force that furnished the majority of 
the supplemental stations, some of which were also located near MSFN sites. 
These were mainly radar sites in the Eastern Test Range; none were involved 
in USB operations. Across the network, different stations had different jobs. 
For example, the three 26 meters provided coverage for operations in the 
lunar vicinity and for EVA while the astronauts were on the lunar surface. 
The 9-meter antennas monitored the spacecraft during its transit to and from 
the Moon. Bermuda continued in its familiar role as the go/no-go decision 
site. Stations like Carnarvon and Hawaii were critical for near-Earth portions 
of a mission, both during outward bound (TLI) and when returning from 
the Moon and reentry. Grand Bahama, Antigua,  and Ascension monitored, 
respectively, the early (S-IC first stage) and late (S-II and S-IVB second and 
third stages) phases of the Saturn V’s powered flight into orbit.9
E E E
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The station on the desolate outskirts of the town of Carnarvon (CRO) was located 960 
kilometers (600 miles) north of Perth, the largest city in Western Australia. The township 
derived its name from Lord Carnarvon, a former Secretary of State for Colonies in Britain. 
The NASA station was a popular tourist attraction along with Carnarvon’s “Blows”, natu-
ral hole formations in the rocky Australian coastline that, due to high pressure caused by 
pounding seas, caused water to shoot up like fountains. CRO was operational from 1964 
to 1974. (Photograph courtesy of CSIRO)
Range instrumented ships had been an integral part of the manned 
network since Project Mercury. Ships have the distinct advantage over land 
stations because of their mobility; their big disadvantage is the higher operat-
ing cost (about twice that of land stations). Early network plans in 1962 had 
called for five Apollo Instrumentation Ships (AIS), two to be assigned to the 
Indian Ocean, two to the Pacific, and one to the Atlantic. By early 1966, 
however, Goddard had refined the plan so as to accommodate several Apollo 
mission profiles to where three TLI insertion ships were needed, one each for 
the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. In addition, two reentry ships were 
to be stationed in the Pacific. The five ships assigned to the Apollo network 
replaced the three that had been in service from the Mercury years, including 
the aging Coastal Sentry Quebec and Rose Knot Victor. In October 1968, just 
prior to Apollo 7 (the first human flight of the new Block II CSM), NASA 
returned the Watertown—one of its two reentry ships—back to the U.S. Navy. 
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TDSD evidently felt confident that it had adequate coverage in the Pacific 
with Guam, Hawaii, plus the Huntsville, to the point that a second ship was 
really not necessary.
This contingent of ships was the AIS fleet as deployed through Apollo 
11. They had the obvious advantage over their land counterparts in that they 
were able to change their area of coverage from mission to mission depend-
ing on what was needed. On Apollo 8—the historic first human circumlunar 
flight—for instance, one insertion ship (Vanguard) was stationed in the Atlantic 
and one was in the Indian Ocean (Mercury). The third insertion ship (Redstone)
along with the reentry ship (Huntsville) took up positions in the Pacific.10
Apollo was launched from the Kennedy Space Center at azimuths 
between 72 and 108°, depending on the particular mission (90° is a launch 
due east). Culminating the boost phase was the first burn of the S-IVB third 
stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle to provide the necessary impulse to insert 
the spacecraft into Earth orbit. As early as 1964, the OTDA had imposed 
the requirement for continuous two-way voice communications, reception of 
telemetry, command capability, and tracking during ascent into Earth orbit. 
The primary use of the tracking data was to verify that a proper parking orbit 
had been achieved, while command uplink and telemetry downlink were 
requirements for flight control operations to evaluate the health and status of 
the spacecraft and astronauts.
Since the third stage burn occurred about 2,250 kilometers (1,400 
miles) downrange of the Cape, it was outside the coverage area of the Bermuda 
Station, and for most launch azimuths, also outside that of the Antigua Station. 
It was thus necessary to have a station farther downrange in the mid-Atlantic 
that was east of both of these islands. The ideal spot for such a station was at 
24° North by 48° West. Unfortunately, no island or suitable land mass exists 
in the immediate vicinity of that location. Therefore, a ship was needed.11
While the first burn of the S-IVB got Apollo into Earth orbit, it 
could not yet begin the trek to the Moon. That was done with the TLI, a 
second burn of the S-IVB, raising the velocity of the spacecraft by some 3,550 
meters per second (11,700 feet-per-second) to attain escape velocity. TLI was 
one of the most critical events of a flight, one that had to be monitored reli-
ably. Once the burn was completed, the spacecraft was committed on a tra-
jectory to the Moon and the three astronauts would not be able to return 
to Earth for at least four days—even on a so-called “free-return trajectory” 
where the spacecraft made a giant “figure 8” around the Moon and coasted 
back to Earth without making any additional engine burns.
Apollo mission requirements at the time called for tracking to begin 
no later than seven minutes after the end of the TLI burn to provide Mission 
Control with the necessary attitude data to make the important go/no-go 
decision on “transposition and docking”—a tricky maneuver in which the 
CSM travels a short distance away from the LM, turns around, docks with it 
152 “Read You Loud and Clear!”
and then pulls the LM out of the adaptor housing and away from the spent S-
IVB third stage. In a 1964 memorandum from the OTDA to Donald Crabill 
of the Bureau of the Budget, Gerald Truszynski pointed out that while the 
South Africa and Madagascar stations could provide post injection coverage 
in that area, it would only be partial and would not be as complete compared 
to a ship stationed in the Indian Ocean.12 Truszynski also pointed out two 
other factors favoring a sea-based solution. First, a ship was already being 
planned to alleviate coverage gaps on non-Apollo missions. Second, the State 
Department did a study on the long term political stability of South Africa 
which “did not assure retention of a critical major Apollo support station in 
the time period required.”13
The return phase of Apollo also required some special coverage 
planning. As the CM reentered the atmosphere at the end of a mission, it 
could, by rolling the craft, control its lift-to-drag ratio making it possible for 
landing to occur in a fairly long corridor 2,200 to 9,250 kilometers (1,200 
to 5,000 nautical miles) downrange from the point where it first entered the 
atmosphere. To pinpoint the expected splashdown location, network engi-
neers had determined that a tracking contact of approximately three minutes 
in duration had to be made starting at the end of the initial telemetry black-
out period. With the blackout window spanning 370 to 1,850 kilometers 
(200 to 1,000 nautical miles) downrange of the initial entry point, coverage 
had to be available out to 3,330 kilometers (1,800 nautical miles) from the 
point where the CM first entered the atmosphere in order to meet the three 
minute requirement.14
That was not the only factor. Depending on the mission, Apollo 
splashdown could occur either in the northern recovery area in the vicinity 
of Hawaii or in a southern area near Samoa. This left a lot of ocean to be 
covered. While there were islands in the western Pacific which could have 
been used as land stations, a total of seven sites would have been needed just 
to meet this three minute requirement, a requirement that could be met by 
using just three ships.
From an overall cost standpoint, though, it turned out that there was 
actually very little difference between using ships versus using land stations 
to cover post-injection, insertion, and reentry tracking. Here’s why: Of the 
proposed five ships, OTDA had determined that all but one could have been 
replaced by land stations given the proper political environment. These four 
ships could have been substituted with eight new ground stations. In 1964, 
each new station cost about $12 million to build. Thus, the initial investment 
for land stations would have been in the neighborhood of $96 million. From 
NASA’s experience with the Navy, the cost of obtaining and refurbishing four 
ships would have amounted to $98 million. Hence, there was only a two per-
cent difference between the two solutions in terms of initial cost investment. 
As for annual operating cost, the rule of thumb was that a ship cost twice as 
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much to operate as a land station. There was thus little difference in operating 
four ships versus eight land stations.15
With one of those rare occasions when cost was not a major player, 
OTDA went ahead with the ship-based solution based on the technical 
advantages:
Position of the ships may be changed to meet requirements of indi-
vidual missions whereas land locations were fixed.
It was only necessary to maintain four communication links back to the 
United States instead eight, thereby reducing mission complexity.
To implement this solution, NASA acquired three “19-class” T-2 
tankers and converted them into highly instrumented vessels equivalent in many 
respects to a primary ground station. Each ship possessed the same C-band radar 
and the same 9-meter USB antenna common to the Apollo prime stations.16
The three ships, the Mercury, Redstone, and Vanguard, provided the network 
with the required flexibility to support various launch azimuths, Earth orbit 
insertion points and differing TLI points—all mission dependent parameters. In 
this way, all critical flight phases were covered and tracking gaps reduced.
These ships were large—a necessity, serving as stable platforms 
under severe sea states. The Vanguard, for instance, measured 181 meters (595 
feet) in length with a 23-meter (75-foot) beam. It had a cruising speed of 26 
kilometers per hour (14 knots) and a dash speed of 31.5 kilometers per hour (17 
knots). These were tracking stations in every respect, capable of remaining at 
sea for two months, supporting a full Military Sea Transport Service crew and 
more than 200 field technicians. With enough electricity to supply a town of 
5,000 people, they were equipped with facilities such as a store, barbershop, 
weight room, and a movie lounge. There was a hospital on board as well.
Serving as reentry ships in the Pacific were the Huntsville and 
Watertown. Being converted World War II “Victory” ships, these were some-
what smaller than the three insertion ships, measuring 139 meters (455 feet) 
long by 19 meters (62 feet) wide. They could accommodate 130 technicians 
and carried the same range of TT&C hardware as their larger counterparts, 
with the exception of a smaller, 3.6-meter (12-foot) diameter USB antenna.17
Taking these old World War II ships out of mothballs and retrofit-
ting them into the space age was, as one can imagine, no simple job. Such 
an undertaking presented many technical challenges which NASA was not 
at liberty, in this case, to work out by itself. This was because as a part of the 
FY 1964 congressional action on NASA funding, Congress had instructed 
the space agency and the Department of Defense to work together and pool 
resources for the expressed purpose of acquiring range instrumentation ships. 
154 “Read You Loud and Clear!”
Congress knew this was not going to be an easy task, as both organizations—
one civilian, the other military—needed to determine what was the best 
method of meeting joint ship requirements and to establish rules of opera-
tions. One thing was clear. Since these were going to be sea faring vessels, the 
DOD would have the lead responsibility for them.
To execute this agreement, the DOD established an Instrumentation 
Ships Project Office responsible for procuring and modifying the ships. The 
office was run by the Navy with representatives from both the Air Force and 
NASA. It quickly drew up specifications and bidding plans for the ships such 
that by September 1964, a competitive contract had been let. A $77.5 million 
fixed-price contract was awarded to the General Dynamics Corporation to con-
vert and instrument three ships taken out of storage. Part of the work included 
installing, checking out, and integrating some $35 million worth of government 
furnished range instrumentation equipment onboard the vessels.18
From day one, the delivery timetable for the ships was inextrica-
bly tied to the development schedule of the Saturn IB and Saturn V launch 
vehicles. In order to support the flight test schedule, the original delivery dates 
A converted Navy tanker, the Vanguard was one of the so-called “insertion ships” that 
tracked and communicated with the Apollo spacecraft as it performed the Trans-Lunar 
Injection burn, sending astronauts on their way to the Moon. (Folder 8788, NASA
Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, 
Washington DC)
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planned for the three ships were for April, July and October of 1966. In late 
1965, a requirement was added to install satellite communication terminals on 
the ships to ensure that communications between the ships and the Mission 
Control Center in Houston would not be at risk. To accommodate this new 
requirement, General Dynamics slipped the delivery by several months, to 
July and December of 1966 and January 1967.
As the first ship (Vanguard) approached completion and sea trials 
were being conducted in June of 1966, a number of technical problems began 
to surface. Many of these were of the type that could not have been detected 
until the complete system was tested at sea when the full dynamic effects of 
rough seas and high winds were combined. But however formidable, these 
problems were within the scope of the contract and were therefore, General 
Dynamic’s responsibility to correct. Fixes proved inadequate and the delivery 
schedule suffered, slipping on a month-by-month basis. Listed is a sampling of 
the technical problems that arose, and their solution:
The 9-meter diameter telemetry antenna did not operate satisfactorily 
over the entire required frequency range (from VHF to S-band). The 
antenna feed had to be redesigned and reinstalled.
The same telemetry antenna also had a serious vibration problem. 
This was corrected after much engineering analysis by structurally 
stiffening the dish and by installing an electrical filter that eliminated 
spurious signals (RF noise) from the antenna drive mechanism.
The command uplink antenna was simply too dynamically unstable 
in high wind conditions. It was completely redesigned to improve 
its aerodynamics and to make it smaller and lighter so as to improve 
servo drive response.
The high frequency radio transmitting antennas—three on each 
ship—could not operate at full power because of electrical insulation 
problems. These had to be redesigned and replaced.
The servo drive system for the satellite communications antenna, 
along with the antenna feed itself, did not perform according to 
specifications. The sensitivity was too low because of the poor quality 
of the antenna sub-reflector surface. These problems were rectified 
through redesign and remanufacturing of the hardware.19
As it became evident that these problems were impacting ship 
delivery, NASA sharply increased its day-to-day workings with the Navy 
and with General Dynamics. Managers from Goddard and Headquarters 
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even went directly to top General Dynamics management, requesting them 
to bring the strongest possible management effort to bear on these problems 
so as to ensure adequate and timely solutions. Subcontractor problems were 
also uncovered. General Dynamics in turn, as part of their increased effort, 
brought in special consultants from outside the company and from academia. 
An MIT professor, for instance, was brought in to tackle the difficulties with 
excessive antenna vibrations.
NASA had to walk a fine line. Since the contract for the AIS was 
actually a Navy contract executed by its Instrumentation Ships Project Office, 
its actions with General Dynamics had to always be taken in full coordination 
with that office. The Navy cooperated and responded to NASA, passing its own 
rather strong terms down to its contractors. The strong management tactics 
worked. General Dynamics responded to the government pressure by instituting 
more frequent and detailed top-level management reviews of the project. They 
also assigned a senior company official at the vice president level to work full-
time overseeing the project, this in addition to the Program Manager already 
assigned. The company also tightened up scheduling control over Bendix, 
their main subcontractor, and instituted bi-weekly senior management reviews 
attended by the President and Vice President of General Dynamics Electronics 
as well as the Executive Group Vice President from their Headquarters.20
Results were slow at first. For a few months, there seemed to be lit-
tle progress. The pace eventually picked up, though, and much time was made 
up in the last few months of the delivery schedule. A limited ship capability 
was finally fielded in the fall of 1967 just in time to support the November 
launch of the first uncrewed Saturn V on Apollo 4. By the time the first 
crewed flight of the huge launch vehicle took place in December of the fol-
lowing year (Apollo 8), the AIS fleet was ready and at full strength.
In 1964, the OTDA had estimated the initial investment for the 
five ship AIS fleet at $98 million. The actual price tag, however, turned out 
to be $186.6 million, almost twice as much as predicted. On top of that, the 
annual cost of operating the ships had, by 1969, reached $5 million for each of 
the three insertion ships and $3.5 million apiece for the smaller Huntsville and 
Watertown.21 In a cost saving move, NASA returned the USNS Watertown back 
to the Navy after the launch of the ATS-D satellite in August of that year. 
This raised concern within Congress, some thinking that the space agency 
was putting cost ahead of safety.
In reality, this move was based on changes in mission requirements 
that had been taking place. In the early stages of Apollo planning, reentry in 
either the Northern or the Southern Hemisphere was simultaneously consid-
ered to accommodate maximum flexibility in lunar mission planning, par-
ticularly for variable times of stay and departure from the Moon. As NASA 
progressed through the early Apollo/Saturn V development flights, it became 
evident to mission planners that a preselection of the return flight trajectory 
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had to be made well in advance of launch. This change in requirement reduced 
the reentry zones that needed to be covered from two to one. As a result, only 
one reentry ship would be needed; hence, the release of the Watertown before 
the first crewed mission was even flown.
On top of this, as more Apollo/Saturn test flights took place, more 
and more information was gained across the board reducing the amount of 
uncertainty in the performance of the CM in such areas as reentry aerody-
namics, heat-shield performance, and the capability of the onboard guidance 
system to achieve a controlled and accurate reentry. All these served to reduce 
the landing footprint, to the point where recovery aircraft could now handle 
nearly all the reentry communication and tracking functions. This develop-
ment eventually led to the release of the USNS Huntsville back to the Navy at 
the conclusion of Apollo 11.
Similar significant reduction in coverage requirements for the out-
ward bound (specifically, TLI) portion of a lunar mission was also taking 
place. This could be attributed to three things all having to do with raised 
confidence that mission planners now had in the performance of the Apollo 
spacecraft and its Saturn V launch vehicle. The first was a reduction in the 
launch window. To the Agency’s delight, Apollo/Saturn V test launches to 
date had all occurred on time and at the beginning of a launch window. As 
a result of this demonstrated launch-on-time capability, the probability of 
missing a launch window on a given day was considered an acceptable risk, 
one which in no way compromised crew safety. A shorter window, in turn, 
engendered a reduction in the needed TLI coverage area.22
The second reason was also related to launch-on-time confidence. 
From orbit mechanics, the location over Earth at which trajectory injection 
for lunar flight must take place was determined by the time and date of launch 
Smaller than the insertion 
ship, the Redstone was one 
of the World War II liberty 
ships that was converted into 
a reentry ship used to track 
and communicate with the 
Apollo Command Module
as it reentered Earth’s atmo-
sphere towards a splash down 
in the Paciﬁc. (Folder 8788, 
NASA Historical Reference 
Collection, NASA History 
Division, NASA Headquarters, 
Washington DC)
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and the relative positions of Earth and its Moon. In NASA’s planning for mis-
sions through the first lunar landing—to ensure the maximum number of 
chances for a launch—mission planners planned for a wide spread of launch 
azimuths, which meant that the TLI burn could take place anywhere over a 
wide geographical area. With the now reduced spread of launch azimuths, this 
coverage area could also be reduced.23
Finally, battery lifetime of the tracking beacon aboard the S-IVB 
third stage had been extended by nearly 50 percent since the first Saturn V 
launch on Apollo 4, 9 November 1967. This had ramifications to network 
requirements because after the TLI burn, the Apollo spacecraft, still attached 
to the burnt-out S-IVB, must be precisely tracked in preparation for transpo-
sition and docking. With the increased third stage beacon life, considerably 
more time was now available for the ground to perform this track, to the point 
where engineers could afford to wait until a land station came into view. Ship 
requirement for TLI tracking could thus be alleviated.24
All these factors allowed injection tracking to now be done by 
the Apollo land stations supplemented with a small number of instrumented 
aircraft. The net effect of these developments enabled the network to even-
tually relinquish two of the three injection tracking ships—the Redstone and 
the Mercury—starting with Apollo 12. It thus left the Vanguard as the only 
remaining Apollo ship operating after Apollo 11. At $6 million a year, it was 
the most expensive to operate, but was well used, supporting not only human 
space missions but also NASA projects such as the Pioneer deep space probes. 
TT&C equipment from the ships was returned to the MSFN equipment pool 
and redistributed for use at ground stations and on aircraft.25
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In addition to the instrumentation ships, eight Apollo Range 
Instrumentation Aircraft, or ARIA, served the network as airborne com-
munication points relaying voice transmissions between the spacecraft and 
Houston. These aircraft were deployed—either in the Pacific or in the Atlantic 
depending on the relative positions of the Moon with respect to Earth—
during each mission launch window. Without the vantage point of these air-
borne platforms flying some 10,500 meters (35,000 feet) above the ocean, as 
many as 20 to 30 relay ships would have been required just to relay commu-
nications between the spacecraft and ground stations.26
But even from their birds-eye vantage point, eight ARIAs were 
still needed to provide coverage in the Pacific and four in the Atlantic. NASA 
had originally planned on a fleet of 12 aircraft. In 1964, an Office of Manned 
Space Flight study concluded that a reduction in the area coverage per 
Apollo mission could be tolerated within the so-called “delta-V budget” of 
the spacecraft. What this meant was that, based on the propulsion capability 
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(limitation) of the Saturn V launch vehicle then under development, the 
location where injection into lunar trajectory could take place on a given 
mission had to be either over the Pacific or the Atlantic, but not both. The 
TLI area thus had to be designated well in advance of a particular mission, as 
well as the reentry area. Mission coverage requirements, therefore, changed 
from two-ocean support to single-ocean support and the number of ARIAs 
reduced from 12 to 8 (6 for primary mission support, 2 for backup) for Pacific 
operations and down to 4 for Atlantic support. This amounted to a savings 
of $32.4 million.27
As Apollo preparations matured over the next three years, GSFC 
and MSC began to see that this reduction in the ARIA fleet was going to 
present coverage limitations. On some flights, it was inevitable that lunar 
trajectory injection was going to shift to a different location as the launch 
window progressed. If a launch were delayed and it became necessary to move 
to the other ocean, the entire mission timeline would then have to be adjusted 
since it took approximately 60 hours to reposition the fleet of aircraft from 
one ocean theater to the other. This was yet another seemingly simple but 
important reason why NASA always wanted Apollo Moon missions to take 
place as early as possible in a given launch window.28
The ARIAs were converted C-135A cargo airframes that NASA 
acquired on long term loan from the Air Force. They were heavily instru-
mented. Externally, the most obvious difference in the aircraft from regular 
C-135s was a large bulbous nose—a 3-meter (10-foot) radome that housed the 
world’s largest airborne steerable antenna at the time. The antenna itself was a 
2-meter (7-foot) S-band parabolic dish used for telemetry and voice. In addi-
tion to the “droop snoot” nose as it soon came to be known, the ARIA—des-
ignated the EC-135N—had a probe antenna on each wing tip that was used to 
enhance high frequency radio transmission and reception. A high frequency 
trailing wire antenna was added to the bottom of the fuselage. The aircraft 
was also heavily modified inside the fuselage to accommodate the suite of core 
electronics and facilities were added for eight more crew members.29
ARIA capabilities normally consisted of the following:
For telemetry reception and recording: single USB link, an S-band 
Pulse Code Modulation link, 6 VHF links.
Telemetry was usually recorded live and then “dumped” over the 
first available Apollo site (ship or ground station) for transmission to 
Houston.
USB and VHF voice reception and recording for real-time space-
craft/MCC voice relay.
Two-way, 100 words-per-minute teletype.30
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ARIAs had a nominal crew of 16. They were based at Patrick Air 
Force Base and flew out several days prior to a launch to their forward station 
in the mission operations area: Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii or Ascension 
Island in the Atlantic.31 Then on the day of the mission, the plane would fly 
to its assigned airspace to support launch or recovery.
Just as NASA had an agreement with the Air Force for launch sup-
port at Cape Canaveral, it had a similar agreement for the ARIA. Under a 10 
November 1965 NASA-DOD cost sharing memorandum of agreement, the 
National Range Division (NRD) of the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) 
had overall responsibility for the ARIA project. NASA provided the specifi-
cations and labor for its equipment and instrumentation needs while the Air 
Force provided structural modifications and the general onboard range equip-
ment. There was a further breakdown of labor since, another division within 
AFSC (the Electronic Systems Division, or ESD), was responsible for the detailed 
The Apollo Range Instrumentation Aircraft (ARIA) served as airborne relay points 
between the Apollo spacecraft and the rest of the network. About the size of a 707 
jetliner, NASA borrowed these converted Air Force C-135A cargo airplanes to sup-
port launch and reentry communications during the Apollo years. (Folder 8788, 
NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, 
Washington DC) 
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Definition and Acquisition Phases of the project. Management and engineering 
change control was thus maintained by NASA and NRD through representation 
in the ESD project office and an ARIA Project Configuration Control Board.
In this somewhat convoluted arrangement, the Air Force NRD 
operated, maintained and provided logistical support for the aircraft for 
NASA. Scheduling and aircraft availability was maintained through a senior-
level joint NASA/DOD panel.32 GSFC was the executing agent in adminis-
tering and managing the NASA portion of the ARIA program. To this end, it 
was responsible for three things: 1) generate the necessary specifications for the 
communications equipment needed for Apollo; 2) ensure that the ARIA met 
overall Apollo requirements; and 3) integrate these aircraft into the MSFN.33
To modify the aircraft, the Air Force contracted Douglas Aircraft 
Company of Tulsa, Oklahoma, to serve as prime contractor with BFEC as 
their subcontractor. In this arrangement, Douglas was responsible for modify-
ing the airframe while Bendix was responsible for supplying the generic and 
Apollo-specific suite of range instrumentation equipment to be installed on 
the aircraft. Contractor work during Apollo was driven by a tight schedule 
and ARIA was no exception. To meet delivery milestones, ESD issued the 
Douglas team with a fixed price contract heavy on delivery and performance 
incentives. While the target cost was $27.2 million, the contract could be 
worth well over $30 million if all the incentives were awarded. The first 
ARIA—scheduled for delivery in the first-quarter of 1966—was delayed and 
finally delivered to the Air Force near the end of the year, just in time to pass 
its first live test on Gemini 12 in November 1966.34
The remaining seven ARIAs trickled in throughout 1967 and into 
the following January. At its peak, Douglas (later McDonnell-Douglas after its 
1967 merger with the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation) had over 300 people 
working on the ARIA program at its Tulsa plant.35 After Apollo concluded in 
1975, the word “Apollo” was changed to “Advanced” and the Air Force fleet 
of aircraft continued serving under the ARIA name, successfully supporting 
a host of NASA satellite launches, Skylab and planetary probes such as Viking 
and Voyager. Over the next 30 years, the DOD has maintained ownership of 
the aircraft which have been used primarily to support military ballistic mis-
sile testing activities.
In all its years of near flawless service, there was only one major 
accident. But it was tragic. On the morning of 6 May 1981, one of the planes—
ARIA 328—took off from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Fairborn, 
Ohio, on a training mission. All 21 onboard perished just an hour later in a 
horrific crash. Among those killed were three civilians, two of whom were 
wives of crew members who were on the flight as part of a program for them 
to become more familiar with their husbands’ work. Today, a living memo-
rial dedicated to those who perished resides near the place where ARIA 328 
took off that ill-fated morning. A bronze plaque, along with 21 flowering 
162 “Read You Loud and Clear!”
crab apple trees, each symbolizing a lost soul, rests in the memorial garden at 
the United States Air Force Museum in Dayton, Ohio.37 On 24 August 2001, 
the last ARIA flight landed at Edwards Air Force Base to bring the airborne 
tracking program to an end.
Besides ground stations, the AIS and the ARIA, NASA added 
a fourth tracking element during Apollo. This one was in space. To fur-
ther cut down on potential communication gaps, the Agency called on 
the services of two communication satellites operated by the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Consortium, or Intelsat. One was the Intelsat 
Atlantic satellite, located in geosynchronous orbit at 6º west longitude off the 
coast of Africa. From this vantage point, it could provide communication 
relay for the Indian Ocean ship (usually the Mercury), the Ascension Island 
Station, the Atlantic Ocean ship (usually the Vanguard), and the Canary Island 
Table 5-2: The Manned Space Flight Network as Implemented for Apollo*36
Station
Abbre-
viation
USB Antenna
12’    30’    85’ 
C-Band 
Radar
VHF TM 
Downlink
UHF CMD
Uplink Other
Primary Stations
Antigua ANT t t t
Ascension ACN t t
Bermuda BDA t t t t
Canberra HSK t
Carnarvon CRO t t t t
Corpus Christi TEX t t t
Goldstone GDS t
Grand Bahamas GBM t t t
Grand Canary CYI t t t t
Guam GWM t t t
Guaymas GYM t t t
Hawaii HAW t t t t
Madrid MAD t
Merritt Island MIL t t t
Ships and Aircraft**
Huntsville HTV t t t t
Mercury MER t t t t
Redstone RED t t t t
Vanguard VAN t t t t
Watertown WTN t t t t
Aircraft (8)*** ARIA t
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Station. The other was the Intelsat Pacific satellite, located at approximately 
5° west of the international dateline over the Kiribatis in the mid-Pacific. It 
served the Australian stations, Guam and Hawaii as well as the Pacific ships 
Huntsville and Redstone. Eventually, reliance on Intelsat for communications 
relay would free up the ARIA to focus on real time USB support.38
Table 5-2 summarizes the Apollo Network as it was eventually 
established in 1968 (also see map in Appendix 1). This was essentially the con-
figuration used throughout the lunar landing program, with ships, aircraft, 
and satellites being augmented on a mission by mission basis.
E E E
Station
Abbre-
viation
USB Antenna
12’    30’    85’
C-Band 
Radar
VHF TM 
Downlink
UHF CMD
Uplink Other
NASA Support Stations
Canberra (DSN) CNBX t
Goldstone (DSN) GDSX t
Lima (STADAN) LIMA t
Madrid (DSN) MAD t
Pretoria (STADAN) PRE t
Tananarive (STADAN) TAN t
White Sands (MSFN/
DOD)
WHS t
Woomera (MFSN) WOM t
DOD Support Stations
Antigua ANT t
Ascension ASC t
Cape Canaveral CNV t
Grand Bahama GBI t
Merritt Island MLA t
Patrick AFB PAT t
Vandenberg AFB CAL t
*Nominal conﬁ guration 1968-1972
**The Huntsville and Mercury were usually stationed in the Paciﬁ c to monitor orbit injection, reentry and recovery. 
The Redstone was usually on station in the Indian Ocean with the Vanguard in the Atlantic. The Watertown was 
deployed only for the early developmental ﬂ ights and was removed from service in October 1968 prior to the ﬁ rst 
human ﬂ ight (Apollo 7).
***Eight Apollo Range Instrumentation Aircraft were used as communication relays to support operations in areas 
where there were no grounds stations, especially during reentry and landing.
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As the MSFN was being modified for Apollo, centralization, 
network communications and the ability to make decisions at remote ground 
stations were again topics that came to the forefront. In the Mercury days, 
the network had flight controllers and a Capcom at all of the prime stations 
mainly because worldwide, real-time communications were still in its 
infancy. Thus each primary site had the means to make critical decisions and 
to execute command instructions in the case of a communications failure. 
In addition, Bermuda had a computer of its own, to help make the vital go/
no-go decision should communication with the main computing center at 
Goddard be severed.
On Apollo, GSFC, MSC, and Headquarters jointly agreed to use 
computers at outlying network stations. This was a radical move and a fun-
damental change away from what had been done up until then. The decision 
was not reached without controversy. Network philosophy had always been 
that ground stations would transmit raw, unprocessed (or slightly processed) 
data back to a central computing center—first located at Goddard and later 
moved to Houston. The expansion of NASCOM had made this possible. 
With Apollo, however, data rates increased several-fold over Gemini, andlive 
television (a high bandwidth item) was added.39
To handle these faster processing requirements, 14 land stations 
were each fitted with two Univac 642B data processing computers to support 
both telemetry and command.40 (Two units were needed to allow for simulta-
neous tasking of telemetry and command.) The old Gemini sites that had been 
equipped with the aging Univac 1218s were upgraded. But the increased real-
time flow of information led to a buffering problem: the outlying sites could 
receive far more data from the Apollo spacecraft than could be transmitted in 
real time to Houston over NASCOM, which could still only handle a maxi-
mum traffic rate of 2.4 kilobits-per-second (kbps). This had potentially crip-
pling consequences. Network engineers at Goddard devised a solution which 
was to essentially compress each station’s aggregate data link into discrete 2.4 
kbps frames or packets grouped into specific data types. By doing so, flight 
controllers in Houston could remotely select and query telemetry informa-
tion of their choosing for review. Even though flight control consoles were 
installed on AISs and at some ground stations, they became unnecessary once 
the buffering problem was solved. These remote flight consoles were never 
used on a mission since controllers could review data and issue commands to 
the spacecraft from the MCC in Houston.41
To fully appreciate the complexity of network operations during 
Apollo, it is important to look at the level of teamwork that went into run-
ning the MSFN. Even though the MCC had control of the spacecraft from the 
ground during a mission, smooth network operations required coordination 
(and cooperation) between the two primary NASA centers involved: GSFC 
and the MSC. Before the actual mission, Greenbelt acted as the manager of 
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network activities, preparing equipment and personnel across the network for 
readiness. It had the final say in pronouncing the network ready (green) or 
not (red). Once a mission began, though, Houston assumed control. Goddard 
continued in a support role to ensure overall network viability, monitoring 
the activities of the ground stations, ships, and aircraft for the duration of 
the flight. At his console in the MCC Mission Operations Control Room 
(the famous “Front Room” familiar to the world), the Network Controller 
(NC)—along with his contingent of support staff in the “unseen” Back 
Room—monitored network operations, maintaining contact with two key 
Goddard figures, namely the Network Operations Manager and his boss, the 
Network Director.42
Perhaps the most elegant achievement in terms of communications 
technology on Apollo was the use of USB. The use of a unified carrier yielded 
immediate benefits for the spacecraft, saving the space, weight, and power 
needed to accommodate other subsystems. Furthermore, communications at 
S-band (1550 to 5200 MHz) was much more powerful, accommodating more 
data than possible at the lower frequencies. But most importantly, it had the 
range to reach the Moon. Two competing USB systems were actually avail-
able for Project Apollo. One, under development by GSFC, was essentially 
an extension of the GRARR, used to support STADAN for NASA’s science 
satellites. The other was a JPL product originally intended for deep space use. 
NASA would select the JPL system but modified it for Apollo. Even with 
this new capability, the MSFN still kept most of the pre-USB equipment 
operational, the majority of stations—both old and new—still fielding VHF 
hardware for backup.
NASA was sending men to the Moon, but like any other televi-
sion or radio station, it still had to ask for permission in order to transmit at 
certain frequencies. Throughout Apollo, the International Communication 
Union granted the MSFN transmission only on a secondary basis. What this 
meant was that NASA was legally required to shut down if its transmissions 
interfered with other authorized users. But the Agency could not complain of 
interference from these primary users. Sure enough, the frequency range of 
the Apollo USB system did overlap with the band then assigned to commer-
cial television broadcasting. GSFC and Headquarters identified and addressed 
this issue early on in the planning of the Apollo network and all conflicts were 
successfully resolved before flights took place. No significant frequency inter-
ference problems ever developed during the 15 times that Apollo flew.43
E E E
By the spring of 1967, with the final USB upgrade at Guaymas 
completed, the MSFN was ready to support the first human flight of the new 
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Apollo spacecraft. In preparation for sending men to the Moon, the GSFC had 
in three years established seven new ground stations and extensively modified 
seven others. It had now been over a year since Americans last flew in space 
and President Kennedy’s commitment of a Moon landing before the end of 
the decade was fast approaching; “Go Fever” was in full swing.
Then tragedy struck.
On the evening of 27 January 1967 during a “plugs out” launch 
pad countdown test at the KSC, a fire erupted in the pure oxygen atmosphere 
inside the Apollo Saturn 204 CM, killing astronauts Virgil I. Grissom, Edward 
H. White, II and Roger B. Chaffee. Super-heated flames consumed the space-
craft within 20 seconds. Grissom, White, and Chaffee didn’t stand a chance. 
Countdown tests involved the network stations, and Apollo 1 was no different. 
Shock and grief quickly spread to the stations. Overseas, where the local popu-
lace took pride in hosting “their” ground station as part of the American space 
program felt the sadness. Official statements of condolences poured in from 
around the world. On Guam, its 9th legislature passed Resolution Number 118, 
officially expressing the grief of the Guamanians. The Honorable E. S. Terlaje, 
Acting Legislative Secretary, requested NASA send copies of the Resolution to 
the families of the three astronauts, which James Webb did.44
The Fire, as it simply came to be known, severely impacted all aspects 
of Apollo. Foremost were program timeline and flight schedule. Instead of the 
first flight taking placing in early 1967, it was delayed for over 18 months, even-
tually to October of the following year. Despite this deadly setback, uncrewed 
launches testing the CSM, Lunar Module, and the Saturn V launch vehicle 
continued as NASA endeavored to recover and rebuild the program.
In the revised timetable, NASA defined seven flights (missions A 
through G) designed to incrementally lead to a Moon landing (the G mission) 
by 1970. In the fall of 1967, the giant Saturn V launch vehicle developed by 
the MSFC was ready for its first all-up test. On the morning of 9 November, 
the Apollo network was put to the test for the first time, tracking the Saturn 
V stack on its maiden flight. Apollo 4 was sent into a high apogee (18,079 
kilometer, 11,234 mile) elliptical orbit around Earth. At the conclusion of the 
flight, the Service Module pointed towards Earth and fired its 20,500 pound 
(91,200 newton) thrust engine to accelerate the spacecraft to a velocity of 
40,200 kilometers (25,000 miles) per hour, replicating return and reentry 
from a lunar mission.
Telemetry received onboard the Huntsville and at the Hawaii 
Station showed no degradation in the cabin environment, verifying the 
design of the CM heat shield to withstand the 2,760°C (5,000°F) tempera-
ture of reentry. This was a significant step in the program since the ability 
of the ablative shield to protect a returning spacecraft at such velocities was 
largely unknown at the time. Guided by terminal tracking data from the 
network, the USS Bennington successfully recovered the Command Module 
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west of the Hawaiian Islands some nine hours after launch. Technically, pro-
grammatically and—perhaps most importantly—psychologically, Apollo 4 
(the “A” mission) was an important and successful event, especially in light 
of the number of firsts it tackled. For the tracking network, it was the first 
shake-down of the MSFN for Apollo. The fact that everything worked so 
well with so little trouble gave NASA much needed confidence and a giant 
psychological boost. As Apollo Program Director Samuel Phillips phrased it, 
“Apollo [was] on the way to the Moon.”45
Apollo 4 was followed in January 1968 by Apollo 5, which flew 
for the first time the LM made by the Grumman Aircraft Engineering 
Corporation. The spacecraft was put through its paces using command uplinks 
from the ground, successfully demonstrating system performance including 
critical restarts of the LM ascent and descent stage engines. At one point, 
Houston sent a “switch-off” signal to the guidance computer and flew the LM 
Astronauts (left to right) Gus Grissom, Ed White and Roger Chaffee stand for photogra-
phers in front of Launch Complex 34 housing their Apollo 1 Saturn 1B vehicle. Ten days 
after this photograph was taken, the crew perished in a pad ﬁre. (NASA Image Number 
GRN-2000-000618)
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in real time from the ground through a series of simulated landing maneuvers 
using only command uplinks.46
The next flight test was Apollo 6, the final uncrewed flight test 
of the Apollo program, on 4 April. Two minutes into that mission, telem-
etry received at Bermuda indicated thrust fluctuations of the S-IC first stage 
engines that caused the entire rocket stack to bounce like a giant pogo stick 
for approximately 30 seconds. During the “pogo”, telemetry also showed low- 
frequency oscillations reached as high as ±0.6 g inside the CM, exceeding the 
design criteria of ±0.25 g stipulated for human flight.47 (This was a flight rule 
A view of the Apollo 16 Lunar Module Orion shows the location of the 0.6 meter (2 foot) 
S-band antenna near the top of the Ascent Module. During their post mission press con-
ference, the crew called attention to the steerable antenna which was frozen along a yaw 
axis during much of the ﬂight. Also visible to the left of the S-band dish antenna are the 
VHF and EVA antennas. This photograph was taken by lunar module pilot Charles M.
Duke, Jr. during the mission’s ﬁrst extravehicular activity on 21 April 1972. (NASA Image 
SAS16-113-18334)
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carried over from Project Gemini. This oscillation level should not be confused 
with Apollo launch or reentry loads, which could exceed 8 g and which the 
spacecraft was designed to take.) After the first stage burnt out and was jetti-
soned, the five Rocktedyne J-2 engines of the S-II second stage came to life.
As acquisition-of-signal occurred over Antigua, telemetry indi-
cated that two of the engines had shut down prematurely. To compensate, 
the onboard Instrumentation Unit automatically directed the other three 
engines to fire longer as flight controllers monitored the situation. Even 
with the extended burn time, the second stage did not reach the desired alti-
tude and velocity before its fuel ran out. Now in order to reach the planned 
speed, the single S-IVB third stage engine had to burn quite a bit longer than 
planned. After its shutdown, an orbit determination was made from state vec-
tors received at the Caribbean stations which showed Apollo 6 in a severely 
lopsided 177 by 367-kilometer (110 by 228-mile) elliptical orbit rather than 
the desired 257-kilometer (160-mile) circular orbit.48
MCC evaluated the situation and decided to continue into the next 
phase of the flight, a restart of the S-IVB engine to simulate the TLI burn. 
Command uplinks to the vehicle went unheeded, however. This was verified 
by telemetry received onboard the Vanguard that the simulated TLI burn did 
not in fact take place. As an alternative, Houston jettisoned the S-IVB and 
instead commanded the Service Module engine to fire for over seven min-
utes (which exceeded lunar mission requirements) to simulate the injection 
burn. The Vanguard tracked the CSM out to 22,200 kilometers (13,800 miles) 
Protruding from the back of the 
Apollo Service Module was the 
spacecraft’s autotracking S-band 
antenna. It was a “quad-feed” 
system meaning that the system 
actually consisted of four antennas. 
Signal strengths of the four were 
compared so as to allow tracking 
of the antenna beam to the Earth 
ground station that the spacecraft 
was communicating with. In this 
way, the ground station “drove” the 
antenna on the spacecraft to keep 
it always precisely pointed. Shown 
is the Apollo 16 CSM Casper as 
seen from LM Orion. (NASA Image 
Number AS16-113-18282)
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where it was turned around and plunged back into the atmosphere for another 
reentry test. Because of the extended burn by the Service Propulsion System, 
Houston expected that the Service Module would not have enough fuel to 
accelerate the CM to the desired velocity. Network tracking verified this, 
showing the CM reentering at 35,900 kilometers (22,300 miles) per hour, 
some 4,500 kilometers per hour (2,800 mph) less than planned.49
The period from fall 1968 to the end of 1972 marked the apex of 
the program, a time in which nine missions were flown to the Moon, land-
ing 12 men on its surface. On 11 October 1968, Apollo 7 was launched with 
America’s first three-person crew: Walter M. Schirra, Jr., Commander; Donn 
F. Eisele, CSM Pilot; and R. Walter Cunningham, LM Pilot (even though 
there was no LM). For nearly 11 days, the MSFN tracked the spacecraft as it 
made 163 orbits around Earth in an engineering flight test to demonstrate 
the space-worthiness of the new Block II CM, a totally redesigned spacecraft 
following The Fire. One improvement was a new hatch that could now be 
opened in just three seconds.
Among the spacecraft’s equipment and communication technolo-
gies tested was the transmission of live television from the spacecraft, a first for 
the manned network.50 The idea of live television had been a topic of debate 
ever since September 1963, when NASA first directed North American 
Aviation to install a portable camera in the Block I CM. With weight a con-
stant concern, many engineers viewed the television camera only as a nicety. 
On occasions when pounds, even ounces, were being shaved from the CM, 
the camera was usually among the first items to go.
Despite the insistence of most engineers that it was not needed—
and the ambivalence of the test-pilot oriented crews—there were those who 
persistently argued for its inclusion. NASA personnel in Public Affairs, for 
instance Julian W. Scheer at Headquarters and Paul P. Haney at the MSC, 
naturally favored the use of television. There were also managers closer to the 
program who agreed with them. For example, in the spring of 1964, William 
A. Lee, a MSC engineering manager, wrote to George Low of the Apollo 
Spacecraft Program Office:
I take typewriter in hand to plead once more for including in-flight 
TV. . . . Since [it] has little or no engineering value, the weight 
penalty must be assessed against a different set of standards. . . . One 
[objective] of the Apollo Program is to impress the world with our 
space supremacy. It may be assumed that the first attempt to land 
on the Moon will have generated a high degree of interest around 
the world. . . .  A large portion of the civilized world will be at their 
TV sets wondering whether the attempt will succeed or fail. The 
question before the house is whether the public will receive their 
report of this climactic moment visually or by voice alone.51
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With emphasis on its civilian nature and Kennedy’s decision to play 
out the Moon race on world center-stage, NASA could not avoid the debate. 
Over the next several years, it continued with persuasive arguments for the case 
of live television being weighed against technical and operational consider-
ations. Finally, in April of 1968 with the first Block II CSM (CSM-101) ready 
to be accepted, television became part of Apollo (and, as it turns out, all future 
NASA human spaceflights) when Samuel Phillips directed George Low to pro-
ceed with a camera on Apollo 7.52 It turned out that television broadcasts on the 
mission were a huge success, both for NASA public relations and as a technical 
milestone for the MSFN. The astronauts used television to show (in black and 
white) views of Earth outside their windows, the uniqueness of working and 
living in the weightlessness of space, and tours of the new Apollo spacecraft. 
Lasting seven to eleven minutes each, the broadcasts came to be called “The 
Wally, Walt and Donn Show,” even garnering a special Emmy Award from the 
Academy of Television Arts and Sciences the following year.53
The success of Apollo 7 was followed two months later by what 
would be the first complete test of the entire Apollo Network. Launched on 
21 December 1968, Apollo 8 made the first lunar voyage, carrying astronauts 
Frank Borman, James A. Lovell, Jr., and William A. Anders to the Moon on 
a six-day circumlunar flight that culminated with 10 orbits around the Moon. 
At 10:47 a.m. EST, Capcom Michael Collins relayed through the Hawaii 
Station, “All right, you are go for TLI,” sending men on escape velocity away 
from Earth for the first time. The mission provided the first true use of the 
network’s large 26-meter (85-feet) USB antennas on an actual human flight; 
previous activities had involved only system checkouts using Pioneer space 
probes as TTS.
Apollo 7 became the world’s high-
est television broadcasting studio 
in October 1968. The inclusion of 
television on NASA spaceﬂights 
was not reached at in a cavalier 
way and was due in no small part 
to the Space Race atmosphere 
of the Cold War. This picture was 
from the crew’s television trans-
mission on the third day of the 
mission. On the left is CSM Pilot 
Donn Eisele; Commander Wally 
Schirra is on the right. (NASA
Image Number S68-50713)
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It also marked a change in the way NASA tracked spacecraft. 
During Mercury, Gemini and on Apollo 7, communication with the space-
craft was not continuous as the stations could not possibly cover all ground 
track locations around the globe. However, as Apollo 8 left the confines of 
Earth towards the Moon, tracking and data acquisition, ironically, became 
continuous. This somewhat counter-intuitive phenomenon can be explained 
by simple geometry. As the distance between a spacecraft and Earth increased, 
the field-of-view required to see it decreased. Also, as a spacecraft sped away 
from Earth, its motion would appear to an observer on the ground to become 
more and more stationary. Now instead of the spacecraft racing across the sky 
in a fast-moving arc, as it would when orbiting Earth, it now traveled on a line 
(or more precisely, a very shallow arc) slowly away from the observer. As the 
spacecraft traveled farther and farther away, eventually only a single ground 
station facing the Moon was needed to communicate with it.
Due to curvature of Earth, the Moon can only be seen comfort-
ably (that is, above the horizon at a fairly high elevation pointing angle) at any 
one time from locations within a 120° longitude range. Therefore, the three 
stations 120° apart at Goldstone, Honeysuckle Creek, and Madrid provided 
continuous coverage to the spacecraft as Earth rotated over a 24-hour period. 
The only time loss-of-signal occurred on an Apollo mission was when the 
spacecraft’s orbit took it behind the Moon and for those five minutes at the 
end of the mission during atmospheric reentry when super-heated plasma 
induced RF transmission black-out.
As successful as live television was on Apollo 7, it paled in compari-
son to what took place from lunar orbit on Christmas Eve 1968. As a spellbound 
world glued their eyes to their television sets, the first live images of our planet 
and lunar landscape as seen by men from the Moon were transmitted from a 
quarter of a million miles away to the Madrid Station at Fresnedillas, Spain.54 In 
a telecast that would forever be etched in the memory of those who were there, 
black and white images of the Moon and Earth—primitive by today’s standards 
of brilliant high definition television (HDTV)—were shown as each astronaut 
took turns reading the Creation account from the first 10 verses of the Book 
of Genesis. As the crew completed their next to last orbit around the Moon, 
flight controllers—choking back tears by now—looked on as Commander 
Frank Borman closed the live broadcast with a farewell that reached over a bil-
lion people around the world, “We close with good night, good luck, a Merry 
Christmas and God bless all of you—all of you on the good Earth.”55
Borman later admitted that he and his crew had not wanted to 
carry a television camera. Technical reasons aside, they knew that whatever 
they showed and said from lunar orbit was going to be seen and heard by a 
whole lot of people. Not a poetic man, Borman, as mission commander, had 
worried about this the most. 
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I said ‘no’ a lot, and the nice thing about it was that NASA gave 
the commander enough prerogative that they backed him up. I was 
overruled on one thing and that was because management was a lot 
smarter than I was. I didn’t want to take the damn television cam-
era with me. And they said, ‘Let’s take it,’ and they were right. . . . It 
turned out to be so important because we could share what we saw 
with the world. It weighed 12 pounds [5.4 kilograms]. We were cut-
ting out everything, even down to the extra meals, which weighed 
16 ounces [0.5 kilograms] or something like that. But I was very 
short sighted there, and NASA was right.56
By including the camera, it made the experience very real to those 
watching on Earth. “It didn’t add a dangerous amount of weight and the 
camera achieved the purpose for which it was intended: to give all Americans 
a real feeling for the mission and what it was accomplishing.”57 As it turned 
out, their broadcast was indeed seen by a worldwide audience, from the 
Americas to Europe (including East Berlin), parts of Asia and Africa, and even 
Moscow. Despite some protesting the religious nature of the message, Apollo 
8’s Christmas Eve broadcast would endure to become one of the most iconic 
moments in space exploration history.
Having successfully demonstrated the network’s 26-meter (85-
foot) USB systems, the next mission Apollo 9, went back to again exercise 
and check out the near-Earth portion of the network. The flight was the first 
for the LM, the first piloted spacecraft designed exclusively for flying in the 
airlessness of space. The flight tested, for the first time, MSFN capability to 
simultaneously track and communicate with both the CSM and the LM. LM 
USB equipment such as dual-redundant transceivers, the audio center, pulse-
code telemetry, central timing, biomedical channels and television were thor-
oughly tested during this 10-day Earth orbit mission. Communication links 
between the LM, CSM, and the MSFN ground stations as well as the extra-
vehicular mobility unit (the moonwalk spacesuits) were demonstrated.
After 151 revolutions, Gumdrop splashed down on 13 March 
1969 near the reentry ship Huntsville and was recovered by the carrier USS 
Guadalcanal.58 Black and white television had worked so well on Apollo 7 
through 9 that on the next flight, NASA decided to install a color system in the 
Apollo 10 CM. Space television had actually come quite far in a short amount 
of time. During the early Apollo missions, the TV used a slow-scan, black and 
white camera that was originally intended for development by RCA but, due 
to procurement delays, was eventually supplied by the MSC as government 
furnished equipment. That camera yielded a poorly defined, erratically moving 
image which MSFN stations converted into a standard commercial broadcast 
format (which after conversion, still exhibited uneven motions). These previ-
ous missions had shown to network engineers that there was actually sufficient 
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margin in transmission bandwidth that good quality, color television could be 
attempted in real time.
Weighing “only” 5.4 kilograms (12 pounds), the new Westinghouse 
color camera could be handheld or bracket-mounted. Its scan rate was at the 
commercial 30 frames per second, 525 scan lines per frame with a resolution 
of 200 TV lines at the standard screen aspect ratio of 4:3.59 What viewers 
experienced on the ground was a fairly good picture obtained by superimpos-
ing the color signals with the imaging (pixel) data. A 7.6-centimeter (3-inch) 
black-and-white video monitor could even be Velcro-mounted on the camera 
(or at various locations inside the CM) to aide the crew in focus and exposure 
adjustment. By Apollo 14, color television capability had been extended from 
the CM to the LM and onto the lunar surface.
As soon as Apollo 10 splashed down on 26 May bringing to an end 
the dress rehearsal for the first lunar landing attempt (the G mission), all eyes 
were on Apollo 11. The historic launch took place before an estimated crowd 
of one million people on the morning of 16 July 1969. Onboard were Neil 
A. Armstrong, Commander; Michael Collins, Command Module Pilot; and 
Edwin E. “Buzz” Aldrin, Lunar Module Pilot. A decade of preparation had 
been directed toward this mission, and the MSFN now had the responsibility 
of tracking the three on the greatest voyage ever taken. NASA has flown over 
100 more human space missions since Apollo 11 (many much more complex). 
But historians and grade-schoolers alike still (understandably) look back on 
this epochal mission as the Agency’s high point.
During a visit to the United States in October 1968, John Bolton, 
Director of Parkes Observatory in western New South Wales, Australia, was 
approached by Covington’s team to consider the possibility of making their 
64-meter (210-foot) radio astronomy telescope available to support the historic 
mission. Although several factors played into this, the driving requirement 
came down to the fact that Kraft and his team at Houston lacked confidence in 
the S-band directional antenna of the LM. Specifically, trajectory of the LM 
on its descent down to the surface was such that after it emerged from behind 
the Moon, there was a critical but very short period of time to make a “bail-
out” decision. If the directional antenna was not performing properly, the sig-
nal from the lower-gain (much less powerful) VHF omni-directional antenna 
would be marginal at best using the network’s 26-meter (85-foot) antennas.60
The way the MSFN stations were spaced also played into this. 
First, the flight plan had the landing of the Lunar Module Eagle taking place 
towards the end of the viewing window at Goldstone and the beginning of 
the window at Canberra, Australia. If landing somehow got pushed beyond 
the Canberra window, however, then Parkes—located some three hours drive 
west of Canberra—would provide that extra margin to capture the signals. 
The mission timeline also first drafted by Houston had Armstrong and Aldrin 
performing the EVA shortly upon landing, with Goldstone being the prime 
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tracking site, and with it, television responsibilities. Honeysuckle Creek, near 
Canberra, was to track Collins and the Command Module Columbia in lunar 
orbit. In this scenario, the Moon was not due to rise at Parkes until 1:02 pm 
local Australian time, by which time most, if not all, of the moonwalk would 
have been completed. Thus, Parkes Observatory was relegated to serve as 
backup for both the landing and the EVA. To facilitate this setup, the radio 
telescope would be linked via microwave to Canberra.61
This scenario changed about two months before the mission when 
Flight Operations in Houston decided that, to give the astronauts a better 
chance to acclimate to the Moon’s 1/6th gravity, a sleep period would be 
allowed before commencing the EVA. Thus, the new plan had the moonwalk 
starting about 10 hours after landing, which was some 20 minutes after the 
Moon had set at Goldstone. In the South Pacific, however, the Moon would 
be high overhead over Parkes. Because of this, the Parkes was redesignated the 
prime site for receiving the EVA telemetry.62
But things changed again. By happenstance, on 17 July—one 
day after the launch—a fire broke out in the power supply at Tidbinbilla 
(Canberra) which severely damaged the transmitter on its 26-meter antenna. 
Despite some quick repair work, GSFC would not take the risk and switched 
the station’s role with Honeysuckle Creek. Thus, the latter would now be 
the prime station to support lunar EVA, including reception of the crucial 
bio-medical telemetry from Armstrong’s and Aldrin’s Portable Life Support 
System (PLSS) backpacks. This was the top telemetry priority. The 26-meter 
antenna at nearby Tidbinbilla would be trained on Columbia instead.63
“Houston, Tranquility Base here. THE EAGLE HAS LANDED.” 
The words were said at 4:18 pm EDT on Sunday afternoon 20 July 1969 by 
Armstrong as Apollo 11 landed on the pristine surface of the Sea of Tranquility. 
With all LM systems checking out fine and the crew’s adrenalin pumping, it 
would have been incredibly anticlimactic (and probably a little unrealistic) to 
expect Armstrong and Aldrin to simply just go to sleep for six hours. They 
had, after all, just landed on the Moon! After discussions with Mission Control, 
Armstrong exercised his command prerogative and decided to forego the rest 
period and begin EVA preparations immediately. This began a chain of events 
from a network perspective that would ultimately decide how telemetry was 
received and how the world would see humankind’s first steps on the Moon.
By skipping the rest period, the EVA would begin five hours before 
the Moon was to rise at Parkes. However, Goldstone was in a good position. 
For a while, it seemed as if the Apollo Station in California would have the 
responsibility of televising the historic first moonwalk as originally planned. 
But delays kept dragging on as Armstrong and Aldrin prepared for their EVA 
inside the cramped quarters of the LM. By the time they were ready to egress 
the ship, moonrise had occurred at both Parkes and Honeysuckle.
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While this was going on, a violent wind squall happened to hit the 
telescope at Parkes while the dish was in its most vulnerable position, pointed 
at the horizon awaiting moonrise. In this “zero-elevation” position, the face 
of the dish caught the full force of the two, 112 kilometers-per-hour (70 mph) 
gusts, subjecting the large antenna to 10 times the force that it was considered 
safe to withstand. Other structures were also batted around in the swirling 
winds and the weather remained bad. But in a stroke of good fortune, the 
winds abated just as the Moon broke horizon at Parkes.64
So, because the sleep period was skipped and EVA preparations 
took longer than expected, no less than three tracking stations—Goldstone, 
Honeysuckle Creek, Parkes—received telemetry of the incredible first steps 
on the Moon. Although this was a good thing (plenty of redundancy), it also 
engendered a dilemma: Which of these TV signals would the world see?
In Australia, signals from both Honeysuckle and Parkes were sent 
to Sydney by microwave links, where a NASA officer selected between the 
two to forward on to Houston via the NASCOM. Since moonrise occurred 
at Parkes just as the EVA was getting underway, the telescope was at a very 
low elevation angle. As a result, it had to use its less sensitive “off-axis” detec-
tor and the received signal strengths were very poor. Antenna elevation angle 
at Honeysuckle was higher and the resulting signal was better. This meant 
that its signals were passed on to Mission Control. There, a controller then 
selected between the Goldstone and the Honeysuckle TV signal. This selected 
signal (ostensibly the best of the three) was then sent to a media pool television 
monitor. But this was still not the TV picture that the world saw; there was 
one more step. The image displayed on this NASA monitor was then filmed 
lived by a media pool camera for transmission to individual domestic and 
international TV networks. As a result, what people saw in their homes that 
evening was of slightly lower quality than what flight controllers and VIPs 
saw inside Mission Control.65
During the first nine minutes of the broadcast, NASA alternated 
between TV from Goldstone and Honeysuckle, searching for the best one. 
Neither was very good as they both came from 26-meter antennas (as opposed 
to the 64-meter dish at Parkes). Because of this, they could only accommo-
date blurry images using what was called ‘slow-scan television’—a picture 
transmission method used mainly by amateur radio operators to transmit and 
receive black and white pictures. There was one more thing. Not only was the 
TV picture grainy and blurry, it was upside-down!
This was because as Armstrong began his 2.4-meter (8-foot) 
descent down the ladder, he pulled a D-ring which dropped open the Modular 
Equipment Stowage Assembly (MESA) containing the television camera. Due 
to the way the camera had to be mounted, however, when the MESA dropped 
opened, it was upside-down. Avoiding what could have been a major embar-
rassment forever recorded, technicians at the stations quickly flipped an incon-
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At top is the slow-scan television image from Honeysuckle Creek of Armstrong plac-
ing his left foot onto the surface of the Moon. Twenty minutes later when Aldrin came 
down the ladder, coverage had switched to the 210-foot (64-meter) radio telescope at 
the Parkes Observatory. The image improved noticeably. The lower picture shows Aldrin 
checking his jump back up the ladder before stepping onto the surface. Note Armstrong 
is overexposed in the background from where he stood and took pictures of his crew-
mate’s climb down to the surface. (Scans courtesy of John Saxon. Also available at 
http://www.honeysucklecreek.net/msfn_missions/Apollo_11_mission/index.html)
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spicuous toggle switch called the ‘Scanner Converter Reversing Switch’, just 
in time to see Armstrong’s final descent down the ladder. Although NASA 
initially began the telecast with Goldstone, by the time Armstrong reached 
the foot of the ladder, Mission Control had switched to the transmission from 
Honeysuckle Creek. In this circuitous way, the Australian station was bestowed 
the privilege of transmitting to the world Armstrong’s “one small step.”66
In a little known vignette of history, the way the camera was 
mounted in the MESA and the way the compartment dropped opened caused 
the camera to be slightly tilted with respect to the true horizontal-axis of the 
LM. What this meant was that an even more harrowing appearance was added 
to Armstrong’s already dramatic climb down the ladder. In reality, although 
the incline of the ladder was indeed quite precipitous at 65º, it was not as steep 
as seen on TV, which gave the illusion like it was almost vertical.67
Eight minutes and fifty-one seconds into the broadcast, the Moon 
had risen sufficiently high over Parkes that the telescope could now capture 
lunar transmissions with its main detector. Normal television scans rates could 
now be accommodated and the picture quality improved. Houston quickly 
switched to Parkes. Thus, the world saw Buzz Aldrin’s descent down the lad-
der much clearer than his commander’s 20 minutes earlier. NASA stayed with 
the Parkes television for the remainder of the two and a half hour telecast.68
Twelve hours later, the Madrid Station tracked Eagle as it lifted off the 
surface of the Moon to successfully rendezvous and dock with Columbia. After
rejoining Collins, Apollo 11 made its critical TEI burn for home. On the morn-
ing of 24 July 1968, humankind’s first journey to the surface of the Moon came 
to an end as Hawaii and the Huntsville tracked Columbia to a perfect splashdown 
less than five kilometers (three miles) from the recovery ship USS Hornet.
Ozzie Covington, who had been so instrumental in smoothing the 
lines of communications between Houston and Goddard, would recall years 
later the almost surreal feeling after it was all over. 
When we finally landed on the Moon on July 20 1969, I was 
grateful that our cooperative efforts had paid off. However, during 
the event, I was in the Mission Control Center in Houston. Some 
of the data from the lunar excursion module became sporadic and I 
really became uptight. NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine hap-
pened to stand nearby and noticed my nervousness. He urged me 
to take it easy. We had come this far and would make it fine, he 
assured me. Well, we did!69
This sense of tension followed by great relief was echoed by Bill Wood, 
who by then was the head of the Manned Network. On Apollo 11, he spent the 
entire eight days at the GSFC Network Control Center, working, eating, and 
sleeping there. “When I eventually got home,” Wood said, “there was a big sign 
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‘Welcome’ greeting me. However, [by then] I was emotionally exhausted and 
it took me quite a while to really comprehend as to what had happened, even 
though for years, I had been deeply involved in preparing for this event.”70
As someone in the “trenches” at the field station, Mike Dinn, who 
was Deputy Director in charge of Operations at Honeysuckle, framed the 
accomplishment of the historic mission in a somewhat different perspective. 
To him, Apollo 11 was a simulation that went well. “The station had reached 
a point of capability whereby it was comfortable not only with a nominal 
mission, but comfortable that the station could cope with just about anything 
nonstandard,” said Dinn. 
We had thought through and tried to simulate as many dif-
ferent things as could happen, and so I was comfortable with it. 
You knew you had the next pass to cope with. Every pass was 
crucial and critical, even though it might have ended up routine 
and nothing happened. You had to be, almost, literally on your toes, 
organized and prepared and staffed to cope with any anomaly. I was 
also comfortable with the management aspects of it. It was a very 
good operational philosophy that Chris Kraft had brought whereby 
everybody in the organization knew the success of the mission 
depended on them doing their bit properly and correctly, and that 
the person in the next station was going to do his bit correctly. We 
were all so busy that it took all your effort and energy to do your 
part well. And so it was very satisfying and rewarding that we didn’t 
Armstrong’s photographic 
counterpart to the television 
image of Aldrin descend-
ing the ladder as seen in the 
previous ﬁgure. (NASA Image 
Number MSFC-6900937)
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have Goddard and Houston micromanaging—in great contrast to 
later years.71
As somewhat of a reality check, Dinn told his shift that morning 
(Australian time) that the most important data coming from the Moon that 
day was not going to be television but the bio-medical telemetry of Armstrong 
and Aldrin. Said Dinn: 
“If you’re there doing a job, you should be concentrating on 
the job at hand and the data at hand. . . . The luxury of ‘whooping 
it up’ doesn’t fit in there. That is the least time you’d be whoop-
ing it up is when something critical just occurred. After Apollo 11 
landed, you heard Gene Kranz say something like ‘Right, we’ve got 
to stay or no-stay’. There wasn’t time there to be whooping it up. 
I fully recognize this doesn’t fit in with what the colloquial media, 
books, and the like want to say. But I’m afraid that’s what it was. Yes, 
we were pleased and satisfied with what we achieved, but we were 
only a small cog in the machine. And yes, we’d done our bit well, 
but we weren’t as tested as we were in simulations. I used to say that 
a nominal Apollo mission used about 5 percent of our capability 
because we had lots of redundancies. . . . When it came down to 
it, there was an enormous amount of onboard redundancies. They 
didn’t need the network all the time . . . and to me, that wasn’t a 
negative; that was a positive. It showed a lot of clever, intelligent, 
management and design of the mission and the hardware. You had 
so much redundancy and so many backups and so many options. 
They were all designed into the mission planning. Yes, there was 
satisfaction. It was the culmination of what we had trained for, and 
everybody performed. The satisfaction for me was to help bring the 
station from this state of not being very competent to one of the 
best in the network, as Bill Wood told me years later.”72
The greatest challenge for the network during the Apollo years 
occurred in April 1970 when the flight of Apollo 13 had to be aborted as 
the spacecraft approached the Moon. Fifty-six hours into the mission with the 
spacecraft some 322,000 kilometers (200,000 miles) from Earth, damaged wires 
and insulation inside the Number 2 oxygen tank caused it to explode during 
a routine tank “stir”. The explosion ruptured a line and damaged a valve in 
the Number 1 oxygen tank, causing it to also lose oxygen. The entire Service 
Module oxygen supply boiled away in less than three hours, which led to the 
loss of water, electrical power and use of the Service Propulsion System.
With the lunar landing now scrubbed, the mission turned into a 
race against time, one of saving the crew before all the life-support consum-
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ables expired. Astronauts James Lovell, John L. “Jack” Swigert, Jr., and Fred 
W. Haise, Jr. quickly powered up the Lunar Module, still attached to the 
CSM, as a lifeboat. All spacecraft systems except for life support were turned 
off to save power. Only a low power transmission link tethered the crippled 
spacecraft to Mission Control. Robert L. Owen, the MSFN Associate Chief 
for Network Engineering at Goddard during the mission, recalled the net-
work improvising and adapting in real time to the situation. “There was a 
transponder on board the S-IVB (third-stage of the Saturn launch vehicle) 
which operated on exactly the same frequency as the transponder on the LM. 
In our planning, we had never considered powering up the Lunar Module 
until after the S-IVB had expired. However, when the power failure forced 
our astronauts to get out of the CM into the LM, we faced the problem of 
having the S-IVB floating nearby, utilizing the same communication fre-
quencies. This was no good, and we quickly had to work out a scheme which 
would enable us to capture the signal from the Lunar Module. Eventually, the 
S-IVB crashed into the Moon, but in the meantime, we had to have reliable 
communications. We succeeded by working out a configuration we had never 
anticipated. Apollo 13 presented us with a frightening situation, which luck-
ily, we were able to meet.”73
To save power, telemetry had to be transmitted back to Earth using 
low power transmitters on the LM. Here, the 64-meter radio telescope at 
Parkes Observatory once again entered the picture. Originally, the Moon 
was too far north to be seen very well from the observatory and the telescope 
was not scheduled to support Apollo 13. But as soon as the accident occurred, 
NASA quickly recognized that Parkes could and would in fact be needed to 
track the failing spacecraft on its altered free-return trajectory.
The Australians, led by observatory director John Bolton, imme-
diately began to prepare the station. While astronomy equipment was carried 
down a ladder from the antenna pedestal, the NASA antenna feed was taken 
up in a lift, installed and checked out at the center of the dish. In a job that 
usually took one week, the facility was reconfigured in 10 hours after receiv-
ing the go-ahead from Goddard.74 Since Parkes was not slated to support this 
mission, microwave links which had been established for Apollo 11 and 12 
were not operational when the emergency occurred. With urgency, a team of 
engineers from Honeysuckle and Tidbinbilla arrived at Parkes within hours to 
reestablish the links to Sydney before the next pass of the spacecraft.
Parkes inclusion was critical owing to the interference of the S-IVB 
as the 26-meter (85-foot) antenna did not have a narrow enough beamwidth 
to discriminate between the Saturn third stage and the LM Odyssey. When 
Parkes moved out of view, the 64-meter (210-foot) dish at Goldstone was able 
to do the same, and together, the two were able to track and communicate 
with Apollo 13, saving the flight from turning into a disaster. From a Mission 
Control perspective, it was NASA’s finest moment.75
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Eighty-seven hours after the explosion, Apollo 13 splashed down 
southeast of American Samoa with Lovell, Swigert and Haise safely strapped 
into their couches to bring to an end the only aborted lunar mission of the 
entire program. In retrospect, Apollo 13 represented a constructive failure 
that highlighted not only the coordination and preparation of network engi-
neers at GSFC and stations around the world, but also the teamwork and 
cooperation between the various NASA centers and, more broadly, with the 
space agency’s international partners.76
Lyn Dunseith, Director of the Data Systems and Analysis Directorate 
at the JSC recalled years later that: 
Throughout the entire program, Goddard provided us with 
the data we so critically needed. The quality of this support is best 
evident by the lack of a crisis in a crisis situation, such as the ill-
fated Apollo 13 mission. Even during the flight, we had command 
and voice capability to handle a very serious condition. Our astro-
nauts returned safely thanks in large measure to superb communi-
cations and tracking capabilities provided by the Goddard team. Its 
members are as much a part of manned space flight as anyone in 
Houston or at the Cape.77
Moon landings continued to unfold after Apollo 13, becoming more 
ambitious and complex with each mission. Scientific exploration of our near-
est neighbor began in earnest on Apollo 12 and moved forward until Apollo 
17 concluded the program. Compared to the life and death drama of Apollo 
13, these missions went relatively smooth, though not totally trouble free. On 
Apollo 14, for instance, a malfunctioning abort switch gave flight controllers 
real trouble. The MSFN enabled Houston to send commands to reprogram the 
computers aboard the LM directing it to ignore that particular signal. Without 
this capability, the mission would have had to be aborted since the crew would 
not have been able to separate from the CM and a lunar landing would not 
have been possible. Former Flight Director Chris Kraft would say that, “On 
virtually every flight, the network and its people, while in the background, 
were ‘under the gun’. We relied on them in every critical situation.”78
These landings left Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Packages 
(ALSEP) in five geographical locations across the lunar surface. ALSEPs were 
a combination of experiments which the astronauts deployed at a site suffi-
ciently far from the LM to collect lunar surface experimental data. There was 
a central processing station to which all of the peripheral experiment and the 
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) were attached. The ASLEPs 
provided power and data with network stations through its own transmitter 
and antenna. With several packages in place, these ALSEPs, connected as a 
network, returned more data than any could on its own.
Chapter 5 \ The Apollo Years 183
Take the seismometer network emplaced by Apollo 12, 14, 15, and 
16. It enabled the location of impacts and moonquakes to be determined very 
precisely. The network of three Lunar Surface Magnetometers enabled the 
study of solar wind plasma movement by tracing its magnetic field. Closing out 
the program, Apollo 17 carried an enhanced package of surface experiments. 
With nuclear power from the RTGs, ALSEP transmissions were received by 
Apollo 15 Lunar Module pilot James B. Irwin loads-up the “rover”, Lunar Roving Vehicle, 
with tools and equipment in preparation for the ﬁrst lunar extravehicular activity at the 
Hadley-Apennine landing site on 31 July 1971. A portion of the Lunar Module Falcon is vis-
ible on the left. St. George crater is about ﬁve kilometers (three miles) in the background. 
Clearly seen is the one-meter (three-foot) steerable Uniﬁed S-Band (USB) antenna of the 
rover through which Houston could remotely control the vehicle if needed. This photograph 
was taken by Mission Commander David R. Scott. (NASA Image Number AS15-86-11602)
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NASA’s Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network for years after the last astro-
nauts had left the Moon.79
Having surpassed President Kennedy’s goal of landing a man on the 
Moon and returning him safely to Earth by the end of 1969, the final three 
Apollo flights that took place between July 1971 and December 1972 were 
conducted with scientific exploration in mind. The last of the Apollo lunar 
flights (the so-called “J-missions” with their emphasis on science), featured the 
Lunar Roving Vehicle (LRV), a 210-kilogram (460-pound) battery-powered 
car manufactured by Boeing-Delco. It was essentially an all-terrain vehicle 
designed to operate in the low-gravity, vacuum, dusty environment of the 
Moon. The Rover could carry 490 kilograms (1,080 pounds)—allowing for 
180 kilograms (400 pounds) for each astronaut, his suit and the portable life-
support system—a total distance of 92 kilometers (57 miles) to survey and 
sample considerable stretches of the terrain.80
Communicating with the rover posed a number of new challenges 
to the MSFN. For example, incorporating it into the television transmission 
scheme created a special set of problems. One issue in particular was how to 
control the motion of the LRV color television camera. Houston’s method of 
operating the camera was to issue start/stop commands relayed through the 
network computers at the respective ground station. There was, however, a 
time lag of 2.5 seconds in the time it took to start and stop the rover camera 
from the time a command was issued at the MCC. This meant that if the 
Flight Controller operating the camera wanted to turn it by 5°, the “Stop” 
command would have to be dispatched before the “Start” command reached 
the Moon! To compensate, network engineers designed a fix to the ground 
station computers that staggered start/stop commands thereby allowing the 
camera to function without having to modify its control format.
Another potential obstacle to successful LRV television transmis-
sions stemmed from voice and telemetry sub-carrier interference into the 
video portion of the rover’s USB signal. Because the telemetry transmission 
spectrum overlapped the voice and video data frequencies, the interference 
left annoying herringbone patterns on TV. To solve this problem, engineers 
from GSFC, Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory, and 
the Goldstone Communication Complex produced a band-pass filter that 
removed the interference while preserving the video transmission to produce 
crystal clear images from the rover camera the quality of which would not be 
surpassed until HDTV became available 25 years later on the Space Shuttle 
and International Space Station.81
Introduction of the rover also increased the number of transmission 
sources that the network had to keep track of. The MSFN now had to synchronize 
all the activities of the Command Module orbiting the Moon, the Lunar Module 
parked on the surface, the LRV moving around on the surface, and finally, the 
two astronauts who may each be walking around in different directions. Keeping 
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track of just where the rover was with respect to the LM was obviously important. 
Needless to say, a more reliable technique was needed than to simply allow the 
astronauts to visually follow their tracks back to the LM.
The solution—a rather novel one devised by Goddard engineers—
was to pinpoint the rover’s position with respect to the LM by extracting dif-
ferential Doppler data from the two separate S-band transmissions coming, 
respectively, from the LM and the rover. By observing the Doppler shift, the 
network could precisely track the rover to provide the necessary naviga-
tion data. Mission Control then passed the data to the astronauts who then 
charted their course, enabling them to venture great distances, even after 
losing sight of the LM.
Proper coordination of lunar surface activities also required com-
munication between the two astronauts on the surface and the CM Pilot in 
orbit. Support from MSFN stations was needed since direct line-of-site com-
munications between the two lunar parties was limited to a brief overhead 
pass on each orbit. Since the ground network could see the CM for just about 
50 percent of each orbit and because it was in continuous contact with the 
astronauts on the surface, MSFN stations served as relay points between the 
two parties. In this way, real-time voice communications between the sur-
face and the orbiting CM were made possible for about half the time that the 
astronauts spent on the Moon.
When the Apollo 17 CM America splashed down on 17 December 
1972, it marked the end of the first epic journeys to the Moon, a lasting trib-
ute to the 400,000 men and women whose skill and determination placed 12 
Americans on the surface of our nearest celestial neighbor. The tremendous 
sense of pride and accomplishment that came with Apollo deeply affected 
those who worked on the program, some, on a very personal level. 
Robert Barnes, who first worked with Ozzie Covington at White 
Sands and later joined him in Greenbelt, saw the potential of the MSFN to 
accomplish something rather unique, something historical. Reflecting years 
later, Barnes said:
My own involvement with this activity lasted 20 years, more 
or less, and it was not unlike having a front seat on a roller coaster: 
you wonder why in hell you got on, but somehow, would not have 
wanted to miss a chance for such a spectacular ride! With NASA, 
each of us saw a chance to fulfill a dream. However, in retrospect it 
must be concluded that all dreams were not the same. Certainly the 
work that led ultimately to the communications support of Apollo 
satisfied a host of dreams and was the work of a very dedicated 
group of people. It stands as an accomplishment for which each 
member can be justly proud.82
186 “Read You Loud and Clear!”
Lyn Dunseith, whose team was instrumental in integrating the 
Goddard network with the MCC, reflected:
It is fortunate that the computer and communications tech-
nology kept pace with the needs of the space program. Indeed 
this program greatly accelerated the state of the art. Surely, with-
out these tools and the men operating them, we would not have 
been able to get to the Moon. When we finally landed there and 
returned our astronauts safely to Earth, I could not fully compre-
hend what actually had occurred. It really seemed incredulous. For 
months after Apollo 11, I was somewhat in a daze and found it dif-
ficult to believe that we had made that lunar landing, even though 
Skylab consisted of four major modules: the Orbital Workshop, Airlock Module, 
Multiple Docking Adaptor and Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM). The Orbital Workshop 
was a converted S-IVB third stage of a Saturn V. The ATM could not be accessed from 
the rest of the space station and a spacewalk was required to reach it. Launched in 
1973, three crews visited the station between May 1973 and February 1974. Skylab 
remained in orbit until 1979. (NASA Image Number MSFC-72-SL-7200-110)
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I had been personally involved in this dramatic event. . . . Yes, I have 
the book with all the equations and procedures, but I still find it 
difficult to believe, as I now look at the Moon, that men actually 
walked and worked there! It was incomprehensible.83
Even before these dramatic flights took place to the Moon, NASA 
was already thinking about what would be next. Beginning in 1964, explor-
atory studies were initiated under various names such as Extended Apollo 
(Apollo-X) and Apollo Extension System (AES) to investigate options for 
space projects that would come after the lunar missions. The next year, these 
initiatives were consolidated under the Apollo Applications Program (AAP), 
which by 1966, had narrowed the scope of the potential projects down to one 
of Earth orbit application; namely, a space station.
NASA had originally planned 20 Apollo lunar missions. But on 
2 September 1970, Administrator Thomas Paine announced that due to a 
$42.1 million congressional cut in FY 1971 NASA appropriations, Apollo 
15 and 19 were to be canceled; the remaining missions were redesignated 
Apollo 14 through 17. This disappointing cut left space-qualified hardware, 
which had already been made, immediately available for an AAP, specifically, 
an Orbital Workshop for a space station. On 17 February 1970, the NASA 
Project Designation Committee officially designated the project Skylab.84
Network response was required from the start, as Skylab encoun-
tered a number of difficulties. On 14 May 1973, the first two stages of a Saturn 
V launch vehicle placed America’s first space station into low-Earth orbit. At 
over 86 metric tons, Skylab was at the time the most massive object ever suc-
cessfully delivered into space. But this almost did not happen.
Sixty-three seconds after liftoff while the first stage was still burn-
ing, a crucial micrometeoroid shield on the exterior of the Orbital Workshop 
designed to protect Skylab from harsh solar heating and micro-impacts, was 
torn away by aerodynamic forces, carrying with it one of the station’s two 
solar panels. Even the second solar array, as it turned out, did not fully open 
upon reaching orbit. The overheated and underpowered space station seemed 
doomed as NASA scrambled to decide whether or not to even attempt launch-
ing a crew to inhabit Skylab.
Over the next week, engineers at Goddard, Houston, and Marshall 
poured over telemetry that revealed the health and status and the extent of 
damage to the station. Houston remotely maneuvered the massive spacecraft 
via a series of command uplinks into a position which minimized excessive 
solar heating. Having bought some time, engineers poured over the telemetry 
data to come up with the appropriate fixes. A solar shield was taken up with 
the first launch of Skylab astronauts on 25 May. Upon reaching the station, 
Commander Charles “Pete” Conrad, Jr. and his crew (Paul J. Weitz, Pilot and 
Joseph P. Kerwin, Science Pilot) found that although metal surfaces were hot 
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to the touch, internal conditions were much better than expected. The team 
lost no time deploying the parasol heat shield which produced a rapid drop in 
temperature and a spacewalk was done to fully release the stuck solar panel. By 
the fourth day, conditions had improved dramatically to the point where the 
three were able to settle into their flight plan. (Kerwin later served as the NASA 
Headquarter’s OTDA Representative in Australia from 1982 to 1984).85
The project pushed network requirements to new heights. Skylab
and its numerous scientific activities created a flood of telemetry that threat-
ened to overwhelm the NASCOM circuits connecting the ground stations 
to Mission Control. It was the familiar problem of the difference in the data-
capturing capability of the sites (now able to receive telemetry at a rate of 
250,000 bits-per-second) and the NASCOM line transmission rates (still at a 
much slower 19,200 bits-per-second). Although 19.2 Kpbs reflected improve-
ment over the recently concluded Apollo lunar flights, ways had to be found 
to accommodate the discrepancy linking the network stations to Houston. To 
this end, GSFC network engineers designed a data compression software that 
enabled each station computer to interrogate and filter-out redundancies and 
static data that, for instance, had not changed from previous downlinks. The 
station could then pass on only new or changed (dynamic) data. The modifi-
cation worked well and was efficient in providing the MCC with all its data 
need without introducing a time lag.
Even with constant improvements like this, the network was not 
immune to occasional “glitches.” The fixes were usually simple though. On 
Skylab 2, the ship Vanguard picked up and transmitted to the crew interference 
sound bursts coming from cars and fishing boats near the port at Mar del Plata, 
Argentina. The solution on that particular day was simple: take the Vanguard
further out to sea.86
As a true testament to the value of humans in space, Skylab over-
came its somewhat inauspicious start to serve as home for three crews, each on 
progressively longer durations: 28 days for the first mission, 59 for the second 
and a then record-breaking 84 days for the third. The last group returned 
to Earth on 8 February 1974. Even though the last crew left the station in 
1974, network activities continued on Skylab until, quite literally, its last day 
in orbit. For several years after the last crew had left the station, commands 
were uplinked so as to maintain the spacecraft’s orbit in hopes of preserving it 
long enough so that one of the early Space Shuttle flights could boost it into a 
higher and more stable orbit. But when the first Shuttle mission was delayed 
into 1981, it was apparent to NASA that Skylab was not going to survive its 
slowly decaying orbit. Like it or not, Skylab was coming down.
With its fate sealed, NASA had to make sure that it would reenter 
the atmosphere without scattering debris in populated areas. Thus prior to reen-
try, the station’s drag characteristics were altered by uplinking commands that 
changed its attitude in an attempt to place the impact in the south Atlantic or 
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Indian Oceans. Skylab finally reentered on 12 July 1979, but it ended up scatter-
ing debris over Western Australia. A post-mission review of the telemetry showed 
that incorrect breakup altitude prediction, uncertainties in the ballistic coefficient 
and atmospheric density caused the impact area to shift downrange to Australia. 
The reentry demonstrated just how difficult it really is to perform a controlled 
reentry, even with good telemetry and an active command capability.87
Ed Lawless, who was the NASCOM Voice Network Manager, was 
in the Goddard Control Center when Skylab reentered. In an interview in 
1989, he recalled:  
We did a lot of special tracking to make sure we had very 
good numbers on where it would most likely reenter at the time 
it was going to happen. . . . We knew that it had come down in the 
Australia area, and we had just started taking all the circuits down. I 
had broken the circuits to NASA Headquarters and all of a sudden 
the network got a telephone call in from our switching center in 
Australia. They had a pilot on the line with a very vivid description 
of the reentry.88
Henry Iuliano, who headed Goddard’s Network Operations on 
Skylab, gave a vivid description of the pilot’s encounter: 
The pilot was 100 miles [160 kilometers] east of Perth, flying 
at 28,000 feet [8,500 meters]. He said he saw this aircraft coming 
at him [and] thought it was a new type of aircraft that looked like 
blue metallic steel. It was about 5° above the horizon slightly off to 
his left, and as it approached him, it turned from steel blue to gray. 
Then the pilot realized it was turning red, that this was the Skylab. 
It began to break up in large pieces, with a tail at least 100 miles 
[160 kilometers] long of smaller pieces behind it, and it disappeared 
behind to his right 7° below the horizon. From the looks of the 
path, he estimated that it landed about 300 miles [480 kilometers] 
in back of him somewhere near Alice Springs, and that’s exactly 
where most of the parts were found! Just before we heard the pilot’s 
report, when Skylab went by the Ascension Island tracking station, 
they were still receiving telemetry data. They gave us a reading and 
said it was in a stable condition—actually flying! Instead of tum-
bling like we thought it would, it was actually flying at 66,000 
feet [20,000 meters] and still giving good telemetry. Somewhere 
between Ascension and Carnarvon, Australia, when the pilot saw it, 
was when it began to break up.89
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East-West rivalry had led to the United States planting six flags on 
the Moon, but it also prevented and forestalled any effort for human space 
cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Without being overly 
dramatic, imagine a spacecraft stranded in orbit unable to return to Earth. Its 
crew may be injured or in peril as oxygen slowly runs out. What were the 
chances of another country sending up a rescue team to bring them home? 
Unlike today, only two countries possessed that capability in the 1970s.
At a meeting with veteran Soviet space scientist Anatoly Blagonravov 
in New York in April of 1970, NASA administrator Thomas Paine raised the 
idea of linking the Apollo and Soyuz spacecrafts on a joint mission. The idea 
interested the Soviets enough that the two countries reached an agreement on 
28 October 1970 to conduct a joint study of a US/USSR rendezvous mission. 
The official intent of such a mission was to create a space rescue capability 
that would be available to aid astronauts who might become stranded in Earth 
orbit. These discussions culminated nearly two years later on 24 May 1972 
when—with great satisfaction to the international community at large—U.S. 
President Richard M. Nixon and USSR Prime Minister Alexey N. Kosygin 
signed a space pact officially endorsing the project. This first-ever interna-
tional space mission was officially named the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, or 
ASTP, on 30 June.90
ASTP was based on a, 17-point technical agreement negotiated in 
Moscow on 4 through 6 April, 1972. This agreement highlighted the level of 
international cooperation—with clear requirements on network activities—
needed to make the project work. Joint requirements included:
1  Control of the flight of the Apollo-type spacecraft will be accom-
plished by the American Control Center and that of the Soyuz 
by the Soviet Control Center, with sufficient communication 
channels between centers for proper coordination.
2  In the course of control, decisions concerning questions affect-
ing joint elements of the flight program, including countdown 
coordination, will be made after consultation with the control 
center of the other country.
3  Joint elements of the flight will be conducted according to coor-
dinated and approved mission documentation, including contin-
gency plans.
4  In the conduct of the flight, preplanned exchanges of technical 
information and status will be performed on a scheduled basis.
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5  The host country control center or host country spacecraft
commander will have primary responsibility for deciding the 
appropriate preplanned contingency course of action for a given 
situation in the host vehicle. Each country will prepare detailed 
rules for various equipment failures requiring any of the pre-
planned contingency courses of action.
6  In situations requiring immediate response, or when out of 
contact with ground personnel, decisions will be taken by the 
commander of the host ship according to the preplanned, con-
tingency courses of action.
7  Any television downlink will be immediately transmitted to 
the other country’s control center. The capability to listen to 
the voice communications between the vehicles and the ground 
will be available to the other country’s control center on a pre-
planned basis, and upon joint consent, as further required or 
deemed desirable.
The Soviet ground network on the Apollo Soyuz Test Project consisted of seven stations 
spanning 125° in longitude across Asia and Europe. (Adapted from Map of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States from the United States Air Force, link www.af.mil/
art/index.asp?galleryID=193 [accessed 9/22/2007])
192 “Read You Loud and Clear!”
8  Both sides will continue to consider techniques for providing addi-
tional information and background to the other country’s control 
center personnel to assist in mutual understanding (including the 
placement of representatives in each others control centers).
9  As a minimum, flight crews should be trained in the other coun-
try’s language well enough to understand it and act in response as 
appropriate to establish voice communications regarding normal 
and contingency courses of action.
10  A public information plan will be developed which takes into 
account the obligation and practices of both sides.91
Apollo-Soyuz presented a new challenge to the GSFC tracking and 
communications team. The challenge was one of providing links between 
two orbiting spacecraft with two control centers with two entirely differ-
ent protocols. The mission was unique in that the NASA network had to, 
for the first time, function in coordination with a Soviet network. Each had 
its own communications protocol which now had to “talk to each other.” 
Arrangements reached between the two sides stipulated that each control cen-
ter could receive all voice and television communications transmitted to either 
spacecraft. Either crew could be contacted by voice from any station, whether 
American or Soviet.
Some 2,300 men and women at field stations and 500 at Goddard 
were assigned to the mission (more than that assigned to the later Apollo 
flights). The NASA stations that supported ASTP were a subset of the 9-meter 
USB sites that supported the lunar missions, plus a handful of STADAN sites:
Ascension (ACN)
Bermuda (BDA)
Guam (GWM)
Hawaii (HAW)
Madrid (MAD)
Newfoundland (NFL)
Orroral (ORR)
Quito (QUI)
Rosman (ROS)
Santiago (AGO)
Coverage from Orroral, Quito, Rosman and Santiago indicated 
the considerable progress that was made in the early 1970s in drawing on 
STADAN stations to assist in human spaceflight operations. In addition to 
the land stations, the venerable Vanguard was stationed off the Argentine coast 
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near Mar del Plata. Three ARIA aircraft also supported launch and reentry 
operations in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific, taking off from airbases in 
South Africa and Australia. 
The Soviet network consisted of seven stations stretched across the 
vast expanse of the USSR. In addition, the Soviets deployed two ships, the 
Korolev (ASK), positioned off Canada, and the Gagarin (KYG), near Chile. 
The Soviet stations were:
Dzhusaly, Kazakhstan (DJS)
Eupatoria, Ukraine (EUT)
Kolpashevo, Russia (KLP)
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskaya, Russia (PPK)
Tbilisi, Georgia (TBL)
Ulan-Ude, Russia (ULD)
Ussuriysk, Russia (SDK)92
It was during ASTP that a new dimension in space tracking and 
data acquisition was added. In a harbinger of things soon to come, NASA 
added for the first time, a specific space element to the network. The newly 
developed Applications Technology Satellite-6 (ATS-6), made by Fairchild, 
was used to relay communications from the orbiting spacecraft to ground sta-
tions. This increased coverage dramatically, from approximately 17 percent to 
60 percent (an increase from 15 to 52 minutes) of each 87 minute orbit.
ATS-6 was the second generation of the GSFC Applications 
Technology Satellite program. Its predecessors, ATS-1 through 5 launched 
between 1966 and 1969, was the first generation in the series. Originally 
designated ATS-F, the program had included a second, very similar satellite 
called ATS-G, but it was canceled for budgetary reasons. Eight of the experi-
ments on ATS-6 were explicitly designed for communications relay studies to 
prepare for the next generation TDRSS.
But use of ATS-6 on Apollo-Soyuz was not orginally planned. 
Bill Wood explained. “We at Goddard were very reluctant to commit the use 
of the ATS except on the basis of a test and not to meet ASTP requirements. 
This was another example of the camel’s nose in the tent. The very nature 
of the ATS was as a test program. The closer we got to launch, the more 
important it seemed to get. We wound up putting a lot of effort into putting 
equipment in Spain to interface with ATS. Thank goodness it worked, but I 
for one was nervous.”93
At nearly 1,360 kilograms (3,000 pounds) with a span of over 15 
meters (50 feet), ATS-6 was quite the imposing bird. It included a 9-meter 
(30-foot) diameter parabolic antenna, an Earth-viewing module located at the 
focus of the parabola and two solar arrays for power. Not only big, it was also 
quite complicated for its time. All the communication experiment was located 
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in a section of the Earth-viewing module with feeds for the large antenna 
mounted on top of the module and Earth-pointing ancillary antennas popu-
lating the bottom side of the satellite.94
Launched out of the Kennedy Space Center atop a Titan III-C on 
30 May 1974, GSFC had a list of performance objectives that they wanted to 
see from the satellite:
Demonstrate the feasibility of using a nine meter diameter, deploy-
able, steerable, high-gain antenna with good RF performance in the 
6.5 GHz range.
Provide spacecraft fine pointing to within ±0.1° accuracy.
Demonstrate precision interferometer attitude measuring technology.
Provide an Earth-facing, stable spacecraft at geosynchronous altitude 
for experiments to be selected by NASA Headquarters.
Originally placed in geosynchronous orbit at 94ºW over the Galapagos 
Islands, the big satellite was immediately used to test operational compatibility 
with the network ground stations. In June 1975, Goddard controllers, transmit-
ting through Rosman, commanded the satellite to 35ºE over Lake Victoria, 
Africa, to support the Indian government’s Satellite Instructional Television 
Experiment (SITE). From this vantage point, ATS-6 could also participate in 
“millimeter-wave” communication experiments with several European ground 
terminals as well as relay ASTP data to ground receiving stations.
To do this, it pointed its antenna towards the horizon and generated 
a signal for the Apollo spacecraft to lock onto as it moved into view. Upon 
establishing contact, Apollo transmitted telemetry, voice and television to the 
satellite. ATS-6 then relayed the signals to a 30-meter (100-foot) antenna at 
the Buitrago ground station outside Madrid. Madrid then acted as the ground 
terminal, relaying the spacecraft’s data via commercial Intelsat to the United 
States.95 After supporting ASTP and the one-year Indian experiment, it was 
slowly moved by a series of ground commands to the Western hemisphere 
where it was stationed at 140ºW over the Pacific until it was deactivated in 
July 1979. During its final trek as it was being repositioned in July 1976, ATS-
6 demonstrated the social benefits possible of data relay by providing tempo-
rary (and goodwill) communication services while passing over 27 countries 
on the way to its final destination. 
Engineers and scientists at Goddard conducted a series of space 
communication experiments using ATS-6 in its five year life. One of them, 
the “ATS-F Tracking and Data Relay Experiment,” designed by F. O. “Fritz” 
von Bun and exercised in conjunction with a Nimbus weather satellite, was 
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designed specifically as proof-of-concept testing for the upcoming TDRSS 
(see Chapter 7). ATS-6 also relayed television signals to remote areas of 
Alaska, the Rocky Mountains and the Appalachians. This operation, begin-
ning in August 1974, brought live, public education television programming 
to those areas of the United States for the first time.96
E E E
Although preparations leading up to ASTP broke new ground in 
terms of cooperation between the two countries, the Soviets still found it dif-
ficult to break with their veil of secrecy. On 2 December 1974, seven months 
before the scheduled launch of ASTP, Soyuz 16 was launched from the 
Baikonur Cosmodrome—completely unannounced. NASA had known that a 
dress rehearsal was coming, but only when the Soyuz spacecraft reached orbit 
did Moscow bother to inform the Americans that it was in fact already under-
way! The Agency was able to put the mission to some use through a quickly 
organized, 15-hour joint tracking exercise at the behest of the Soviet Union. 
This even included a simulated launch so that the Soyuz crew had something 
to “aim” at in a mock rendezvous. Data recorded by NASA ground stations 
were relayed to Goddard and, after the mission, compared to data received by 
Soviet stations during the same time period. This comparison merely verified 
what NASA already knew: the network was ready for the mission.97
All this took place in the Cold War. The United States had just 
pulled out of an unpopular war in Southeast Asia, one which pitted the coun-
try face-to-face against communism half a world away. It had cost 50,000 
American lives. While U.S. preparations for the mission were done in the 
open, Soviet preparations, although more open, were still for the most part 
veiled in secrecy (as Soyuz 16 so clearly illustrated). It was not surprising, then, 
that NASA went about preparations for the mission with a certain sense of 
trepidation. While international cooperation was what ASTP was all about, 
NASA kept finding itself in situations asking “How does one cooperate with-
out giving away too much from a technology standpoint.”
A case in point was the technology needed to physically dock the 
Apollo with the Soyuz. The two not only had different docking mechanisms 
but also different atmospheres inside the spacecraft (Apollo operated at a cabin 
pressure of about 0.3 atmospheres while Soyuz operated at 1 atmosphere, or 
standard sea-level). The technology imbalance led to the U.S. developing with 
help of the Soviet Union, the Docking Module, the central, critical piece of 
equipment without which the mission could not have succeeded. The Docking 
Module turned out to be purely U.S. technology in the end. Technology, 
however, was not the only thing that changed hands during preparations for 
ASTP. There was also a language barrier. While it is well known that both 
flight crews had to learn each other’s language during training, what is lesser 
196 “Read You Loud and Clear!”
known was that there were actually classes conducted in Russian at the GSFC 
to train the network engineers who would be communicating with their 
counterpart in the Soviet Union. The direction from NASA management 
was, “If we’re going to deal, we have to learn to speak the language.”98
At 1220 hour GMT, 15 July 1975, Commander Aleksei A. Leonov 
and Flight Engineer Valeri N. Kubasov blasted off aboard Soyuz 19. It was 
the first time that a Soviet space launch was seen live on television by its own 
people and others around the globe. The communication link traveled in 
a circuitous route: Moscow to Helsinki, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Prague, 
Hamburg, Frankfurt, and then to a Comsat ground station at Raisting, near 
Munich, West Germany. From there it was sent via the Comsat satellite to 
the United States. The routing was requested by the Soviets since an AT&T 
ground station planned for this flight was not finished in time. According to 
Charles J. Goodman, Goddard’s technical manager for television on ASTP, 
the routing involved some seven relay points on both the East and the West. 
It also required conversion of signals from the Russian color system protocol 
(SECAM III) to the European PAL color system and finally to American stan-
dards National Television System Committee (NTSC).99
Despite the complexity, communications never showed any notice-
able degradation. “Just about everybody broke his back to help make it hap-
pen,” Goodman remembered. “We had some 50 hours of virtually flawless 
television transmission. Our arrangements began on November 25, 1974 and 
everything was in place for the launch some eight months later.”100 Goodman 
specifically pointed out a first-rate relationship with the European Broadcast 
Union headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, and its technical personnel. Apollo-
Soyuz was seen by more people in more countries than even Apollo 11.
Seven and a half hours later, Commander Thomas P. Stafford, CM 
Pilot Vance D. Brand and Docking Module Pilot Donald K. “Deke” Slayton 
were launched atop a Saturn IB rocket from pad 39B at the Kennedy Space 
Center. After a series of orbital maneuvers—the most complex of its kind dur-
ing the Apollo era in which the American CSM chased the Soyuz—the two 
spacecraft began station keeping at 1551 hour GMT on 17 July. They docked 
24 minutes later. After Slayton and Stafford equalized the atmosphere inside 
the Docking Module with that of the Soyuz, the hatches were opened and 
the now celebrated “space handshake” between the two mission Commanders 
was televised live to the world.
Over the next two days, the crews exchanged mementos and con-
ducted (token) zero-g science experiments; a second docking was also per-
formed. They also exchanged cuisines, with the Americans offered a choice 
of hot soups from the different peoples of the USSR—Ukrainian beetroot 
and cabbage soup, a piquant Georgian mutton broth and Russian sorrel and 
spinach soup. In return, their western colleagues offered up such delicacies as 
applesauce, spaghetti, apricot pudding, and bacon squares.101 After two days, 
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the two vehicles undocked for the final time. After a fly around photography 
experiment in which the Soyuz was used to block out the Sun simulating an 
artificial solar eclipse, the two spacecraft went their separate way. Two days 
later, Leonov and Kubasov de-orbited their spacecraft, bringing it back to 
Kazakhstan on 21 July. As with the launch six days earlier, their landing and 
recovery was seen by a live television audience for the first time. Apollo stayed 
in orbit for another three and a half days, splashing down four and a half miles 
from the recovery ship New Orleans near Hawaii on the afternoon of 24 July 
to bring to an end the first international space venture and the final Apollo 
splashdown.102
Chris Kraft would reflect years later on the uniqueness of the ASTP 
experience and what each side was able to learn from the other:
Getting to know the Russian management approaches, their 
thoughts and objectives, both in a national and personal sense, 
was an extremely interesting experience. The Russians are very 
different and their motivation is certainly not the same as ours. 
Their pride is very important and their engineering skills are very 
good. They are just as smart as we are. They did a superb job 
of building parts of the machinery and in the planning. They 
needed a great deal of help from us particularly in getting the job 
done within the management confines that existed in the Soviet 
Union. Here they needed help, and they told us so. Certainly the 
Russians do not do things in a manner even closely resembling 
our approaches. They are more secretive and I am not sure that 
we really learned how they do things internally. For instance, I do 
not remember ever having seen an organizational diagram. It was 
a long and protracted process. In the beginning, I thought a joint 
project might just not be possible. There was a great lack of cred-
ibility and trust between us and our ability to communicate. But 
slowly, primarily due to the tremendous efforts Glynn S. Lunney, 
the American Technical Director for the mission and his Russian 
counterpart, Professor Konstantin Davydovich Bushuyev, their 
associates and the respective space crews, we found a way to get 
things on the right track. They deserve all the credit for this. It 
was a fantastic achievement for both sides when we finally flew 
this mission.103
The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project stood as a symbol of the Nixon-
Ford era of détente. This atmosphere of cooperation was short lived however. 
Soviet-American relations soon deteriorated, reaching a new low in 1979 
after the invasion of Afghanistan. Cooperation in space exploration turned 
tepid and would stay dormant for the next two decades. For the balance of 
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the 1970s, human spaceflight practically disappeared from the American pub-
lic’s eyes. While atmospheric Approach and Landing Tests of the developing 
Space Shuttle were conducted as the new decade approached, NASA would 
not return a person into space until 1981. In a way, Apollo Soyuz marked 
the swansong for the first era of human space presence, one driven by the 
intense rivalry between the two Cold War superpowers. How fitting then 
that this era, which began in 1961 with Alan Shepard’s 15 minute response 
to Gagarin’s flight, concluded with a handshake in space between those same 
superpowers.
NASA’s Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network stood out during this 
time to make possible this success story and America’s victory in the space race. 
The role it played led to a much deserved recognition by Congress when in 
September 1974, the House declared that 
After completing an investigation which took nearly a year, it 
[has] concluded that the Tracking and Data Acquisition Program is 
being managed and operated in an effective and efficient manner. 
The people working in the program—both government and con-
tractor, both U.S. and foreign—are doing an excellent job, and are 
to be commended for their contributions to the success of the U.S. 
space program. 
As one committee member put it, “They are the unsung heroes of the 
space program.”104
Noel W. Hinners, who retired as Director of the Goddard Space 
Flight Center in 1989, echoed this sentiment when he recalled the uniqueness 
of the time and place that was the Space Race, and how NASA’s tracking and 
communication networks met the challenge. “There was a unique contest: 
the dream of man’s quest to explore space and the harsh technical realities 
which had to be faced if these dreams were to come true. The area of space 
tracking, communications and data acquisition from orbiting satellites and 
eventually from the Moon and beyond, was an important part of this odyssey. 
A dedicated team of men and women, both in and out of government, helped 
to make these dreams a reality. They were the first generation of ‘space track-
ers’ whose electronic links tethered the spacecraft to its controllers and scien-
tists. The Goddard Space Flight Center, as a member of the NASA-industry 
team, [was] proud to have contributed to these expeditions in space.”105
CHAPTER 6
ERA OF CHANGE
NASA’s annual budget was $330 million in 1959. Just six years 
later, it had ballooned to $5.25 billion.1 Over the next seven years, however, 
even as the space agency was putting 12 men on the Moon and busy push-
ing the envelope in launching a plethora of new generation of space probes, 
science satellites and application spacecraft, it saw its funding gradually being 
cut. By 1974, it had bottomed out at $3 billion.2 In the FY 1973 NASA bud-
get hearings, Gerald M. Truszynski, Associate Administrator for the OTDA, 
announced plans by the space agency to merge the STADAN and the MSFN 
into a single, more streamlined network.
Networks were developed under a certain sense of urgency in the 
early years of the space program. The need to respond to the Soviet Union and 
to put the American space effort on the fast track sometimes took priority over 
such matters as coordination of effort and minimizing of cost. It was, after all, 
a time of pioneering work with many unknowns. By the early 1970s, while 
the major emphasis on meeting program requirements had not diminished, 
coordination of these requirements, economic efficiency, and tighter manage-
ment controls were being given a much higher priority. This fundamental 
shift to the pragmatic was felt—and felt hard—by those running its spaceflight 
tracking networks. As one NASA manager recalled, “There wasn’t as much 
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money there, wasn’t as much activity, [and we began] closing Apollo tracking 
stations, cleaning up after Apollo.”3
It was in this atmosphere of renewed fiscal awareness that NASA 
merged the two networks to form what would be called the Spaceflight 
Tracking and Data Network, or STDN. There were also other reasons besides 
budget for a network consolidation. With the decline in scheduled human 
space activities after Apollo, the argument for a separate, manned-flight net-
work became less compelling. For the engineers, technicians, managers and 
even the astronauts—the very men and women who had just put Americans 
on the Moon—there was a definite sense of let-down when it dawned on 
them that what seemed like an adventure which had just begun was now sud-
denly over. Bill Watson, the Program Executive at Headquarters who today 
oversees NASA’s Ground Network, was fresh out of school and just starting 
his career at the time. Reflecting back, Watson said: 
There was a sense of what’s next, what we should do next after 
Skylab and Apollo-Soyuz.  It was hard for guys to get excited about 
scientific, robotic satellites to the extent that they were excited 
about the manned flights. There was a large hiatus there until the 
Shuttle program came along, and . . . a lot of folks left the program 
during that gap.4
The numbers reflect this.  In 1970, the Agency’s fulltime, civilian 
workforce stood at 31,223.  By 1979, this had dropped to 22,633, a reduction 
of almost 30 percent. NASA cut its workforce by 7 percent in 1972 alone.5
Besides fiscal constraint and the rescoping of the Agency’s mission, 
there were also good technical reasons for merging the networks. Both the 
STADAN and the MSFN were growing increasingly sophisticated. The clear 
separation of crewed versus uncrewed requirements that had so differenti-
ated the two were becoming more nebulous due to the increasing number of 
high eccentricity (highly elliptical), high apogee observation satellites being 
launched. This new class of satellites had much in common from a track-
ing standpoint with an Apollo spacecraft traveling to and from the Moon. 
Meanwhile, network managers at Goddard thought that implementing the 
USB concept throughout the STADAN could serve as the common bond 
needed for a single, overarching, near-Earth network. All these factors served 
to provide Truszynski and his office with good reasons to merge the capabili-
ties of the two networks. NASA’s thinking was that, with a leaner network, 
fewer stations could actually provide a more flexible capability to support its 
upcoming workload for all near-Earth missions, both robotic and piloted.6
Network engineers understood that the existing geographical dis-
tribution of the stations could effectively be modified into a configuration that 
would be able to handle the total mix of missions which NASA at the time 
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foresaw for the latter half of the 1970s. Before this transition, there were 25 
stations (19 STADAN and 6 NASA-owned, primary MSFN sites) spread over 
five continents (see maps in Appendix 1). The continual operation and main-
tenance of so many stations were, not surprisingly, expensive and required a 
great deal of manpower.
As of the mid-1960s, satellites were carrying much more power-
ful beacons so that telemetry—and not tracking—was now the pacing item. 
Technology was also advancing such that having fewer but better instrumented 
stations was now possible. Bill Wood, at the time Chief of the Manned Flight 
Operations Division and later Associate Director for Network Operations at 
Goddard, said of the change: 
As the Apollo program began to wind-down, we realized that 
both manned and unmanned tracking functions had to be consoli-
dated. It simply became too impractical and too costly to maintain 
separate networks. . . . This was the time to change from the old to 
prepare for the future—Skylab, Apollo-Soyuz, Space Shuttle and 
the many unmanned missions also being planned.7
At the Directorate level of Goddard, the organization was reworked 
starting in January of 1971. Ozzie Covington now consolidated all network 
activities under him including the field stations, the Network Operations 
Control Center (NOCC), and communications. Under Jack Mengel were all 
the Project Operation Control Centers, data processing, and the large com-
puters at the Center.
To implement the change, Goddard made sure that several require-
ments, both new and old, were going to be met. First, the high data rate, 
real-time TT&C capability of the manned network were retained since they 
matched well with the increasingly more complex satellite requirements that 
were then coming online. Many of the satellites were, in fact, approaching the 
complexity of and taking on the characteristics of human missions in terms of 
requirements for command and control, downlink data rates, and the higher 
operating frequencies at the S-band. Foremost among this new generation 
were “mega” satellites such as the Earth Resource Technology remote sens-
ing satellite (ERTS), the High Energy Astronomy Observers (HEAO), and 
the International Ultraviolet Explorer (IUE). On the IUE, for example, the 
onboard telescope had to be moved at regular intervals by means of ground 
commands emanating from the GSFC. In general, telemetry rates were push-
ing state-of-the-art capabilities at 150,000 bits per second.8
When ERTS-A was launched on 23 July 1972, it was actually sup-
ported by the MSFN. Thus, there was an increased need in the unmanned 
spacecraft community for the type of technical capabilities which already 
existed in the MSFN. By 1974, work was well underway to modify the telem-
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Technicians check out Earth Resource Technology Satellite ERTS-A at the General 
Electric Company Astro-Space Division in Princeton, New Jersey in 1972. Launched atop 
a Delta 900 launch vehicle from Vandenberg Air Force Base in July of that year, ERTS-A
was the ﬁrst in the series of Landsat remote sensing satellites, one of the most successful 
Earth resource application programs ever. Downlinking its data to the Goddard Space 
Flight Center at a rate of 15 megabits-per-second, ERTS-A was designed to last one year 
but was not deactivated until 2 January 1978. (Photo courtesy of the United States 
Geological Survey)
Chapter 6 \ Era of Change 203
etry and command processing systems at the existing MSFN sites for compat-
ibility to support science spacecraft. At the same time, however, NASA still 
had many of the less complex spacecraft such as the old Explorer series, which 
was still returning a healthy amount of data. These were generally the smaller, 
spin-stabilized satellites which could not accommodate the newer and larger, 
high-gain, directional antennas, and therefore, still had to operate at the lower 
VHF frequencies.
With this wide spectrum of needs, NASA required the full range 
of capabilities offered by both networks. Apollo just came to an end; the time 
was right for such a merger. By the end of 1974, the number of ground stations 
(STADAN and MSFN) had dropped to 17. Two years later, it went to 15. Of 
the eight ARIA, only four were now available for NASA support, the others 
having reverted back to the Air Force full time.  Four of the five AIS were 
retired in 1969, leaving the Vanguard as the only network vessel to remain in 
service (it too retired in 1978).9 Indeed, once the transition to the newly orga-
nized STDN was complete in 1976, network operations quickly became more 
standardized. NASA began to see greater returns from the slimmer network, 
all the while reducing the manpower needed for operations, logistics, and 
most importantly, cost.
While NASA did not present the consolidation of the STADAN 
and the MSFN to Congress until 1973, phase-down activities had already 
been taking place for some time. The first round of phase outs involved the 
STADAN stations at Blossom Point, Maryland; East Grand Forks, Minnesota; 
and Woomera, Australia in 1966. This was followed by shutdown of the tem-
porary sites at Darwin and Cooby Creek in Australia; Lima, Peru (transferred 
to that country’s university); and at Mojave, California in 1969 (the remnant 
of the old San Diego Minitrack station which had moved to Goldstone). A 
year later, St. John’s, Newfoundland, on the eastern-most point of Canada, 
was shut down for good as was Fort Myers, Florida in 1972. By the time the 
STDN consolidation occurred, STADAN had, in fact, already streamlined 
down to nine stations (plus the NTTF in Greenbelt).
On the MSFN side, downsizing began soon after Apollo 11 when 
requirements for Apollo were carefully reevaluated by Headquarter’s Office 
of Manned Space Flight. With little fanfare, NASA soon began reducing the 
number of MSFN stations as well, beginning with the shutdown of Antigua 
in the South Caribbean Sea on 15 August 1970. The Agency had determined 
that limitations on launch azimuth angles for flights following Apollo 13 
would not require data from Antigua and that no increase in risk to mis-
sion success would be incurred as a result of the shutdown. In the words of a 
NASA spokesman, Antigua was simply the victim of “reduced requirements 
for NASA’s worldwide tracking system.”10
The station had a 9-meter (30-foot) USB system as its center-
piece. After Apollo 11, it was almost immediately relegated to a caretaker 
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status with the 17 Bendix employees and 11 Antiguans put on standby sta-
tus.11 Most of the equipment was transferred to other facilities in the MSFN. 
Although human spaceflight requirements for Antigua were soon deleted all 
together, the requirement to support other NASA launches out of the KSC 
still remained and the station stayed open at a reduced level. But the writing 
was on the wall. Soon thereafter, NASA pulled out of Antigua. The Air Force 
Eastern Test Range station on Antigua agreed to provide services to NASA as 
needed—on a cost reimbursable basis.12
The review board also showed that either the Corpus Christi 
Station in Texas or the Guaymas Station in Mexico could be closed. Had 
all factors basically been equal (including politics), the decision would have 
come down to fiscal considerations; that is, which one would yield the most 
cost savings. But Texas had one thing going for it that Guaymas did not.  Due 
to its desirable location to support Earth resource satellites, it was the logical 
choice to remain open. By utilizing USB equipment from Guaymas, the sta-
tion would be able to support both crewed and uncrewed programs.  Because 
of this, the decision was made to keep Texas operational and close Guaymas. 
A meeting was held in Mexico City on 16 June 1970 with Mexican space offi-
cials, the U.S. Ambassador, and Gerald Truszynski discussing plans on how 
best to phase out the station.  This was followed by a second meeting two 
months later in which it was agreed upon that NASA would remove two of 
the three major station systems for relocation to other parts of the network. 
The third system would be left in Guaymas to support Mexican space activi-
ties and programs of mutual interest to the Mexican science community and 
the United States.13
This was a good way to close a station. In addition to promoting 
goodwill between the two neighboring governments, the Mexican National 
Commission for Outer Space (CNEE) and NASA were, at the time, cooperat-
ing on two scientific projects. One was to develop a system using weather data 
acquired from U.S. satellites by using automatic picture transmission equip-
ment. The other was to develop capabilities and applications for Earth obser-
vations using advanced airborne remote sensing instruments. The two coun-
tries were also completing plans for a cooperative project involving meteo-
rological sounding rockets. After details of the agreement were ironed out, 
joint press announcements officially closing Guaymas were released by both 
governments on 12 November 1970.
By the following February, NASA’s withdrawal from the station 
was complete. This brought to an end a decade of association during which 
America blazed a pioneering trail into space. From John Glenn’s first flight 
into orbit to Apollo 11, Guaymas was there. Commenting on the legacy of 
the station, Dr. George M. Low, then Acting NASA Administrator, noted 
most fondly that the “cooperative establishment and operation of the station 
over the 10 most exciting years in space exploration stood as a tribute to the 
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friendship and understanding between the two countries.”14 In particular, he 
singled out members of the Mexico-U.S. Commission for Space Observations 
who first laid the groundwork in 1959 to make Guaymas possible, specifi-
cally recognizing: Hugh Dryden, Chris Kraft (Director of Flight Operations 
at the Manned Spacecraft Center), Ralph Cushman (Special Assistant, 
Office of the Administrator), and Dr. Eugenio Mendez Docurro (Secretary 
of Communications and Transport, Av. Universidad Xola). This was quite 
the fitting tribute to a decade which saw the sleepy little railroad town of 
Empalme, Sonora (12 miles outside the actual city of Guaymas) thrusted into 
the international space forefront to become, even today over 30 years later, a 
source of pride for the Mexican people.
As the transition took place, plans regarding which stations to keep 
and which to close could change quickly, and often did. Take Canary Island, 
for instance. In the summer of 1973, NASA Headquarters proposed a five-year 
extension to the Spanish government that the station be kept open until 1978, 
when NASA’s TDRSS was then scheduled to become operational.15 The sta-
tion seemed safe for another five years. Several requirements still needed sup-
port including telemetry reception from the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiment 
Packages that had been left on the Moon by the astronauts and the upcoming 
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project that would take place in 1975. Ironically though, 
it was this same requirement to support ASTP that ended up providing the 
impetus needed to shut down Canary Island.
This twist of fate came about due to the requirement for live tele-
vision, a critical requirement on the highly publicized ASTP. It had been 
anticipated (correctly) by NASA that this particular mission, as the first inter-
national human spaceflight between the two Cold War rivals, would draw 
worldwide interest not seen since that of Apollo 11 five years earlier. As early 
planning requirements for extensive real-time coverage were being devel-
oped ( jointly by the ASTP Program Office in Washington DC and Moscow), 
it became apparent to both that this requirement was not going to be met 
effectively using existing MSFN capabilities. Something better was needed. 
The Agency would use the ATS-6 to directly receive television signals from 
the Apollo spacecraft and then retransmit them to a ground station in Spain, 
rather than depending on the ground stations alone.
Fallout from this decision on Canary Island came quickly. On 22 
January 1975, Truszynski sent a letter to the Director General of the Madrid 
Station (of which the Canary Island station was a part of ) that NASA has 
“regretfully come to the conclusion that both near and long term data acquisi-
tion requirements do not support the continuation of the Canary Island sta-
tion and would desire to close the station as soon as possible.”16 Canary Island’s 
fate was officially sealed two days later by a notification from Truszynski 
to NASA’s Assistant Administrator for International Affairs that services on 
Canary Island were no longer needed and that the State Department was 
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requested to take appropriate actions as soon as possible to shut down the sta-
tion. Thus, Canary Island went from being a crucial land station in the eastern 
Atlantic to “not necessary” in the span of not even a single mission. In a way, 
it was a harbinger of things to come as ATS-6 tested out the new concept of 
space communications, one that would rely almost exclusively on space-based 
satellites to do the job that ground stations once did.
E E E
Soon after Apollo 11, the Guam and Hawaii stations took center 
stage in a budget fight between the Bureau of the Budget and NASA. During 
the FY 1971 budget process, the Budget Bureau notified NASA that Guam 
and Hawaii were going to be phased out and their operations transferred to 
the DOD satellite control station on their respective island. Each year, with a 
few exceptions, every department and agency of the federal government has 
to negotiate the “necessary evil” of the budget process; NASA was no excep-
tion.  While budget negotiations were an annual ritual, what the Bureau was 
telling NASA in this instance was considered by the space agency as being 
somewhat “out-of-line.” The Budget Bureau’s position was that NASA should 
shut down these stations, but that in order to “alleviate to the extent possible 
impact on mission support,” the DOD would “give the NASA manned mis-
sions highest priority in workload allocation.”17
In November 1969, Administrator Thomas Paine rejected this pro-
posal outright, making it clear that this was indeed an assumption of fait 
accompli, one not based on any DOD-NASA discussion after it was proposed 
at the start of the budget process. A paper was drafted explaining why NASA 
believed that any such consolidation would be neither operationally feasible 
nor cost effective. NASA’s viewpoint was based in part on a preliminary joint 
NASA-DOD sponsored study to evaluate the merit of consolidating the NASA 
and DOD network facilities on Guam and Hawaii. No long-term operational 
costs were identified which would have offset the substantial immediate cost 
of modifying and relocating the equipment and expansion of facilities required 
to handle the high-priority functions of both agencies. Before sending this 
paper to the Budget Bureau, Paine confirmed that “responsible officials in the 
Air Force agree with us that the conclusions of this study are still valid.”18
This did not end the matter however. Three months later, the 
Bureau of the Budget once again informed NASA that the Guam and Hawaii 
stations were to be phased out. This time, in a strongly worded letter to Robert 
P. Mayo, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Paine voiced the Agency’s 
concern that they now appeared to be under direction, without prior consul-
tation, to take an action which was operationally and economically unsound 
in the view of both NASA and the U.S. Air Force. Since he was at the time 
accompanying the Apollo 11 crew in the “Giant Leap” victory tour in the Far 
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East, Paine volunteered to change his travel plans so that he could person-
ally look into the situation at the NASA and Air Force stations in Hawaii on 
his return. In the meantime, he directed Truszynski and his office to review 
again the requirements on both islands with DOD officials. Drawing a line in 
the sand, Paine concluded his letter to Mayo in no uncertain terms, saying, 
“Unless new information is developed in my visit or in the review, I will then 
formally reopen this matter with you, and if necessary, the President.”19
Gerald M. Truszynski (far left) rose through the ranks to become NASA’s Associate
Administrator for Tracking and Data Acquisition from 1968–1978. This picture shows 
Truszynski when he was Head of the Instrumentation Division participating in the 27 January 
1953 ground breaking ceremony of the NACA High-Speed Flight Research Station (which 
became the Dryden Flight Research Center) on the northwest edge of Rogers Dry Lake in 
the Mojave Desert. Pictured with Truszynski were Joseph Vensel, Head of the Operations
Branch; Walt Williams, Head of the Station, scooping the ﬁrst shovelful of dirt; Marion Kent,
Head of Personnel; and California state ofﬁcial Arthur Samet. (NASA Image Number E-980)
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Guam and Hawaii went on to survive that year’s budget process. In 
fact, both stations went on to become among the longest-serving STDN sites, 
remaining operational for another 19 years, finally closing in 1989.
As NASA stations began to close around the globe, none was more 
of a political target than the Johannesburg Station in the Republic of South 
Africa. This was one of the few communication complexes where the DSN 
and the STADAN shared a location. Roots of the DSN go back to the late 
1950s. As the United States moved from the realm of Earth-orbiting satel-
lites to begin sending probes to the Moon and beyond, a “World Net” was 
established by the DOD’s Advanced Research Projects Office. This World 
Net formed the nucleus of what would go on to become the DSN. In order 
to maintain continuous coverage of space probes departing the planet as Earth 
rotates, three sites are needed, each situated about 120º apart. The DOD—
and later NASA—had placed the first two sites at Goldstone, California and 
Woomera, Australia. Completing the World Net was the construction of a 
third station in the country of South Africa, where a government-owned, 
4,000 acre grassland valley near the Hartebeestpoort Dam 65 kilometers (40 
miles) north of Johannesburg was provided.20 The station became operational 
in June of 1961.
To meet tracking requirements in the Southern Hemisphere, a $5 
million expansion at the Johannesburg complex was done three years later that 
brought the number of stations to three. One was run by the U.S. Air Force to 
control its satellites. Due to its obvious military nature, the station was staffed 
entirely with Americans. The other was a NASA satellite tracking station. The 
remaining site, for all intents and purposes, was part of the NASA station but 
was operated for the Smithsonian Institute, its roots dating back to the IGY and 
Minitrack.21  Unlike the Air Force, NASA staffed these two stations with South 
African workers and normally only had a U.S. liaison officer present onsite. 
Under a 1960 agreement with the space agency, the National Institute for 
Telecommunications Research, a part of South Africa’s Council for Scientific 
and Industrial Research (CSIR), had full responsibility for management of 
the station which they operated so as to meet NASA’s technical requirements. 
The station was fairly extensive. At its peak, the NASA side of Johannesburg 
employed some 280 South Africans of whom about one in five were black.22
Even as NASA began working with the South African government 
to establish stations there, the potential fallout from that country’s racial seg-
regationist policies was not lost on many in the United States. NASA was fully 
aware that an agreement with a government espousing such policies could 
become a political flashpoint. But at the same time, it could not just discard the 
technical merit of such a location.  Here’s why: for optimal coverage of inter-
planetary probes launched on trajectories from Florida, an antenna was best 
placed as far south as possible, preferably deep in the Southern Hemisphere. 
The Republic of South Africa, being on the very southern tip of the conti-
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nent, was ideal. As unfavorable as the South African political climate was, it 
was actually the most democratic and most stable government accessible to the 
United States on the continent at the time. To keep its options open, even as 
negotiations were being held with South Africa, NASA still looked at other 
locations, particularly those in southern Europe. These, in order of prefer-
ence, were Sicily, Sardinia, south Spain, and south Portugal. Headquarters 
also looked into a possible cooperative arrangement with France, which at 
the time was considering the purchase of a 26-meter (85-foot) antenna from 
the Collins Radio Company to build a ground station of its own on the 
Normandy peninsula.23
These were more than just cursory looks. Site survey teams consist-
ing of members from Headquarters and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory were 
sent to all these locations as NASA wrestled with whether or not to proceed 
with South Africa. In the end, it was decided that the geographical location, 
along with the country’s already robust scientific community and the expressed 
enthusiasm of the South Africans, best advocated putting stations there.
It did not take long for tensions to arise. Accusations centering 
on the station started to surface even back in 1962, that South Africa might 
be putting pressure on the U.S. government for NASA to adopt a segrega-
tionist policy there. This was a serious concern, so much so that Associate 
Administrator Edmond Buckley wanted an early evaluation of the matter by 
asking the State Department to look into the situation.24 Time did not assuage 
the tension between the two governments, though.  In fact, things only got 
worse. The situation came to an early head when in May 1965, the United 
States asked South Africa for permission to have a squadron of advance-planes 
from the aircraft carrier USS Independence land at airports when the ship was 
scheduled to dock at Capetown. The government granted the Americans per-
mission, provided the planes’ crews were white. Up until then, American 
planes had often landed at South Africa airports and on occasion, there had 
been mixed-race crews including blacks. However, never before had the 
South Africans explicitly asked for all-white crews.25 This caught the State 
Department totally off guard. In an attempt to clarify the meaning of the 
South African response, the United States asked if this was a condition or 
a suggestion. If it was a condition, South Africa was told it would not be 
accepted. If it was a suggestion, no guarantees could be given. With no clear 
response from the South African government and not wanting to escalate 
the already well publicized series of events, the USS Independence, in the end, 
skirted the issue by bypassing Capetown altogether.
American resolve was further tested just a month later when, for 
the first time, pressure to actually shut down the station officially came from 
the South African government. This time, Premier Hendrik F. Verwoerd 
announced in a press release that he had told the United States it cannot 
employ “negro scientists in the South African stations,” and that his govern-
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ment “would not admit American negroes if they were assigned to work at the 
tracking stations.”26 Verwoerd’s comments on the tracking station staff seemed 
to most observers at the time to have been a condition, deliberately made, so 
as to provoke an American response. An opinion editorial came out that same 
week in the South African Sunday Times declaring that the United States would 
have to decide whether it can “afford morally” to overlook Dr. Verwoerd’s 
remarks. The irony was that just three years earlier when South Africa’s role in 
NASA’s tracking network was being heralded, the same newspaper headlined 
“South Africa has Important Part in U.S. Moon-Shot.”27
On the other side of the Atlantic, the station became a major target 
of blacks and liberal politicians who protested that the United States should 
not be putting money into a country with whose racial policies we do not 
agree. Into the 1970s, numerous congressional inquiries and hearings before the 
House Subcommittee on Aeronautics and Space Technology were conducted. 
Led mainly by prominent liberal members of the Democratic Party, these hear-
ings aimed to determine just what exactly NASA was doing in South Africa. To 
that end, they looked at what the United States was doing to improve the work-
ing and living conditions and opportunities for black South Africans employed 
at Johannesburg. NASA administrators from Headquarters also answered ques-
tions before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding the specific 
racial breakdown of employees, salary breakdown by race, wage practices, and 
NASA’s hiring practices of Black Africans. (The irony was that NASA did not 
do any hiring in South Africa.  CSIR hired African employees from an agricul-
tural group resident in the area of the station while whites were hired through 
normal CSIR employment channels for technical assignment.)28
As hearings progressed through the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, 
the issue intensified to the point where heightened scrutiny was placed on 
even the smallest of details, such as educational assistance, Christmas bonuses 
paid to whites versus negros, eating facilities and provisions for medical ser-
vices. On one side of the aisle, members of the House Congressional Black 
Caucus, led by Representative Charles B. Rangel of New York, viewed the 
station as an egregious symbol of American acquiescence to apartheid. Others 
in Congress, led by Representative Olin E. Teague of Texas, Chairman of the 
House Space Committee, argued that the station was really South African, 
not American, since NASA did not employ any Americans in South Africa. 
Information gathered by NASA at the behest of Representative Charles C. 
Diggs of Michigan showed that, whereas blacks held about 25 percent of the 
jobs at the station, they received only about 5 percent of the wages paid by 
NASA through CSIR. In 1972, after returning from a visit to the site, Diggs 
reported that black employees were barred not only from the station cafete-
ria but from most of the technical and all of the supervisory jobs and from 
the technical training programs. Representative Rangel charged that gross 
disparities existed between fringe benefits given to white and black employ-
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ees, benefits such as sick leave, vacation time, and medical benefits. To sup-
port his case, Rangel presented numbers showing that the highest paid black 
employee—a “skilled laboratory assistant”—earned $2,005 per year, just 
barely more than the lowest paid white employee—a “raw trainee”—who 
earned $1,930 a year.29
Even when there was good news for NASA regarding South Africa, 
it was tainted by what could only be called handwriting on the wall. In May 
of 1973, a House bill that would have cut $3 million of NASA funding for sta-
tions in South Africa was defeated. However, in defeat, more votes than ever 
before (104 to 294) were rallied. That same month, Massachusetts Senator 
Edward M. Kennedy introduced an amendment to cut off funds for the station, 
an amendment he later withdrew but only after the Senate Space Committee’s 
new chairman, Utah’s Frank E. Moss, promised to look fully into the mat-
ter in the fall session. According to Moss, the unconditional shutdown of the 
station would have meant that another station would have to immediately be 
established elsewhere. If this had to be done, the replacement cost would have 
amounted to around $35 million, something that would have been difficult to 
justify on the bill that late in the budget process.30
Throughout this debate, NASA consistently countered that local 
improvement programs which accompanied the stations were in fact making a 
difference. For example, the United States was, at the time, providing approx-
imately $109,000 a year (1973 dollars) on improvement programs for the black 
station community. Among them was the building of houses for the African 
staff, at the rate of one completed every two months, and the construction of 
an elementary school. By 1974, 18 new houses had been constructed plus the 
school. Under the agreement between NASA and CSIR, the South Africans 
provided the initial construction funds which were then reimbursed by the 
United States upon completion. NASA also operated a small medical facility 
onsite, the services of which were made available to the Black African staff and 
their families. Although it was only staffed part time—a nurse was on duty 
three days a week and a doctor visited once a week—it was, nevertheless, one 
of the very few modern medical facilities in the Hartebeestpoort area that pro-
vided services to the black community, and as such, was well used. However, 
station critics in Congress regarded these improvements as merely cosmetic, 
noting that South Africa seemed not to think the station important enough to 
its own interests to justify making exceptions to the rules of apartheid. “The 
system is so unyielding,” said an aide to Charles Rangel, “that if the U.S. had 
forced the point, South Africa would have just kicked the station out.”31
As things turned out, Senator Kennedy did not have to wait until the 
fall session. After more than a decade of defending the station, on 10 July 1973, 
Administrator James C. Fletcher announced that it would begin pulling out of 
South Africa the following summer and would withdraw U.S. support entirely 
by late 1975. The phase-out would be done in two stages, starting first with the 
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DSN side in June of 1974 followed by the STADAN side after completion of 
the near-Earth phase of the Viking Mars missions.32 The decision to phase out 
Johannesburg did not, however, signal the immediate cessation of all NASA 
activities in South Africa, just its tracking stations. Meteorological data collec-
tion as part of NASA’s worldwide program to conduct high altitude air sam-
pling in all hemispheres continued. Data analysis for the LANDSAT-2 satellite 
(in which the U.S. was one of roughly 50 countries involved) and lunar sample 
analysis continued for years thereafter, some even to this day.
As NASA pulled out of Johannesburg—and other stations for that 
matter—what to do with the equipment and hardware usually came down to 
two options: 1); Remove all or part of it at the Agency’s own expense, with the 
implied, parallel responsibility to restore the site to its original condition; or 2); 
Dispose of the property, all or part of it, within the host country in accordance 
with arrangements agreed to beforehand by the two governments. In South 
Africa, the cost to dismantle the Deep Space portion (DSS-51) would have 
amounted to $643,500 with an additional storage cost of $11,060 (1975 dol-
lars).33 Based on this estimate, NASA determined that its real property interests 
at the tracking station constituted foreign excess property which had essentially 
no commercial value. Eventually, it was concluded to be in the best interest of 
the U.S. government to either donate or abandon in place the property to the 
South Africans.  In doing so, it was mutually understood that the assets would 
be relinquished with the provision that no further U.S. obligation or liability 
remained. NASA, in essence, washed its hands of South Africa.34
Nevertheless, finger-pointing continued. Noting that the Agency 
had previously closed down two similar tracking stations in just the past 
year—Fort Myers, Florida, and Woomera, Australia—the Agency said that 
the South Africa decision was based entirely on technical requirements and 
was in no way a response to political pressure. Critics in Congress disagreed. 
“Frankly,” said a spokesman for Senator Moss, “I think they just saw the 
handwriting on the wall, the message being that the station was becoming an 
embarrassment.” Moss himself later released a statement praising NASA for its 
decision to pull out, adding “Apartheid has always been repugnant to me.”35
In reality, NASA began planning phase out activities for the sta-
tion as early as 1971. Its official position was that there would be an absence 
of requirements for long-period, near-Earth, Southern Hemisphere coverage 
after Viking left for Mars in 1975. Following that, deep space requirements 
could be handled by the DSN stations at Canberra, Goldstone, and Madrid. 
With this plan in mind, discussions were held with CSIR in August of that 
year to give them as much time as possible to work out staffing plans. A con-
cern at the time for both countries’ space programs was to not just abandon 
the station but rather, retain enough competent staff through the transition 
period as it moved from being a jointly sponsored site to one that was fully 
South African.
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In the phase out discussions with CSIR, the fate and future of the 
Black African staff were, in fact, discussed at length, down to the number of 
Black Africans which might remain employed after NASA relinquished fund-
ing. There was particular concern on NASA’s part that Black African staff 
would be declared “redundant” and whether they would be treated equitably 
relative to the white staff. At Headquarters, Gerald Truszynski, in his discus-
sions with Dr. Frank Hewitt of CSIR, felt that the South Africans appreciated 
the American position, with Hewitt saying he “reflected a genuine concern 
for the future of this group.”36
A legacy of these discussions was that it led the South Africans to 
implement several policy changes with regards to Black station staff members. 
One had to do with the pension they were receiving. At the time, the African 
staff members were covered by a different benefits plan that was generally (and 
obviously) inferior to that of the white staff. This “Provident Fund Plan” was 
soon changed so that the same formula was used in calculating the pension for 
all staff members. In addition, after these changes were made, CSIR allowed 
the Black African staff who were declared “redundant” to, where appropriate, 
continue occupying their houses, thereby enabling them to look for other 
employment before moving their families off the station site. Arrangements 
were also made for CSIR to provide a vigorous outplacement service and 
reemployment counseling. On the other hand, the one service which the 
South Africans did not continue after NASA ceased its funding was the sec-
ondary school bursary program which the Agency had started. CSIR deemed 
this to be outside of their normal responsibility and charter as they had many 
Blacks employed in their agency’s other activities who were not receiving any 
educational assistance.
In the end, two-thirds of the Black staff (39 out of 59) were released 
after NASA pulled out of Johannesburg.37
E E E
As a principal site in the Southern Hemisphere, Tananarive (TAN) 
had been busy, supporting a host of science satellites as well as all the Gemini, 
Apollo and Skylab missions. The routine began to change in 1972 when the 
Malagasy government underwent a series of political upheavals. In May of 
that year, the president of the ruling Social Democratic Party, which had been 
in power since Madagascar first gained independence from France in 1960, 
resigned under political pressure. The unrest continued over the next three 
years, culminating with the brutal assassination of the military dictator which 
put the country under martial law in February of 1975. Before long, a new 
Marxist regime was formed under the leadership of a 38-year-old revolution-
ary named Didier Ratsiraka. Under President Ratsiraka, known in the region 
as the “Red Admiral,” the government became highly centralized and com-
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mitted to revolutionary socialistic ideals. (These policies did not change until 
the 1990s only after the formation of new political parties.)
One of the first foreign policy changes that Ratsiraka made was to 
impose a rent on the United States for operating a NASA ground station in 
his country. In the original memorandum 20 years earlier which both coun-
tries signed establishing a site near Majunga, it was agreed upon that there 
would be no exchange of funds and no rent exacted for use of land. But now, 
Ratsiraka was demanding $1 million per year, retroactive to 1963 on back taxes. 
This was a demand that the United States obviously could not agree to.
Negotiations were conducted but to no avail. A few weeks later, the 
Supreme Council of Revolution of the Malagasy Republic forced the station 
closed. This action came upon NASA unexpectedly. During that time, GSFC 
was still improving on the station and in the process of adding a Unified S-band 
antenna. Under the guise of avoiding “possible maneuvers of sabotage,” President 
Ratsiraka immediately placed it under military control. The Station Director 
and Bendix workers with their families were allowed to evacuate, but all equip-
ment had to be left behind. At the time of closure, there were the two Goddard 
appointed NASA employees and 50 Bendix workers, along with their depen-
dents—148 rather apprehensive Americans total—at the station.38
With the abrupt shut down, Goddard had to make some quick 
changes in order that support for Apollo-Soyuz, which was to launch the 
very next day, would not be disrupted. They improvised by tasking the geo-
synchronous ATS-6 to serve as a data link. Workload from other satellites 
was shifted to other stations. ARIA instrumentation aircraft and the Vanguard
were repositioned to help support other launch activities out of the Eastern 
and Western Test Ranges. These changes resulted in some temporary sched-
uling problems but otherwise proved adequate and Apollo-Soyuz went on to 
be an unparalleled success.
Over the course of the next five years, the Malagasy government 
periodically allowed NASA back into the country to remove equipment. On 
3 April 1980, the last of the remaining hardware that NASA still wanted was 
removed from Tananarive. By diplomatic note, the remaining U.S. property 
was turned over to Madagascar the next day. This note, which was actually 
received by the U.S. Embassy the previous October, expressed essentially an 
agreement on the list of equipment NASA would remove and the monetary 
settlement. The removal process, in effect, was the final act that brought to 
an end five years of negotiations by the State Department to repatriate NASA 
equipment following the forced closure of the station.39 Besides the stress and 
disruption experienced by the staff and their families, the closure also had an 
effect on NASA in terms of operating cost. After Tananarive was shut down, 
the Vanguard was called on to fulfill some of its requirements. In the mid-
1970s, the annual cost to operate a tracking ship was quite high, about $6 
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million per year. By contrast, a land station like Tananarive cost around $2.8 
million, or less than half that of a ship.40
E E E
One of the first actions in the reorganization for STDN took place 
at the Goddard Space Flight Center where management of both networks was 
consolidated as early as May of 1971. Two new directorates, the Mission and 
Data Operations (M&DO) Directorate and the Networks Directorate (ND), 
replaced the Tracking and Data Systems (T&DS) and Manned Flight Support 
(MFS) Directorates. In this new arrangement, divisions within the M&DO 
managed the data processing activities and the computing requirements of 
the network. The ND became responsible for operation of all the STDN 
elements, from NASCOM to the ground stations and the satellites. In a har-
binger of things to come in the 1990s, it was at this time that the Networks 
Directorate formed the Network Office for International Operations, which 
allowed GSFC to start handling some of the foreign policy work that up 
until then had rested exclusively in the domain of NASA Headquarters in 
Washington, DC. This move seemingly made sense at the time, coinciding 
with preparations for Apollo-Soyuz which demanded a lot of technical inter-
action with Soviet Union network engineers at the working level.
Although STDN was considered a new network (or at least a 
greatly retooled old network), much of the way in which it was run continued 
as before, including usage of acronyms—a well known hallmark of NASA. 
The MCC in Houston continued to serve as the focal point during human 
space missions with the responsibility of directing all ground stations when a 
flight was in progress. Meanwhile, the NOCC (Network Operations Control 
Center) in Greenbelt continued in its role of controlling the network includ-
ing overseeing all network preparations leading up to the launch of a human 
space mission. 
In this capacity, NOCC engineers monitored console displays and 
established direct voice links amongst all the mission elements such as the 
launch site at the Cape, the network ground stations and the appropriate Proj-
ect Operations Control Center (POCC). These POCCs that began emerg-
ing during the previous decade were essentially individual operation con-
trol centers at the GSFC that were built to specifically control certain types 
of satellites such as the Applications Technology Satellite (ATSOCC) or the 
Orbital Astronomical Observatory (OAOOCC). Not to be left out were the 
multimission “umbrella” centers such as the Multisatellite Operations Control 
Center (MSOCC) and the Mission Operations Control Center (MISSOC) 
that scheduled network support for all classes of satellites and assigned each 
station a weekly list of satellites that were to be monitored.
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To accommodate the data downlink from the new generation 
of satellites that were now nothing short of orbiting laboratories, Goddard 
enhanced the STDN with increasing centralized capabilities. A typical change 
was the greater reliance on electronic data transfer methods in the late 1970s 
with the implementation of systems such as the Telemetry Online Processing 
System (TELOPS), that eliminated the need to ship magnetic tapes from the 
field stations. Raw data was, instead, transmitted over communication lines to 
a dedicated storage system at GSFC.
The POCC themselves also continued to acquire improved tech-
nology, permitting scientists stationed at Goddard to manipulate the orbits 
and attitudes of satellites with greater ease. Take for example, as a progenitor 
of touch-screen technology, a scientist seated at the IUE Operations Center. 
This person could, by simply pointing a light-pen at a specified portion of a 
video display, swing the IUE telescope around to look at another part of the 
The Goddard Space Flight Center has been home to many Project Operations Control 
Centers over the years. Shown here is the Space Telescope Operations Center where 
commands to the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) originate and where its systems are 
monitored. The picture was taken in December 1999 as engineers monitored activities 
during the telescope’s third repair mission. Today, command and control of the HST is 
done mostly from the Space Telescope Science Institute in nearby Baltimore.(Image 
courtesy of NASA, available at http://hubblesite.org/gallery/spacecraft/01/)
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sky. In a move exemplifying NASA’s continual effort to obtain ever better 
quality videos, scientists supporting Earth resource and remote sensing satel-
lites also received a special Image Processing Facility (IPF) at Goddard that 
provided video and pictures that were continuously corrected for distortions 
introduced by spacecraft equipment or during transmission—a progenitor to 
today’s high definition television transmissions.41
Stations reported back each week to the MISSOC on the perfor-
mance of their satellite coverage. To measure performance, matrices were 
set up and grades given on how well stations were doing their jobs, whether 
excellent, good or poor. The success rate for each station was measured by 
how many passes were supported and how much low bit-error data was cap-
tured. This was then compared to how much could have been or should have been
captured. The focus was primarily on the amount of data captured on satellite 
passes and not on cost of operations. This may not have been the best way to 
gauge how well a station did. Former Quito Station Director Charles Force 
said, “I thought at the time that was a mistake. You need to have some kind of 
a balance between how much you are spending and how well you are doing 
the job. But it was totally focused on how well the job was being done.”42
The system was also not without its flaws. Force remembered an 
example that always puzzled him: 
It was my first exposure to performance evaluation using a 
matrix and what I learned from that personally, was that you have 
to be very certain the matrix measures what you want. One exam-
ple I remember. If a satellite came over the horizon and the station 
was tracking it and the receiver failed, and they start losing data, 
they would then be scored down so [that] if they got the receiver 
up before the end of the pass and covered the balance of the pass, 
they got a lower score than if they didn’t get the receiver back up. 
In other words, the station would actually get penalized if it suc-
cessfully recovered from the receiver failure than if it hadn’t. “That was the 
system,” said Force. “That was idiotic why it was set up that way. I have no 
idea because I was not in on the early days of the STADAN.”43
While the original STADAN side of the house relied on these met-
rics to grade the performance of its stations, no such matrix was used on the 
MSFN side of the house. This apparent dichotomy in the way the two net-
works operated prior to their merger can, in large part, be traced back to the 
way the two networks came about—and the competition that followed. For 
years, while both the STADAN and the MSFN were run by Goddard, they 
were separate, up through the directorate level. Specifically, “Code 800” ran 
the MSFN while “Code 500” ran the STADAN.
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From the onset, there were cultural differences, and with it, fric-
tion. Some would go so far as to call it jealousy. While Code 500 dated back 
to Jack Mengel and the team that created Minitrack, Code 800’s heritage was 
basically an offshoot of Langley—a lot of the people actually came over to 
Goddard from Langley. Because of this, the two networks had different heri-
tages and different cultures in everything from the way they operated to how 
people were used in the field. STADAN stations, for example, were generally 
more “remote” in the way they operated in the sense that data was gathered 
and sent back to Goddard where it was then assimilated and processed. Thus, 
there was a lot of effort by technicians and engineers physically at GSFC run-
ning the computers. Unlike today where desktop and notebook computers can 
be found in every office, this way of centralization made sense at a time when 
mainframe computers were required to do the massive calculations. These 
mainframes were expensive, to put it mildly, and required a fair amount of 
maintenance. Therefore, the STADAN had a lot higher percentage of its tech-
nical expertise stationed at Goddard in proportion to the field. This was exactly 
the opposite of the MSFN, that had more computational capability in the field 
and, therefore, had more of its share of expertise assigned to the field.
There has been the conception throughout the years that by nature 
of its mission, the MSFN was somehow more glamorous and had a higher 
profile (public exposure) than the STADAN, and therefore, got more atten-
tion and resources. This was, in all likelihood, exactly what happened. It was 
an undeniable fact that the MSFN received more attention than the STADAN 
in the one area where it most mattered: funding. In 1968, for example, two-
thirds of the budget for Goddard’s tracking operations went to the MFSN 
whereas one-third went to the STADAN.44
It’s been said that where the money lies, so lies the priority. This 
apparent inequity was well recognized and unfortunately, resented within the 
STADAN system. An “us-and-them” attitude developed in many circles. As 
Force put it, “They didn’t talk to each other that much.”45 The presence of this 
“sibling rivalry” is probably not too surprising considering the diversity of the 
people and their talent that was (and is) the Goddard family.
The years have shown that while such differences and strong feel-
ings existed, they were worked out and the STDN moved on. The network 
that came out of it was a far better and more efficient network than before. 
Force would later say compellingly of the big picture, “The people did work 
together [and] the job was done successfully. There were an awful lot of good 
people that did work together and there was an awful lot done right and suc-
cessful.”46 Indeed, the ensuing three decades have proven that.
By 1975, the merging of STADAN and MSFN was complete. Table 
6-1 is a glance of the reorganized network in the mid-1970s.
Over time, these sites adjusted to the changing demands of the 
integrated network to support tracking of both human spaceflight missions 
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and applications satellites. From a purely technical standpoint, the augmen-
tation of former STADAN stations with Unified S-band hardware was the 
biggest single improvement that NASA took to provide a common capabil-
ity across the STDN stations. By the mid-1970s, this had been done at the 
Goldstone Apollo site (1972), Fairbanks (1974), Orroral Valley (1974), and 
Santiago (1974).
E E E
How busy a station was depended on how many spacecraft it was 
assigned to track. It was not necessarily true that the largest and best-equipped 
stations were the busiest. It all depended on where a particular ground station 
was located. For example, it may not be surprising that Fairbanks, Rosman, 
A “Spanish Watchman” on the hills overlooking NASA’s Madrid Spaceﬂight Tracking and 
Data Network Station and its prominent 26 meter (85 foot) Uniﬁed S-band antenna. The 
station at Fresnedillas, some 50 kilometers(30 miles) west of the city of Madrid, was the 
NASA ground station that tracked Eagle to the lunar surface on the historic ﬂight of 
Apollo 11. The station was phased out and transferred to the nearby Deep Space 
Network site at Robledo in 1985. (Photo courtesy of Larry Haug and Colin Mackellar.)
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Canberra, and Goldstone—all home to one or more 26-meter (85-foot) 
antenna—were normally on four-shift, 24/7 operations. Contrast that with 
the Madrid Station at Fresnedillas. It was also among the best-equipped sta-
tions in the network boasting its own 26-meter system, but it only oper-
ated on a two-shift basis. Moreover, older stations like Quito, Santiago, and 
Winkfield—which could all trace their roots back to the old Minitrack days—
still operated on four shifts, even well into the 1970s. 
This variation in scheduling of workload had everything to do with 
the numbers and types of Earth science satellites that a station was called on to 
monitor. When one talked about the largest number of different satellites that 
a given station supported, Johannesburg and Orroral immediately came to 
mind. Each monitored 30 or more satellites in the mid-1970s. Fairbanks and 
Winkfield were not far behind at 24 and 22, respectively. Overall, NASA’s 
STDN provided coverage to some 50 different satellites in the 1970s.48 In 
December 1975, the GSFC made a familiar move by awarding Bendix a two 
year, $104 million contract—with provisions for three additional one-year 
extensions—to continue its role as the prime operator of the network into the 
decade of the 80s and the age of the Space Shuttle.49
Even though American human space presence clearly saw a period 
of quiescence in the mid to late 1970s, science and application satellite activi-
ties continued to flourish. One area of research in which Goddard satellites 
and the STDN played a leading role was in tectonics—the study of the struc-
tural deformation of Earth’s crust. On 4 May 1976, LAGEOS 1−the LAser 
GEOdynamics Satellite−was launched on a 50-year, high inclination Earth- 
orbit mission to study the geophysical behavior of our planet. The idea behind 
the mission was that long term data received from the satellite could be used 
to monitor the motion of Earth’s tectonic plates, for example, and to measure 
the gravitational field and nutation (wobble) in the axis of rotation.50
In this activity, the exact position of the STDN on the surface of 
Earth was itself a piece of scientific data. Most tracking is done under the pre-
sumption that the location of the ground station is known and that tracking 
determines where the satellite is with respect to the ground station. In laser 
tectonics, the logic is reversed: the location of the satellite is known. What 
is desired is the exact location of the ground station. The LAGEOS satel-
lites, covered with tiny “retroflectors,” reflect laser beams transmitted from 
various ground stations. Covering the two-foot spherical satellite were 426 
cube-corner reflectors made of fused silica glass and the heat tolerant element 
of germanium. By measuring the time between transmission of the beam 
and reception of the reflected signal from the satellite, stations on Earth can 
thus precisely measure the distance between themselves and the satellite. The 
accuracy obtained is extremely high, with distance measurements correct to 
within one to three centimeters, or about an inch.51
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To return the laser data to Earth, Goddard Space Flight Center 
came up with the Goddard Laser Tracking Network, or GLTN, in 1975. The 
GLTN functioned as somewhat of a “mini network,” same as the STDN but 
using laser instead of radio frequency signals—essentially an optical system. A 
laser at a GLTN station would emit a beam to the satellite which would then 
be reflected and returned to the station. The interval between the start of the 
transmission and the receipt of the return signal was recorded at the GTLN 
station and multiplied by the speed of light to obtain the precise distance 
between the station and the satellite. In this way, ever subtle changes over time 
in the satellite-to-station distance painted a picture of motion in Earth’s tec-
tonic plates. As a result, significant information concerning fault line move-
ments and the dynamics of earthquakes, for example, could be deduced.
Because of tectonic science requirements, the design of GLTN sta-
tions also had to emphasize mobility. During the 1970s, most of these sites 
were configured into Mobile Laser Ranging Systems (MOBLAS), with each 
MOBLAS housing the required hardware in three instrumentation vans. By 
the end of the decade, the pace of laser ranging activities had picked up to 
where MOBLAS units had been deployed to diverse locations such as Bear 
Lake, Utah; Quincy and San Diego, California; and places in Australia and 
around the Pacific and Indian Oceans. A fixed site, meanwhile, operated on 
the grounds of Goddard in Greenbelt, Maryland. Like its STDN counterpart 
the Network Training and Test Facility, this fixed station essentially acted 
as a test site for development of additional MOBLAS units. To achieve even 
more mobility, Goddard engineers soon developed a second generation sys-
tem called the Transportable Laser Ranging System, or TLRS. Instead of 
large instrumentation vans, the TLRS consisted of relatively small, box-like 
transportable units that were readily borne by trucks and aircraft. Their per-
formance was even better than that of the MOBLAS. By 1990, these laser 
tracking systems had achieved astonishing ranging accuracies, down to the 
sub-centimeter level, a must for measuring the slow and virtually indiscern-
ible movement of Earth’s crust over time. The work continues today with the 
MOBLAS and the TLRS terminals still operating at Goddard. 52
E E E
In 1977, the NASA began a series of low altitude, atmospheric glide 
tests of the Space Shuttle. These Approach and Landing Tests (ALT) took 
place at the Dryden Flight Research Center near Edwards Air Force Base, 
California from February through November. The ALT was the first step in 
the flight qualification of the Shuttle Orbiter, verifying its flight worthiness 
as it glided to a landing after returning from orbit. Testing began with three 
ground taxi runs of the Shuttle Enterprise mounted atop a Boeing 747 Shuttle 
Carrier Aircraft—a highly modified Boeing 747-100—to determine loads, 
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control characteristics, steering and braking of the mated vehicles. This was 
followed by eight so-called “captive-flights” of the Enterprise (five uncrewed, 
the last three crewed) attached to the 747 to evaluate the structural integrity 
and aerodynamic performance of the mated pair in the air. Five free-flights of 
the Orbiter concluded the test program.
To support the ALT, Goddard set up a special mobile telemetry sta-
tion in 1975 at Buckhorn Lake (a dry lake) on a hill overlooking the landing 
strip. Buckhorn (BUC) was a fairly simple ground station, with transportable 
equipment consisting of two 4.3-meter (14-foot) antennas and C-band radar, 
equipment in part used previously at Grand Bahama during Apollo. Trailers 
housed UHF air-to-ground voice and S-band telemetry equipment. After 
supporting the ALT and seven Shuttle orbital missions, Buckhorn was closed-
out in 1983 following the STS-8 night landing. One of its 4.3-meter antennas 
was permanently transferred to the nearby Dryden Flight Research Facility 
while the other hardware was put back into the STDN equipment pool.
Three and a half years after ALT ended, the STDN tracked the 
first Space Shuttle into orbit. After a six year hiatus, America finally returned 
to space, this time ushering in a new era in space transportation with the 
launch of the Shuttle Columbia on STS-1 the morning of 12 April 1981. As 
Commander John W. Young and Pilot Robert L. Crippen lifted off from 
pad 39A at the KSC, long-time Flight Director Christopher Kraft called it 
the most tense moment in all his years at Mission Control. Never before had 
NASA flown a crew on the very first launch attempt of a new rocket. Boosted 
by the largest solid rocket motors ever made, the entire Shuttle stack cleared 
the launch tower within seconds, a surprise to those at Mission Control who 
remembered the painstakingly slow liftoff of the mammoth Saturn V just a 
decade earlier.
The 2,500 men and women of Goddard’s STDN had prepared six 
years for the launch.53 Even though in the eyes of the public, little activity 
had come from the space agency since the mid-1970s, it was quite a different 
story behind the scenes. Much had improved. Station equipment had been 
upgraded to accommodate the new multi-channel S- and Ku-band commu-
nication system of the Shuttle. Telemetry rates from tracking stations had 
increased to 128,000 bits per second (128 kbps) in real time versus the 14 to 21 
kbps of the 1960s. Telemetry streams were transmitted to the JSC in real time 
on three 56 kbps circuits.54 A key communication change was the implementa-
tion of S-band air-to-ground voice circuits in addition to UHF radio capabil-
ity. The Shuttle continued to use the UHF air-to-ground voice system but 
the USB system of tracking, telemetry, and command developed for Apollo 
was now expanded to include two-way voice. This required the development 
and installation of equipment to digitize and multiplex voice on the command 
channel and de-multiplex voice from the telemetry channel. Voice was now 
multiplexed with commands for uplink and downlinked with telemetry. The 
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links were then de-multiplexed, converted to analog voice and redirected to 
the MCC in Houston. The more than two million circuit miles of NASCOM 
lines continued to be upgraded, relying on domestic and international land 
lines, submarine cables, commercial satellites, and microwave radio systems 
(not unlike relaying of cell phone signals today) to interconnect the overseas 
stations with the launch facility at Kennedy and the MCC in Houston.55
In contrast to earlier human space missions when the need for voice 
contacts steadily declined, the Space Shuttle program imposed a goal of 30 
percent voice contact on each orbit to monitor things like critical ascent and 
reentry events, payload delivery tasks and on-orbit crew science activities. 
Studies done in the late 1970s, however, showed the STDN could provide 
voice support for only about 23 percent of the time. Gaps in voice coverage 
had to be addressed.  As with earlier renditions of the network, international 
cooperation once again held the key. 
The Dakar Station in Senegal on the western most point of the African continent looking 
towards the Atlantic was an ideal location to track the Shuttle’s ascent into orbit on east-
ern launch azimuths. The arid setting was typical of west Africa as were the facilities. 
Clearly visible are the 4.2-meter (14-foot) USB antenna on the right and the quad-helix 
command antenna on the left. During Shuttle missions, DKR was staffed by about a 
dozen NASA contractors and Senegal workers. (Photo courtesy of Gary Schulz)
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Discussions and diplomatic negotiations resulted in new stations 
at several important locations, each equipped with UHF air-to-ground 
voice systems to fill coverage gaps. As B. Harry McKeehan, former Chief of 
International Operations at Goddard who spearheaded many of these talks 
put it, “These countries gave us their full support,” even in places such as 
Pakistan, where NASA operated a Landsat station near the industry center of 
Rawalpindi.56 In June 1982, a station was added in Dakar (DKR), Senegal—the 
western most point of Africa—to support the Shuttle’s Orbital Maneuvering 
System first burn (OMS-1), a critical event in the ascent to orbit timeline 
where a decision as whether or not to continue onto orbit or to initiate the 
Abort-Once-Around (AOA) sequence had to be made. DKR also provided an 
additional contact point for each orbit once the Shuttle was safely in orbit. In 
addition, Dakar served as the early Transatlantic Abort (TAL) landing site.
Also established in Africa was the Botswana Station (BOT) at 
Gaborone. Also called Kgale, it was added in 1981 primarily to cover the 
OMS-2 circularization burn. Since the Johannesburg Station was closed-out 
in 1975, Botswana assumed many of the functions formerly handled by the 
South Africa station. In the archipelagos of Seychelles, NASA called on the Air 
Force, tasking their 18-meter (60-foot) antenna to serve as the Indian Ocean 
Station (IOS) some 1,100 kilometers (700 miles) northeast of the Madagascar 
coastline.57 Yarragadee (YAR) in Western Australia, was added in 1980—just 
prior to the launch of STS-1—to provide coverage for the Shuttle’s deorbit 
burn and reentry.58
Rounding out the changes to the STDN required for Shuttle sup-
port was a 4.3-meter (14-foot) antenna atop the 1,980-meter (6,500-foot) Tula 
Peak (TULA) in 1979. Situated on the grounds of Holloman Air Force Base 
just outside the gates of White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, TULA 
alleviated the approximate, 10-minute communications gap during each 
Shuttle orbit over the southern United States.59
By July of 1982, the STDN reached its zenith in terms of the 
number of ground stations (20 stations). For Shuttle support, it had acquired 
new outposts in the United States, Africa, the Indian Ocean and Australia. 
Network engineers had greatly enhanced its capabilities by incorporating the 
latest data processing and transmission innovations of the 1970s. The result 
was an unprecedented network with 10-fold increase in telemetry and data 
handling capacity over that of Apollo just a decade ago.
Despite the tide of innovation and streamlining that went into the 
leaner and more efficient STDN of the 1980s, NASA could not totally off-
set the rising cost of station operations. The network remained manpower 
intensive. This made operations highly susceptible to inflation, not only in 
the U.S., but even more so overseas, where the impact of wage escalation 
was even more stifling. Remote, often isolated locations were especially bur-
densome on cost, staffing and maintenance. Spiraling cost at certain loca-
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tions—particularly Spain, Australia, Goldstone and Alaska—could no longer 
be ignored. The prime culprit—wage increases—had led to a 15 to 20 percent 
jump in operating cost at Madrid and the Australian stations, and increases of 
13 and 25 percent, respectively, at Goldstone and Fairbanks. This equated to 
a 6 percent across the board cost increase over the entire network. While this 
was not huge, in the cost-conscious days following Apollo, and with double 
digit inflation of the late 1970s, it was enough for the space agency to begin 
closing down more ground stations.60
One of them was Rosman in North Carolina. Among the best-
equipped of the original STADAN sites, Rosman had been supporting ATS-6 
which was no longer operating by December of 1979, and the OAO which had 
completed its mission in November 1980. Although NASA pulled out of 
Rosman in January 1981, five years earlier it had been the target of a well-pub-
licized (at least among the locals working there), rumored-closing. The 1976 
events did not stem from technical reasons though. That year, a labor dispute 
arose between employees of Bendix and their company with respect to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement.
What happened was this: the station employees, who were repre-
sented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), on 
25 February of that year commenced negotiations with Bendix on their labor 
agreement which was soon to expire. But despite numerous meetings, an 
agreement could not be reached and so the union went on strike. While labor 
disputes were not uncommon, this strike caught the attention of the local 
North Carolina residents who began to feel that NASA may be thinking of 
closing down “their” station because of the dispute. Although the Agency 
really had no such intentions and (by law) had to leave IBEW and Bendix to 
work out their differences, state and U.S. representatives from North Carolina 
soon, perhaps in somewhat of a panic, got into the fray and began questioning 
NASA on its “true intentions.”
Only after an official letter from NASA Headquarters was sent to 
Congressman Roy A. Taylor clarifying the Agency’s position that the strike 
would not affect the status of the station did the rumors begin to fade. In the 
end, the dispute was resolved when IBEW accepted a new labor offer from 
BFEC which included a 15 percent wage increase—not bad considering that 
the average wage settlement for all major collective bargaining agreements 
negotiated in the U.S. during the first quarter of 1976 was just 8.8 percent.61
Six years later, though, dwindling pass requirements did cause 
NASA to really leave Rosman. But instead of just shutting it down, the DOD 
received authorization from Congress to assume operations of the tracking 
facility. As for the workers, all 119 Bendix employees assigned to the sta-
tion were offered jobs elsewhere within the company. Some remained, others 
did not. Of the 119, 30 transferred to other Bendix locations while 34 were 
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retained by the DOD at Rosman. Fifty-five others declined to accept employ-
ment elsewhere and were terminated.62
Like Rosman, other stations were also reassigned, either within 
NASA or to another agency. In 1974, the NTTF became part of the opera-
tional network—Greenbelt or BLT—and expanded to take on responsibilities 
for NASA’s IUE.  This ended in 1986 when the Center decided, after the 
deactivation of IUE, to align all support activities at Wallops Island off the 
coast of Virginia. With the decision made, the 12-meter (40-foot) antenna 
used on IUE was given to the nearby United States Naval Academy and the 9- 
meter (30-foot) USB system moved to Wallops. Following this decision, this 
rather unique facility reverted back to its original role of serving the network 
as a test bed and training center.63
Another case in point was in Alaska after LANDSAT-3 went inop-
erative in 1983. On 30 September 1984, NASA operations at Fairbanks, Alaska 
ceased when it granted the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) a temporary-use permit to operate the station to track weather satel-
lites. The polar orbiting Landsat was by now using TDRS-1 for support and 
Goddard no longer had any pressing requirements for Alaska. Being in Alaska, 
the station was one of the most expensive stations to operate. NASA never-
theless continued to provide operations and maintenance support to NOAA 
for the next four years (at a cost of $1,920,000) until a permanent transfer was 
finally granted by the Bureau of Land Management.64
In 1985, Alaska’s remaining 26-meter (85-foot) antenna was trans-
ferred to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory for continued support on Nimbus and 
the Dynamic Explorer satellites. At the time of the station’s closing, NASA 
had invested $12 million of capital equipment in Alaska which, after transfer-
ring to NOAA, brought to an end 26 years of NASA operations there.65 The 
Agency’s absence from the state, however, would be rather short-lived as it 
would soon return to the area, this time to conduct scientific research, activi-
ties which continue to this day.
Other sites were closed out in a more permanent way. In November 
1981, one of the most venerable stations in the network came to an end. 
During STS-2, the second flight of the Shuttle Columbia, the Quito Station 
in Ecuador was shut down as planned. Fiscal belt-tightening and steep for-
eign inflation rates often overpowered the international cooperation value 
of keeping an overseas station open. (Another consideration was the balance 
between international cooperation and the desire for more “U.S. territory-
based solutions.”) One of the original Minitrack sites, the station was located 
near Mount Cotopaxi, the highest active volcano in the world, 56 kilometers 
(35 miles) south of the Ecuadorian capital and had served faithfully as a key 
Southern Hemisphere station dating all the way back to 1957 and Sputnik. 
Bendix had operated Quito, along with the Ecuadorian Services Company 
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(ESCO) who provided subcontractor services, since 1961. Closing it saved 
NASA an estimated $4 million annually.66
Quito exemplified the “international value” of a NASA overseas 
station. It showed how the seed of a NASA station in a foreign country germi-
nated to eventually became a technological national resource for that country, 
a resource that endures to this day. Ecuador’s main product is agriculture. In 
the late 1950s, there was an economic need for companies willing to enter into 
other fields such as technology and oil. In 1960, a group of Ecuadorian exec-
utives—visionaries in hindsight—led by Carlos H. “Polo” Cadena founded 
ESCO. BFEC soon awarded ESCO a subcontract to help operate the Quito 
STADAN station.
The station grew as NASA grew. It upgraded from Minitrack to a 
three-link station in the mid-1960s. The compliment of Ecuadorian nationals 
bloomed from 50 to 220. With the consolidation of STDN, it expanded from 
supporting only application satellites to human spaceflight support on ASTP 
continuing on to the Space Shuttle. This was a giant step forward for an overseas 
station, one that required a dynamic and joint managerial effort by Bendix and 
ESCO. A transition from American station staff to Ecuadorians took place and 
Goddard implemented its training and certification program with outstanding 
results. Cadena himself was a strong proponent of “station nationalization” and 
firmly believed that it was in the best interest of his employees.67
The Ecuadorian government had designated the Esceula Politecnica 
Nacional as NASA’s cooperating agency, responsible for facilitating and 
monitoring the Agency’s activities in that country. In the early 1970s, its 
Director, José Rubén Orellana, expressed dissatisfaction with NASA’s 
integration of Ecuadorian nationals into the station staff, as provided for 
in the international agreement. In response, NASA brought in new station 
management: Charles Force was transferred from Guam while Bendix named 
Cliff Benson as their new Senior Manager. They quickly determined that 
Orellana’s charges were valid and moved aggressively to remedy the situation. 
Over the next two years, over 50 Bendix personnel were replaced with 
Ecuadorian nationals. The willingness with which people like BFEC Logistics 
Supervisor Harry Bailey trained Fabian Mosquera as his replacement, for 
example—not knowing where he himself would go next—was impressive! A 
year or so later even Benson himself was replaced with a national: Julio Torres. 
Open animosity, while it did exist, was infrequent as Bendix management 
understood their role and made every effort to place their workers in other 
positions with other parts of the company.  While operational performance 
of the station had previously been quite good, it improved even more under 
the new personnel, and operations costs were simultaneously reduced.68 In 
22 years, Quito provided over half a million hours (578,160 hours to be 
exact) of direct mission support, one of the highest in the STDN. Numerous 
performance awards were bestowed by both NASA and Bendix.69
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At 7:04 a.m. local time on 14 November 1981, as astronauts Joe 
H. Engle and Richard H. Truly passed over Mount Cotopaxi for the final 
time, they expressed their appreciation to the 75 station employees. Words of 
bittersweet thankfulness also went to the Quito crew from a host of Agency 
officials, including: Robert E. “Ed” Smylie, NASA’s Associate Administrator 
for Tracking and Data Systems; John H. McElroy, Deputy Director of the 
Goddard Center; Richard S. Sade, NASA’s Director of Networks; Mike 
Stevens, the Shuttle Network Manager; Walt LaFleur, Deputy Director of 
Networks; and Daniel A. Spintman, Chief of the Goddard Network Oper-
ations Division.70
The last formal agreement with Ecuador came on 4 December. 
On that day, the State Department authorized the U.S. Embassy to exchange 
A panoramic view of the Quito Station in 1973. The station was located at 3,650 me-
ters (12,000 feet) elevation 69 kilometers (43 miles) south of the Equator, at the base of 
Mount Cotopaxi. A herd of llamas that frequented the station is slightly visible grazing 
just left of the 12-meter (40-foot) USB antenna. The deactivated Minitrack antenna is 
visible in the background between the two larger buildings. The photograph is unusual 
because Cotopaxi is cloud-free, and because of the rare vantage point—from the top of 
a communications tower along the nearby Pan American Highway that was accessible 
only by climbing 30 meters (100 feet) up an open ladder. (Photograph by Charles Force)
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notes with Quito extending the agreement for another six month to allow 
NASA to perform “cleanup work” completely closing-out the station. Station 
equipment was transferred to Dakar, Senegal, which at the time was just being 
established as the Transatlantic Abort emergency landing site for the Space 
Shuttle. On 1 July 1982, the facility was transferred to the government of 
Ecuador who, in turn, assigned the CLIRSEN agency the responsibility for 
its operations. It has been used since to support Earth science data acquisition 
and regional land management and development. A number of nationals who 
started at the Quito Station have gone on to play an important role in the 
industrial development of Ecuador.71
Also closed during this time, with no fanfare, was the small station 
atop Tula Peak near Alamogordo, New Mexico. Its relatively light work-
As large as the 26-meter (85-foot) antennas of the STDN were, they were dwarfed by the 
70-meter (230-foot) dishes that the DSN uses to communicate with spacecraft at the outer 
reaches of the Solar System. This photographic rendering drives home the size of these 
dishes at Canberra, Goldstone and Madrid. (Photograph courtesy of NASA)
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load allowed it to be phased out and its responsibilities reassigned to other 
STDN sites. From a scheduling perspective, its impact was small, less than 
5 percent coverage for most scientific application satellites. The loss to Space 
Shuttle support was even less at 3 percent and none involved mandatory or 
mission critical events. TULA had only been operational for less than three 
years but closing it would save the Agency half a million dollars a year. Just 
four and a half months after its closing, however, Tula Peak had to be quickly 
reactivated—literally overnight—to support a contingency landing of the 
Shuttle Columbia at White Sands. Due to wet ground conditions at Edwards 
in California, STS-3 was diverted to New Mexico (the KSC was still unavail-
able for Shuttle landings in 1982). Getting TULA up and running in just over 
24 hours was a rather impressive feat of logistics and field engineering, a feat 
that once again demonstrated the “badgeless” teamwork of those who made 
the STDN possible.72
This steady phase out of the ground network continued through the 
1980s. In 1981, NASA transferred ownership of its only station in England—the 
Winkfield Station at Berkshire—to the British, who having operated it since 
its establishment in 1961, continued to use it for radio research. Also realized in 
the big picture was the long-planned consolidation in 1985 of STDN stations 
at California, Australia, and Spain with their DSN counterparts. Under the 
reorganization, STDN capabilities were retained but now as part of the DSN. 
They would still be used to support the Agency’s near-Earth and highly ellipti-
cal orbiting spacecraft but would be run out of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 
The thinking was that by combining the capabilities in each geographical loca-
tion, more efficient use of the facilities could be realized.
First to be realigned was Goldstone. Of all the ground stations at 
Goldstone, only one, the Apollo Station (GDS) built in 1967, was originally 
part of the STDN; all others were original DSN equipment. To meet tracking 
requirements on the Apollo program, DSN assets were used as a wing-station, 
modified for USB operations and tasked to support the primary Apollo antenna. 
At Goldstone, the wing-station was the Pioneer Station (DSS-11), the first of the 
DSN sites constructed back in 1958 (It is now a National Historical Landmark). 
In general, a wing-station was not equally equipped as its STDN counterpart, but 
it provided the redundant systems (transmitters and receivers) that were needed 
under Apollo mission rules. This was a technically sound requirement. At lunar 
distances, the very narrow beamwidth of the 26-meter (85-foot) antennas (0.43º) 
meant that one was needed to track the Command/Service Module circling the 
Moon while the other was needed to focus on the Lunar Module as it made its 
way down and back up from the lunar surface. Under the Goldstone consolida-
tion, Apollo GDS was reassigned to the JPL and redesignated DSS-16. A smaller 
9-meter (30-foot) USB antenna was also transferred, redesignated DSS-17.73
An essentially parallel move was made in Spain at the Madrid Station 
(originally abbreviation MAD, which was changed to RID in 1984) built in 
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1965 at Fresnedillas 50 kilometers (30 miles) west of the capital city. The sta-
tion had operated under bilateral agreements signed by the U.S. and Spain on 
29 January 1964 and 11 October 1965 to establish mutual cooperation in the 
scientific investigation of outer space. There, the 26-meter (85-foot) STDN 
antenna used on Apollo was moved to Robledo by GSFC workers, placed 
under the auspices of JPL and redesignated DSS-66 as part of the Madrid 
Deep Space Communication Complex (MDSCC). Like Goldstone, MAD 
also had a wing-station assigned to it during Apollo. DSS-61 was just eight 
kilometers (five miles) away at Robledo de Chavela. It was modified for USB 
operations. In 1971, MDSCC became one of the first NASA tracking facilities 
to be turned over completely to a foreign government. Under the agreement, 
INTA, the Spanish National Institute of Aerospace Technology, today oper-
ates Madrid on behalf of NASA.74
Finally, the STDN stations half a world away in Australia were 
phased out. Today, mobs of wild kangaroos freely roam the abandoned grounds 
of Orroral Valley where one of the busiest stations once stood. ORR as it was 
Abandoned in 1985, site of the Orroral Valley Station is today home to hundreds of kan-
garoos and their joeys in the serene valley. Shown here are remnants of where the main 
Operations Building used to be. (Photograph by the author)
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known, located 58 kilometers (36 miles) southwest of Canberra, was estab-
lished as a STADAN facility in 1965. It was used mainly to support science 
and application satellites until its closure in 1985. In addition to its 26-meter 
(85-foot) antenna, ORR also had the Minitrack and the old Smithsonian 
Baker-Nunn optical cameras transferred from Island Lagoon, Woomera. In 
1984, NASA shutdown the station and the USB antenna was donated to the 
University of Tasmania. The next year, it was moved to Mount Pleasant, east 
In this picture from early April 1970, former Honeysuckle Operations Coordinator John 
Saxon (left) and Deputy Station Director Mike Dinn man the Ops console during pre-mis-
sion simulations for Apollo 13. Saxon holds the distinction of being the only person to 
have talked with an astronaut on the Moon from the Southern Hemisphere. During the 
Apollo 16 EVA, an earthquake knocked out the Los Angeles NASCOM node which caused 
Mission Control in Houston to temporarily go off the air. Since HSK was in communica-
tion with the crew at the time, Saxon chatted with Mission Commander John Young 
as Houston slowly got back on the air. The two agreed to share a toast if they should 
ever meet. They ﬁnally did—22 years later when the former mission commander visited 
Australia in 1994 to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the ﬁrst Moon landing. (“Long
Time Between Drinks,” Canberra Chronicle, 16 July 1994. Photograph courtesy of Colin 
Mackellar, www.honeysucklecreek.net/people/at_work.html )
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of Hobart, Tasmania, where it stands today. The Baker-Nunn camera was also 
donated, but to the University of New South Wales. The remaining Minitrack 
control equipment was handed over to the Commonwealth Department of 
Territories and was used for a while by the Australian Department of Transport 
and Communications for monitoring small satellites.75
Goddard had also put in a laser ranging facility at the station 1972 
for geodetic research which was operated on behalf of NASA by the Australian 
Land Information Survey Group (now called Geoscience Australia) from 1975. 
This laser tracking facility operated at Orroral until 1998 when it was shut 
down and the equipment moved back to the United States. Continuing the 
work started at Orroral, a new laser ranging facility was established at Mount 
Stromlo, near the Australian Capital in 1998, wholly operated by Australia. 
But five years later, a devastating wildfire erupted in the hills surrounding 
Canberra which reached the outskirts of the city and destroyed the facility (as 
well as over 500 homes). A replacement facility was built in mid-2004 which 
continues to operate today.76
Just a few miles north of Orroral on Apollo Road was Honeysuckle 
Creek (HSK), perhaps the most historical of all the Australian sites because of 
its unique role on Apollo 11. In November 1981 after the second flight of the 
Space Shuttle, HSK closed its doors and simply faded away. Hamish Lindsay, 
who worked the consoles at the station, said in his book that “There were no 
farewells, no speeches, no parties, no wakes. All the equipment was removed, 
we pulled the last of the cables out, and walked out the door. During its 
short but glorious life, Honeysuckle Creek distinguished itself as a top sta-
tion around the world in two completely different spheres as a Manned Space 
Flight Station and then as a Deep Space Station DSS.”77
NASA transferred the HSK antenna to the Canberra DSN station 
at nearby Tidbinbilla where it has served as DSS-46 since 1983. Planned for 
phase-out in the coming years, the fate of the “old Honeysuckle antenna” as it 
is affectionately called, is nebulous. Those who worked at Honeysuckle would 
hate to see this piece of history simply scrapped. To this end, space enthusiasts, 
former station workers, and local residents in the area have banded together 
to form an ad hoc, private, “Save the Antenna” campaign. Their hope is that 
perhaps one day the historic antenna which received telemetry and video of 
mankind’s first steps on the Moon will be restored, maybe even to stand once 
again at its original location in the hills of Namadgi National Park. Whether 
or not there will be a concerted effort by NASA or the Australian space agency 
CSIRO to preserve the legendary antenna in someway remains to be seen.
From a goodwill perspective, the closing of Guam was perhaps 
the most difficult. If ever there was a station outside of the 50 united states 
that could be called family, it was Guam. From the time of its ground break-
ing in 1966 to the later operation of the TDRSS ground node on the island, 
the Guamanians consistently strived for that close association with NASA, 
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and vice versa. An important objective in originally establishing a station on 
Guam was for the United States to contribute to the economic growth of the 
island and to serve as an educational catalyst on the territory.
In late 1988 when it became apparent that the station was going 
to be closed, the Guam government pleaded with NASA to keep it open. 
At the time, it employed 91 people, of whom almost two-thirds were hired 
in Guam, at an annual payroll of $3 million. In an effort to save the station, 
Guam Governor Joseph F. Ada formally requested that NASA Administrator 
James Fletcher reconsider the decision, saying “the station has lent luster to the 
territory of Guam and has been a great source of pride for our people.”78
The station at Dandan, establishment of which had been such the 
personal campaign of Governor Guerrero, was put into caretaker status in 
1989 and closed out the following year. Some equipment was left in place at 
the request of the State Department, who was interested in using the facilities, 
while the remaining equipment was transferred to the government of Guam. 
While many stations may have simply ceased operating without any fanfare 
when they were shut down, this was definitely not the case at Dandan. At the 
conclusion of the final pass of the Solar Maximum Mission (Solar Max) at 
10:30 a.m. on 30 June 1989 Guam time, simultaneous farewells took place on 
the island and on the other side of the globe at NASA Headquarters. Present 
at the ceremony were one time Guam Station Director Charles Force; Robert 
Spearing, former Director of Goddard’s Mission Operations and Data Systems 
Directorate; and a host of other NASA and contractor employees who had 
worked the station over the years.79
Going back to even before the establishment of NASA and the 
Minitrack days when the network was set up by the Army Corps of Engineers, 
the United States always tried to bring local people into the operation. The 
station at Santiago, Chile, was an example of where this policy worked to near 
perfection, even if it were at times the target of anti-American political demon-
strations. The station was a remarkable example of the long-standing goodwill 
engendered by the networks’ activities. It was eventually operated entirely by 
Chileans. (Even the Station Director was Chilean, working for the University 
of Chile under NASA contract.) Wes Bodin, the former Associate Chief for 
Ground Network at Goddard, explained. “This policy created a cooperative 
spirit with the countries NASA dealt with, created a mutual relationship. And 
as we phased out a station, we transferred the equipment in total to the local 
government. At Santiago, we transferred the entire operating entity over to 
the University of Chile. The University kept the Station Director and part of 
his crew to operate as a space tracking station.”80
After NASA left the station, it still bought services from Chile. In 
the late 1980s, the university reconfigured the station to support the COSPAS-
SARSAT project, a multilateral, cooperative project sponsored primarily by the 
United States, Canada, France, and the former Soviet Union. (COSPAS was an 
Chapter 6 \ Era of Change 237
acronym for the Russian phrase “Cosmicheskaya Sistyema Poiska Avariynich 
Sudov” meaning “Space System for the Search of Vessels in Distress” while 
SARSAT stood for “Search And Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking.”) The pro-
gram used satellites to help search and rescue efforts by detecting signals emit-
ted by airplanes, boats, and others in distress. Even today, the European Space 
Agency (ESA) and the National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA) 
continue to use such services provided by the Santiago Station.81
The year 1989 also saw the end of NASA operations on Ascension 
Island. The most isolated location in the network, Ascension ended up as one 
of the longest serving stations, operating without interruption for close to 
25 years.82 This streak was nearly broken, however, in 1982. From March to 
June of that year, the United Kingdom and Argentina engaged in a military 
conflict over the Falkland Islands to the south. During this brief but intense 
conflict, Ascension Island was used by the British for logistical support and 
as a result, commercial communications on and off the island were heavily 
disrupted. Fortunately for NASA, technical support was able to continue for 
the most part as the Agency maintained its own communication lines on and 
off the island for direct mission support. But the situation was not without its 
share of tense moments. Even though military action took place almost 10,000 
kilometers (6,200 miles) to the south and Bendix workers on Ascension were 
at no time in any real danger, concerned family members back in the U.S. 
nevertheless had plenty of difficulty placing commercial telephone calls to 
their loved ones. Much of the problem was resolved when the company made 
available special circuits, routing telephone traffic through its headquarters in 
Columbia, Maryland to reach their families.83
Seven years later, operations at Ascension would be interrupted, this 
time for good. While the technical reasons to shut down Ascension Island were 
clear, how to close the site and what to do with it afterwards were not as obvious. 
Here, international cooperation with the international space community once 
again came to the forefront. What happened was that a series of events occurred as 
NASA was deciding to phase out the station, events that ended up involving three 
parties: the island government on Ascension, NASA, and the Europeans. Before 
the Challenger Space Shuttle accident in 1986 broke NASA’s stride in construct-
ing its Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System, or TDRSS, the space agency 
had planned to transfer ACN to the Air Force’s Eastern Space and Missile Center 
(ESMC) when NASA operations ceased there in October of 1985.
To this effect, in a memorandum of understanding between GSFC 
Director Noel Hinners and the ESMC commander, authority and terms of the 
transfer were laid out in which Goddard had the responsibility to provide logisti-
cal support to ESMC for supplies and materials. Conversely, ESMC was to reim-
burse Goddard for contractor support provided to them during this transition 
period. But by 1986 when it was evident that TDRSS was going to be delayed, 
NASA quickly extended its agreement with British Cable and Wireless, who 
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provided the only way to transmit wideband data off the island. (The Air Force 
station, ASC, did not rely on cables but rather used high frequency radio trans-
missions to the Eastern Test Range as their primary communications link.)
Although the commercialization of space would not reach a full 
swing until the following decade, even in the 1980s it was not difficult to see that 
a fundamental shift in the space landscape was already taking place. This change 
was the movement of space from the realm of government sponsorship to com-
mercial commodity. With the Reagan administration being a strong proponent 
of privatization, as the nation’s space agency, this paradigm shift was not lost on 
NASA. In fact, the Agency had already been operating from Ascension for a few 
years under an agreement with the Europeans.
During this time, U.S. dealings on the island, in the words of 
French program officials, “has been excellent.”84 For it to work, international 
cooperation had to have flexibility, and on occasion, some good fortune. A 
case in point was the handling of coverage for Ariane’s 9 November 1985 
launch, which happened to coincide with Shuttle mission STS-51A. The ESA 
Ariane carried the GTE Spacenet 2 and the European Marecs B2 satellites 
while the Shuttle mission included deploying two satellites and the recovery 
of Westar 6 and Palapa-B2. The Shuttle launch was originally planned for 7 
November and would have required Ascension Island tracking support two 
days later for satellite retrieval operations. It ended up, however, being delayed 
24 hours causing Ascension support for the Westar and Palapa recovery to 
now occur on the 10th. So, because of the Shuttle delay—not an unusual 
occurrence—the station was now free to cover Ariane without conflict.
But according to NASA mission rules, Ascension Island was not 
available for Ariane support for a 48-hour period before and after a Shuttle 
launch, and for a similar period before and after a scheduled landing. In prac-
tice, though, flexibility in scheduling was not uncommon so as to accommo-
date international partners’ needs. Commenting on the series of events during 
STS-51A in 1984, Clet Yven, a Station Chief for the French Centre National 
d’Etudes Spatiales CNES said: 
What we have seen in practice is that Ascension Island avail-
ability is handled on a case-by-case basis, and the periods blocked 
against our use depend upon the mission. They [NASA] have dem-
onstrated excellent flexibility and have said they could free their 
facilities for short periods in certain cases, even when there may be 
general scheduling conflicts with Shuttle missions.85
Hence, private commercial space launch industry officials were at the 
time especially concerned that the station closings (not just Ascension but the 
others as well) would leave them without the ability to receive data from their 
boosters. It was logical for the United States to consider commercializing some 
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sites. In discussing the fate of the Ascension Station with NASA Headquarters, 
it was the perspective of the Office of General Counsel that “commercialization 
is feasible and would be consistent with other efforts to commercialize the space 
industry.”86 Such an arrangement could generally benefit everyone involved. 
In addition to the potential financial gain to the commercial operator, such an 
arrangement would also address these concerns, keeping the station operational 
while providing a continued source of revenue to benefit the local economy.
Recognizing the European’s need for downrange launch support 
out of Kourou, French Guiana, officials from NASA and CNES met at the 
KSC in January of 1986. On the day of the Challenger launch, David W. 
Harris, at the time Manager of Space Network Operations at GSFC, happened 
to be leading a contingent from Goddard to discuss with CNES these issues. 
Breaking the meeting to view the launch—in one of those moments indelibly 
etched in one’s memory—the team immediately recognized the horror of the 
situation. Still numb from what they just witnessed, the group disbanded that 
morning and agreed to reconvene at a later date.87
Three long years would pass before the group met again on 12 
January 1989 to finish their talks. NASA already had plans to transfer the 
facility to the Air Force ESMC at the end of the fiscal year under an existing 
memorandum of understanding with the DOD. Under the proposed agree-
ment with ESA, the Europeans would in turn install their own equipment on 
Ascension by March of 1990, to be operated by British Cable and Wireless 
personnel. The station was perfect for ESA since from its spaceport at Kourou, 
equatorial launches of the Ariane rocket flew almost directly over the island. 
Therefore, ESA requested that NASA continue operating the Ascension 
Station just a little bit longer, on a monthly reimbursable basis, until April 
1990, when their equipment would be installed and become operational.88
Thereafter, ESA would assume full operations on its own to provide tracking 
services to its international customers.
An agreement was thus signed on 21 February 1989, extending 
NASA operations on the island on a cost reimbursable basis, one that would 
have ESA pay NASA $283,000 per month to keep the station open.89 As for 
the facilities that ESA did not want to use, NASA was requested by the Island 
Administrator to restore the site to its preexisting condition. In this cleanup, 
the Operations Building was transferred to the Ascension government for use 
by the local community. All other buildings were demolished and the rubble 
hauled off. A significant restoration effort was the cleaning out of Devil’s 
Ashpit which had been used as a trash pit for a quarter-century. As one can 
imagine, this was no easy task since The Ashpit was quite large—30 meters 
deep by 40 meters wide by 90 meters long (100 by 125 by 300 feet)—with 
sheer, fragile walls. The cleanup took a year.90
In this rapid succession of station closings, perhaps no other group of 
people was more affected on a day-to-day basis than the contractors and their 
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families. In 1989, BFEC for example, employed over 300 people at Ascension, 
Dakar, Guam, Hawaii, Santiago and Yarragardee, a good portion of whom had 
established families at these remote outposts (except for Ascension, which was 
“singles only”).91 This meant that by shutting down these stations, a few thou-
sand people were going to be uprooted, some from the only homes they knew. 
Of course, there were some places where it was easier to leave than others.
Take Ascension versus Hawaii, for instance. While it may not have 
been all that difficult for folks to walk away from a place called Devil’s Ashpit—
recall that “If you can’t go to the Moon, the next best place is Ascension 
Island!”—it was quite a different story for those who were stationed in the 
tropical settings of Hawaii. Located on a 25-acre site at Kokee State Park, the 
Hawaii Station was near Waimea Canyon on the west side of Kauai—one of the 
most scenic sights in the world. Since its establishment in 1961, the station had 
supported every U.S. human spaceflight with the exception of the first two sub-
orbital Mercury missions. With its lush, green settings and surrounding hillside, 
the area is often used for motion picture and television location shots. Thus, it 
was not surprising that once assigned to Hawaii, one usually stayed in Hawaii.
Many of the employees at Kokee had been there for 20 years or more 
and had established roots there. When NASA announced that the site would 
be shut down at the end of the fiscal year on 30 September 1989, most of those 
at the station were offered positions elsewhere by Bendix. Few wanted to leave 
though. In the end however, with limited job opportunities on the island for 
skilled technicians, most took the offers and reluctantly left the island. Those 
who did not left the company. After 29 years of service which saw the sta-
tion track John Glenn around Earth and bring back 27 astronauts from the 
Moon, much of the land was returned to the state of Hawaii. The station was 
turned over to the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Missile Range. The 9-meter (30-foot) 
USB antenna system continued to be used for years on the Goddard Crustal 
Dynamics Project and is still being operated for science—tracking radio stars 
and studying plate tectonics by the University of Hawaii.
Finally, Botswana, Dakar and Yarragardee—the early UHF air-to-
ground Shuttle voice stations—were closed in 1986, 1995, and 1991, respec-
tively. Hardware from these stations were transferred to other STDN sites or 
mostly just donated to the host country. In the case of Botswana, the legacy 
of having hosted a “space station” in their country was preserved as NASA 
donated the surplus equipment to the Botswana National Museum, who made 
an exhibit commemorating their involvement and contribution to the success 
of the early Shuttle flights.92
E E E
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It was clear by the end of the 1980s that the era of NASA’s world-
wide, ground-based network had come to an end. Goddard’s once sprawling 
STDN had been reduced by over 75 percent. Deemphasis had come a long 
way in just a few years. If one were to ask what the largest structures ever 
assembled on the face of Earth is, answers might range from the Great Wall of 
China to the Great Pyramids of Giza. From an infrastructure point of view, 
NASA’s family of tracking networks—NASCOM, Minitrack, STADAN, 
MSFN, STDN, as well as the DSN—put together comprised one of the most 
wide-reaching infrastructures of the twentieth century, a true testament to 
the men and women who engineered it, built it, and made it work. Eventually 
though, technology and better access into space would supersede the need for 
such an extensive ground network. Instead of being tied to the surface of 
Earth, this new kind of network would now literally be based in space. It 
would change the STDN from a network using many ground stations into 
one using only a handful of satellites called the Tracking and Data Relay 
Satellite System, or TDRSS. TDRSS would enable Earth orbiting spacecraft 
such as the Hubble Space Telescope, the Space Shuttle and the International 
Space Station, to continuously communicate with control centers on the 
ground without an elaborate and expensive network of stations.
This fundamental change in spaceflight communications from pri-
marily a ground-based network to a space-based network was something that 
NASA had in fact been working on since the early 1970s.
In other words, the revolutionary change to this new kind of net-
work did not take place overnight. 

CHAPTER 7
A NETWORK IN SPACE
The roots of a satellite-based communications network can be 
traced to 1945, when a Royal Air Force radar specialist and member of the 
British Interplanetary Society, Arthur C. Clarke expounded on his concept 
of what is known today as the “geosynchronous satellite.” The reason geo-
synchronous communication satellites are needed is really very simple: The 
curvature of our Earth limits how far we can see. Consequently, a network of 
tracking stations, even when spread around the world, can only see and com-
municate with an orbiting satellite about 15 percent of the time, only when 
it passed within the station’s field-of-view. In his article, Clarke accurately 
hypothesized that a satellite placed into orbit at an altitude of 35,900 kilome-
ters (22,300 miles) over the Equator would circle Earth at the same angular 
rate that Earth rotated. In such an orbit, it would appear to an observer on 
the ground to be hanging motionless over the Equator. Thus, he concluded 
that a stationary satellite at geosynchronous altitude would be in an excellent 
position to relay communications around the globe. To this end, he suggested 
that use of three manned satellites in orbit could be used to relay programs for 
the newly invented medium of television.1
Clarke’s article apparently had little lasting effect, however, in spite 
of the story being repeated in the 1951 –1952 publication The Exploration of 
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Space. Lying dormant for several years, it was not until 1954 when a scientist 
named John R. Pierce at AT&T’s Bell Telephone Laboratories carefully reevaluated 
the various technical merits (and the potential commercial windfall) of Clarke’s 
proposal. Since the terms geosynchronous and geostatio nary had not yet been 
invented, Pierce, in a 1954 speech and 1955 paper, elaborated on the utility of 
a communications “mirror” in space. Along these lines, he added the concept 
of a medium-orbit “repeater” and a 24-hour orbit “repeater.” In comparing 
the communications capability of a satellite, which he roughly put at 1,000 
simultaneous telephone calls, with the capacity of the first trans-Atlantic tele-
phone cable (TAT-1), which could then carry only 36 simultaneous telephone 
calls at a cost of $40 million dollars—Pierce wondered if such a “repeater 
satellite” could be worth over a billion dollars to his company!2
Within 10 years, Clarke’s and Pierce’s concept would be translated 
into reality as communication satellites enabled viewers from around the 
world to enjoy the 1964 Tokyo Olympics live on television.
Spurred on by the 1957 launch of Sputnik 1 and later the Explorer 
satellites, the use of artificial satellites for communications quickly became a 
high-interest item in academia, the fledgling space industry and in the gov-
ernment. Many in the military saw its obvious strategic potential. NASA 
too, understood its incredible potential towards global communications. 
However, due to Congressional fears of “duplication” and in keeping with 
NASA’s civilian charter, the Agency pretty much confined itself to experi-
ments with passive, reflective, mirror-like satellites such as Echo 1 and 2. 
These were essentially nothing more than gigantic, shiny, Mylar balloons 
that bounced radio signals from one point on Earth to another. Meanwhile, 
the DOD dabbled in the more “active” satellites which actually amplified the 
signals received, providing much higher quality and stronger returns.
Government agencies, however, were not the only ones involved. 
In 1960, AT&T filed with the FCC for permission to launch an experimental 
communications satellite with the full intention of following it up with an 
operational system. The U.S. government was caught somewhat off guard 
since there was really no policy in place to regulate the decisions needed to 
implement the AT&T proposal. (This is somewhat akin to the situation that 
the FAA found itself in during the 1990s with respect to the commercial space 
launch market. Many laws and policies were in effect, but the FAA found itself 
having to quickly adapt them into guidelines for a cottage industry interested 
in this new commercial arena.)
The pace quickened. By the middle of 1961, NASA had awarded a 
competitive contract to RCA—who won the contract over AT&T and Hughes 
Aircraft—to build the medium-orbit (6,500 kilometer or 4,000 miles high), 
Relay communication satellite. Undeterred, AT&T would soon build its own 
satellite, the Telstar, which NASA launched for them on a cost-reimbursable 
basis in July 1962. 
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On 25 May 1961, President John F. Kennedy spoke to the nation, 
committing to an American Moon landing by the end of the decade. But in 
another, long forgotten, portion of that speech, the President also commit-
ted the country to build a global satellite communications network. To this 
end, NASA and the Hughes Aircraft Company began developing a small, 
experimental, geostationary satellite called Syncom. Its first launch in January 
Echo, America’s ﬁrst communication satellite, was a passive spacecraft based on a bal-
loon design created by engineers at NASA’s Langley Research Center. Made of highly 
reﬂective Mylar, the satellite measured 30.5 meters (100 feet) in diameter. Once in orbit, 
residual air inside the balloon expanded, and it would begin its task of reﬂecting radio 
transmissions from one ground station to another. Satellites like Echo 1 shown here dur-
ing an inﬂation test generated a lot of interest because they could be seen with the naked 
eye from the ground as they passed overhead. (NASA Image Number GPN-2002-000122)
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1963 went successfully, but unfortunately, the satellite failed to operate after 
injection into geostationary orbit. The second attempt in July 1963, though, 
was a complete success. These pioneering experiments soon paved the way 
for the semi-private, U.S. government subsidized Communications Satellite 
Corporation, COMSAT, that was formed as a result of the Communications 
Satellite Act of 1962 (a fallout from Kennedy’s commitment), to pave the way 
for the world’s first commercial communications satellite.3
Not surprisingly, the United States was not the only country in the 
West interested in this new realm. Understanding full well the global nature of 
the endeavor, NASA began negotiations with the Europeans to build ground 
stations on their soil (negotiations which AT&T had begun two years earlier 
in preparation for its Telstar experiment). Soon, Earth stations existed in Great 
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Brazil, and Japan. Further negotiations over 
the next two years eventually led to a new international organization, one 
Antennas for communicating with satellites have come a long way. “The Horn” antenna 
at Bell Telephone Laboratories in Holmdel, New Jersey was built in 1959 for pioneer-
ing work in communicating with the NASA Echo satellites. Made of aluminum with a 
steel base, it was 15 meters (50 feet) in length and weighed in at 18 metric tons (40,000 
pounds). Used to detect radio waves that bounced off Echo, this primitive antenna was 
later modiﬁed to work with the Telstar Communication Satellite. In 1990, The Horn was 
dedicated to the National Park Service as a National Historic Landmark. (NASA Image 
Number GPN-2003-00013)
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which would ultimately assume ownership of the satellites and responsibility 
for management of the new commercial space communications network.
On 20 August 1964, INTELSAT (the International Telecommu-
nications Satellite Consortium) was officially formed with America’s COM-
SAT as a majority owner. INTELSAT would eventually come to have more 
than 140 member nations, becoming the world’s largest commercial satellite 
communications service provider. In this cooperative, owners contribute in 
proportion to usage of satellite services and receive a return on their invest-
ment. On 6 April 1965, the consortium launched the Early Bird from Cape 
Canaveral, and the age of international satellite communications was born. 
Today, INTELSAT operates a fleet of more than 20 geostationary satellites, 
providing television, telephone, and data services to literally billions of people 
worldwide. To manage the system, the consortium establishes technical and 
operating standards for ground stations which all users must comply with. 
Using antennas as small as 1.5 feet in diameter, users such as television and 
telephone companies, along with data service providers around the world, can 
access the system on a 24/7 basis to support their customers.4
But back in the 1960s, much of the early use of the COMSAT/
INTELSAT system was to provide circuits for NASA’s communications net-
work NASCOM, relaying data back and forth between ground stations and 
their respective control centers. By the end of the decade, fortuitous timing 
led to the INTELSAT-3 series completing the global network just days before 
a billion people watched on live television mankind’s first steps on the Moon 
on 20 July 1969. 
During this time, communication satellites were fairly simple and 
not very big. Like Syncom, they were all spin-stabilized. In order to keep 
proper orientation in the weightlessness of space, an object (any object) has to 
be stabilized, either actively with an attitude control system consisting of small 
thrusters, or passively by spinning so as to conserve angular momentum (like 
how a bicycle wheel or a top stays upright when spun). By the 1970s, three-
axis stabilization using gyroscopes had matured to the point where they could 
be used to reliably maintain the orientation of a satellite in orbit.5 This made a 
huge difference. Since a satellite would no longer have to be spinning, it could 
now accommodate large directional antennas to support high data rates and 
deploy very large solar arrays for power. With more power came more equip-
ment, sophistication, and more capabilities.
Technology steadily improved through the 1960s and 1970s. Perhaps 
an even more important improvement than new stabilization techniques was 
the increase in the amount of power that RF signals can be transmitted at 
and the utilization of higher frequencies in the RF spectrum. At the heart 
of signal amplification is a device called the Traveling Wave Tube, or TWT. 
Invented by Austrian born physicist Rudolf Kompfner and his colleagues at 
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Started in 1964, the International Telecommunications Satellite or INTELSAT ushered 
in the era of communication satellites for everyday use. Today, the consortium consists 
of over 140 member nations. This photograph shows Intelsat IV in an anechoic (sound-
absorbing) test chamber in 1972. Built by the Hughes Aircraft Company, NASA placed it 
in geosynchronous orbit over the Atlantic with a then state-of-the-art capacity of 6,000 
voice circuits or 13 television channels. (NASA Image Number 72-H-872) 
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Bell Laboratories, the TWT amplifiers date back to the beginning of the space 
communications era. Early tubes had power output only in the one-watt range 
(less than a common household nightlight). By the early 1970s, though, TWTs 
with a couple hundred watt capabilities were becoming available. What this 
meant was that ground stations no longer needed large dish reflectors costing 
millions of dollars to build. Antennas for satellite services quickly and dra-
matically shrank to the point where a 3-meter (10-foot) dish costing around 
$30,000 could now do the job that once required a 26-meter (85-foot) dish.6
Advancements have continued in this field to where today, direct-broadcast 
application satellites have TWTs in the 300 watt range, requiring receive 
antennas that are only a foot or two (0.3 to 0.6 meters) in diameter and which 
cost less than a hundred dollars a piece. This has resulted in a huge leap in the 
amount and types of services available to everyday users literally anywhere 
in the world—as evidenced by the boom in the number of satellite television 
subscribers in recent years.
These sweeping strides in communications satellite technology 
provided NASA with the technology it needed to turn the TDRSS (Tracking 
and Data Relay Satellite System) from a concept on the drawing board into 
reality.7 In fact, it would not be an overstatement to call TDRSS a national 
resource, one that has totally transformed the way space communications are 
done. In its planning and conceptual stage for about 10 years, implementation 
of the TDRSS in the 1970s and 1980s was, without a doubt, the biggest evo-
lution in NASA tracking and communications during that time. So different 
was TDRSS that, to put it simply, it made the sprawling network of global 
ground stations a thing of the past.
Of the many communication satellites launched prior to the Shuttle 
era, only one—ATS-6 on Apollo-Soyuz—played a key role for tracking and 
data acquisition on a human space mission. Its success in 1975 took place at an 
important juncture. By this time, the Agency had completed Apollo and had 
already conducted several years of feasibility studies on a space-based commu-
nications network. ATS-6 underscored the unique ability of a communication 
satellite to serve as an orbiting platform, greatly enlarging the field-of-view 
capable from a single location.
Thus, the timing seemed right to establish a completely new kind 
of network, one based in space. Cost-benefit analysis done by GSFC drove the 
point home. By the 1970s, the sheer number of American spacecraft requiring 
network support had exceeded 50 and the cost of running ground stations was 
rising. Moreover, the STDN, as a ground-based system, had inherent weak-
nesses. Each station, for example, could monitor only two spacecraft at the same 
time and all stations working together could only hold a spacecraft in view for 
a small percentage of each orbit. TDRSS changed all that. “The network will 
take on a whole different complexion, becoming primarily a satellite-to-satel-
lite network. But the big advantage that we’ll get from that is the amount of 
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coverage we’ll get. That’s the big benefit of TDRSS,” said Henry Iuliano in 
comparing the expected performance of the TDRSS to the STDN. 
We have a very, very reliable network out there right now but 
it has wide gaps of information, compared to what we will get 
from TDRSS. There’s no comparison. During the aborted Apollo 
13 lunar mission, voice contact was very important because you 
would have to wait sometimes 20 to 25 minutes between contacts. 
We had to fit as much communication as possible into that short 
span, whereas now, once the TDRSS system is fully deployed, we’ll 
have absolute coverage for a Shuttle mission. You can call and talk 
just about any time you want to.8
Its implementation greatly slashed the number of ground stations, 
saving NASA an estimated $500 million dollars in network operating expenses 
alone while providing this almost seamless communication capability.9
The original plan envisioned three satellites, each placed in geo-
synchronous orbit: one over the Eastern Hemisphere, one over the Western 
Hemisphere, and a spare positioned between the two. They would be con-
nected to the ground at a single ground terminal. In this way, TDRSS could 
provide 100 percent viewing of spacecraft orbiting between 1,200 and 5,000 
kilometers (745 and 3,100 miles) altitude. Craft orbiting above this altitude 
would be assigned to the DSN while for those orbiting below 1,200 kilome-
ters, TDRSS could provide 85 percent coverage for—not perfect but still a far 
cry better than that offered by traditional ground stations.10
These hard facts were compelling and NASA’s commitment to 
TDRSS was firm by the mid-1970s. Originally intended for inauguration 
with the Space Shuttle in the 1979 to 1980 time frame, implementation of 
the new system experienced many frustrations, and unfortunately, a tragic 
setback as well. This series of events was to prevent the TDRSS from meet-
ing its full potential for nearly the entire decade of the 80s. Even though by 
the late 1970s, when the Agency knew that the new Space Network (SN) was 
not going to happen for a few more years, there was nevertheless optimism on 
the part of planners that there would not be too much of a delay between the 
inception of Shuttle flights and when NASA would have an operational SN in 
place. Even as late as December 1979, Goddard was counting on TDRSS taking 
over all tracking and data support of near Earth-orbiting spacecraft by 1982.11
Though it took the better part of the decade to complete, by 1989 
NASA finally had what it had been waiting for. With TDRSS now available, 
the size of the ground network indeed shrank dramatically while communi-
cations coverage grew, from some 15 percent to over 85 percent, a six-fold 
increase. On top of that, network complexity was greatly reduced. TDRSS 
does not perform processing of user traffic but rather, operates simply as a 
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“bent-pipe” repeater, one in which signals and data between spacecraft and 
ground terminals are relayed but not processed in real time. One Goddard net-
work manager prognosticated (correctly, as it turns out) in 1989 on the future 
of space communications on the eve of a fully operational TDRSS network. 
We’re certainly not going to go out of business. We’ll start 
exchanging data through international programs, and there’ll be 
increased contact with the universities and foreign space programs. 
We’ll still maintain a NASCOM presence in Europe and Australia 
through the DSN and the domestic network is going to continue 
to grow in communications capabilities through the universities and 
scientific project control centers. As the tracking stations go away 
and the Shuttle flies on a regular basis, we’ll have more and more 
satellites and more and more scientific data to exchange, so we’ll 
be changing the network. Instead of linking up to tracking stations 
around the world, we’re linking up users to the data we’re getting 
back from the spacecraft, and that’s going to continue to grow.12
A drawing of the TDRS-3 spacecraft. The Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System 
(TDRSS) provides nearly uninterrupted communications with the International Space 
Station (ISS), the Space Shuttle and Earth orbiting satellites, replacing the intermittent 
coverage provided by the Spaceﬂight Tracking and Data Network (STDN) ground sta-
tions. (NASA Image Number MSFC-8893551)
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This is how the system works. Data, voice, and video acquired by 
the constellation of satellites are relayed to a centrally-located terminal on the 
grounds of NASA’s White Sands Test Facility in southern New Mexico—
the White Sands Ground Terminal—or on Guam. From there, the raw data 
is sent directly by domestic communications satellites to control centers at 
the JSC, the GSFC or wherever it may be needed by independent users. In 
this way, nearly continuous communications with the ISS, for example, is 
allowed. This permits far greater flexibility in mission operations than had 
been previously achievable with a network of stations on the ground. To carry 
out the commercial side of the program, TDRSS also serves the space and 
science community at large by providing near-continuous coverage for over 
two dozen low-Earth orbiting spacecraft all at the same time. As one former 
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The Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System, TDRSS. The ﬁrst generation Space 
Network used S and Ku-band to relay communications from up to 20 satellites at the 
same time. Ka-band capability was added beginning with three second generation 
satellites in the early 2000s. (Adapted from Roger Flaherty, Satellite Communications, 
Goddard Space Flight Center, May 2002)
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manager put it, this new kind of space-centric network “focuses on the total 
data system, from instrument to scientist.”13
All this ties back to just how the TDRSS came about. Studies for a 
tracking and data system that would rely on satellites rather than on a network 
of ground stations date back to the early 1960s. It was the DOD, not NASA, 
who first planted the seed. In the interest of controlling the “high ground,” 
the United States Air Force knew that a space-based communications net-
work could be the key. To this end, they held discussions with the Lockheed 
Missiles and Space Company and General Electric to investigate the feasibility 
of putting into space a so-called network of “Instrumentation Satellites.”
NASA, however, was not far behind. In 1964, tracking person-
nel at the GSFC requested that Headquarter’s OTDA consider funding an 
“orbiting tracking and data station” as a research and development project. 
OTDA managers in Washington were intrigued with the idea and put it 
on the agenda for Future Advanced Studies. Two years later in April 1966, 
the RCA Astro-Electronics Division and Lockheed were both awarded six-
month contracts to define the characteristics of what was by then called an 
“Orbiting Data Relay Network.”
By fall of the following year, OTDA was convinced that the space-
based concept had a future. Goddard was thus tasked to establish a Data Relay 
Satellite System (DRSS) Requirements and Interface Panel, which included 
specialists from human spaceflight and science applications offices from around 
NASA. This panel’s assignment was to oversee the definition and startup of 
such a system.14
The DRSS focused on a basic plan that called for a two satellite 
network in geosynchronous orbit over the Equator. In this configuration, an 
“East” satellite would be placed off the northeast coast of Brazil and a “West” 
satellite placed southwest of the Hawaiian islands. The goal was to have a sys-
tem that could “be developed to augment and, to the extent practical, replace 
certain of the facilities that [comprised] NASA’s tracking and data acquisition 
network.”15 The Agency was hoping for an operational network in orbit in 
the 1974 to 1975 time frame. To do this, Goddard had to expend considerable 
effort designing a system that would meet user needs at a time when most of 
the users were not even around yet. In other words, how did NASA know that 
this system it was designing would meet the needs of a future user community 
for the next 15 years?
To answer these questions, network planners developed what 
was called “loading analysis” computer programs. These programs evalu-
ated whether the designs would satisfy user demands and determined how 
changes to staffing and closure of ground stations would affect the existing 
users. Meetings were held to identify the needs, understand onboard record-
ing capabilities, data dump requirements, antenna design, and orbit planning. 
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For instance, it was through such analysis that Goddard came to understand 
that two so-called Single Access (SA) antennas and an array of 30 Multiple 
Access (MA) antennas could be used to satisfy those needs. (The number 
of spacecraft that can be supported by the MA system is determined by the 
phasing equipment on the ground, not by the number of antennas on the 
spacecraft.) From a station closure standpoint, loading analysis was used to 
help phase-down ground station shifts and closures in anticipation of each 
successful TDRS launch.
By May of 1971, Goddard was ready to issue Requests for Proposals 
to the industry for design of what was now officially called the Tracking and 
Data Relay Satellite System—TDRSS. An open competition led to Hughes 
Aircraft and North American Rockwell both being awarded two-year design 
contracts. However, before the contractors could finish their studies, NASA 
management realized that a budget conscious Congress would likely not fully 
fund development from the ground up of an effort that was still at a minimum 
four or five years down the road.
NASA had to think about new ways to procure TDRSS.
In what could only be termed a radical departure from the way it 
had operated up until then—and in an effort to get the project started without 
committing the Agency to a future purchase of a suite of satellites—OTDA 
decided to lease rather than buy a satellite system. In other words, rather than 
proceeding with a government-owned and operated system, NASA would, 
in essence, negotiate with private industry for a long term contract, one that 
would have the latter sell communication services back to the government. 
Since TDRSS was categorized as a support program rather than an agency 
research and development program, NASA considered leasing to be a viable 
option. Besides, all the technology required to implement the system was 
labeled as either off-the-shelf or in a high enough technology readiness level 
that leasing was considered no riskier than buying.16
In a flip-flop of the traditional customer-client relationship, the 
space agency was now a customer of private industry. Again, the impetus for 
this fundamental departure in the way NASA did business was rather simple 
and as usual, came down to economics. By obtaining this capability from 
industry on a long term, fixed price service basis, the Agency hoped to save 
money, and at the same time, spur on the commercial space sector.
In September 1973, Administrator James C. Fletcher wrote to indi-
vidual members of Congress advising them of the Agency’s budget needs for 
FY 1975. Among the new programs listed was TDRSS. Regarding the cru-
cial role that the new system will play in Space Transportation System (STS) 
(Shuttle) operations, he wrote:
Our studies have shown that the only way to meet our future 
tracking and data acquisition needs with reasonable expenditure of 
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funds will be through a . . . TDRSS. Such a system will improve our 
Earth orbital tracking and data acquisition capabilities and meet the 
high data rates anticipated when the Space Shuttle is in operation, 
while at the same time, permitting the elimination of most of the 
ground stations in the present.17
Fletcher’s statement to Congress captured the main reason for 
TDRSS: it was cheaper than augmenting the ground stations to meet Shuttle 
requirements.
The Agency had already identified six companies that were inter-
ested in the project, but, in this case, needed the assistance of Congress to 
develop the necessary legislation to authorize NASA to enter into such a con-
tractual arrangement, since something like this had never been done before. 
Congress debated the wisdom of such a relationship through the spring of 
1974, but finally authorized the go-ahead in May.18
Looking back over the last 50 years, the transfusion of technology 
from the government-borne space program to the private sector has occurred 
in many areas. Nowhere has this been more visible than in the realm of com-
munications. Even in 1977, Gerald Truszynski summed it up rather succinctly 
when he testified before Congress, saying “The TDRSS contract, we think, 
is a good example of government developments moving into commercial 
applications.”19
NASA now had the authority it needed to proceed with this leas-
ing venture. It was at this time that the Agency’s Headquarters made the 
(fatalistic in hindsight) decision that NASA had no basis to preclude tele-
communications companies from bidding. The fallout of this decision was 
that by October 1974, no less than 27 companies or teams of companies had 
indicated their interest in bidding for the design, fabrication and operation 
of TDRSS. On 7 February 1975, Goddard issued a Request for Proposals 
for Phase I studies which would detail the system design and cost. In June, 
awards went to two contractor teams: RCA Global Communications, Inc., 
and Western Union Space Communications, Inc. A separate contract was 
awarded to Hughes Aircraft to define the user antennas systems that would be 
required by customer satellites.20
By 15 January 1976, Western Union and RCA had completed their 
six-month Phase I studies. Both were now intensely competing for the Phase 
II production contract, the winner of which would actually build and oper-
ate the system. These two were not the only ones busy. Throughout the year, 
announcements came of awards for several smaller, support contracts. One 
was given to Hughes, as expected, for the company to continue on the user 
(customer) antenna system. Others were awarded for building various support 
hardware. The big announcement for the TDRSS prime contract itself did 
not come, however, until the end of the year.
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On 12 December 1976, in what could only be called a shock to the 
aerospace industry, NASA awarded the lucrative, 10 year, $800 million prime 
contract to Western Union Space Communications, Inc., otherwise known 
as Spacecom—a wholly owned subsidiary of the Western Union Corporation 
headquartered in Upper Saddle River, New Jersey. It ranked among the larg-
est contracts ever awarded by the Agency, even dating back to the big pro-
curement days of Apollo. Western Union, while a leading communication 
services provider (it continues to be one of the largest wire service companies 
in the world), had virtually no experience in the aerospace world. 
Under the Western Union team, TRW’s Defense and Space 
Systems Group in Redondo Beach, California would build the satellites and 
provide the computers and software for the ground terminal at White Sands. 
Unlike its prime, TRW was a leading satellite manufacturer for the DOD 
and NASA, and thus provided the valuable experience of working on large 
aerospace projects that Western Union so sorely lacked. In addition to TRW, 
the Harris Corporation’s Government Communications Systems Division in 
Melbourne, Florida, was on the team. Harris, a leader in communications and 
information technology, was responsible for $60 million of the contract to 
build and integrate the system’s antennas at the White Sands terminal.21
After the network was up and running, terms of the contract called 
for 10 years of services to be provided by Western Union Spacecom to NASA 
in both the space and ground segments. This included six spacecraft with 
components for a seventh. But here is where the contract was different. Unlike 
traditional procurements where the government provided funding from the 
onset, no money would be forthcoming to Western Union until the system 
was operational. Since no funds would be forthcoming from NASA until 
TDRSS became operational, the development of the project was financed 
with loans provided to Western Union by the Federal Financing Bank, an arm 
of the U.S. Treasury. To make this work, Congress had to actually pass a law, 
which they did on 30 July 1977. Under the terms of Public Law 95-76, NASA 
would make loan repayments to the bank once services began.22
Unfortunately, and almost from the beginning, the contract with 
Western Union ran into problems. While large, government procurements 
on this scale are already difficult enough to handle, the TDRSS procurement 
had an added level of complexity. More specifically, the space agency was 
trying (for the first time) to build what was known as a “shared system.” 
What this meant was that TDRSS would actually serve two purposes: It 
would be designed and built to provide NASA with a new communications 
network, but it would also be designed and built to provide commercial 
communications. Part of this venture called for one satellite to be dedicated 
exclusively for use by Western Union to provide domestic communication 
services once the constellation was complete.
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This sharing of the system introduced some technical complica-
tions into the system. But that was not the main problem. What really became 
an issue to NASA was that Western Union was unable to market the com-
mercial part of it. Bob Spearing, NASA’s Director of Space Communications 
who was at Goddard during this time, explained what happened: 
In a sense, they [Western Union] were ahead of their time. 
They were designing a commercial satellite package that worked at 
Ku-band. Ku-band was not a household word at the time. It was a 
new emerging capability and they just weren’t able to get traction. 
So that created some difficulties in terms of how they were going 
to proceed with NASA. The idea of the shared system was that it 
costs less because the satellite would serve two purposes. When that 
started to go down the drain, there were a lot of contractual issues 
that transpired with NASA to try and resolve that problem leading 
eventually to NASA actually buying out the commercial side of 
the system. 
By buying out the system, the Agency in essence changed TDRSS 
from a shared system back to one that was basically dedicated for NASA use. 
However, the commercial capability remained on the satellites. As Spearing 
said, “The design was far enough along at that point that it would have been 
much more costly to scrap the design and start over, so we actually built the 
satellites with the commercial capability.”23
In 1980, in the first of a succession of moves, the TDRSS opera-
tions contract was transferred to a partnership of Western Union, Fairchild 
and Continental Telephone. Then three years later, in July 1983, Western 
Union got out of the contract all together by selling its 50 percent of the 
business to the other two partners. The buyout continued. In 1985, Fairchild, 
sold its share, leaving Continental Telecom—better known as Contel—as the 
sole owner of Spacecom and the TDRSS contract. This continued until 1990 
when a new contract was negotiated which finally transferred ownership of 
the system back to NASA. Contel remained onboard but was now the space 
agency’s contractor that operated the system for NASA.24
The failure of Western Union in their role as the TDRSS prime 
contractor can be traced in large part to the nature of the company itself. 
Unlike its subcontractors, TRW and Harris, Western Union was not a major 
player in the aerospace industry. As such, it operated in the highly regulated 
environment of the telecommunications industry where it was not unusual 
to find four lawyers and managers for every engineer. As a communication 
services provider, it knew how to get the most out of a network. However, 
it lacked the experience to actually build one. From a technical standpoint, 
the concurrent development of the TDRSS with the Space Shuttle in the late 
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1970s also meant that Western Union had to work closely with Rockwell (the 
Orbiter prime contractor) as well as the JSC. This was again something that 
the company did not do successfully. Western Union’s function on the con-
tract thus became more and more administrative than technical, even to the 
point where TRW ended up assuming most of the systems engineering and 
integration role.
Former Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Operations 
Robert O. Aller presented to senior Agency management and Congress in 
1989 a “lessons learned” workshop from the TDRSS procurement process. 
Aller gathered 30 NASA and industry people who were closely involved in 
the process to review its successes and its problems. The eight lessons learned 
concisely addressed the heart of the matter:
1  Shared Service Concept. The concept of combining a commercial 
need with an established NASA need is valid, and may offer 
significant savings to the government through shared costs; how-
ever, the rights and operational utilization needs, availability, and 
privileges of each party must be clearly established in advance.
2  Leased-Service Concept. A leased-service concept should be based 
on the use of available commercial services or existing system 
technology if service is mission-critical.
3  Interdependency with Government-Provided Services. The interde-
pendency of government-provided services to the establishment 
of a shared-lease service should be avoided or minimized to avoid 
government impact to the enabling of the leased services.
4  Fixed-Price Contract for Developmental Work. A fixed-price contract 
is not appropriate for development of a mission-critical support 
system where significant technology development may be required 
or where substantial changes to requirements may occur.
5  Government Control Under Leased Service. Under a leased-service 
arrangement, NASA must accept some loss of control over phys-
ical assets and accept risks of system outages or failures.
6  Operational Interface. In a fixed-price environment, establish the 
government/contractor operational interface at a point where 
changes in requirements affect only the government side, so far 
as possible.
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7  End-to-End Engineering and Operations Analysis. In a leased-
service approach to obtaining a mission support capability, it is 
just as essential initially to establish a comprehensive end-to-
end systems engineering analysis and an operations and testing 
plan as would be done in a conventional NASA space system 
development program.
8  Considerations for Prime Contractor. The prime contractor must be 
one who has an extensive background in the business at hand.25
Spearing elaborated on these lessons and what happened: 
In a sense, it was like NASA does today. In other words, if 
NASA lets a contract today, we would be in that oversight and 
management role and we would have a group of contractors han-
dling the various elements, usually one lead contractor with some 
subcontractors associated with it. So we had this extra layer in there, 
if you will, with Western Union, driven principally by this shared 
system concept.26
Despite these challenges, work on TDRSS pressed on. Entering its 
final year of development in 1979, hardware fabrication continued in both the 
space and ground segments.27 In the space segment, manufacturing of the high 
precision spacecraft antennas was the main item. Other activities included 
finishing up work on the propulsion system, specifically, qualification testing 
of the propellant tanks and acceptance testing of the Reaction Control System 
(RCS) that will be used to maneuver the satellites. In the ground segment, 
the Operations Building and ground antenna installation at the White Sands 
Ground Terminal (WSGT) was completed while hardware checkout and soft-
ware development continued.28
Since nothing like TDRSS had been built before, technical chal-
lenges were expected. They were essentially the kind of things expected with 
building a brand new system, both in the design, and in particular, with the 
software. One way to describe the nature of a networked system involving 
many components such as the TDRSS is that it is “tightly coupled.” This 
means that the software is such that if there is an anomaly in one part, it is 
going to affect a lot of other parts of the system. Along these lines, TDRSS 
was not only a tightly coupled system but an integrated system as well, with 
many subsystems that all had to work together. As a forerunner to today’s 
so-called lights-out operation, TDRSS was envisioned by its designers to be 
capable of around-the-clock, unattended automatic operations.
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For example, an operating schedule could be uploaded to a TDRS 
spacecraft. From there, it was up to the software to control the system, both 
on the ground and aboard the spacecraft—to configure links and acquire a 
given user satellite at the appropriate times. This was not at all trivial consid-
ering that each TDRS might be accessing 20 satellites at the same time, each 
in their own orbit while entering and exiting the spacecraft’s field-of-view. 
With scheduling now automated, the number of ground controllers and the 
operational cost could be greatly reduced, to the point where personnel were 
needed only to monitor the system and implement changes. This move to 
systems automation was a major intent of the TDRSS. Thus for TDRSS to 
work, the software simply had to work.
Eventually, TRW engineers, working with Goddard, ironed out 
the problems. To demonstrate its capability, Spearing recalled that
One day, just to show off a little bit, when we got it working, 
we had the operations team actually get up from their consoles 
and walk out of the room. We actually watched from a monitor 
to see how the system did. It went right through the whole pro-
cess, acquired the spacecraft, got the signal and the data flowed out 
the back door. We wouldn’t do that normally—just sort of a little 
showoff thing that we did for the local folks. We were not tracking 
the satellite operationally, just using it as a target of opportunity.29
But it proved the point: TDRSS was ready.
Another key hurdle that had to be cleared by the Agency as the ini-
tial operating capability of TDRSS approached was to make sure that there was 
not going to be radio frequency interference with other transmissions. A FCC 
Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis was done in Annapolis to make sure that 
NASA’s new system would “operate on a not-to-interfere basis with other ser-
vices” operating in the 13.25 to 15.35-GHz regime.30 At the heart of this analysis 
were classified DOD assets that operated in the same frequency range.
With the FCC analysis showing no serious radio frequency con-
flicts—and with the planned initial operating capability of the Space Shuttle 
quickly approaching—GSFC, that same year, made some rather significant 
decisions. The most important of these had to do with how the new satellites 
were going to be launched. Instead of sticking with the original decision to use 
a combination of expendable launch vehicles like the Atlas/Centaur and the 
reusable Shuttle, it tied TDRS launches exclusively to the latter. To do this, 
the spacecraft would be mounted atop an Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) rocket 
and the whole stack loaded horizontally inside the Shuttle payload bay. Once 
in Earth orbit, the TDRS/IUS stack would be raised up and gently deployed 
(literally pushed away) from the Orbiter. After it had moved a safe distance, 
the IUS would be ignited placing the TDRS on a course to geosynchronous 
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orbit. The launch mode was officially tied to cost but ostensibly made the 
Shuttle that much more indispensable as it would now be the TDRS’s only 
ticket into space. NASA, in essence, became a key supplier to its own satellite 
contractor. It was a watershed decision, one that would end up directly affect-
ing the fate of TDRSS for years to come.
Other modifications had more to do with the capabilities of the 
satellite itself. Provisions for increasing spacecraft weight, reliability and 
station-keeping fuel reserves were added. Its tolerance in high radio frequency 
interference environments up in geosynchronous orbit was improved. (A 
Spacecom analysis done the year before had indicated that pulsed interference 
signals emanating from ground radar systems could create substantial TDRSS 
system upsets.) Overall, the value of these modifications added about $80 
million to the project, which brought the total value to $866 million, plus 
award fees. When it became apparent that the Shuttle was not going to fly 
until after 1980, NASA slipped the schedule and delayed the launch of TDRS-
1 until December 1980. As it turned out, it would not fly until 1983.31
From 1983 to 1995, NASA launched seven (TDRS-1 through 7) 
first generation TDRSS satellites. At the time, they were the largest and most 
advanced communication satellites ever made, weighing 2,270 kilograms 
(5,000 pounds) each and measuring 17.4 meters (57 feet) from one end of the 
solar panels to the other (equivalent to the height of a five-story building). 
In fact, the spacecraft was so large it would collapse under its own weight 
and could only be opened in the weightlessness of space.32 Physical attributes 
aside, the heart of the spacecraft is its data handling capability. Operating in 
the S- and Ku-band, each satellite’s electronic relay system could handle up to 
300 million bits of information per second (300 Mbps), unheard of at the time 
considering 150 Mbps was considered high-rate service. Since eight bits of 
data make one digital word, this capability was somewhat akin to processing 
three and a half, 20-volume sets of encyclopedias every second.33
Looking somewhat like a giant, robotic bird out of a science fic-
tion novel, the TDRSS spacecraft had several distinguishing, easily recog-
nizable features. Foremost among them were the two huge, wing-like solar 
arrays which provided the satellite with over 1,800-watts of electrical power. 
The total array consisted of six (three on each side) 3.8 by 1.3-meter (12.6 by 
4.2-foot) panels weighing approximately 130 kilograms (288 pounds) with a 
total photo-cell area of 30 square meters (317 square feet). These wings were 
movable so they could  be kept pointed to the Sun. To do this, the arrays rotated 
about a common axis by two identical electro-mechanical drive assemblies 
which were individually controlled (Sun oriented) by the onboard Attitude 
Control System (ACS).34
Solar energy converted by the photo-voltaic cells was  then used to 
charge the onboard nickel-cadmium (NiCd) batteries. These were capable of 
producing a power output of 1,440 watts and were housed in the hexagonal 
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Space Network User’s Guide, SNUG-450, Revision 8, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center)
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equipment module of the main body of the spacecraft. Since electricity was a 
precious commodity (true of any spacecraft), TDRS battery usage was care-
fully monitored and controlled via the ground at White Sands. To maintain 
spacecraft weight symmetry, these batteries were configured in two assem-
blies, each comprised of 36 sealed NiCd cells. With each assembly weighing 
66 kilograms (145 pounds), they were quite heavy, but had good electrical 
capacity at 40 amp-hours each, about that of an automobile battery.35
To show just how far technology had come over the years, the 10 
milliwatt mercury battery that powered the transmitter on the old Vanguard 
satellite was designed to last 10 to 14 days. Since the TDRS batteries were 
not self-contained but rechargeable via solar power, their design life was 10 
years minimum. Since the spacecraft had four major power busses, electricity 
was routed from the solar arrays and batteries to the spacecraft systems using 
an onboard Power Control Unit (PCU). As its name implied, the PCU con-
trolled the charge and discharge rates of the batteries.
All active space vehicles require some type of ACS, or Attitude 
Control System—unless the spacecraft is purely passive like the Echo. On the 
TDRS, the onboard ACS contained all the equipment necessary to control 
its orientation and stabilization. In addition, it served to point the antennas, 
drove the solar arrays and controlled thruster firings for precise, three-axis sta-
tion keeping. Like most modern control systems, the ACS used a combination 
of miniature momentum wheels, gyroscopes, and accelerometers to precisely 
measure its inertial attitude and position in space (exactly how it was oriented 
with respect to the stars and the horizon). An important capability that the 
ACS provided was to recover the satellite should there be a loss in attitude 
control—for example, a spin from a highly unlikely, nondestructive impact 
with space debris.36
Since the spacecraft was designed to stay in orbit for at least 10 
years, it carried its own fuel to provided impulses for maneuvering and preci-
sion station keeping. Onboard were 680 kilograms (1,500 pounds) of hydra-
zine propellant, enough to operate the spacecraft for 10 years.37 Like electrical 
power, the propellant budget was also carefully monitored on the ground. 
Rounding out the ACS was a solar sail which compensated for the effects of 
solar wind against the asymmetrical body shape of the satellite.
In addition to power and propulsion, a critical requirement for any 
spacecraft is the thermal protection needed for it to survive the extreme tem-
peratures of space. On the surface of Earth, we are protected by the atmosphere 
so that temperature changes are relatively gradual. But outside the atmosphere, 
temperatures can swing by more than 280°C (500°F) during each orbit. When 
TDRS was in daylight, the temperature could reach 117°C (243°F); when it 
was on the night side, the temperature dropped to -173°C (-279°F). This is 
why spacecraft are often seen wrapped in gold thermal protection blankets. 
TDRS’s Thermal Control System (TCS) maintained its temperature within 
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acceptable limits during all prelaunch, launch, orbit insertion, and on-orbit 
activities for the duration of its mission. To control the temperature, the TCS 
used a combination of insulation blankets, radiator panels, thermostatically 
controlled heaters, and special reflective surface coatings. For example, radia-
tors were located on the upper and lower faces of the equipment compartment 
to help reduce solar heating effects. Components with nonradiating external 
surfaces were covered by aluminized Mylar or Kapton insulation blankets 
which were electrically grounded together to the main spacecraft structure so 
as to prevent any on-orbit static charge build up.38
Along with the solar arrays, the antennas of the spacecraft were 
undoubtedly its most prominent features. In fact, TDRS carried five antennas. 
Particularly noticeable were the two 4.9-meter (16-foot) diameter, high-gain 
parabolic antennas which resemble giant parasols after unfurling. These were 
the so-called Single Access (SA) antennas, providing dual frequency commu-
nications at both the S-band (2.025 to 2.300 GHz) and Ku-band (13.775 to 
15.0034 GHz). They were called SA because they tracked and relayed com-
munications only with a single user spacecraft at any one time, in response 
to ground commands. The two SA antennas were steerable in two-axes and 
could be slewed for this purpose, following an object as it moved below, cross-
ing TDRS’s field-of-view.39
The high-rate service provided by these antennas was available to 
different satellite users who wanted to use the TDRSS on a time-shared basis. 
While the antenna may only be pointed at a single position, it was capable 
of supporting two users if they were operating at the different S- and Ku-
Band frequencies. In other words, with the SA antennas capable of handling 
dual frequencies, each could actually be used to support two user satellites at 
the same time—one on S-band and one on Ku-band—if both were within 
the antenna’s field-of-view. To keep design complexity at a minimum and 
to reduce circuit cable loss (that is, loss of radio signal strength as it travels 
through a finite length of wiring), the SA receivers and transmitters were 
actually mounted on the back of these large antennas.
Since every pound that is launched into space drives up the cost, 
materials are usually selected with as high a strength-to-weight ratio as pos-
sible, and as durable as possible; exotic manufacturing techniques are thus 
not uncommon. This was particularly true with something as big as the SA 
antennas. In this case, the primary reflector surface was made of a molybde-
num wire mesh, woven like cloth, on the same type of machine used to make 
material for women’s hosiery. For RF reflectivity and thermal tolerance, it was 
clad in 14-carat gold. When unfurled, its 18.9 square meters (203 square feet) 
of mesh was stretched tightly on 16 high-strength tubular ribs by fine, thread-
like quartz cords. In this way, the antenna looked somewhat like a large, 
glittering, metallic spiderweb. Despite the size, the entire antenna structure 
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weighed only about 23 kilograms (50 pounds) on Earth. To help explain 
their lightweight sophistication, NASA liked to publicize the following fact: 
Because of the support and structure that would be needed to counterbalance 
the effect of gravity, an antenna of similar capability and size based on Earth 
would need to weigh about 2,270 kilograms (5,000 pounds).40
Mounted on the lower side of the spacecraft’s main body was 
the MA antenna. It was an electronically steerable, 30-element, phased-
array antenna used to relay communications for multiple customer satellites 
simultaneously. To relay signals, 12 of the elements—called helices—were 
diplexed (split) for transmit and receive while all 20 were used as receive ele-
ments. Signals from each helix antenna were received at the same frequency, 
multiplexed or combined into a single composite signal and transmitted to 
the ground. In the ground equipment, the combined signal was demulti-
plexed and distributed to 20 sets of beam-forming equipment that discrimi-
nate among the 30 signals to extract signals of individual users. So a TDRS 
functioned somewhat like a celestial switchboard, receiving data from up to 
20 different satellites while transmitting to 12, all at the same time. (The 12 
that it was transmitting to could be other satellites or be the same ones from 
which it was receiving data.)41
From its vantage point at geosynchronous altitude, the 13º field-
of-view of the MA meant it could see all spacecraft in orbits of 1000 km (620 
miles) or below—the majority of low-Earth orbit spacecraft. Not only could it 
track all spacecraft below this altitude, it could also track many aircraft simul-
taneously. The MA service was attractive because it was very reliable, and 
for TT&C and low science data rate functions, it could provide user support 
everywhere and at any time. By contrast, the SA service was attractive because 
it could handle high data rates (300 kbps for S-band or 25 Mbps for Ku-band 
SA forward service versus only 10 kbps for MA service). Another difference 
was that the MA antenna operated only in the S-band. More specifically, it 
forwarded signals at 2106.4 MHz and received return signals at 2287.5 MHz.42
When the system was being designed in the 1970s, this S-band only capability 
was deemed sufficient by most communications experts for handling the com-
mercial satellite traffic then envisioned for the coming decade. This is only 
partially true now 35 years later.
While the Single and Multiple Access antennas were fine for com-
municating, tracking, and relaying data between the TDRS and other satel-
lites, they could not be used to actually link the spacecraft with the ground. 
This was done with a separate Space-to-Ground Link antenna, or the SGL. 
It was a pointable, 2-meter (6.6-foot) diameter dish whose only purpose is to 
provide the uplink and downlink between the TDRS and the ground termi-
nals at Whites Sands and Guam. Signals were relayed with the SGL using the 
more bandwidth efficient Ku-band (13.4 to 15.25 GHz). The SGL antenna, 
unassuming in appearance compared to the pair of SA antennas, handled all 
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customer scheduling and service requests as well as NASA’s own TDRSS com-
mand and telemetry. It was, in essence, the customers’ only electronic link 
back to Earth.
Finally, there was the Omni Antenna which supported the space-
craft’s TT&C system. The TT&C collected data from the various onboard 
subsystems and transmitted the telemetry down to White Sands so that the 
The Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TRDS) stowed in the Shuttle payload bay is raised 
to a vertical attitude in preparation for deployment from low-Earth orbit. Shown here is 
TDRS-6 being deployed from the Shuttle Endeavour on STS-54 on 13 January 1993. 
Clearly visible is one of the Single Access (SA) parasol antennas seen folded at the top. 
The solar arrays are also in the stowed position. The Inertial Upper Stage(IUS) is visible 
below the satellite. (NASA Image Number STS054-71-025)
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spacecraft’s health and status could be ascertained (for example, how fast were 
the batteries discharging). Conversely, it processed and implemented com-
mands uplinked from the ground (for example, initiate thruster firings to 
rotate the craft). The TT&C system provided range and range rate information 
by computing precise turnaround-and-retransmission delays in signals to-and-
from the ground.
Once the TDRS was operational in orbit, TT&C was normally 
done at Ku-band through the SGL antenna. However, there were exceptions 
and that was where the Omni came in. Looking rather inconspicuous—an 
oddly-shaped polygon—this omni-directional antenna mounted on the side 
of the main structural body operated in the S-band and was used strictly by 
NASA for command and control. Specifically, it was used during deployment 
from the Shuttle and, if necessary, during system recovery in the event of 
an emergency. It supported no customer services. With the Omni, TDRSS 
control on the ground could switch satellite operations to failsafe mode at any 
time for a variety of reasons: prevention of command lockout caused by fail-
ure of the primary SGL equipment, anomalous spacecraft attitude or pointing 
errors, and something that NASA hoped never happens—remote (hostile) 
takeover of the spacecraft. To put it simply, if one thinks of the SGL as the 
spacecraft’s normal link back to Earth, then the Omni was, for all intents and 
purposes, the spacecraft’s last-chance lifeline.43
E E E
When STS-6 left Pad 39A at the KSC on the afternoon of 4 April 
1983, it had a few firsts. It was the first flight of the new Shuttle Challenger. It was 
the first use of the improved, lightweight External Tank and the lightweight 
SRB casings. The mission had the first spacewalk (EVA) of the Shuttle pro-
gram, one that lasted 4 hours and 17 minutes to check out the new generation 
of spacesuits that will be used by Shuttle astronauts. And finally, it launched the 
first Tracking and Data Relay Satellite, TDRS-1.
The launch, originally slated for 20 January 1983, was delayed sev-
eral times due to leaks discovered in Challenger’s main engine fuel lines while 
it was on the pad. But in an unfortunate turn of events, as engine repairs were 
being made, a severe rain storm swept through the Cape that caused TDRS-1 
to be contaminated while it was still in the Payload Changeout Room (PCR) 
at the pad. As a result, workers had to take it back to its checkout facility, have 
it cleaned, rechecked and remounted into the Shuttle payload bay. (The PCR 
and the payload bay first had to be cleaned out also.) With this temporary 
roadblock cleared, STS-6, commanded by Skylab veteran Paul Weitz, lifted 
off without further delay at 1:30 pm. EST on 4 April, sending the crew of four 
on their five-day mission to deploy the first TDRS.44
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Deployment of a TDRS from the Space Shuttle is a well orches-
trated series of events. After reaching orbit, the Shuttle’s payload bay doors
are opened and its Ku-band antenna deployed. This antenna—stowed on the 
right, forward side of the payload bay—was crucial for checking out and com-
municating with the new satellite. As efficient a bandwidth as Ku-band is, one 
drawback of having to operate in this high frequency is the inherently narrow 
TDRS deployment sequence. (Space Shuttle Mission STS-54 Press Kit, January 1993, 
NASA Headquarters)
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pencil-like beam needed to focus the signals.45 This makes it somewhat diffi-
cult for the SGL antenna to lock onto the signal in order to communicate with 
the Shuttle. However, since an S-band system can get by with an inherently 
larger beam, the Omni antenna is first used to lock the Ku-band antenna into 
position after the satellite is deployed from the Shuttle—a process known as 
acquisition. For anyone who has ever looked for an object in the night sky 
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using a telescope, this is not unlike having to first use a finder-scope to point 
the main telescope in the vicinity of the star.
Once the Omni has locked on, the Ku-band system is turned on. 
To perform the acquisition, the Shuttle’s Ku-band antenna is gimbaled so it 
can acquire the TDRS by executing a preprogrammed search. In this search, 
if the satellite’s SGL signal is not detected within the first 8° of a scan, the 
search automatically expands to 20° and is repeated. The entire search typi-
cally takes only about three minutes. The scanning stops once the acquired 
signal strength meets a given threshold. At that point, the Ku-band system
becomes operational.46
About an hour after release, having moved sufficiently far from the 
Shuttle, the IUS first-stage rocket motor is ignited. Built by Boeing Aerospace 
for the U.S. Air Force, the two-stage IUS solid-rocket boosts the TDRS  into 
its 35,900 kilometer (22,300 mile) geosynchronous orbit since the Shuttle 
itself cannot go that high. This is then followed by a second-stage motor burn. 
Once this burn is successfully completed, the TDRS—still attached to the 
IUS—is well on its way to geosynchronous orbit and the Shuttle and her crew 
have essentially done their job.
There is, however, still more to do, this time by the ground. First, 
there is the geosynchronous insertion burn to circularize the spacecraft’s orbit 
at geosynchronous altitude. This is followed by separation of the satellite from 
the now spent IUS. At this point, the TDRSS team at White Sands com-
mands deployment of the solar arrays. The two 4.9-meter (16-foot) diameter 
SA antennas are then unfurled and pointed toward Earth for the spacecraft 
to begin its checkout. This testing will take place over the next three to five 
months. During this time, the ground will also command small thruster fir-
ings to slowly move the craft and position it at its desired operating location.
Joining Weitz on this mission were Pilot Karol J. Bobko and Mission 
Specialists Donald H. Peterson and F. Story Musgrave, both of whom would 
deploy the satellite from controls inside the aft flight deck. After Challenger was 
successfully inserted into a 286-kilometer (178-mile) circular orbit, the payload 
bay doors were opened and the TDRS-1/IUS stack was raised. Ten hours after 
launch Peterson flipped the switches which allowed the giant satellite to be 
released and gently pushed away from the Shuttle. The first engine burn went 
perfectly. However, the second did not; the motor shutdown prematurely.
For almost three hours, America’s first TDRS  appeared to be lost, 
deaf to all commands. At 9 a.m. EST the following morning—as Goddard 
engineers were busy with contingency procedures—the Goldstone tracking 
station received a faint indication that it had indeed separated from the spent 
IUS. However, its orbit was far from what was needed. Instead of a nice, 
circular 35,900 kilometer orbit, the incomplete engine burn had stranded 
TDRS-1 in a useless 35,325 by 21,790-kilometer (21,950 by 13,540- mile), 
elliptical orbit. Furthermore, instead of zero inclination (orbit parallel to the 
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Equator), it was crossing the Equator at an angle of 2.4º. As if that was not 
enough, the spacecraft was spinning out of control at an alarming rate of 30 
revolutions per minute, or once every two seconds. 
From the ground, the situation looked bleak. There was hope, 
however: Use the onboard ACS (designed only for station keeping maneu-
vers and for adjusting the satellite’s location) to actually finish boosting it 
into geosynchronous orbit. Over the next two months, engineers at Goddard, 
TRW and Contel worked out a series of burns using the small (one pound 
thrust) ACS thrusters to carefully nudge the spacecraft into the proper orbit. 
Since the thrusters are so small, this orbit transfer could not be done with one 
maneuver. It, in fact, took 39 separate commands and consumed some 400 
kilograms (900 pounds) of the usable 635 kilograms (1,400 pounds) of fuel 
onboard TDRS-1. The maneuvers began on 6 June 1983 and took a total of 
three weeks. During this time, overheating caused the total loss of one of the 
two sets of 12 thrusters plus one thruster from the other set.
But the patience paid off. On 29 June 1983, TDRS-1 reached its 
destination, parking itself over the Equator in a “figure-8” loop at 41° west 
longitude, just off the northeast coast of Brazil. There was much to celebrate 
at Goddard. As one flight controller put it, “It was a cliff hanger.”47
A week later, TDRS-1 was turned on for testing. All went well until 
October when the spacecraft began to be plagued by a series of component fail-
ures. First, one of the Ku-band SA diplexers used to combine RF signals failed. 
Shortly thereafter, one of the Ku-band TWT amplifiers on the same antenna 
failed crippling the forward link relay service that it could provide. The failures 
continued. On 19 November 1983, one of the two TWT amplifiers serving 
the other SA antenna also failed. This meant that TDRS-1 had lost one of its 
primary capabilities, the Single Access, Ku-band, forward link relay.
One of the consequences of losing this link was that it prohibited 
the use of the Text And Graphics System (TAGS) onboard the Shuttle. TAGS
was a high-resolution facsimile system that scanned text or graphics and con-
verted the analog scan into a digital bit-stream. Basically, a fancy fax machine 
that operated via telemetry, it provided an on-orbit capability to transmit text, 
maps, high resolution schematics and photographs between the astronauts and 
Houston. In lieu of TAGS, Mission Control—not until 1989 as it turned 
out—had to resort to using the old S-band, Apollo-era teletype system to 
relay text-only instructions up to the crew (for example, procedures, weather, 
crew activity plan changes, etc.).48
Despite these annoying setbacks, Goddard continued testing over 
the next 12 months. The fact that the craft had lost a major link capability 
notwithstanding, NASA declared TDRS-1 operational in December 1984, 
saying “Working solo, TDRS-1 provided more communication coverage . . . 
than the entire network of NASA tracking stations had provided in all previ-
ous Shuttle missions.”49
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It had been a long 20 months since TDRS-1 left Pad 39A.
The ensuing years have born witness to this declaration. Besides 
serving as one of the two primary satellites in the early Space Network, 
TDRS-1, over the years, accumulated a number of firsts to its credit. It was 
the first satellite used to support KSC launches in the early 1990s, returning 
real-time telemetry and video. It also helped close the Zone of Exclusion over 
the Indian Ocean (explained later in the Chapter), providing 100 percent cov-
erage for the ISS, the Space Shuttle and low Earth orbit satellites. In March 
1992, Goddard called on TDRS-1 to quickly aid its Compton Gamma Ray 
Observatory (CGRO) when data recorders onboard the spacecraft failed.
Since the satellite was precessing (that is, changing its orbital incli-
nation or tilt with respect to the Equator) in its orbit almost 1º per year since 
its deployment, it was used serendipitously in ways never expected. Due to its 
changing orbit, TDRS-1 was the first satellite able to see both Poles. In coop-
eration with the National Science Foundation (NSF), NASA put a ground 
station for TDRS-1 in January of 1998 at the exact location of the (true) South 
Pole. The terminal has since given scientists at the Amundsen-Scott Base in 
Antarctica the year-round ability to return high volumes of science data to the 
continental United States. With it, the first connection to the Internet—and 
the first live Web cast—from the North Pole was done as was the first Pole-to-
Pole telephone call connecting the North Pole to the South Pole. The event 
was even recorded in ‘Ripley’s Believe It Or Not’ and the Guinness World 
Records in April 1999.50
NASA considered retiring the aging satellite in 1998, but instead 
allowed the NSF and others to use it for scientific, humanitarian and educa-
tional purposes. For example, TDRS-1 was used in 1998 for a medical emer-
gency at McMurdo Station in Antarctica. Its high-speed connectivity allowed 
scientists to conduct a telemedicine conference, allowing doctors in the U.S. 
to teleconference a welder through an operation on a woman diagnosed with 
breast cancer.
A second working satellite placed into orbit in January 1986 would 
have meant an operational TDRSS and attendant closure of most ground sta-
tions shortly thereafter. Those plans were, however, suddenly dashed when the 
Space Shuttle Challenger met with a horrific demise 73 seconds into its mission 
on 28 January 1986 (STS-51L). At 11:38 EST that morning, it was launched 
atop Pad 39B at the KSC in the 36°F chill of the south Florida winter, the 
coldest ever for a Shuttle mission. The mission was the most publicized NASA 
flight since Sally K. Ride became the first American woman in space on STS-
7 two and a half years earlier. Challenger’s crew of seven was commanded by 
Shuttle veteran Francis R. “Dick” Scobee; joining him were Pilot Michael J. 
Smith; Mission Specialists Ellison S. Onizuka, Judith A. Resnik, and Ronald E. 
McNair; and Payload Specialists S. Christa McAuliffe, a high school social stud-
ies teacher from Concord, New Hampshire and Gregory B. Jarvis, an engineer 
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with TRW. The primary mission of the planned week-long flight was to deploy 
and checkout TDRS-2. However, the fact that McAuliffe was going into space 
garnered the flight more national attention than usual from the media, much 
more so than on any of the previous 17 missions since STS-7.
From liftoff until telemetry was lost, no flight controller observed 
any indication of a problem, although post-flight analysis showed telemetry 
had uncovered some anomalies regarding pressures inside the starboard SRB 
motor shortly after liftoff. The last voice transmission was received via Ponce 
de Leon as Scobee acknowledged a routine main engine throttle up call from 
the Capcom with simply a “Roger, go at throttle up.” Three seconds later, 
a horrified crowd—including many in the crewmember’s families and stu-
dents who had made the trip from New Hampshire to cheer on McAuliffe—
watched, stunned, as Challenger erupted into a giant ball of flames.
Many unfamiliar with the Space Shuttle at first thought this was 
the routine separation of the SRBs. However, the onlookers soon realized 
that something was happening that was anything but routine when they saw 
the SRBs emerging from the cloud without any sign of Challenger. The crew 
The Challenger crewmember remains are transferred from seven hearse vehicles to a 
C-141 at the Kennedy Space Center’s Shuttle Landing Facility for transport to Dover Air 
Force Base, Delaware. The accident that claimed the lives of the ﬁve NASA astronauts 
and two Payload Specialists also set back construction of the TDRSS Space Network by 
32 months. (NASA Image Number GPN-2000-001480)
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apparently had no indication of any problems before the Orbiter rapidly broke 
apart.51 No alarms ever sounded on the flight deck. The first evidence of the 
accident came from live video coverage on the ground and when radars at the 
Cape began picking up multiple objects. 
A Presidential Commission (the Rogers Commission, named after 
Commission Chairman William P. Rogers, a former Secretary of State in the 
Nixon administration) was formed by President Reagan on 3 February 1986 
under Executive Order 12546 to investigate the accident, which by then had 
assumed national tragedy proportions. Four months later, the Commission issued 
its report which included the following conclusion on the cause of the accident:
The consensus of the Commission and participating inves-
tigative agencies is that the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger
was caused by a failure in the joint between the two lower seg-
ments of the right Solid Rocket Motor. The specific failure was 
the destruction of the seals that are intended to prevent hot gases 
from leaking through the joint during the propellant burn of 
the rocket motor. The evidence assembled by the Commission 
indicates that no other element of the Space Shuttle system con-
tributed to this failure.52
Besides the tremendous shock of having lost a flight crew for the 
first time on an actual mission—other astronauts and astronaut candidates had 
been killed before during training and on ground tests—the space agency 
had to deal with the ramifications of a nearly three-year wait as the Shuttle 
would not fly again until September of 1988. The launch manifest had to 
be rearranged. Foremost among the considerations was to resume deploy-
ment of the TDRSs as soon as possible. Getting TDRSS operational had an 
extremely high priority at NASA as its capabilities were needed by so many 
science application satellite missions and of course, the Space Shuttle itself. 
The SN simply had to be established as quickly as possible after Shuttle flights 
resumed. In what is somewhat of a bittersweet irony, the TDRSS program in 
a way benefited from the Challenger disaster in that the hiatus allowed TDRS-
1 to be shaken down as a prototype. The added time before the launch of the 
next spacecraft, TDRS-3, allowed problems with TDRS-1 to be fixed. This 
probably led to longer useful life of the succeeding spacecraft.
After the accident, Shuttle launches were put on hold indefinitely. 
Since Challenger was to have launched all the early TDRS, NASA used 
this down time to begin modifying the payload bay of Discovery for it to 
assume this duty. Following the Rogers investigation and an extensive rede-
sign to the SRBs, Return-to-Flight processing finally began in earnest in 
September of 1987.
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On 16 May 1988, TDRS-3 arrived at the KSC from California 
followed by its IUS eight days later. By the end of May, mechanical mating 
of the two was complete. The pace picked up from there. On the morning of 
July 4th, in a symbolic gesture befitting the moment, the entire STS-26 stack 
was rolled-out of the Vehicle Assembly Building to take the Shuttle’s first steps 
back into space by making its three-mile journey to Pad 39B. Countdown 
tests were conducted over the next few weeks which revealed some leaks 
with the Main Propulsion System as well as the Orbital Maneuvering System. 
However, repairs were successfully done on the pad and on August 29, tech-
nicians installed the satellite into Discovery’s payload bay. One month later, 
NASA managers gave the final go-ahead for launch.53
At 11:37 a.m. EDT on the morning of 29 September 1988, STS-
26, with NASA’s most experienced crew to date, took to the skies of eastern 
Florida. After 32 long months, the Shuttle was back in space, this time flying 
with redesigned SRB field joints along with other safety and performance 
upgrades, including for the first time since STS-4, a (limited) crew escape 
capability. This time, the launch was flawless.54
Twelve minutes later, Discovery was in orbit. Onboard was TDRS-
3. Six hours after reaching orbit, the crew successfully sent it on its way to 
its geosynchronous destination over the Pacific. NASA had for some time 
considered not putting the TDRS-3 payload on STS-26 since it was going to 
be the first mission following Challenger. Risk analysis showed, however, that 
it would have made little difference in terms of probability to mission success 
whether the payload was launched then or on a later mission since launch risk 
did not vary significantly from mission to mission. More importantly, getting 
TDRS-3 deployed was critical for the success of missions down the line.
With TDRS-3 (and TDRS-1) firmly in orbit, NASA finally had 
its long-awaited, dual-satellite SN capability. The two were referred to as 
TDRS-West and a TDRS-East, respectively. But the constellation was far 
from complete. The network called for even more satellites, including on-
orbit spares plus a replacement for the one that was lost on Challenger. In fact, 
the original, first generation constellation called for six satellites total. Today, 
there are nine TDRSS spacecraft on orbit all together.
In the years since, NASA has been criticized (mostly from opposi-
tion in Congress) as to why there are so many satellites “up there”? After all, 
only two are needed to provide 85 percent coverage while three can provide 
100 percent. The answer lies in something called “availability of the system.” 
As a communications network, TDRSS, from the beginning, was designed 
with a very high probability that it would be there when needed. Thus, a very 
high mark or “figure-of-merit” was put on the system—an assurance that 
it was going to be available. Former Associate Administrator Charles Force 
explained  what that meant in terms of the number of satellites required: 
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There are more satellites and more capacity than you need 
because you are shooting at that mark. So that mark is what drove 
the number of TDRSs which were ordered and the replenishment 
satellites. . . . The reason goes right back to the criticality of it and 
the need to make sure that the capacity was there when needed. 
My analogy to a light switch: You turn on a switch and there is a 
satellite up there to do the job.56
Then the issue came up. What should NASA do with all these extra 
satellites—most of which were not needed yet because of the success of those 
already in orbit? The answer, in the eyes of the space agency, was quite simple: 
warehouse (store) them in orbit. Said Force: 
There were some studies done, primarily by TRW . . . which 
said . . . there’s nothing on the satellite that really wears out with 
use except the solar cells degrade slightly with time, [so] there 
was plenty of capacity there. The riskiest thing about a TDRS is 
the launch phase, as demonstrated by the fact that we lost one on 
Challenger and the first one halfway to geosync because the IUS 
failed. So the decision at that point was, we’re better off storing 
them in orbit because then you get by the infant mortality—the 
launch failures and all that sort of stuff. So that’s basically why there 
are so many TDRSs up there. If you look at the requirement, hav-
Table 7-1: First Generation TDRSS Constellation55
Satellite
Launch Date
Shuttle Mission
Geosynchronous 
Longitude Location
TDRS-1 (F1*) April 4, 1983
STS-6 Challenger
49˚W Off the northeast coast of 
Brazil
TDRS-2 January 28, 1986
STS-51L Challenger
— —
TDRS-3 (F3) September 29, 1988
STS-26 Discovery
85˚E Indian Ocean
TDRS-4 (F4) March 13, 1989
STS-29 Discovery
41˚W Atlantic Ocean east of Brazil
TDRS-5 (F5) August 2, 1991
STS-43 Atlantis
174˚W Paciﬁ c Ocean over the 
Phoenix Islands
TDRS-6 (F6) January 13, 1993
STS-54 Endeavour
47˚W Off the northeast coast of 
Brazil
TDRS-7 (F7) July 13, 1995
STS-70 Discovery
171˚W Paciﬁ c Ocean over the 
Phoenix Islands
*GSFC designation F1 through F7 represents TDRS-1 through TDRS-7
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ing 96 percent probability that you’re going to have TDRSS capac-
ity that is needed,…then you have to have x-number of TDRSs. 
And once you’ve got them, you might as well launch them and 
store them on-orbit.57
In fact, the operational availability of the TDRSS is not 96 percent 
but has exceeded 99 percent. This is thus a clear case where the requirement—
and not the cost—drove the program.58
On 13 March 1989, TDRS-4 was launched on STS-29 again 
aboard Discovery. After successfully attaining orbit, it was slowly positioned as 
TDRS-East off the coast of Brazil. After that, TDRS-1 was slowly moved to 
the spare position where it has served ever since on a limited basis under the 
inauspicious name of WART (White Sands Complex Alternative Resource 
Terminal), used by the NSF in their research activities at the South Pole.
TDRS-5 followed on STS-43 on 2 August 1991, this time aboard 
the Shuttle Atlantis. Seventeen months later, on 13 January 1993, TDRS-6 was 
launched on STS-54 aboard Endeavour. The last of the first generation satellites, 
TDRS-7, (included with NASA’s Challenger replacement fund) went into orbit 
13 July 1995 aboard Discovery on STS-70. It was the replacement for the one 
lost on Challenger. With it, NASA’s first generation TDRSS was completed.
Table 7-1 is a summary of the SN as it appeared during the 1990s. 
Since the satellites are capable of being repositioned and NASA at times 
changes their locations so as to maximize network efficiency or to meet spe-
cific mission demands, a good way to look at the table is that it shows the 
locations for a baseline TDRSS constellation.
If one were to take a close look at the satellite locations making up 
the TDRSS constellation, it can be seen that they are clustered in groups of 
roughly 130º apart in longitude around the Equator. This spacing is not by 
chance and has to do with where NASA wanted to put its central network 
ground terminal.
Take, for example, a case where two satellites are spaced 180° apart 
in geosynchronous orbit, one over the Eastern Hemisphere and the other 
over the West. In this arrangement, they would be able to provide complete 
global coverage. But due to curvature of Earth, however, two ground termi-
nals would be required to communicate with them. If this spacing were to 
be reduced, however, from 180º to 130º, then only a single ground terminal 
would be needed.
Goddard network planners understood this well and very early on 
in the program, decided to take advantage of this by locating a single ter-
minal at White Sands in southern New Mexico. The White Sands Ground 
Terminal (WSGT) provides a perfect line-of-sight vantage point from the 
western United States where communications with both TDRS-East and 
TDRS-West could be maintained. To protect physical security, NASA also 
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wanted a location in the continental United States. Finally, like the Mojave 
Desert of California, White Sands is relatively dry in terms of annual rainfall, 
which is important since rain can interfere with Ku-band transmission—one 
of its few disadvantages.
In addition to meeting these requirements, White Sands had also 
continuously served NASA since 1961. Taken together, the decision to put the 
TDRSS ground terminal there was really quite logical. It is interesting to note 
that when the TDRSS Source Evaluation Board (SEB) was deciding between 
Western Union and RCA as to which would be awarded the contract, it gave 
the option for both bidders to propose putting the central ground terminal 
elsewhere, as long as it was within the continental United States. Neither bid-
der chose to do that, both opting instead to use the government-furnished 
land on White Sands, the birthplace of America’s missile testing activities 30 
years earlier.59
Located 25 kilometers (16 miles) northeast of the city of Las Cruces, 
New Mexico, the WSGT is one of the largest and most complex communi-
cation terminals ever built. Run by the Space Network Project Office at the 
GSFC, the WSGT provides the acquisition and relay hardware and software 
necessary to ensure uninterrupted communications between customer space-
craft in orbit and the NASA Integrated Services Network (NISN) that inter-
faces to the various spacecraft control centers. In other words, it is the critical 
hub on the ground that links a user spacecraft to its control center. Without 
it, data from the TDRSS cannot reach its user and commands cannot be sent 
up to the satellite.
The NISN provides the critical ground circuits which make the sys-
tem a true network; without it, TDRSS would just be a collection of satel-
lites and antennas. The ground terminal maintains each TDRS spacecraft in a 
nominal communication mode (Ku-band) at all times and ensures that all sys-
tems aboard the spacecraft are properly configured and functioning properly. It 
transmits the so-called “forward” link traffic to each TDRS spacecraft for relay 
to the designated user satellite. Conversely, the ground terminal receives and 
processes customer spacecraft “return” link, formats and then transmits the data 
to the NISN interface which carries the data to the rest of the user community.
In addition to providing data services, the health and status of each 
TDRS spacecraft must be monitored. This is done by flight controllers at 
White Sands who also track “the birds” in space. As with any large space proj-
ect, testing and simulation are done on a regular basis so as to evaluate the per-
formance of all the elements that make up the system. For example, “mission 
sims” are conducted with White Sands sending commands via the tracking 
and data relay satellites to the user spacecraft, ordering it to perform certain 
functions and self-test diagnostics. If the tests involve the Shuttle or the ISS, 
these commands would originate from the JSC in Houston. Otherwise, they 
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would come from the Project Control Centers at the GSFC or the Network 
Control Center (NCC) at White Sands.60
From the outside, the complex is dominated by three 60-foot Ku-
band dish antennas. Designated “North,” “South,” and “Central,” they are 
the link from the ground to the TDRSS spacecraft in geosynchronous orbit 
35,900 kilometers in the sky. They handle every aspect of TDRSS trans-
missions, from voice to television to data. Satellite commands received from 
various NASA sources are also modulated onto Ku-band frequencies and 
transmitted to orbit via the system. Because of the extremely short wave-
length of Ku-band signals, there is very little room for error. These antennas 
are extremely precise. Surfaces of these antenna dishes cannot deviate by more 
than 0.5 millimeter (0.02 inches) from norm (about the width of 20 human 
hairs) under the extremes of the Southwest desert climate, such as tempera-
The White Sands Ground Terminal (WSGT) is the central hub of NASA’s Tracking and Data
Relay Satellite System (TDRSS). It continues the space agency’s tracking and data network 
presence on the south New Mexico Range, a legacy that dates back to 1961. (NASA Image 
Number HQTC83-907)
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tures and winds, plus the loading variations introduced by gravity at various 
pointing angles. In addition to tolerance, they also have very narrow beam-
widths operating in the Ku-band. As a result, Harris had to build them to 
very fine specifications so that they can be pointed at anytime to within 0.03 
degree and track within 0.01 degree accuracy.61
The complexity of the system can be illustrated by looking at what 
goes on inside the TDRSS Operations Control Center, the large building 
next to the antennas. Satellite command and control functions ordinarily 
found in the space segment of a traditional communication system are, for 
TDRSS, performed by the ground terminal. At the heart of the WSGT are 
the three redundant Space-to-Ground Link Terminals (SGLTs) each of which 
is supported by one of the Ku-band antennas to transmit and receive user traf-
fic. Here resides over 300 racks of state-of-the-art electronics equipment that 
handle everything from data routing to precise timing synchronized to the 
United States Naval Observatory cesium clock to nanosecond—one-billionth 
of a second—accuracy.
The three SGLTs operate autonomously and are, for the most part, 
fully redundant. This means that if one of the SGLTs were to fail, then only 
the TDRS and services supported by that SGLT would be impacted. Breaking 
down the system even further, each SGLT is capable of providing four, Single 
Access, forward and return services for customers. In addition to SA services, 
two of the three SGLTs can support up to five MA return services along with 
one forward MA service.
From this control center, NASA can schedule TDRSS support 
for users and distribute the data from White Sands. Also at the ground ter-
minal are several smaller S-band Tracking, Telemetry & Command System 
(STTCS) antennas. These are used to provide contingency communications 
to a TDRSS spacecraft in the event of a SGLT failure. They are also used to 
communicate with the other on-orbit spare satellites. As an everyday anal-
ogy, the STTCS is somewhat like the “service elevator” in the back of a five-
star hotel that is used for maintenance, whereas the SGLTs are like the main 
“guest elevators” that go directly from the guest floors to the front lobby. The 
White Sands ground terminal and satellites are all automatic and receive their 
operational inputs from the NCC at the GSFC. The NCC is critical to the 
operation of the system and is in many ways the brain of the system. Several 
functions are carried out by the NCC: 1) It serves as the user interface and 
command center of the system. 2) It provides overall management and moni-
toring of the system. 3) It sets up conflict free schedules and establishes the 
user unique configuration details (satellite assignment, start and stop times, 
antenna assignment, pointing information) required for the satellites. To this 
end, over 40 unique configurable items can be provided by the NCC. 62
As technically challenging as the whole process seemed, the Agency 
had good evidence that it was all going to work out. A data relay satellite, ATS-
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6, had been used with success in 1975 on the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. Two 
years later, on 6 December 1977, the Seasat Program provided for data trans-
mission via satellite from Alaska simultaneously to the GSFC and the Naval 
Fleet Numerical Weather Center in Monterey California. Even though the data 
rate was a low 1.544 Mbps, the transmissions served as a feasibility demonstra-
tion for the WSGT which would end up using the same types of circuits.63
On 17 August 1981, four years after ground break on the project, Ed 
Smylie, Associate Administrator for Tracking and Data Acquisition, presided 
over the acceptance ceremony of the White Sands TDRSS Ground Terminal. 
Other NASA dignitaries included Jesse C. Jones, the new Facility Manager 
and his Deputy Louis Gomez. The opening of this new communications ter-
minal—the largest of its kind anywhere in the world—was a much needed 
infusion to the south New Mexico economy which has been tied so closely to 
the DOD. In 1981, for instance, the value of NASA’s contracts and grants to 
institutions in New Mexico, and White Sands in particular, provided between 
$20 to $30 million per year and accounted for 600 jobs and 66 contracts in the 
private sector and universities such as New Mexico State University in nearby 
Las Cruces and the New Mexico Institute of Technology in Socorro.64
With Holloman Air Force Base—operating right outside the gates 
of White Sands Missile Range—soon to be designated as the home for the 
Air Force’s then most advanced and stealthy aircraft, the F-117A Nighthawk 
(better known as the Stealth Fighter), the flatlands of Otero County soon 
boasted some of the most advanced technology found anywhere. Added to this 
was the diverse work NASA was doing with the Department of the Interior 
in the use of remote sensing for diverse applications such as timber manage-
ment, land cover classification, grasslands range management, and deer habitat 
identification.
On the cultural realm, satellite remote sensing technology sup-
ported by TDRSS was used by the National Parks Service to uncover fea-
tures of prehistoric ruins not visible by conventional aerial photography. As 
an example, Smylie pointed out in his dedication speech the new insight into 
the society of the Anasazi Indians that had been gained by remote sensing. 
TDRSS continues to support Earth science research today.65
E E E
With six TDRSS spacecraft now in orbit, the question of reliability 
and the need to support more than just three operational satellites (TDRS-East, 
TDRS-West and the spare) became an issue. The WSGT had three antenna 
systems, perfect for supporting these three operational spacecraft. But now six 
TDRSs were in orbit all needing support from the ground. This, combined 
with a host of data-intensive missions that NASA was planning—missions 
such as the Great Observatories, Spacelab and Spacehab (orbital workshops 
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attached to the Shuttle payload bay), Space Station Freedom (the canceled, U.S.-
only forerunner to the ISS) and the Cosmic Background Explorer—and the 
huge amounts of data returned to Earth all pointed to the need for a second 
TDRSS ground terminal. In August of 1987, NASA approved Project 9717 to 
construct a Second TDRSS Ground Terminal at White Sands.
The STGT, as it would be called, is identical to the first terminal and 
is in fact located just five kilometers (three miles) to the north. Its purpose is 
really twofold: In addition to keeping up with America’s spaceflight communi-
cation requirements in the 1990s and beyond, it would serve as a backup to the 
WSGT, eliminating it as a single point of failure in the event of a breakdown 
or during planned outages for system upgrades and repairs.66 This point was 
driven home on 1 September 1983. On that day, controllers were busy check-
ing out the TDRS-1 spacecraft after it had finally made it to its duty station 
in geosynchronous orbit, when a sudden failure at the WSGT caused a three- 
hour communication outage with the Shuttle (STS-8). Flight controllers did 
not wake the crew, however, since all indications through other communica-
tion links (transponders were in place which could operate in either TDRS or 
ground network mode) showed that everything was otherwise normal onboard 
the vehicle and that this was strictly a communications problem.67 Nevertheless, 
it was a good lesson that a backup was needed. In fact, this second ground ter-
minal was considered so important that design specifications called for it to have 
greater than 0.9999 reliability, or less than one hour per year of down time.68
In 1987, the TDRSS program office initiated competitive definition 
phase studies for the development of a STGT. A year later, General Electric’s 
Military and Data Systems Operations of Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, received 
the prime contract to build the second terminal. This included all the design, 
development, installation, and testing of the $245 million worth of commu-
nication and computer hardware along with all the software. The $14 million 
building construction contract was awarded to Argee Corporation, a civil and 
mining construction company of Denver, Colorado.69
As massive as the original, this new terminal also boasted a 7,430- 
square meter (80,000-square foot) operations building, a 2,320-square meter 
(25,000-square foot) technical support building and an 830-square meter (9,000-
square foot) power plant. Coming on the heels of the Challenger accident, and 
with the rather significant windfall to southern New Mexico economy, ground 
breaking for the new terminal on 9 September 1987 was quite the public affairs 
event. Speakers included Robert O. Aller, NASA Associate Administrator for 
Space Tracking and Data Systems; GSFC Deputy Director John J. Quann; and 
Captain Frederick H. “Rick” Hauck, Commander of the first mission follow-
ing Challenger. In addition to representatives from State and U.S. Congress, dig-
nitaries included Major General Joseph S. Owens, Commander of the White 
Sands Missile Range; John P. Stapp and Gregory P. Kennedy from Alamogordo’s 
Chapter 7 \ A Network in Space 283
own International Space Hall of Fame (one of New Mexico’s top tourist attrac-
tions); and even archaeologists from nearby Las Cruces.70
Before any concrete could be poured, though, NASA had an 
obligation, this one regarding the environment. In keeping with its federal 
mandate to protect cultural and natural resources, test excavations had to be 
conducted near the site of the terminal to see if construction would adversely 
impact any significant archaeological or historical sites. To this end, the space 
agency hired the firm of Batcho & Kauffman from Las Cruces to serve as 
archaeological consultants for this new Space Age project.
Sure enough, excavations soon uncovered Native American arti-
facts on the site. Further digs revealed that NASA had in fact stumbled onto 
quite the archaeological find. In their report, the archaeologists noted that: 
“ . . . it soon became apparent that one of the sites contained the undisturbed 
remains of a pithouse settlement, while the other—located a few miles farther 
south—contained the remains of a temporary camp, probably once used to 
gather and process wild foods.”71
Further research showed these pithouses to be a common type of 
dwelling used by prehistoric Indians in the Southwest United States. Charred 
Photograph of the Second TDRSS Ground Terminal (STGT) at the White Sands Missile 
Range in Southern New Mexico. Towering over the main Operations Building are the 
three 18.3-meter (60-foot) Ku-band antennas. The San Andres Mountains are in the 
background. (Photograph courtesy of NASA)
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roofing material was also found which carbon dated to some time between 
650 and 750 A.D., meaning the site was more than 1,300 years old! In addition 
to the pithouse settlements themselves, a broad area around the dig was also 
excavated in what archaeologists call the “activity areas.” The completeness of 
the find was confirmed as the activity areas contained the remains of outdoor 
camp and cooking fires, as well as large quantities of debris including pieces 
of broken pottery, several arrowheads and discarded or broken stone tools and 
the chips of stones leftover from making them. Also found was a large amount 
of burnt and unburnt animal bones—the last remains of many meals. 
Because of the find, NASA had to move to a second, nearby site. 
It too was excavated. Though not as robust as the first site, a well-preserved 
roasting pit, about 1,000 years old, was found. Based on information from 
early settlers in the area, archaeologists were able to trace the find back to the 
original Mescalero Apaches of the Southwest.
Construction of the terminal eventually embarked on a plot of land 
near the archaeological find. As serendipity would have it, what started out as 
NASA simply fulfilling a legal obligation unexpectedly turned into a portal 
to the past. As one of the archaeologists on the project put it: “While con-
struction is about to begin on this new, high technology facility—to give us 
another window into space—archaeologists have, likewise, been able to open 
a small, yet intimate, window into the dim past.”72
Two and a half years after the ground breaking ceremony, Agency 
officials once again returned to White Sands, this time to hold a formal rib-
bon cutting ceremony dedicating the new and second White Sands terminal. 
Present at the February 1990 ceremony were NASA Administrator Richard 
H. Truly and his wife; Goddard Center Director John W. Townsend, Jr.; a 
contingent of New Mexico officials from Albuquerque and Las Cruces; and 
astronauts John E. Blaha and James F. Buchli, crewmembers of STS-29 that 
deployed TDRS-4.73
With civil construction finished and the new terminal set to open, 
the Agency wanted something special to tie the White Sands Complex (note the 
new name) to the Native American and Southwestern roots of New Mexico. 
After considering several options, the Office of Space Communications, along 
with the nonprofit New Mexico Space Grant Consortium and New Mexico 
State University, decided to sponsor a “Name the Ground Terminals” contest.
In keeping with the spirit of the “Land of Enchantment” and the 
Agency’s charter, entries had to 1) Relate to Native American, Hispanic or 
African American local culture; 2) Be appropriate for space communications 
and America’s involvement in space; 3) Limited to one to two words in length; 
and 4) Show relationship between the two names. Teams from elementary, 
middle and high schools in qualifying school districts of southern New Mexico 
competed. These teams had to abide by some simple rules, such as four stu-
dents per team along with a team coordinator. Teachers were responsible for 
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guiding their team’s activities and for submitting their entry. And each team 
could submit only two names, one for each ground terminal.74
Just as NASA had hoped, the contest proved to be popular, espe-
cially among elementary and middle schoolers. More than 100 entries were 
received. From these, two names—submitted by a team of four girls from Zia 
Middle School in Las Cruces—were selected: Cacique (kah-see-keh) which 
means “leader” and Danzante (dahn-zahn-teh) which means “dancer”. Roots 
of the winning names can be traced back to the Tortugas Indians who pre-
serve their culture through traditional dance. In reaching the names, “the 
students compared the TDRSS to the Tortugas dancers. The dancers com-
The Compton Gamma-Ray Observatory (CGRO) is deployed by the Remote Manipulator 
System aboard the Space Shuttle Atlantis during STS-37 in April 1991. For nearly nine 
years, the observatory studied gamma-rays from objects like black holes, pulsars, qua-
sars, neutron stars, and other celestial objects. The information returned have provided 
scientists clues to the birth, evolution and death of stars, galaxies, and the universe. 
It reentered Earth’s atmosphere and ended its very successful mission in June 2000. 
(NASA Image Number MSFC-0003356)
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municate through complex maneuvers as do the TDRSS satellites, [and] the 
ground terminals are the leaders of this orbital dance,” said Wilson T. Lundy, 
Manager of the White Sands Complex, in an interview after the winning 
entrants were selected.75
NASA was elated. As Charles Force put it, “To those familiar with 
the culture of the Southwest, these names will give meaning to the purpose of 
the stations. To those who understand the role of the stations, the names will 
convey appreciation for the culture of the area.”76 Although the names of the 
stations were never really embraced by the technical community, the contest 
was politically successful and had more than fulfilled its purpose.
As for the four girls from Zia Middle School, they received a two-day, 
all expenses paid trip to tour the JSC in neighboring Texas. In a ceremony on 17 
May 1993, the names for the White Sands terminals were officially announced, 
with presentation of awards to the students by retired Apollo 8 Commander and 
Las Cruces businessman Frank Borman. A year later, the Danzante terminal was 
accepted by NASA and declared a fully operational part of the TDRSS.
E E E
On the morning of 5 April 1991, the Shuttle Atlantis took off on a 
six-day mission, the highlight of which was deployment of the CGRO. Named 
after Ohio Nobel Prize laureate Arthur Holly Compton for his research demon-
strating the particle behavior of electromagnetic radiation, the second of NASA’s 
“Great Observatories” to be launched into space, the CGRO, at 17 metric tons 
(37,500 pounds), was the heaviest astrophysical payload ever flown into space.
The Great Observatories of NASA were four of the largest and 
most powerful space-based telescopes ever put into orbit. Each was similar 
in terms of its size, cost and scope of the program, and all have since made a 
substantial contribution to our understanding of the deep space environment, 
greatly expanding our knowledge of the known universe. Each of these four 
space-based observatories was designed to investigate a specific region of the 
electromagnetic spectrum.
Undoubtedly the best known of the four is the first one to be put 
into space: the $1.5 billion Hubble Space Telescope (HST). Launched aboard 
STS-31 on 24 April 1990, the HST primarily observes the visible spectrum. 
Besides the incredible photographs that have since come from the telescope, 
it also received a lot of media scrutiny early-on over its “blurred vision,” a 
manifestation of a manufacturing imperfection in which the objective mirror 
was ground too flat by 2.2-microns, or 1/50th the width of a human hair. 
Demonstrating the irreplaceable value of human spaceflight, this error was cor-
rected when the crew of STS-61, over the course of four spacewalks, installed 
and checked out corrective optics to the telescope in December 1993.
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Besides the HST and CGRO, there is the Chandra X-ray Observatory, 
launched on 23 July 1999 aboard STS-93 and the Space Infrared Telescope 
Facility (SIRTF) whose primary mission, as its name implies, is observation of 
the infrared spectrum. (The SIRTF, launched on 25 August 2003 aboard a Delta 
II rocket, was later renamed the Spitzer Space Telescope.)77 Aside from perform-
ing each telescope’s own mission, most of which cannot be replicated by ground 
observatories, the Great Observatories program allows the four to synergistically 
interact with each other for greater combined scientific returns. Each astronomi-
cal object in the sky radiates in different wavelengths. But by training two or 
more observatories on an object, combined data can be returned to paint a much 
more comprehensive picture than is possible with just a single instrument.78
After its deployment from STS-37, the CGRO operated as adver-
tised for almost a year, returning more data on that portion of the electro-
magnetic spectrum than the previous six decades put together. But in March 
1992, it suffered a failure of its two onboard tape recorders which restricted 
downlinks of scientific data to real time only. With the tape recorders gone, 
CGRO was able to relay only slightly more than half of the science data it 
collected, because it could not point at a TDRS all the time.
While TDRSS coverage had been about 65 percent of each orbit, 
scientists could not even collect that percentage of data anymore because 
Compton’s instruments had to be turned off during the part of each orbit 
when it passed through the elevated background radiation of the South 
Atlantic Anomaly—a region of significantly increased space radiation expe-
rienced by satellites passing over the South Atlantic Ocean.79 This reduction 
in data return presented an obstacle to the Goddard science team. NASA, 
understandably, wanted to get back to the point where all of the data could 
be retrieved. Furthermore, real-time data dumps could only be done at the 
very slow rate of 32 kilobits-per-second whereas the playback rate was 512 
kilobits-per-second.80
Considering all these factors, in March 1992, Goddard’s Mission 
Operations and Data Systems Division was tasked to study approaches to solve 
this problem utilizing any combination of ground or space resources available. 
Analysis quickly ruled out an independent, Compton-only, ground station as a 
solution due to potential high cost with a relatively small increase in additional 
coverage. An on-orbit Shuttle repair was also looked at but proved too costly, 
even if just one time. But the same study showed that a TDRSS solution could 
produce (up to) full, 100 percent coverage for the Compton observatory.81
The solution was this. One of the existing TDRS spacecraft had 
to be moved and located somewhere over the Indian Ocean. Despite the fact 
that TDRS-1 was near the end of its 10 year design life, it was apparent that 
its remaining functionality—fuel, health, and condition of onboard instru-
ments—was still meeting the requirements needed for an Indian Ocean sat-
ellite. Since this location could not be viewed by the White Sands Complex 
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(being inside the so-called Zone of Exclusion from North America), the solu-
tion was to consider a ground terminal which could see a TDRS spacecraft if 
placed over the Indian Ocean.
The existing DSN sites at Madrid and Canberra could observe the 
TDRS and were thus (initially) the prime candidates. Of the two, Canberra 
had a slightly better line-of-sight. In addition, it had the advantage of being 
located in an English speaking country and had a NASA-like culture in its 
operating infrastructure, the Australian Space Office (ASO). Other ground 
locations were examined too, for example eastern Africa, but were disquali-
fied mainly because they were not under direct NASA control.82
Following completion of the study that summer, Goddard sent out 
a site survey team, which along with members of the ASO, visited five sites 
throughout the commonwealth. Reminiscent of the old STADAN days, the 
team considered such factors as existing hardware, accessibility to long dis-
tance communications, transportation and overall logistical support require-
ments. Based on this survey, the NASA site at the Canberra Deep Space 
Communication Complex (CDSCC) was selected. The pace of establishing the 
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The ﬁrst generation Tracking and Data relay Satellite System (TDRSS) constellation 
as it appeared in 1994, with ﬁve orbiting satellites—two operational and three backups—
in communication with the White Sands Ground Terminal (WSGT) and the GRO Remote 
Terminal System. (Space Shuttle Mission STS-54 Press Kit, January 1993, NASA
Headquarters)
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site was of a high priority since a period of “best science” solar activity was then 
fast approaching.
The $12 million, GRO Remote Terminal System (GRTS) project 
was started without delay on 1 September 1992. Scheduled for completion in 
13 months, the station was built leveraging maximum use of existing equip-
ment. Essentially all of the TT&C equipment was transferred from existing 
resources at other Goddard facilities. Redundancy in design was exploited, 
to the extent feasible and practical, so as to attain good mission assurance. In 
addition, the TT&C equipment used was purposely identical to the existing 
equipment on the CDSCC Deep Space side so that any additional training, 
repair and logistics would be minimized. All of the remaining hardware, such 
as the 9-meter (30-foot) S-band and 5-meter (16.4-foot) Ku-band antennas, 
were bought using existing, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) designs. In 
fact, the overall design of the GRTS was based on that recently used to com-
plete the STGT at the White Sands Complex.
With the help of Raytheon Service Company as the procurement 
agent and Allied Signal Technical Services Corporation providing technical 
support, Goddard was able to complete the entire procurement process—
specifications, solicitations, and negotiation—by January 1993. The Australian 
contribution was significant too, as all of the construction was done in four 
months. This included two antennas, two new S- and Ku-band transmitter 
buildings and a two-kilometer fiber optic cable-run to a remote calibration 
site—an amazing feat in that amount of time.83
On 29 November 1993, White Sands sent a series of commands to 
begin drifting TDRS-1 from its location over the Phoenix Islands in the Pacific 
to the Indian Ocean. The trip took 73 days. A week later, the nearly completed 
GRTS at Tidbinbilla made first contact with the satellite. Then on 9 February 
1994, commands were sent to stabilize the spacecraft at its duty station 85° East 
longitude over the middle of the Indian Ocean. TDRS-1 was now perched atop 
the Eastern Hemisphere and NASA finally had a truly global SN. Data from 
the Compton was received by TDRS-1, downlinked to Tidbinbilla, relayed up 
to an Intelsat commercial satellite where it was downlinked to a commercial 
terminal on the West Coast and then routed to White Sands. From there, the 
data was distributed to scientists around the world. Control of TDRS-1 and the 
Tidbinbilla ground terminal remained at White Sands, marking the first time 
NASA controlled an out-of-view TDRS from that location.
On 14 March 1994, the Agency officially announced the opening 
of the new, remote ground station in Tidbinbilla, Australia. “With activation 
of this ground facility, the TDRS System can, for the first time, provide global 
coverage,” said Charles Force in declaring the new TDRSS station opera-
tional. “While the new ground station is devoted to Compton at this time, it 
has the potential for use by other Earth-orbiting spacecraft.”84
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Compton scientists were elated. Frank J. Stocklin, a mission manager 
at Goddard compared the added capability to the repair of the Hubble Space 
Telescope: 
We’re very pleased that this project came in on budget and 
on time and that we are able to collect additional, significant data 
from Compton in a cost-effective manner. It’s difficult to place a 
dollar value on the additional science data obtained in this effort, 
but the restoration of data recovery capability is similar to that 
done for the HST, and marks the second successful recovery of a 
major NASA observatory.85
Almost immediately, Compton scientists saw a 30 percent jump in 
data returned from their observatory. As useful as the Tidbinbilla station at the 
CDSCC was, though, it still had its fair share of drawbacks. First, the location 
resulted in a lower than desirable elevation look angle to the TDRS in orbit. 
Another problem was related to the inability of TDRS-1 to point its Space 
Ground Link (SGL) antenna far enough south to Canberra to maximize the 
coverage duration for users besides just the Compton observatory. While not 
a serious problem, another location could be better. Then there was the cost 
factor. The ongoing grip of a fiscal mandate to reduce annual maintenance 
and operating costs required some form of ground station automation. And 
finally, there was the geopolitical factor. While the British Commonwealth is 
among the strongest of America’s allies—cooperation of Australia with NASA 
had been impeccable since the days of Minitrack—the United States wanted 
something as important as an overseas TDRSS ground terminal on American 
soil, if at all possible. TDRSS had become a national resource. Although not 
a military asset, the missions and programs it supported had national security 
implications. A “U.S. territory-based solution” was highly desirable.
Guam, once again, stood out. In addition to being a longtime U.S. 
territory, there is the stability offered by virtue of having key DOD presence 
on the island. From its location in the Mariana Islands, Guam is closer to the 
Equator and longitude to a TDRS spacecraft over the Indian Ocean, allowing 
it to accommodate much higher antenna elevation angles than is possible from 
Australia. Besides, the Agency had only just left the island in 1989, finally 
closing down the Guam STDN station after 24 years as one of the most suc-
cessful stations in the history of the Agency’s networks. Thomas A. Gitlin, 
Goddard’s former ground terminal Project Manager summarized it concisely: 
“NASA built the Guam ground station to significantly expand the quantity 
and quality of services we provide to all our customers.”86
In 1995, NASA was ready to begin funding for a new Guam Remote 
Ground Terminal, or GRGT. With the acceptance of the second terminal at 
White Sands the previous year and the launch of TDRS-7 to complete the 
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satellite constellation, $9 million of SN funds became available for this project. 
The remaining $12.4 million needed (for a total of $21.4 million) also came 
from within the SN program office, but in two parts—from phase-down of the 
Compton GRTS in Tidbinbilla and from an unexpected source: greater-than-
anticipated reimbursements by the Columbia Communications Corporation 
for revenues from their agreement with NASA for the lease of excess C-band 
services on the TDRSS. This last point could be called the “remnant” of the 
Western Union debacle, albeit a positive one. Under the original TDRSS con-
tract, a reimbursable, long-term plan for using the commercial capability built 
into the original Western Union TDRS design was negotiated. Despite a long, 
drawn-out, legal process to recover the expected commercial reimbursement 
(involving the Small Business Administration and the courts), the nightmarish 
process did eventually return funds to the Agency and was a good use for a C-
band system that was otherwise totally superfluous.87
The GRGT was designed from the beginning to be a fully auto-
mated, remote station, identical in most respects to its White Sands counter-
part in the United States. Situated on the secure grounds of the Computer 
and Telecommunications Area, Master Station Receiver Site of the U.S. Navy 
base, the station is distinguished by two large radomes which enclose the 5-
meter (16.4-foot) Ku-band and 9-meter (30-foot) S-band antennas, protecting 
them from the typhoons of the central Pacific. Equal in performance with the 
terminals in New Mexico, the Guam terminal provides relay services in the 
form of two S-band and two Ku-band forward and return links. High rate, 
forward service to customer satellites is done at 25 million bits-per-second 
(Mb/s) while the return service rate is double that, at 50 Mb/s. 
Three years after getting the go-ahead, the GRGT was offi-
cially opened in a ribbon-cutting ceremony held on 15 July 1998. Although 
Governor Guerrero was not present this time, the legacy he helped set in 
bringing NASA’s first tracking station to the island three decades earlier had, 
in a way, come full circle. With the Guam terminal operational, the SN’s 
Zone of Exclusion was closed and TDRSS could now provide 100 percent 
coverage regardless of where a satellite is in low-Earth orbit. With the project 
completed, the original Compton remote terminal in Tidbinbella was shut 
down as planned.88
E E E
Even before the first TDRS was deployed by the crew of STS-6 
in April 1983, NASA was already planning for the day when the original 
TDRSS spacecraft would need to be replaced or replenished after their pro-
jected 10-year service life expired. The space agency (and space communica-
tions in general) could take advantage of an increase in capabilities brought on 
by a more advanced, second generation of TDRSS spacecraft. A big factor was 
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that with TDRS-1 through 7, communication links for the Space Shuttle, the 
HST and its Great Observatory companions, and other Earth-orbiting space 
missions are limited to the S- and Ku-bands.
In 1981 and 1982, the Office of Space Tracking and Data Systems 
(OSTDA) conducted a “Prephase A Advanced Study” to look at an advanced 
TDRS System in which communications would utilize the even more efficient 
Ka-band of the radio frequency spectrum. Even at that time, the increasing num-
ber of users in the S-band was starting to crowd that part of the RF spectrum. 
It was obvious that the congestion was only going to get worse as the number 
of satellite users increased in the coming years. With the second generation—or 
TDRS-II—spacecraft, users would be able to take advantage of Ka-band links to 
transmit at higher data rates. Along with the higher frequency, smaller antennas 
could be used than those required at Ku-band—just like smaller antennas are 
required for Ku-band compared to S-band (and VHF before that).89
Following the cessation of all Shuttle flights that ensued after 
Challenger, a Phase A Preliminary Analysis for the TDRS-II was conducted, 
even as the initial satellite constellation was still being completed. A Phase 
B Definition Study followed in August of 1990. With this year-long study, 
specific requirements of a TDRS-II spacecraft were defined, along with spec-
ifications and a roadmap of the potential migration of services to the Ka-
band. Issues which would affect this migration of services to Ka-band were 
addressed, such as availability of commercial off-the-shelf space-qualified 
antennas and equipment with acceptable performance, weight, size, power 
consumption, and cost. On the user end, the study looked at the development 
and qualification of customer antennas which would be needed.
The replenishment program would have three TDRS-II space-
craft—designated TDRS-H, I and J—that would support customer services 
currently provided by TDRS-1 through 7. The three new satellites would be 
functionally equivalent to the original spacecraft with the exception of the 
added Ka-band communications capability and an improved MA capability. 
But there was a major difference, one primarily philosophical. The original 
TDRS spacecraft—not including TDRS-7—hosted a Ku-band commercial 
payload which was to have been used by Western Union but was never acti-
vated, and a commercial C-band antenna and payload package, two of which 
are operated by a commercial service provider. To stay far away from the 
“shared system” approach this time, TDRS-H, I and J were dedicated from 
the beginning to NASA missions and did not include a commercial Ku or C-
band payload. To minimize impact to the user community, the spacecraft was 
designed such that Ka-band used the same SGL design that the original Ku-
band used. In this way, transmissions at the new frequency were essentially 
transparent to the ground station.90
Looking like a high-end version of the original spacecraft, the 
second generation TDRSS spacecraft was still dominated by two 4.5-meter 
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(14.8-foot) diameter steerable SA antennas and a pair of wing-like, solar arrays 
spanning almost 21 meters (68 feet) from one end to the other. But with a 
fully-fueled launch weight of 3,175 kilograms (7,000 pounds), it was nearly 
900 kilograms (2,000 pounds) heavier than the original.91 Based on the then 
newly developed Hughes Spacecraft 601 bus structure, the electrical power, 
TDRS-H, I, and J could provide over two and a half times the data relay capability of 
its predecessors by using Ka-band and other new features. (Photograph courtesy of 
NASA, www.gsfc.nasa.gov/topstory/20021127tdrs_j.html, accessed October 2, 2005)
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attitude determination and control system, and the TT&C units were all 
mounted on the central bus structure, as were the solar arrays.
While the original TDRS used hydrazine monopropellant, the 
new spacecraft now used the higher performing bi-propellant combination 
of monomethyl hydrazine fuel and nitrogen tetroxide oxidizer for attitude 
control and main propulsion. This was a proven propellant combination that 
has been used in the Apollo spacecraft and the Space Shuttle. The RCS used 
this propulsion system to feed a 110-pound thrust (490-newton) liquid apo-
gee kick motor (used for orbit insertion), along with four 2-pound thrusters 
(9-newton) and eight 5-pound thrusters (22-newton) mounted around the 
periphery of the main spacecraft bus to support on-orbit operations over its 
15-year service life.92
In addition to the RCS jets, attitude control was passively main-
tained using a gimbaled momentum wheel for three-axis torquing and angu-
lar momentum “storage.” Continuously operating gyros—updated by Earth 
and Sun sensors on the spacecraft—provided highly accurate, three-axis atti-
tude sensing to point the spacecraft and its antennas in the proper attitude 
Unlike the ﬁrst generation of 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellites, 
TDRS-H, I and J were launched 
using expendable launch vehicles. 
Here, TDRS-H rises from PAD36A,
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station at 
8:56 a.m. EDT on 30 June 2000 atop 
an Atlas IIA/Centaur launch vehicle.
The new satellites augmented 
TDRSS’s existing S- and Ku-band 
capabilities by adding a Ka-band 
capability. (NASA Image Number 
KSC-00PP-0825)
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in the weightlessness of space. Since the nature of Ka-band transmissions 
required a narrower beam and thus tighter pointing accuracy than Ku or 
S-band, the rate gyros used on TDRSS-II were much more robust and had 
significantly fewer moving parts (that can wear out) than those on the first 
generation satellites.93
Integrated into the main bus structure was a system of heat pipes, 
multi-layer insulation, radiators and thermostatic heater controls that provided 
thermal control to the spacecraft—a necessity in the harsh environment of 
geosynchronous orbit. Then there were the two wing-like power arrays cov-
ered with silicon solar cells designed to last 15 years. They provided approxi-
mately 2,300 watts of power, enough to light some 30 common household 
light bulbs. Besides providing electrical power to the spacecraft, they also 
charged four nickel-hydrogen battery packs which supplied power when the 
spacecraft was in darkness.94
Just like the first generation TDRS, the most prominent part of 
spacecrafts H, I, and J were the two, mechanically steerable SA antennas. Made 
of a flexible, graphite reinforced, epoxy mesh, the antennas were furled into a 
taco-like shape and stored for launch. Once deployed, they unfurled and with 
an innovative “spring-back” design, fine adjustments could be made to com-
pensate for on-orbit changes in the dish contour from things like heating and 
cooling in the vacuum of space. The SA antennas used a tri-band electronic 
feed—the device at the focus of the antenna which receives and transmits sig-
nals—to accommodate frequencies in S-, Ku- and Ka-bands. With S-band, 
user satellites with lower gain (less sensitive) antennas, or MA users temporar-
ily requiring an increased data rate, could be accommodated.95
It was used, for instance, to support human missions, science data 
missions such as the HST, and satellite data dumps. With Ka-band, higher 
bandwidth items such as high-resolution digital television—including all 
Space Shuttle video—could be relayed. Also, more transmission traffic and 
higher volumes of data could be dumped to the ground. Finally, with the 
significant increase in transmission performance (so called “figure-of-merit” 
increase) afforded by Ka-band, transmission rates approaching the realm of a 
billion bits-per-second (1 Gbps) were possible. At the TDRS-II specification 
of 800 million bits-per-second, it was over two and half times faster than what 
was possible with the original TDRS operating at Ku-band.96 Again using the 
encyclopedia analogy, that was somewhat akin to downloading ten 20-volume 
encyclopedias each second.
Request for Proposals to build the three next generation satellites 
were issued in April of 1994. After a six-month evaluation, the SEB consist-
ing of members from GSFC and NASA Headquarters presented its recom-
mendation to the Source Selection Official, Charles Force. Force and the SEB 
were convinced that Hughes Space and Communications of Los Angeles (now 
Boeing Satellite Systems after its acquisition in 2000) was the best contrac-
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tor for the job. Not wanting a repeat of the whole Western Union affair, the 
agency this time went with a well-established satellite manufacturer and the 
producer of the commercially proven 601 spacecraft bus design. (Founded 
by billionaire aviator Howard R. Hughes, Jr., the company was in fact the 
world’s largest supplier of commercial satellites in 1995.)
Work started in July, five months after the official announcement. 
This time, the progress was smooth. Over the next two years, the contrac-
tor worked with GSFC to move TDRS-II from a set of requirements onto 
the drawing table and finally into a design which would fly. After passing the 
Critical Design Review in June 1997, the pace picked up as manufacturing 
and testing on the first new satellite, TDRS-H, entered final production.97
One major difference between the second generation TDRS space-
craft and their predecessors was in the way they went into space. The original 
TDRS were launched by the Space Shuttle exclusively. In a move that can still 
be traced back to the Challenger accident, TDRS-H, I, and J were launched 
by an intermediate class of expendable launch vehicles, the Lockheed Martin 
Atlas II-A. Developed to fulfill an expendable launch vehicle requirement to 
supplement United States launch capability following the accident, the Atlas 
II-A, along with its variants, was a two-and-a half stage liquid propellant 
rocket. (The Centaur upper-stage was a so-called “half stage” since it was 
used to position the payload into a separation orbit after booster burnout.) 
Following separation from the Atlas, the TDRS spacecraft was injected into 
its final orbit using its own apogee kick motor.
Launch services using the Atlas II-A were finalized as early as 1997. 
Nearly three years later, the new TDRS-II spacecraft was ready. On 30 June 
2000, TDRS-H successfully lifted off from Launch Complex 36 at Cape 
Canaveral. Since the satellite was not launched by NASA, Boeing had the 
overall responsibility to make sure that it got onto orbit as advertised prior to 
the Agency taking control. It attained orbit without any problems. Its accep-
tance by NASA was delayed, though, due to lower than expected perfor-
mance of the new MA phased array antenna. As a result, ground controllers 
discovered that 5 of the 18 communications services provided by TDRS-H 
performed at less than full capability.
This degradation puzzled both Boeing and NASA since the space-
craft had checked out perfectly on the ground. After a month of troubleshoot-
ing, the culprit was found. Randy H. Brinkley, President of Boeing Satellite 
Systems explained at the time that the hidden problem was traced back to 
a material defect. “We identified the cause of the problem to be rooted in 
one specific material used in the assembly of the antenna and implemented 
straightforward corrective measures for TDRS-I and TDRS-J. We are certain 
that a repeat of this performance shortfall will not occur.”98
Manufacturing changes were implemented and 18 months later, 
on 8 March 2002, the next spacecraft was launched. This time, it performed 
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flawlessly. TDRS-I was followed into orbit 9 months later with the launch of 
the final satellite, TDRS-J, on 4 December 2002.
The three satellites were initially launched into their on-orbit 
“storage locations” over the Phoenix Islands in the mid-Pacific; off the west 
coast of South America near Ecuador; and off the Brazilian coast over the 
Atlantic. There, the satellites stayed, almost in a “garaged” fashion, until they 
were needed. The advantage of having these spacecraft in orbit was that the 
Explorations, Operations, Communications and Navigation Systems Division 
of Goddard, who manages the SN, may change the geosynchronous location 
of any TDRS to any other geosynchronous location assigned to NASA. This 
allowed collocation of two spacecraft in one longitudinal setting. Two second 
generation spacecraft could be located together, if needed, or one first genera-
tion with one second generation. This was quite useful and allowed the use 
of two partially failed spacecraft to be collocated to conserve the limited slots 
available at geosynchronous altitude and to pool together their capabilities.99
With TDRS-II available, the SN was much more flexible and more 
options could be exercised to optimize the TDRSS network for all users. 
A case in point was a high data rate user such as a remote sensing mission 
with large amounts of imaging data. This satellite, which could have onboard 
several bandwidth-intensive instruments, may generate up to three-terabits
(3,000,000,000,000) per day of science data. On top of that was the required 
“overhead” information such as data for link protocols and error correction 
coding, adding another 16 percent or more to the raw science data.100 With 
the first generation TDRS, it would have taken over three hours each day just 
to transfer this data from the spacecraft to the ground. A Ka-band TDRS-II 
SA link at a rate of 800 Mb/s reduced this to about 72 minutes per day. NASA 
may schedule this data transfer in a number of ways. For instance, 5 minutes of 
TDRSS service for every orbit of a satellite or 10 minutes of service on every 
other orbit. If the data was time sensitive, Ka-band service allowed for near 
instantaneous availability of the data to its users, much more so than with the 
original system. While S- and Ku-band capabilities also provided near instan-
taneous services, they required significantly longer transfer times.101
Now consider the case of a small, low-data rate user such as a sin-
gle instrument satellite. It too wanted to use the TDRSS to get data to the 
ground. Although low-data rate users did not require the wide bandwidth 
channels available at Ka-band, they could still benefit from Ka-band services in 
terms of antenna requirements. Take a small low-Earth orbiting spacecraft 
that had only one or two low data rate instruments. It may generate only 20 
gigabits (20,000,000,000) of science data per day. Ka-band MA service at 4 
Mb/s could transfer all that data in less than 7 minutes on each orbit or 13 
minutes on every other orbit. In this case, the user only needed a very small 
10-centimeter (4-inch) diameter parabolic dish or a phased array antenna on 
his satellite. Although small, the parabolic dish would still require a tracking 
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mechanism to keep it pointed at the TDRS spacecraft. On the other hand, a 
phased array antenna would have been especially beneficial since the absence 
of a steearable antenna greatly simplified attitude control of the user satellite 
and minimized moving parts on the spacecraft.102
NASA now had its long awaited TDRSS. With it, the expansive 
network of worldwide ground stations seemed to be a thing of the past. Gary 
A. Morse, former Network Director at Goddard’s Network Control Center, 
reflected on the change TDRSS brought to those who worked on NASA’s 
spaceflight tracking networks:
The concept of the SN was culture shock. Here, instead of a world-
wide net of ground stations, we had two satellites looking down and provid-
ing 85 percent orbit coverage, continuous command and telemetry. We were 
no longer confined to six-minute passes over stationary ground equipment. 
We had to learn an entirely new technology and apply it. With the old ground 
net, we had to rely on redundancy. This switch fails, the backup is activated 
by an operator reaching over and flipping another switch. The new SN was 
less real-time redundant than the GN had been. We had relied heavily on that 
redundancy to remain transparent. Any mission was about the spacecraft that 
was flying, not on what might be going on inside the tracking network. It’s 
our job to focus on the mission . . . The network was there to serve the user, to 
serve the guy that’s flying his spacecraft . . . We might be launching and flying 
fewer spacecraft now, but those in orbit and the ones planned for launch were 
more complex. Data rates were higher. The stakes were higher.103 
E E E
As passé as the ground network may have seemed at the time, the 
advent of TDRSS did not eliminate ground stations all together but merely 
transformed them into a different role. The GN was supposed to have been 
shut down with TDRSS and the SN was supposed to have taken on the load 
for near-Earth activities. But it did not quite happen that way. One reason was 
that a satellite with fairly high data demands still had to have a steerable dish in 
order to communicate with a TDRS. That was an expensive thing to put on 
a satellite, even today. To get around this, the satellite could instead downlink 
to a ground station using only a fixed, much cheaper antenna since a ground 
station was much closer—only some 1,000 kilometers or 600 miles away—
rather than the TDRS orbiting 35,900 kilometers (22,300 miles) overhead.
Users, including NASA itself, understood this. It was inherently 
less expensive for many cost-constrained, particularly Earth science missions, 
to build small ground stations dedicated specifically to support their own mis-
sions. Many of these places were either unattended or minimally attended sta-
tions (for safety) to further reduce cost. Since the TT&C service was the MA 
service and TDRSS could provide that at anytime and anywhere, an interest-
ing synergy developed. Satellites quite often downlinked their high rate sci-
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ence data to their ground station but still used the TDRSS for the lower data, 
lower cost MA capability to monitor its health and status.104
No longer would a STDN ground station be used to track a space-
craft orbiting around Earth or to talk to astronauts in space. Ground stations 
now had a new mission, and that mission could be summed up in one word: 
Science. With TDRSS operational, there was no longer the need for ground 
stations to assume the role of the traditional “tracking station.” Emphasis of a 
GN was now on data acquisition at remote outposts and rocket ranges to sup-
port range safety, Earth science and space research. This paradigm shift in the 
role of the ground stations soon made NASA a key player in what became the 
commercialization of space, taking the Agency to ever more remote regions 
of the globe, even to the North and South Pole.
CHAPTER 8
THE NEW LANDSCAPE
An operational TDRSS did not mean that a GN was not needed. It 
still was, just not in the same way as before. Phase out from the STDN orga-
nization did not put an end to NASA’s ground station activities. Many sites 
operated like they did before TDRSS came along, only now they did so for 
different reasons. No longer called the STDN, the GN played a different role 
to support a different mission.
In the Pacific, the Kauai Station supported the University of Hawaii 
specifically, and the Earth science community at large, operating as the Kokee 
Park Geophysical Observatory (KPGO). As far back as 1981, operations at 
Kauai had reduced from 24/7 around-the-clock operations to a standard 
eight-hour, five-days-a-week schedule. Like many of the stations in the net-
work, Hawaii had seen its fair share of “close calls” when it came to closing. 
Originally scheduled for complete phase out in April of 1984, it kept getting 
postponed while NASA awaited TDRSS to come online.1
The original plan was to transfer the equipment and tracking 
responsibilities of the station to the Navy’s Pacific Missile Range Facility 
(PMRF) on nearby Barking Sands. The memorandum of agreement for this 
transfer had in fact been signed-off by both NASA and the DOD when the 
Challenger accident happened in January 1986. After STS-26, the station was 
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officially closed on 30 September 1989 after TDRS-4 was checked out and 
declared operational, and the transfer to PMRF took take place at that time. 
The Navy took possession of most of the equipment with the exception of one 
key asset which NASA retained, the 9-meter (30-foot) S-band antenna system 
used by KPGO.
One of KPGO’s first assignment in its new Earth observation role 
was to support Goddard’s Crustal Dynamics Project. It joined several other 
observatories in the continental United States, Japan, Chile, and Australia 
to make ultra-precise position determination of the crust using the tracking 
measurement technique called Very Long Baseline Interferometry, or VLBI. 
Kokee Park participated in these NASA and Naval Observatory sponsored 
experiments and because of its location in the mid-Pacific tectonic plate, was 
among the most active of the more than 30 observatories around the world.2
In this application of VLBI, several radio telescopes (observatories)
simultaneously received signals from extra-galactic quasar radio wave sources. 
Using lasers and the most precise clocks in the world, the difference in time of 
arrival of the signals due to the slightly different path lengths from the quasar to 
each VLBI observatory around the world could be determined to an accuracy of
1x10-11 seconds (10-trillionth of a second) and their relative positions measured 
to better than 1 centimeter (0.4 inches).3 These ultra-precise position measure-
ments, when made repeatedly over several years to decades, allowed scientists to 
plot the contemporary motion of the tectonic plates—the enormous pieces of 
Earth’s crust—as they moved slowly with respect to each other. The observatories 
were also able to monitor other geodynamic parameters such as the very complex 
variation of Earth’s spin rate with the minute wobble of the spin axis.
All these gave insight, unavailable before this time, into global geo-
physics and the underlying forces that led to earthquakes, for example. VLBI 
measurements which have been made at KPGO since 1984 and which con-
tinue today, showed clearly that the Hawaiian Islands (located on the Pacific 
plate) move at a rate of some 9 centimeters (3.5 inches) a year with respect to 
the North American plate.
In this new mission, Kokee Park was a principal ground station that 
diversified to support science application satellites from across several U.S. 
government agencies. One was the Department of Commerce’s PEACESAT 
(Pan-Pacific Education and Communication Experiments by Satellite) pro-
gram, which provided medical, educational, and cultural satellite commu-
nications between Hawaii and the remote islands in the Pacific basin. It also 
supported GSFC’s Interplanetary Monitoring Platform-8 (IMP-8) that moni-
tored Earth’s magnetic field and solar wind activities. In addition, KPGO 
supported the GOES (Geostationary Observational Environmental Satellite) 
program for the state of Hawaii.
In South America, the station at Santiago—one of the original 
Minitrack sites established in 1957 and which had been mostly operated by 
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the Chileans—was completely turned over in 1988 to the University of Chile, 
who operates it to this day. NASA, though, still has a stake in the station, but 
now strictly as a customer. Because of its optimal location in the Southern 
Hemisphere, the United States pays Chile about half a million dollars a year 
to support a finite number of satellite passes. The number averages out to 
about two or three passes a day depending on what missions need support. Bill 
Watson at Headquarters explained how the Agency uses the station today to 
meet its data pass requirements. 
Some days we take none, some days we take a lot depending 
on what’s going on. Sometimes Santiago is one of a few Southern 
Hemisphere stations that we have so when something is happening 
in the Southern Hemisphere and we need coverage, that is a con-
venient place. Sometimes there are planetary flybys, JPL satellites 
whizzing by the Earth. They are going so fast near the Earth that 
their big antennas can’t slew fast enough to track, so stations like 
Santiago will support it.4
In effect, a station that the United States in cooperation with the 
government of Chile started nearly 50 years ago continues in its legacy today.
The surest sign that the era of NASA’s world-wide network of 
spaceflight tracking stations have come and gone was when Bermuda was 
finally phased out in 1997. Since 1962, when it first gave John Glenn the “go 
for orbit” call, Bermuda had supported every human spaceflight that NASA 
had flown, making the critical go/no-go call on all of them—an impressive 
resume of 118 missions. On 19 November 1997, Columbia took to the air on 
the 88th flight of the Shuttle program. In a Space Shuttle first, the entire stack 
was rolled from its usual belly-up to a belly-down position in a 40-second 
Roll-To-Heads-Up (RTHU) maneuver six-minutes after liftoff. Prior to this 
flight, such a maneuver would have been used only if a Trans-Atlantic Abort 
emergency landing were declared by Mission Control due to a failed main 
engine or the loss of cabin pressure during the crew’s ascent into orbit.5
The RTHU maneuver was added to eliminate the Shuttle’s large 
External Tank from obstructing the communication line-of-sight between the 
vehicle’s antennas and the TDRS-East spacecraft. By doing so, a smooth hando-
ver from Merritt Island to TDRSS could be made with only a momentary gap 
in coverage. Up until that mission, the Shuttle switched over to the space-based 
tracking satellites only after reaching orbit some eight and a half minutes after 
launch. The RTHU maneuver—used ever since on all low inclination, easterly 
launches—allowed the Orbiter to communicate with TDRS about two and 
a half minutes sooner. (Higher inclination launches towards the northeast for 
flights to the ISS did not have to perform the roll maneuver due to the avail-
ability of DOD tracking stations along the East Coast.) Although tricky, the roll 
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maneuver did not unduly stress the vehicle since it was done well after the SRBs 
had jettisoned and the Shuttle itself had passed through the thickest part of the 
atmosphere so that aerodynamic stresses were not a problem.6
Bermuda was needed no more. Ultimately though, the decision to 
close the site came down to cost. The closing saved NASA $5 million a year, 
which coincidently, was the same amount it cost to build the station in 1961.7
With Bermuda closed, Merritt Island/Ponce de Leon (MILA/PDL) 
became the only source of tracking data for the first seven minutes of each 
Space Shuttle launch. Despite the phase out of all the original ground stations 
in the STDN, MILA still remains. In fact, it is as essential today after over 100 
Space Shuttle launches as it was for STS-1 back in 1981.
Located adjacent to Launch Complex 39 at the KSC, MILA (acro-
nym for “Merritt Island Launch Annex to Cape Canaveral,” the early name 
of the area that was eventually renamed the John F. Kennedy Space Center) 
was greatly expanded in 1972 right after Apollo 17. The site was used to 
get Shuttle data to the Launch Control Center at Kennedy during prelaunch 
testing and terminal countdown. Once the vehicle cleared the tower, MILA 
transmitted data to Mission Control in Houston. The GSFC first established 
MILA in 1966 as a primary MSFN station to provide Earth orbit support for 
Apollo. The station received the first television signals using Unified S-Band 
during the Apollo Saturn 203 mission on 5 July 1966 on a flight first testing 
the performance of the liquid hydrogen fuel in the S-IVB third stage to verify 
its on-orbit restart capability.
Shortly thereafter, GSFC worked with JSC and equipped the station 
with a complete set of flight control consoles in order to train Mission Control 
engineers during prelaunch testing of the CSM and LM. The consoles were 
used until the end of the program in December 1972. In the mid-1970s when 
S-band transmitters were added to NASA’s Delta and Atlas-Centaur expend-
able launch vehicles, MILA became really busy, supporting those programs as 
well as Skylab and Apollo-Soyuz. When the STADAN station at Fort Myers 
was shut down in 1972, its VHF telemetry and communication equipment 
were relocated to MILA, greatly enhancing the station’s capability to also sup-
port application satellites programs.8 With 13 antennas, including a 9-meter 
(30-foot) USB system, C-band radar, full TT&C capabilities and a UHF air-
to-ground voice link for backup, MILA was (and is) NASA’s primary launch 
area tracking station.9
As development of the large SRBs of the Space Shuttle neared com-
pletion in the mid to late 1970s, GSFC, working with the MSFC, predicted a 
potential “plume attenuation” problem in which the high temperature, highly 
reflective plasma in the rockets’ exhaust interfered with MILA’s reception of 
signals from the Shuttle early in its ascent. The phenomenon would have been 
something akin to trying to follow the flight of a bird with a pair of binoculars 
while looking through a cloud. To solve this problem, a site with a different 
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look-angle had to be found. What followed was the Ponce de Leon Station 
(PDL) “wing-site” that was set up in 1979. Located 64 kilometers (40 miles) 
north of MILA on 1.4 acres of U.S. Coast Guard property, it was just south 
of the Ponce de Leon Inlet at New Smyrna Beach. PDL provided a different 
viewing angle, putting it outside of the “plume shadow.” A 4.3-meter (14-
foot) USB system was setup specifically to circumvent this problem.
Upon loss-of-signal at MILA, PDL took over as the primary station 
during a launch, communicating with the Shuttle during its second minute of 
flight. PDL, however, could not directly communicate with Mission Control 
at the JSC; MILA still had to do this. Therefore, a three-hop, microwave 
system with towers at Shiloh and North Wilson were built to relay data from 
the wing-site to the main location (again, not unlike relaying of cell phone 
calls). Strictly a supplement to Merritt Island, Ponce de Leon was normally not 
even staffed, with two or three technicians dispatched to the station to support 
flight readiness, countdown activities and the actual launch.10
With PDL tagged to cover this 60-second gap, according to Shuttle 
flight rules, a backup to the site itself had to be identified. This dual-redundant 
Prior to STS-87, Shuttle ﬂights 
on easterly trajectories went all 
the way into orbit on their backs. 
The Shuttle now performs a Roll-
to-Heads-Up (RTHU) maneuver 
prior to main engine cutoff so that 
communication with TDRSS can 
be established some two and a 
half minutes sooner. This allowed 
the Bermuda Station to be closed 
down in 1997. (NASA Image 
Number GPN-2000-000736)
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requirement harbored back to the early days of NASA human flight operations 
where a back up was required for any system designated as primary. To this end, 
a search was conducted in the southern Florida area to find a location suitable 
to back up Ponce de Leon. Communication link analysis showed that the Air 
Force’s Jonathan Dickinson Missile Tracking Annex ( JDMTA) some 150 kilo-
meters (95 miles) south of the Cape near Jupiter, Florida, could back up PDL for 
S-band downlink. The DOD had constructed this facility in 1985 and 1986 on 
11 acres of land in the state park to provide launch support for their launches and 
missile testing activities. This allowed the Air Force to permanently shut down 
its more expensive Grand Bahama tracking station. (The latter had provided 
launch support for over three decades, from 1954 to 1987, first for the Air Force 
and then for NASA.) Jonathan Dickinson already had everything that Goddard 
engineers were looking for, including radar, telemetry, a microwave relay to the 
Cape, and a command destruct system that could be remotely activated from 
the Cape if it were ever necessary to protect life and property should a launch 
go awry. 
Since MILA was so crucial, the site continually evolved and was 
upgraded. The most dramatic change was its transition from a mostly human-
operated site to autonomous operation, which has, not surprisingly, significantly 
reduced costs. While not a switchover to purely unattended (or “lights-out”) 
operations, the change brought on by the ever increasing reliance on automa-
tion and computer processing has been beneficial, significantly reducing the 
station’s staffing requirements. During the height of Apollo and for STS-1, 
for instance, the station employed upwards of 140 workers. That number has 
dropped dramatically to where less than 40 people are now required.11
Even as staffing was being reduced, modernization of technology 
increased. In 1995, the station went to an “all fiber” system, with fiber optics 
replacing all the communication lines between MILA, PDL and the control 
facilities at the KSC. A year later, a UHF voice system with a powerful, state-
of-the-art quad-helix antenna was installed to support the Shuttle in the event 
of a Return to Launch Site (RTLS) abort. Today, Merritt Island has become a 
full-service spaceport communications facility, boasting a suite of 15 antennas 
that support all phases of a Shuttle flight—from prelaunch checkout to launch, 
on-orbit (via TDRSS) and landing. Leveraging each other’s assets has enabled 
the DOD and NASA (and more recently the commercial launch industry) 
to support a wide range of space launches from Florida. As former Station 
Director Tony Ippolito put it, “All of this has allowed us a more business ori-
ented approach in the operation of MILA.”12
With near-Earth space communications now well covered by the 
TDRSS and the SN (with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s DSN handling 
planetary work), the emphasis for NASA to support suborbital science missions 
has, in turn, made Goddard’s Wallops Flight Facility home to the GN’s most 
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Merritt Island, MILA (top) and Ponce de Leon, PDL (bottom) provided uninterrupted launch 
vehicle tracking out of the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). Shown are the MILA operations 
building along with the station’s two 9-meter (30-foot) Uniﬁed S-band (USB) antennas 
used for tracking, telemetry, command (TT&C), and voice. The less complex PDL “wing 
station” had a 4.3-meter (14.1-foot) antenna used to cover loss-of-signal at MILA from 
the exhaust of the Shuttle’s Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB). (Un-numbered Kennedy Space 
Center images, science.ksc.nasa.gov/facilities/mila/milstor.html, science.ksc.nasa.gov/
facilities/mila/pdl.html, accessed 21 November 2005))
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extensively equipped facility. Located on Wallops Island off the Delmarva 
Peninsula coast of Virginia, Wallops is NASA’s lead facility for implementing 
its suborbital and special low-orbit research projects. Established by the NACA 
in 1945, the 6,200-acre facility is today staffed by 1,000 full-time government 
personnel and contractors who support everything from sounding rocket and 
balloon launches to conducting unpiloted aerial vehicle research.13
The beginnings of Wallops date back to the end of the Second 
World War. In 1945, NACA authorized the LRC to develop the small off-
shore island into an aeronautical range where rocket propelled models can be 
launched to conduct studies of the upper atmosphere. In this way, Wallops 
became the oldest civilian launch site in the United States. The facility 
allowed Langley scientists to have many more options in conducting their 
research, like overcoming the limited capabilities of the wind tunnels of the 
day, for example. With the establishment of NASA in 1958, the creation of the 
“manned-satellite” (Mercury) program and Wallops’s close association with 
Langley and its STG, much of the activities there quickly turned to devel-
oping the components needed for putting a human in space. This included 
designing capsule escape techniques, pressure testing of the early blunt-body 
aerodynamic designs and flight test support of heat shield development and 
ocean recovery techniques.14
In addition to the emphasis put on Mercury, research in the avia-
tion arena continued. The facility’s airport, for instance, was used to develop 
and test runway surface designs for aircraft noise reduction. And it was at 
Wallops that the Scout launch vehicle solidified its place in history as the 
premier rocket for launching small payloads for the scientific community, 
with a remarkable 100 percent success rate since 1976. It was here that the 
Scout became the first solid fuel rocket to place a satellite into orbit when, on 
16 February 1961, it successfully launched a 44-kilogram (96-pound) NASA 
atmospheric research payload into orbit.15
On 19 October 1981, the Wallops Flight Center, as it was then 
called, was consolidated under GSFC management and redesignated the 
Suborbital Projects and Operations Directorate, otherwise known as the 
Wallops Flight Facility. Less than five years later, in April 1986, the track-
ing station that was part of the NTTF located on the grounds of GSFC, was 
transferred to Wallops. The flight facility now had the added responsibility for 
capturing small satellite telemetry, tracking, and command. Many of the first 
satellites supported from the facility would go on to become some of NASA’s 
most successful orbital science platforms. Among them were the IUE, the 
Inter-planetary Monitoring Platform (IMP-7), and the Cosmic Background 
Explorer (COBE). To better handle the additional workload, the facility soon 
underwent a one-year modification where existing hardware was supple-
mented with equipment from former STDN stations around the world that 
were then being phased out. A new communications system was added as part 
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of the upgrade to transmit data from Wallops to the Project Control Centers 
located back at Goddard.16
In the late 1990’s, the facility began developing ways to really 
expand its sphere of operations so as to more effectively support launches at 
locations away from Wallops Island and the immediate Virginia coast area. 
Mission operations at Wallops took on a new dimension when it began operat-
ing the Mobile Range Control System, or MRCS. Developed by the Center’s 
Electrical Systems Branch, the MRCS is a self-contained, transportable launch 
system that can be loaded into a military cargo aircraft such as the C-130 and 
flown around the world to conduct satellite launches at remote locations as 
needed. It in fact acts somewhat like a transportable range, equipped with 
an Uninterruptible Power Supply, a range safety display and redundant com-
mand destruct transmitters for flight termination along with all the necessary 
computers and communication equipment needed to support a launch in a 
“turnkey” fashion.17
Before there was the MRCS, setting up a mobile range was much 
more cumbersome and logistically demanding, translating into higher cost. 
Equipment in several vans and trailers had to be transported either by air or by 
sea and put together upon arrival at the remote location. One former MRCS 
Project Manager noted the tremendous advantage this new system offered, 
saying “In comparison with the older collection of subsystems in separate 
trailers, the fully integrated MRCS can be completely tested prior to ship-
ment. This helps reduce mission support and cost.”18
True to its calling, the Wallops’s mobile range has been well trav-
eled since 1997, supporting launches from the nearby Coquina Outer Banks 
of North Carolina, to the Canary Islands in the East Atlantic and even as far 
north as Kodiak Island, Alaska. To support the commercial launch market, 
the MRCS was in 1999, granted a license by the FAA’s Office of the Associate 
Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation (FAA/AST), which 
allows private paying customers from the U.S. commercial launch industry to 
use the system to launch their payload into space.19
All these developments have made Wallops Island (also known to the 
commercial launch sector as the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport) America’s pre-
eminent small rocket facility. As a controlled range, it has the authority to clear air-
space and reroute planes in times of need. Since Wallops’s mission is so diverse, the 
ground station there is somewhat unique in that it has a combination of some very 
old antennas alongside state-of-the-art equipment. It still operates, for example, an 
original VHF antenna for ISS and Russian Soyuz voice support. A VHF Satellite 
Automatic Tracking Antenna/Satellite Command Antenna on Medium Pedestal—
SATAN/SCAMP telemetry/command system—from the 1960s can also be 
found still operating there. Although rendered obsolete when stations began using 
microwaves to transmit data over long distances, this old system was kept to sup-
port the facility’s suborbital and short-range data needs. Also, there are the original 
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9-meter (30-foot) S-band antennas that tracked Apollo astronauts to the Moon 
and back. These “antiques” can be found still being used everyday alongside the 
station’s state-of-the-art 11-meter (36-foot) S-/X-band dual-feed antenna. As one 
NASA manager puts it, “They have practically one of every kind of antenna out 
there,” which, in some ways, makes Wallops the perfect setting as a nostalgic rocket 
range.20 It bridges the gap between an old fashioned test range nestled along the 
Atlantic coast and the modern twenty-first century spaceport.
E E E
Satellites and spacecraft circling Earth today rely on both the SN 
and the GN in different ways. The GN of today is used primarily to sup-
port aeronautical and atmospheric research, range safety, and high inclination 
(high latitude) orbital communications. It is in this setting that the new era of 
NASA’s communications network is found, the hallmark of which are technol-
ogy expansion and commercialization.
The remote barrier-island location of Wallops Island on Virginia’s Eastern Shore makes 
it ideal for testing aircraft models and launching small rockets. As the space program 
evolved, it became one of the Agency’s mainstays for launching sounding rockets carry-
ing scientiﬁc experiments into the upper atmosphere. In the 1980s, however, a proposal 
emerged to close Wallops as a way of reducing NASA’s operating costs. Instead, ofﬁ-
cials decided to incorporate the facility into the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) as 
it relied on the facility for satellite launch, tracking and data support. In this way, Wallops 
Island Station became the Wallops Flight Facility managed under the Suborbital Projects 
and Operations Directorate at GSFC. (NASA Image Number GPN-2000-001323)
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First, the rapid expansion—indeed evolution—in digital telecom-
munications technology over the last quarter-century has made NASA’s space 
communications a truly global amalgamation that connects every corner of 
the world. This same technological evolution has also greatly improved the 
ability of today’s stations to perform TT&C functions compared to the previ-
ous STDN generation. Station autonomy has greatly reduced the requirements 
for human staffing. The objective is not to eliminate human-in-the-loop but 
let automation do what can be done in terms of scheduling, redundancy, and 
self-testing. Advancements in digital signaling and transmission techniques 
have allowed for the ever increasing demand for higher bandwidths (traffic) 
and lower bit-error-rates (accuracy) to be accommodated.
The other trait which can be used to describe the Agency’s net-
work operations is commercialization. This should not be surprising when one 
looks at the trend of space communication in which NASA has historically set 
the precedence but is now heavily influenced by the commercial sector. Just 
like the demand for better technology is always a driver, as space moves from 
the realm of government sponsorship to being a commercial commodity with 
increasing private industry participation, cost reduction,—and more impor-
tantly—profit in today’s world of real-time global communications is more 
important than ever. It is these fundamental paradigm shifts that have taken 
NASA’s STDN of the past to where it is today. This shift has enabled NASA in 
recent years to put ground stations in very remote regions of the globe where 
it was just simply not feasible a generation ago.
Take Antarctica, for example. The manpower that would have 
been needed to make a continuously operating ground station cost effective 
from such a location would have, in the past, been difficult at best. On top of 
that would have been the technical challenge of how one would get the data 
received at the station in a timely manner to their users who may be scattered 
across many continents.
In 1956, the U.S. Navy established McMurdo Station on the 
continent of Antarctica. At 77˚ 50˚ south latitude, McMurdo is well inside 
the Antarctic Circle and is the southern most harbor in the world. It is also 
Antarctica’s largest community and the continent’s center of activity. Built on 
the bare volcanic rock of Hut Point Peninsula on Ross Island, it is the farthest 
south solid ground that is accessible by ship. As early as 1901, McMurdo took 
on some sense of import when it became the staging point for the race to 
plant the first flag at the South Pole. Among the landmarks still preserved (by 
the New Zealand government) from that era is Hut Point, left behind by the 
doomed expedition of British Naval officer Robert F. Scott and his party in 
1910. That year, Scott—with his team of four companions—embarked on an 
expedition with the aim of becoming the first man to reach the South Pole. 
The 2,964-kilometer (1,842-mile) trip was the longest continuous sled jour-
ney ever attempted in the polar regions. On 18 January 1912, they reached 
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the bottom of the world only to find the tent and flag of the Norwegian 
explorer Roald E. G. Amundsen, who had achieved the goal only five-weeks 
earlier. Demoralized and short on supplies, Scott and his men never made it 
back to McMurdo. The return journey ended in the loss of the entire party. 
Scott came to within 18 kilometers (11 miles) of a supply depot when he 
and his remaining two teammates perished of starvation and exposure. Their 
remains, along with diaries left by Scott in his tent, were found by a search 
party almost eight months later.21
Since 1956, McMurdo has grown from an outpost of a few build-
ings to the largest community on the icy continent with more than 100 struc-
tures, an outlying airport (Williams Field) with landing strips on sea ice and 
shelf ice, and a helicopter pad. Despite its remote location, McMurdo is among 
the most ethnically diverse communities per capita anywhere to be found. 
During the summer months, the population can swell to over 1,000 people, 
attracting scientists, construction workers and polar explorers from all nations 
around the world. During the harsh winter months of March to October, the 
population usually drops down to below 250 people who, except for time of 
emergencies, find themselves pretty much isolated for the winter. 
Like a small town, there is a freshwater system, sewer, telephone, 
and power lines linking the buildings. Science equipment at McMurdo include 
diving equipment, recompression chambers for diving accident victims, cos-
mic ray monitors, and facilities to study magnetosphere and ionosphere phe-
nomena. From the runways of Williams Field 16 kilometers (10 miles) away, 
flights span the continent and to airbases in and out of New Zealand. While 
skid-equipped planes can fly in and out of the frozen landing strips year-
round, it was not until 1992 when a permanent, hard-ice runway on the Ross 
Ice Shelf was completed that larger transporters equipped with wheeled land-
ing gears could come and go more frequently thereby greatly increasing the 
availability of supplies to the delight of the personnel stationed there.22
It is in this unique part of the world that NASA teamed up with the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) to establish the southern most satellite data 
acquisition station in the world.23 The McMurdo Ground Station (MGS) is today 
home to a 10-meter (32-foot) S- and X-dual band NASA antenna located atop 
the 152-meter (500-foot) Arrival Heights peak. From this vantage point, it has 
a fantastic view in all directions. Looking south, it can see satellites on the other 
side of the Pole. NASA’s original requirement there was to support a joint effort 
by the two Agencies (along with international partners) to radar map the entire 
Antarctic continent by satellite.
Operational since 1996, MGS started out collecting X-band telem-
etry (frequencies in the 5- to 11-gigahertz range in the electromagnetic spec-
trum, higher than C-band but lower than Ku-band) on about 25 passes each 
day from ERS-1 and ERS-2 the European Earth Resource Satellites, and 
the Canadian synthetic aperture radar mapping satellite RADARSAT. The 
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station’s S-band capability was put to use not long after in August of 1997 
when a NASA Lewis land imaging satellite malfunctioned and began tum-
bling shortly after launch. Because MGS could see virtually every pass, it was 
a real asset in the rescue attempt. Unfortunately the spacecraft could not be 
stabilized and was consumed in a fiery reentry just 36 days after its launch. 
NASA today uses McMurdo as a data collection hub for satellites monitoring 
ice movements in the Southern Hemisphere. Such data is used immediately 
on site by scientists on the continent as well as by those planning re-supply 
shipping routes in and out of Antarctica.24
Despite the fact that few other ground stations have the capability 
of MGS to collect the enormous volume of data that can only be done at the 
Poles, communications in and out of the continent is still not so good. The 
only way to get data out is through something called the McMurdo TDRSS 
Relay System, or MTRS, which consists of two antennas (4- and 7-meter 
[13- and 23-foot] dishes) that actually communicate with the TDRSS. NASA 
uses a nearby microwave tower to relay signals to the MTRS at a place called 
Black Island located about 50 kilometers (30 miles) closer to the Equator. Due 
to the curvature of Earth and the way a satellite travels in polar orbit, near the 
poles, even this relatively short distance can make a big difference to provide 
McMurdo, Antarctica is the world’s southern-most port and home to numerous expedi-
tions to the South Pole since 1901. The McMurdo Ground Station is located on nearby 
Arrival Heights Peak. (Photograph courtesy of NASA)
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a much better view to relay satellites. The drawback for NASA, however, is 
that since the link is shared with the NSF, it is only used occasionally so as not 
to overwhelm the NSF’s ability to send data off the continent on the always 
busy TDRSS.
Rounding out Antarctic communications is a small system located 
right at the South Pole. Although not really part of NASA’s GN, it allows 
polar scientists there to communicate with TDRS-1—the original satel-
lite—on brief occasions when it pops above the horizon while performing 
its “figure-8” loop in the vicinity of the Equator. These ongoing efforts to 
build a good communications network on this most desolate of places has 
only recently culminated, allowing the inhabitants to join that most global of 
communities: the Internet. This accomplishment is not lost on those who run 
the space agency’s networks. The proclamation “We brought internet to the 
South Pole!” sums up the Agency’s legacy on Antarctica rather nicely.25
E E E
Antarctica and the South Pole are not the only places to have been 
“tamed.” In this new era of ground stations, NASA has also been busy on the 
A team from the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) visit the Intelsat communications 
relay station on Black Island in 1999. Note the microwave tower link back to McMurdo. 
(Photograph courtesy of NASA)
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other end of the globe. While the mid-latitude location of the continental 
United States makes for a good setting for launching science payloads into 
orbit (Wallops, Cape Canaveral), it cannot however, provide routine, low-
cost, launch access to investigate interesting activities that permeate the upper 
atmosphere in the polar regions, activities such as Aurora Borealis, or the 
northern lights. To do this, one must venture near the Arctic Circle, to a place 
called Poker Flat some 30 miles north of Fairbanks, Alaska. 
Owned and operated by the University of Alaska’s Geophysical 
Institute since 1968, Poker Flat Research Range has been primarily dedicated 
to the launch of sounding rockets for the purpose of middle to upper atmo-
spheric research. The first rocket was launched there in 1954. The rather entic-
ing name Poker Flat is believed to have been taken from American author and 
poet F. Bret Harte’s rags-to-riches short story, The Outcasts of Poker Flat, which 
in a way describes the inauspicious beginnings of the original ad hoc launch 
site that was constructed from begged and borrowed materials. But the range 
could have simply been named after nearby Poker Creek. In any case, Poker 
Flat is today the only nongovernment, university owned and operated range 
in the world. It is also the only high-latitude, polar region, rocket launching 
facility in the United States.
Because of its importance, NASA has funded the operation of the 
range under a cooperative agreement with the University of Alaska’s Geophysical 
Institute since 1979, assuming funding responsibilities previously held by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Much bigger 
than the birthplace of America’s missile activities at White Sands, Poker Flat 
is in fact the world’s largest, land-based rocket range. It consists of a chain of 
downrange flight and observation sites spanning inland Alaska to Spitsbergen 
in the Arctic Ocean that are used to monitor and help recover payloads. Since 
it is an active rocket range, NASA and the university have to coordinate their 
activities with many U.S. government agencies. The FAA must approve and 
coordinate the air space during launches. Also, since the range is so large, 
permission to impact rockets and their payload on its 26 million acres of land 
has to be authorized by a whole host of government agencies, including: the 
Bureau of Land Management; the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; the State of 
Alaska Division of Lands; Doyon, Ltd. (the largest private landowner in the 
state of Alaska); and the Village Traditional Councils of Venetie and Arctic 
Village. Unlike bygone days at the dawn of the Space Age, environmental 
regulations mandate much of what can go on at these ranges today.26
As with the oil pipelines a quarter-century before, Alaska today 
serves as the great northern frontier. But this time, instead of energy, the com-
modity is information. More specifically, the information age revolution and 
commercialization of space. In fact, AGS, the Alaska Ground Station at Poker 
Flat, is not really even a NASA owned station at all. Rather, it is part of a 
commercial network of ground stations called DataLynx, which is owned and 
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operated by Honeywell Technology Solutions, Inc. With U.S. and interna-
tional partners such as Universal Space Network, the Australian CSIRO, and 
the Japanese Institute for Aerospace Technology ( JAXA), just to name a few, 
DataLynx has today expanded to over 20 ground stations on six continents.
Mirroring in many ways NASA’s STDN of the previous generation, 
DataLynx stations today operate in a latitude band spanning 78° north at Svalbard, 
Norway, down to 33° south at the Santiago Station operated by the University 
of Chile. In fact, locations of many of the stations harbor back to the STDN 
days (and even earlier), with places like Hartebeesthoek, South Africa; Perth, 
Australia; and as mentioned, Santiago. Other places such as Beijing, China—a 
location which would have been impossible to imagine during the Cold War—
have become part of this new age in commercial networking designed to serve 
satellite-using customers from around the world. With profit openly the bottom 
line, DataLynx, which depends highly on automation and “lights-out” opera-
tions, advertises itself as a “ rapid, proven, reliable, cost effective mission-critical 
. . . distributed partner network,” one that offers 24/7 command, control, and 
communications for “broad and flexible solutions, reducing cost and risk to our 
clients so that they can focus their resources on their core businesses.”27
One of these clients is none other than NASA, the one who subsi-
dizes Poker Flat, the very range that the Alaska Ground Station sits on. With 
$5 to $6 million a year, the Agency literally buys a minimum number of passes 
each day using the station’s 11-meter (36-foot) antenna. (AGS also supplements 
this system with a smaller 5-meter (16.4-foot) S-band system called the Low 
Earth Orbit Terminal as well as a somewhat larger 8-meter (26.24-foot) trans-
portable S-band antenna called the Transportable Orbital Tracking System.) 
Assuming 36 passes a day, this averages out to approximately $400 per pass, 
a figure that is much more economical to NASA than what it would cost to 
otherwise engineer, build, operate, and maintain a station of its own. It is 
therefore a truly joint government/industry arrangement that in the end ben-
efits both NASA and the DatyLynx stakeholders.
Program Executive Bill Watson explained the arrangement which 
in a way captures the business-end of how ground stations in the twenty-first 
century works: “In this case, Honeywell not only owns DataLynx but they also 
won the current contract for operating the GNs. So they consolidated the deal 
and said we will treat the government assets and commercial assets as a pooled 
resource. You give us a guaranteed annual amount of revenue and we will guar-
antee you a minimum number of passes per day, and then if we [NASA] go over 
that, we pay by the pass. So it’s a quasi-government commercial activity.”28
While the Alaska station at Poker Flat is located just outside of the 
Arctic Circle, there is yet another ground station which continues this joint, 
government-to-private enterprise theme but is situated a mere 965 kilometers 
(600 miles) from the North Pole itself. It is here on the Norwegian archipel-
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ago of Svalbard that the world’s northern-most, permanent, satellite ground 
station can be found at 81° latitude near the top of the world.
The earliest written records documenting the existence of these 
frozen polar islands date back to the late twelfth century by the Vikings as they 
sojourned about the Arctic Ocean. For the next 400 years, though, Svalbard—
which means “cold edge” or “cold coast”—was largely forgotten. Then in 
1596, the islands were accidentally rediscovered by an expedition led by the 
great Dutch seaman Willem Barents while searching for a Northeast trade 
passage to Asia. This was followed by the English explorer Henry Hudson, 
who mapped the area and reported good whaling there. This spurred a bitter 
quarrel between English and Dutch whalers over the territory. In 1618, a com-
promise was reached, with the Dutch limiting their operations to the northern 
part, leaving the rest to the English, the French and the Hanseatic League 
(an alliance of trading cities that maintained a trade monopoly over northern 
Europe between the 13th and 17th centuries). The Danes also claimed the 
archipelagos as part of Greenland.
Over the next 300 years, various countries such as Norway, Russia, 
and Sweden laid claim to the islands, this especially after coal—the great source 
of energy that could empower the new steam engines—was discovered there in 
the late nineteenth century. Norway finally took formal possession of Svalbard 
in 1925 after a treaty was signed in Paris after the First World War. (Russia, 
who did not sign the accords, was to dispute Norway’s stance on the islands 
well into the latter part of the century.) The islands again came to the forefront 
when, during the Second World War, it was the scene of some very intense 
naval battles between Germany and the Allies due to its rich deposit of coal.
Although Svalbard’s claim to fame for years had been its geographi-
cal setting serving as the staging point for North Pole explorers, it was not 
until 1990 that Norway officially opened up the region to general tourism, 
greatly expanding its economic base and spurring on the development of new 
industries. In 1997, the Norwegian Space Center (NSC), along with the pri-
vate space conglomerate Konnesberg Satellite Services (KSAT), began putting 
together the Svalbard Satellite Ground Station at Platåberget, near the town 
of Longyearbyen. SvalSat, or SGS, is today a truly general purpose facility, 
providing customers with tracking, telemetry, and data returns from a host of 
polar orbiting satellites.29
While NASA knew that the Alaska Ground Station was in a fairly 
good location at 65° latitude, it could, nevertheless, only observe about 14 out 
of every 16 passes that were actually available each 24 hours. With SGS being 
less than 1,000 kilometers from the North Pole, it could literally see every sin-
gle polar orbit pass. Therefore, when Norway approached NASA to join their 
operations, it was a rather easy decision. The Agency first put up a trailer (often 
covered by a tent to keep the snow off) and an antenna in 1997. The site has 
steadily grown since then into sort of a “space park” of the Arctic. NASA now 
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operates an 11-meter (36-foot) S/X-band antenna there. Here, the Americans 
join the Norwegian Space Center and Kongsberg, as well as EUMETSAT 
(the European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites), 
to make up the world’s northern-most tracking station.
Surrounded by “the King of the Arctic” polar bears—personnel are 
required to carry a weapon when working outside—the space park continues 
to grow. One of its hallmarks is the ability to get large amounts of data quickly 
off the island with the use of fiber optics. NASA arranged in 2004 to have the 
NSC install redundant fiber optics all the way back to the United States, much to 
the delight of data users on the North American continent. With this capability, 
NASA’s communications to Norway today is actually much more robust than 
that to Alaska. Taking the Agency’s domestic, government-industry relationship in 
Alaska to an international level, the operation in Svalbard serves as a model for the 
way space is being treated openly as an international commercial commodity.
Unlike days bygone, the United States and the (former) Soviet 
Union are by no means the only torch bearers. Watson explained:
With its extreme northern location on the Svalbard archipelago (78º13’ latitude), SGS 
is the only ground station in the world able to provide all-orbit support of polar orbiting 
satellites. Six multi-mission antenna systems, along with several minor antenna systems, 
are used for TT&C and operations. One of the systems is dedicated to the NASA Ground 
Network (in shared operations with EUMETSAT) and is operated locally by SvalSat. The 
remaining antennas are remotely controlled and operated from Tromsø at the Tromsø 
Network Operations Center 1,000 kilometers (600 miles) to the south on the Norwegian 
mainland. (KSAT photograph, https://www.spacecommunications.nasa.gov/spacecomm,
accessed 22 August 2007)
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The Norwegians made us a deal. They said you’re [NASA] 
paying $6 million a year now for commercial relay satellite services 
to haul data out of Norway. For $5 million for five years, we will 
install the fiber and then give you the next 15 years for free. How 
could we turn that deal down! And what they did was they made 
a similar offer to NOAA and so between NASA and NOAA, they 
got a revenue stream of about $10 million a year. They went off to 
a commercial financier and got the money, . . . basically borrowed it 
against a promissory. The implication was that NASA and NOAA 
would commit to pay for five-years. . . . They brought two ships in 
and laid redundant fiber, two different paths so if one gets cut, we 
still have the other. It was a remarkable plan.30
Svalbard has proven to be a win-win situation for both NASA and 
the Norwegians. What began as a joint venture to gather a few more satel-
lite passes has basically turned this faraway mining town into what is one of 
the best wired and well connected places anywhere in the world. In a way, 
NASA’s operations at Svalbard bring the GN of the twenty-first century full 
circle to how it all began nearly half a century ago. Back then, the emphasis 
was on hiring local people and training them to “nationalize the station.” This 
worked well at many places, from Chile to Ecuador to Guam. With Norway, 
this is very much a continuation of that legacy, except NASA no longer has 
to provide all the technology and set all the precedence. At Svalbard, the 
Norwegians did not need that “leg up” to turn their concept into a reality.
In a sense, while America was winning the space race, the rest of 
the world caught up.
E E E
Throughout the 1990s, the phrase “Faster, Better, Cheaper” became 
somewhat of a choreographed aphorism that drove much of the way business 
was conducted in the high technology world, both in the private sector and 
in the government. This approach impacted the space program in ways rang-
ing from economics to performance and, some would argue, safety. For critics, 
“Faster, Better, Cheaper” was usually followed by “Two out of three aren’t bad!”
In this era of commercialization, the approach as to how ground sta-
tions were to be built and how they were to be used began to change. “Lights 
out” operations and station autonomy entered the scene. Companies like USN 
and DataLynx entered the playing field. These multimission network termi-
nals offered users the advantage of low cost services based on the philosophy 
of “pay only for what you use.” Like Santiago, they provided services on a 
retainer basis with added “per-pass” cost on actual usage, targeting not only 
commercial users of satellite services but also government users like NASA.
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It was in this renewed atmosphere of cost awareness and infra-
structure reduction that NASA tried implementing an across-the-board 
streamlining of its organizations. This included, in particular, its tracking and 
space communications operations. The goal was actually rather sweeping but 
straight to the point: back the government out of day-to-day operations. To 
do this, all management of space operations was consolidated under a single 
office at the JSC in Houston. The office was named the Space Operations 
Management Office. Known as SOMO, the name would seemingly take on 
a life of its own in the coming years, the mere mention of which, even today, 
conjures up strong feelings on the part of those who were involved.
The decision to establish SOMO was prompted by an Agency-wide 
examination of space operations requirements as part of a so-called Zero Base 
Review, completed in 1995. In this review, representatives from NASA Field 
Centers evaluated opportunities for consolidation, privatization, and com-
mercialization of existing government functions across NASA. The review 
team recommended several initiatives to achieve cost savings while ensuring a 
continued, high quality of operations services. It was decided that a single but 
consolidated, management structure could be implemented that would best 
accommodate these goals. SOMO would be that management organization. 
Theoretically, it could be a centralized office that could quickly respond to 
service requirements as identified by specific NASA programs and projects, 
and even to external (non-Agency) customer requests for similar services—as 
long as NASA operations were not interfered with. Whether this was a good 
idea or not, at least on paper it seemed like it could work.31
Under Administrator Daniel S. Goldin’s direction, the SOMO was 
established the following year. Its central objective was to ensure that exist-
ing NASA assets were used as efficiently as possible and that duplication was 
avoided. This objective unavoidably resulted in shuffling of responsibilities 
(and power) between various organizations within NASA. Not only that, it 
would also go one step farther by eliminating certain offices.32
SOMO was purposely designed to be small, with key positions 
held by about three-dozen individuals from NASA Field Centers who, for all 
intents and purposes, made the decisions in carrying out all the Agency’s space 
operations. Specifically, the Data Services Manager was from the JPL; the 
Missions Services Manager was from Goddard; and the Commercialization 
and NISN Manager was represented by the MSFC.33
Thus from JSC, the office soon ended up basically managing all 
of NASA’s space operations, including its vital communication networks and 
tracking systems. The TDRSS Space Network became a part of it as well as 
the GN, the NISN and JPL’s DSN. In other words, management of the net-
works suddenly—and for those involved, unbelievably—now came under the 
auspices of the JSC. This gave JSC an inordinate amount of power. While 
the move did not take away the GSFC’s day-to-day responsibility of operat-
Chapter 8 \ The New Landscape 323
ing the network (nor JPL for its Deep Space activities), it did significantly 
erode the role that Headquarters had in Washington. The Office of Space 
Communications (OSC, organizational designation “Code O”) responded 
unreservedly to the sweeping mandate to, in effect, do more with less. Staffing 
at OSC was first reduced by 35 percent, then by 60 percent, and finally, 85 per-
cent. This included elimination of 16 senior level GS-15 and higher positions. 
With its role greatly reduced, the job of Headquarters was relegated to con-
ducting external interface, determining program requirements and strategic 
planning.34 In short, Code O was one of those, which for all intents and pur-
poses, eliminated. The numbers back this up. Prior to consolidation, Code O 
had in excess of 50 people at Headquarters working the Agency’s tracking and 
communications needs. After the reorganization, scarcely eight remained.35
To put it bluntly, space communications—at Headquarters as well 
as Goddard—was being gutted. 
The idea of consolidation was radical but seemed noble enough 
at the time. NASA established the SOMO (Code M) to oversee its space 
operations activities and to implement a single Consolidated Space Operations 
Contract (CSOC) as the initial step to reduce the cost of operations. In this 
“integrated operations architecture”, many of the trends which were perme-
ating space communications in general—trends such as the aforementioned 
automation and privatization—could take effect. The thinking was that a 
single, large contract would naturally be more efficient than a plethora of 
smaller ones. On 25 September 1998, NASA awarded the enormous $3.4 bil-
lion operations contract—five year base with an option for an additional five 
years—to a team led by Lockheed Martin. It was one of the most valuable 
outsourcing programs ever undertaken by a civilian agency. Under CSOC, 
five contracts which had up until then operated independently were consoli-
dated on the first day that the contract took effect. (Ten more separate con-
tracts transitioned to CSOC from 1999 to 2004.)36
Even NASA was fully aware, however, that the envisioned cost 
reduction could not take place overnight. While some reduction could be 
gained initially, the contractor work force supporting space operations at five 
NASA Centers would have to be reduced gradually over the 10-year period at 
a rate of slightly less than 100 jobs per year on the average. The idea was that, 
by implementing the reductions over a decade, essentially all of the attrition 
could be absorbed through planned retirement, personal job changes and reas-
signment of contractor employees to other programs.
Even as CSOC was being awarded to industry in 1998, SOMO 
began exploring several additional commercialization initiatives with the aim 
of realizing some further, longer term cost savings. For example, services with 
USN were established. Another component was to provide, using the CSOC 
contract-vehicle with private industry, opportunities to offset some of NASA’s 
operating cost by marketing unused capacity on the TDRSS. One such ini-
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tiative—originally conceived by Code O—was to provide “TDRSS time” 
to commercial oil exploration vessels at sea, as there was virtually no com-
mercially available communication satellite that could support the transfer 
of the large amounts of data for such application. Through these and other 
initiatives, SOMO at the JSC projected that a $1.4 billion cost saving could 
potentially be realized over the next 10 years.37
As optimistic as JSC was on the outside, however, it could simply 
not shed a barrier that soon (and clearly) manifested itself as a growing cancer 
in the whole SOMO idea. When the office was formed in 1996, program 
responsibilities moved from Washington to Houston. This had huge reper-
cussions. While the various Field Centers still had their programs to work, 
this shift in responsibility to Houston naturally did not sit well with them. 
According to Robert Spearing, who witnessed the whole thing and was one 
of those actually recruited back from private industry by NASA to help fix 
the problem, it was putting in charge “an organization that they [the Field 
Centers] felt was ill-equipped to deal with their issues.” Said Spearing, 
What was not understood well was what happens to the work 
that has to go on at Headquarters is very difficult for a Field Center 
to perform because they don’t have the skills for that. A lot of our 
work here at Headquarters relates to working with the other agen-
cies of the federal government, both civilian and military, and also 
working with the Congress to advocate our programs. So you 
ended up having a very limited capability to perform that function 
here at Headquarters.38
Essentially, SOMO had grossly underestimated the importance of 
having a team in Washington to take care of business with the rest of the fed-
eral government (and international partners). Said Spearing:
You have to have the right talent here in town for our rela-
tionships internationally. . . . When you work with international 
organizations like the European Space Agency or the Italian Space 
Agency or the Japanese Space Agencies, all of these organizations 
look to NASA Headquarters. When someone from a Field Center 
goes and represents NASA to these organizations, they see that as 
somewhat of a mismatch. So there were some lessons learned.39
By 1998, just two years after SOMO was set up, it was already 
clear to most that in the process of trying to work issues between the JSC, 
Headquarters, and the other Field Centers like Goddard, Marshall, and JPL, 
that it just was not working. Space Communications had been relegated to an 
office under Code M. There were open and often ugly struggles over who was 
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in charge and who had control. Beset by quagmire, something had to be done. 
The SOMO in Houston eventually came around to this realization. A rather 
laborious process followed in which the OSC was slowly restored. First, the 
position of Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Communications under 
Code M was abolished. It was then placed under the Office of the Deputy 
Associate Administrator for the Space Shuttle. Later in the year, it was again 
transferred, this time under the Director for Resources Management. By 2001, 
Stan C. Newberry, who by then was heading up the SOMO, was holding talks 
about the future of the office with top agency officials at Headquarters. Not 
soon thereafter, and with little fanfare, Administrator Dan Goldin dissolved 
the controversial office and restored program management of space operations 
back to Washington where they remain today. With the restoration of Code O, 
management for tracking, data acquisition, and space communications at NASA 
NASA’s management of its tracking and space communications activities began at 
Headquarters with the establishment of the Ofﬁce of Tracking and Data Acquisition
(OTDA) on 1 November 1961. This photograph shows its staff in the early 1980s. OTDA
was reorganized into the Ofﬁce of Space Tracking and Data Acquisition (OSTDA) in 1983 
and then into the Ofﬁce of Space Operations (OSO) in 1987. It became the Ofﬁce of 
Space Communications (OSC) in 1992. Edmond C. Buckley was OTDA’s ﬁrst Associate
Administrator (1961–1968). He was succeeded in that position by Gerald M. Truszynski
(1968–1978), William C. Schneider (1978–1980), Robert E. Smylie (1980-1983), Robert
O. Aller (1983–1989), Charles T. Force (1989–1996), Wilson T. Lundy (interim Deputy AA
1996), David W. Harris (interim Deputy AA 1997–1998), Robert E. Spearing (1998–present). 
(Photograph courtesy of Charles Force)
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were reconsolidated. Ten years after the controversial reorganization began, the 
OSC was finally restored to the structure Buckley had setup 45 years earlier.
In April 2004, at the end of the five-year base period, the CSOC 
industry contract to the Lockheed-Martin team was terminated and not exer-
cised into the option period.40 OSC at Headquarters not only survived the 
SOMO fiasco, it broke apart CSOC. The separate set of five contracts (now 
collectively called Space Mission Communications and Data Services) divided 
CSOC’s functions fairly equally across three NASA centers—Goddard, 
Kennedy, and Marshall. The new contracts were collectively worth about 
$400 million a year, roughly equal to the annual average of the old CSOC. 
But now Headquarters intended to award, manage and determine the specifics 
of each contract separately.41
Regarding the whole affair, James Costrell of the OSC said, “It was 
a new concept to NASA. The theory was that spacecom (space communica-
tions) is spacecom, that it’s all the same. So NASA charged ahead with the idea 
that a consolidated contract would result in efficiencies.”42
Of course, it didn’t quite work out that way. With the contract 
managed by SOMO from Houston, other Field Centers found that Lockheed-
Martin and its subcontractors could not respond to their needs very effectively. 
The contract had other weaknesses too. Among the worst was that NASA had 
to renegotiate prices with the contractors whenever conditions changed. For 
instance, if the Agency ended a mission, closed a tracking station or took any 
action that altered the work needed from the industry team, Agency and com-
pany managers had to agree on cost revisions. Through the lessons of SOMO 
and consolidation, NASA learned (the hard way) that one size does not always 
fit; divide and conquer sometimes works better. “What the agency finally 
came to grips with was that there are some fundamental differences between 
the various communications activities,” Costrell said.43
Although the controversy and subsequent fallout of what is now sim-
ply referred to as “consolidation” inside NASA may have in many ways been a 
failed experiment and a bitter pill to swallow (many were reassigned from GSFC 
and Headquarters or left the Agency), the ensuing years have shown the resiliency 
of America’s space agency as an organization to overcome and move forward from 
its setbacks.44 The revolutionary, new kind of network ushered in by TDRSS 
and the new mission of today’s network of ground stations have helped set the 
stage for the coming decade. On 14 January 2004, President George W. Bush 
announced his “New Vision for Space Exploration” to return astronauts to the 
Moon by the year 2020 to be followed by mankind’s first journeys to a neighbor-
ing planet.
Space communications have indeed come a long way since engi-
neers first tried to keep track on a little sphere called Sputnik as it beeped it way 
around the globe. Today, that same technology—which allowed the world to 
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watch live broadcasts of the 1964 Tokyo Games to the “space handshake” of 
Apollo-Soyuz and webcasting of telemedicine from Antarctica—continues 
to provide people around the world with sharing of everyday technologies 
not possible before. Such is the diversity that has allowed live communica-
tions from virtually anywhere in the world. Families who have not seen each 
other in years can stay in touch using cellular telephone networks and video 
networking on their personal computers. Brilliant HDTV via satellite can be 
enjoyed, for example, by the outdoorsman on a camping excursion hundreds 
of kilometers from the nearest city.
As NASA prepares to send humans back to the Moon and launch 
evermore ambitious space missions into Earth orbit and beyond, the tracking and 
communications network which Jack Mengel, Ozzie Covington, Ed Buckley 
and so many others began not so long ago will be there to meet the challenge.

CHAPTER 9
A LEGACY
NASA’s STDN supported every U.S. space mission since 1958. Its 
desire was to stay inconspicuous, the more invisible the better. Much like an 
offensive lineman in the game of football or a player in an orchestra, they did 
not want their name called because it usually meant there was a penalty or a 
wrong note. Yet, the team could not win without the lineman nor could the 
orchestra music make without every member playing the right note.
How will space communications progress in the decades ahead and 
how will it best be able to build on the accomplishments of the past?
This is the question the NASA finds itself asking at the dawn of the 
twenty-first century. But this is not new. 
Man has made remarkable strides in penetrating the atmo-
sphere surrounding his planet and even venturing into space. 
Scores of objects have been launched into space, many to roam 
the solar system forever. We stand now on the threshold of a new 
era of discovery.1
This was not the reflection of a modern day philosopher, but rather, 
something that Ed Buckley said in 1966 even before man had first left the 
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confines of Earth. Bill Wood echoed this sentiment when he was asked in 
1983 even before the first TDRS was launched just what the future holds for 
spaceflight tracking and communications. 
Today, the problems are hardly any different: how to handle 
reliably and economically a data flow now grown to 50 million 
bits-per-second and how to make the best use of these data in 
our search for new knowledge for the benefit of all mankind. 
We may have new and more advanced technology, but the chal-
lenge remains. . . . Our motto was a rather basic one: ‘Close is good 
enough when you are playing horseshoes, but that is not good 
enough for manned spaceflight!’2
The challenge remains. Instead of megabytes (millions of bytes of 
digital data), today space communications work in gigabytes and terabytes 
(billions of bytes and higher). Just like it took the pioneers of aviation nearly 
half a century to go from 10 miles per hour to the speed of sound, the last 50 
years of the twentieth century has seen tracking and space communications go 
from the picket line of Minitrack to the near-instantaneous, on-demand ser-
vices offered by an invisible network that sees an entire hemisphere of Earth 
from 36,000 kilometers away.
In an age when global weather forecasts, spectacular images of 
celestial objects never before seen from space, and live images of astronauts 
living and working in space are taken for granted, it is difficult to imagine 
a time when America was struggling to put satellites into space. Engineers 
were not even sure whether or not they could be reliably tracked let alone 
prove useful on an everyday basis. From optical and radar tracking to radio 
interferometry, and from the large, automatic tracking antennas of the 1960s 
to the SN of today, advancement in communications technology has under-
gone many evolutions during this time. In fact, entirely new industries have 
been spawned. Though it may sound a bit trite, the continuing legacy of the 
spaceflight networks through its many incarnations has not only produced 
America’s success in space but has, in its own way, contributed to such spin-
offs as calculators, personal computers, digital watches, cellular telephones, 
and internet links to remote corners of the world. From VHF and UHF to 
S-band and Ka-band, the exploitation of higher and higher frequencies across 
the radio spectrum has enabled the spaceflight networks to meet and plan for 
the ever-increasing demand for higher bandwidths that are needed both today 
and for visions on the horizon.
But more than the technology itself, the history of America’s STDN 
is a testament to the people behind the scenes who made it work, both as an 
organization and as a technological marvel. Leading the way has been the 
organization at NASA’s GSFC, the Agency’s focal point for all near-Earth 
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communications and scientific satellite work, a role which it continues to 
enjoy today. Henry Clements, who was the first Network Controller during 
Project Mercury, reflected on the role of this Center. 
As for the support provided by the Goddard tracking and com-
munications team, it was outstanding—though it has been largely 
unrecognized even within NASA’s own family. Management, out-
side the JSC, all too often failed to recognize the very important 
contributions made by these men and women, engineers and com-
puter experts who were stationed around the world. We could not 
have done it without them. They got the data to us.3
Vern Stelter, who ran the Center’s Communications Division from 
1962 to 1973, summarized what he and his people were all about. “We were 
there, but determined to be invisible. Ours was a service on which the pro-
grams could depend. We were there when needed.”4
This unpretentious mindset that the spaceflight tracking network 
be an “invisible network”—or as former Associate Administrator Charles 
Force put it like a light switch, always there when you turn it on—was some-
thing that Ozzie Covington always stood by. Said Covington unpretentiously 
years ago:
I must confess, I had never been able to actually pinpoint what 
my contributions were. Granted, we pushed the state of the art 
in the areas of tracking, communications, and computer appli-
cations. Maybe it was the assembling of a first rate team of men 
and women—both in NASA and private industry—who in fact 
deserve the credit. We were only in the background, providing the 
links between the astronauts and the Earth.5
This first rate team was in fact a testimony to what can be accom-
plished when industry and the government develop a high level of trust. From 
Bendix field technicians like Gary Schulz to Senior Managers like Glenn 
Smith and Cliff Benson or Program Manager Larry Jochen, working the net-
works became a way of life. Like the early days of Mercury when the Agency 
had “Go Fever”, many had “Island Fever”. Some ended up spending their 
entire careers with the contractor teams, hopping from one locale to another. 
Some brought their families, others found new ones. As one former supervisor 
put it, “We didn’t make a lot of money, but we had a lot of fun!”6
Murray Weingarten, President and Chairman of the Board for 
Bendix from 1973 to 1989 and who was perhaps the one most influential in 
establishing this esprit de corps of contractors, once summarized this legacy: 
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During the peak of the U.S. space program, some 2,300 Bendix 
people were committed to this effort. It was a good marriage, based 
on professional relationships and a dedication that would be dif-
ficult for some to understand. It was a productive partnership for 
both the government and private industry. There is no doubt that 
it has been effective, and we take great pride that the Congress of 
the United States referred to these people—both government and 
industry—as the ‘unsung heroes of the space program.’7
Author Alfred Rosenthal in 1982 interviewed Gerald M. Truszynski, 
NASA’s top official for Tracking and Data Acquisition from 1968 to 1978, 
and asked him to describe how the Agency (in particular, the importance of 
Headquarters charting the course and delegating the responsibilities to the 
Field Centers) and its contractors were able to meet the unique challenges of 
the time. The fabric of Truszynski’s remark is as true today as when he first 
spoke compellingly of it 25 years ago:
One of the major reasons for the outstanding success of the 
NASA tracking and data acquisition networks lies in the organi-
zational and management approach taken by NASA in this vital 
area of flight program support. While the variety of these programs 
was quite broad—ranging from research sounding rockets through 
scientific satellites, manned missions of great complexity and far 
ranging planetary missions—all needed the very necessary com-
mon denominator of reliable, and in most cases, worldwide track-
ing and data acquisition support for their accomplishment.
In the beginning days of the space program, there was a ten-
dency to look upon tracking and data support as an associated part 
of major flight program functions, or as a necessary part of launch 
vehicle operations. However, early in the 1960s, we were successful 
in making the point to NASA management that there was a need 
to organize the tracking and data acquisition and communications 
function as a single, centralized entity, responsible for the develop-
ment, implementation and operation of these facilities for support 
of all of NASA’s flight programs. This resulted in a highly efficient 
structure and gave us the necessary resident technical expertise—in 
one office—to plan, develop, budget and defend before Congress 
the requirements for this key activity in an integrated fashion.
The office was able to become an integral part of the over-
all program planning function at NASA Headquarters and was 
involved, early on, in the evolution of every major program and 
thus able to translate mission requirements into network require-
ments in a timely manner. We now could plan our own destiny. We 
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were given control over our own financial resources along with 
the technical expertise in the NASA Field Centers—primarily the 
Goddard Space Flight Center and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory—
where major elements of these centers were directly associated 
with the tracking and data acquisition function.
The dedication of the people at these Centers was a major 
factor in the success of our program, and deserving of particular 
mention. We involved them directly in our planning and, with the 
splendid cooperation of the Center Directors, had the ability to 
deal quite directly with the appropriate technical groups to handle 
our problems with a minimum of administrative delay. Over the 
years, we evolved a network capability which was extremely reli-
able by requiring that systems committed for implementation into 
the network were within the state of the art and had the neces-
sary developmental and test lead times to assure their operational 
integrity. This, despite the fact that we were working under too 
stringent, fixed time constraints. Because of this record, we were 
able to earn the confidence of the flight programs, the support of 
our management, and the Congress, which gave us the financial 
resources to get the job done.
Another important element in the success of our operations
was the good international cooperation we enjoyed where we were 
required to establish tracking stations in foreign countries. We, at the 
outset, always approached each country involved as partners, never 
attempting to or even suggesting that we establish ‘Little Americas.’
We encouraged the active participation of the host country in the 
planning, construction, and subsequent operation of the tracking 
stations. As a result, we were never refused permission to establish 
our facilities. Zanzibar [and Havana] was the only facility we had to 
vacate on short notice when a coup toppled the government.
In the final analysis, the success of any activity usually can be 
traced to the individual efforts of the personnel who were highly 
skilled and dedicated in their efforts to provide the highest quality 
and roost reliable support possible to the space flight programs. The 
late Congressman Olin Teague referred to these individuals as ‘the 
unsung heroes of the space program.’ I certainly share his senti-
ments and thank each one for a job well done.8
As the space agency builds on these accomplishments moving into 
the future, some challenges remain the same. But some are quite different. 
Take the ISS and the Space Shuttle—which NASA plans to retire in 2010 after 
completion of the ISS. To support a Shuttle launch, it is not just the Agency’s 
Space and Ground Networks that are involved. It is a collaborative effort 
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between NASA and the DOD, with international partners also having a stake. 
In a sense, NASA integrates a network from different organizations in order 
to meet a particular mission need. And when that mission is over, the network 
is broken up to allow the different stakeholders to return to their primary 
functions. This kind of “virtual networks” allows the Agency the flexibility it 
needs to accommodate many different types of missions.
A case in point is the new communications requirement stipu-
lated for the Space Shuttle after Columbia broke apart on reentry during the 
final minutes of STS-107 on 1 February 2003. Foam and ice debris from 
the Shuttle’s giant External Tank during launch punched a hole in the lead-
ing edge of the left wing which led to thermal protection breakdown in the 
1,650°C (3,000°F) searing heat of reentry, killing the crew of seven. (The 
crew member on that fateful day were Commander Rick D. Husband; Pilot 
William C. McCool; Mission Specialists Kalpana Chawla, David M. Brown 
Ofﬁcial crew portrait of STS-107 which broke apart during reentry on 1 February 2003. From 
left to right are David M. Brown, Rick D. Husband, Laurel Clark, Kalpana Chawla, Michael P.
Anderson, William C. McCool, Ilan Ramon. (NASA Image Number KSC-01PP-1639)
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and Laurel Clark; Payload Commander Michael P. Anderson; and Payload 
Specialist Ilan Ramon of the Israeli Air Force.)
Flight rules now require continuous, live, high-resolution video 
of the External Tank during the Shuttle’s ascent into orbit. To this end, 
Enhanced Launch Vehicle Imaging System, or ELVIS, cameras are mounted 
on the Orbiter, SRB and the tank itself. The goal is to provide the ground 
with engineering and visual data to assess the vehicle condition and track-
ing of debris during launch and ascent. To meet this flight-critical (“Crit 1”) 
safety requirement, the integrated network stations of Merritt Island/Ponce 
de Leon, Wallops Island and the Jonathan Dickinson Annex provide the nec-
essary and seamless link needed for ELVIS to work.9
With respect to communications with the ISS, several upgrades have 
been implemented in recent years or will be in the near future. One such mod-
ification goes by the catchy acronym of IDEA: ISS Downlink Enhancement 
Architecture. IDEA is in essence a modified ground system infrastructure that 
provides the space station with the ability to increase its science data return 
rate three-fold, from 50 megabits-per-second to 150 over the station’s Ku-band 
downlink. A fiber optic ground network began in 2004 enabling JSC and 
MSFC to receive this high-rate data. It became operational in 2005.10
For TDRSS and the SN, GSFC, and JSC have been working with 
the ESA since 1998 to make the system compatible and ready to support the 
latter’s much anticipated Automated Transfer Vehicle, or ATV. ESA’s ATV 
will be an automated, resupply ship designed to dock to the ISS and pro-
vide the crew with dry cargo, oxygen, water, and propellant. After cargo is 
unloaded, it will be reloaded with waste products, undocked, and set on a 
course for destructive reentry.
The first craft—to be named Jules Verne after the nineteenth cen-
tury French science fiction writer—is considered by ESA as the most sophisti-
cated space vehicle ever to be built in Europe. To support these partner objec-
tives, Goddard completed a series of communications compatibility tests in 
Bremen, Germany in 2004.11 Parallel with this effort, NASA SN engineers are 
working with the Japanese Space Agency NASDA to develop a tracking and 
communication solution for their H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV), the Japanese 
version of Europe’s ATV. Coding, data rate, and modulation upgrades to the 
TDRSS are anticipated to be complete no later than 2007.12
Finally, there is the familiar matter of television. What started 
humbly on Apollo 7 has come full circle, with HDTV. Just like consumer 
demands for better and better pictures from sporting events to big-screen 
IMAX pictures, images from space are no different. Starting with STS-114 
(the first flight after the Columbia disaster), real-time HDTV was downlinked. 
Future HDTV sponsors include the Japanese along with the American cable 
television’s Discovery Channel. Using customer-furnished hardware, HDTV 
336 “Read You Loud and Clear!”
signals will be downlinked from the ISS via TDRSS and distributed to users 
at the NASA Field Centers and to domestic and foreign customers.
The trend is clear. Space communications will remain an interna-
tional activity, just like it was when it all started back in the 1950s. As it did 
then, NASA Headquarters will play a leading role to establish partnerships 
with the international space community. In the late 1980s, the Space Networks 
Interoperability Panel (SNIP) was informally created at an international con-
ference under the direction of then Associate Administrator Robert Aller. At 
that time, differing space data relay systems were in various stages of planning 
and development by NASA, ESA, and NASDA. It was the first forum specifi-
Backdropped against water and clouds, the International Space Station (ISS) was pho-
tographed by the crew of STS-102 on 1 March 2001 as they headed home in the Space 
Shuttle Discovery. In the foreground is a Russian Soyuz still docked to the station. Major 
construction of the ISS is scheduled for completion in 2010, at which time, NASA will 
transition American human space transportation from the Space Shuttle to the Crew 
Exploration Vehicle. (NASA Image Number MSFC-0102549)
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cally designed to discuss, anticipate and try to resolve differences in the design 
and operation of the different systems with their stakeholders. The routine 
meetings among the agencies identified, for example, frequency differences, 
on-orbit locations, user operation limitations, and even emergency backup 
support scenarios in the event of total space communication system failures.13
This panel was followed in the June of 1999 by the formal estab-
lishment of the Interagency Operations Advisory Group, or IOAG. Here, 
top officials from NASA, Italy’s Agenzia Spatiale Italiana (ASI), the French 
Centre National D’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), Germany’s Deutsches Zentrum 
für Luftund Raumfahrt (DLR), the European Space Agency (ESA), and the 
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency ( JAXA), meet annually (at rotating host 
countries) to coordinate space communications policies, procedures, techni-
cal interfaces, and many other matters related to interoperability. The group 
itself does not do—for the most part—the technical work. It relies primarily 
on technical work already completed by other organizations, for example, that 
develop standards for space systems. However, when a deficiency or incon-
sistency is discovered, the IOAG may recommend to such organizations that 
they address the missing areas in their work. By doing so, a common frame-
work is laid that enables synergy and cooperative efforts among all the inter-
national partners.14
In the same vein, in 1995 and 1996, NASA was an active participant 
in the National Facilities Study—a joint effort by the DOD, NOAA, NASA, 
and other U.S. government participants—the basic premise of which was to 
reduce duplication and identify areas of national need. One of the sub-panels 
was devoted to aerospace tracking and communications capabilities. It was in 
this panel that issues regarding frequency usage, allocation, and station loca-
tions were addressed. There was also extensive discussion regarding synergies 
between NASA and NOAA in places like Alaska for mutual cost savings and 
improved coverage. Like the IOAG and its predecessor the SNIP, the National 
Facilities Study addressed and tried to resolve the spectrum differences and 
expedite cooperative operations amongst the agencies.15
With respect to ground station operations, since Earth is round and 
the United States obviously does not own territory everywhere, it has been 
and always will be an international activity. In other words, if NASA has a 
requirement on foreign soil, it has no choice but to go to the other country. 
This actually has inherent advantages. Said Bill Watson: 
I think the really neat thing about the early ground network 
was that many of these countries welcomed us in because they 
wanted to join the space program. But they also welcomed us in 
on the condition that we train their people, hire them to become 
technically literate and competent. We did a lot of that. We had a 
NTTF at Greenbelt that ran classes for years and put thousands 
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of people through and trained them up in receivers and recorders 
and computers and how to solder and all kinds of techniques. They 
then took that back home and became technically competent in 
the countries that they came from. I think we still see that desire to 
engage, even with our peers today.16
While Earth science will always be there serving to anchor near-
Earth space activities, the future for NASA—as it was in the past—is explo-
ration. Here, synergies exist between science and sending astronauts back to 
the Moon and onto Mars, neither of which can be done without defining the 
space communication requirements. NASA Headquarters has set up, for this 
purpose, a Communication and Navigation Architecture Working Group to 
define and lay the foundation for its communication and navigation infra-
structure for the next 25 years. One concept is a plan for an Integrated Near-
Earth Network (INEN).
Although only a proposal, the elegance of an INEN is attractive 
since it would involve building a network one mission at a time. One of the first 
ingredients is Goddard’s Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO), a geosynchro-
nous mission that will monitor solar storms and send back information which 
will be a benefit to astronauts in space in case of storms. It will do this, plus 
provide warnings of commercial communications disruptions here on Earth.
In conjunction with development of the SDO is the LRO, or Lunar 
Reconnaissance Orbiter. To support these projects, NASA’s next expansion 
in ground stations may again be at White Sands, New Mexico where three 
60-foot Ka-band antennas could be built to support these missions. Both the 
SDO and LRO will utilize the Ka-band frequency for communications where 
ever higher bandwidths and data rates can be accommodated. (Today most of 
NASA’s communications is at X-band which is fine for data rates of around 150 
megabits-per-second.) With the advancement to Ka-band, though, data rates 
can be increased by over a factor of three, to 500 megabits-per-second.17
With Ka-band capability, the kernel—or seeds—for an exploration 
network at White Sands could be established. The idea is that once SDO and 
LRO are over, this resource could then become part of a Ka-band network for 
lunar exploration. As the need arises, S-band commercial sites—for instance, 
in Australia and South Africa—can be used to supplement White Sands. As 
it does today, NASA can buy these lower rate services commercially. As the 
Exploration Program matures and as the need for high rate data requirements 
expands, the Agency might then consider putting additional Ka-band dishes 
in places like South Africa, Australia, or Madrid to complete its mid-latitude, 
high data rate network for exploration.18
The idea is that although the DSN has traditionally been respon-
sible for planetary communications, it will help support near-Earth work as 
well since GSFC has closed down its large tracking antennas in places like 
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Pictured is the chosen artist’s rendering of NASA’s next generation space telescope. 
A successor to the Hubble Space Telescope (HST), the futuristic James Webb Space 
Telescope (JWST) is named in honor of NASA’s second administrator, James E. Webb. 
To further our understanding of the way our universe formed, NASA is developing the 
JWST to observe the ﬁrst stars and galaxies in the universe. The new telescope will 
carry a near-infrared camera, a multi-object spectrometer and a mid-infrared camera-
spectrometer. The JWST is scheduled for launch in 2010 aboard an expendable launch 
vehicle. It will take the spacecraft three months to reach its destination, an orbit of 
1,513,000 kilometers (940,000 miles) in space. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) 
is supporting Goddard in developing the JWST by creating an ultra-lightweight mirror 
for the telescope at Marshall’s Space Optics Manufacturing Technology Center. The 
program has a number of industry, academic, and government partners, as well as 
the European Space Agency and the Canadian Space Agency. (NASA Image Number 
MSFC-0202886)
340 “Read You Loud and Clear!”
Rosman and Fairbanks. Since the TDRSS coverage zone stops at around 
12,000 kilometers (7,400 miles)—the point at which TDRSS can no longer 
provide continuous communications with a spacecraft—new 18-meter (60-
foot) Ka-band systems will be added to cover the gap between near-Earth and 
deep space. It in effect pushes the boundary of the NEN out to somewhere 
around two million kilometers (1,240,000 miles), which is where near-Earth 
transitions to deep space from a spaceflight point of view.19
Of particular interest in recent years are spacecraft that can be 
located at five distinct points in space where the gravitational pull of Earth, 
Sun, and Moon all balance out. A craft positioned at one of these “Lagrange 
Points” (named after Italian-French mathematician Joseph Louis Lagrange) 
can “hover” there in a so-called lissajou orbit—somewhat akin to the “fig-
ure-8” loop that a geosynchronous satellite does over Earth except the orbit 
would not be stable. One point in particular, called “L2,” is approximately 1.5 
million kilometers (932,000 miles) away from Earth beyond the Moon. In the 
coming decade, NASA plans to put several astronomical observatories there, 
including the much anticipated James Webb Space Telescope—the follow up 
to the HST. Space will be a busy place.20
Under the envisioned Integrated Near-Earth Network, the Agency 
could use a combination of 18-meter Ka-band antennas plus the TDRSS to 
provide seamless coverage on a space mission. Take a Mars exploration mis-
sion for instance. As it is launched out of the KSC, it would be supported from 
a Merritt Island/Ponce de Leon-like station, but equipped with Ka-band. Just 
like the Shuttle, it would then transition to TDRSS soon after launch. But 
as the vehicle leaves Earth’s orbit and out of TDRSS coverage, the new Ka-
band antennas at mid-latitude locations such as New Mexico, South Africa, or 
Madrid and Australia would pick up its signals much like the Apollo stations 
did with their Unified S-Band antennas in the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, as it 
goes beyond two million kilometers towards Mars, coverage will transition 
over to the DSN.21
NASA’s tracking and data network will have then come full-circle, 
albeit this time with much faster data rates, much higher bandwidths and 
much more autonomy than before. This is really but a reflection of the cycli-
cal nature of space exploration. The first satellites went into orbit to explore 
Earth. This was followed by space probes to the Moon and the planets. After 
America sent 12 astronauts to the Moon and won the space race, the Agency 
once again concentrated on Earth science, both un-crewed and with human 
presence (the ISS). In the coming decades, this cycle will likely shift once 
again to emphasize human exploration, not only of the Moon but this time 
out to Mars and beyond.
To this end, NASA’s Exploration Systems Mission Directorate 
plans to start flying the Crew Exploration Vehicle soon after the three Space 
Shuttle Orbiters are retired in 2010. To ensure continuity, the TDRSS will 
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have to deploy new satellites in the 2012 to 2015 time frame. As astronauts 
return to the Moon, the Agency will likely need some type of lunar relay 
system to be able to communicate with the spacecraft when it is on the back 
side of the Moon. Much has happened in the three-decades since Apollo last 
went to the Moon. Tragedy, unfortunately, has played a major role. To enter 
lunar orbit, the Apollo Service Module had to fire its engine on the backside 
of the Moon out of communication with Mission Control. After Challenger
and Columbia, the Agency will likely not want to fire another rocket with-
out having a communication link and know what happened. Thus, there is 
expectation at NASA that a TDRSS-like system on the backside of the Moon 
may have to be built before returning astronauts there.
The challenges don’t stop there. Farther down the road, as man-
kind places our first steps on Mars, high-definition television will have already 
been a fixture for many years. The world is going to want to see pictures a
lot clearer than what it saw with Armstrong and Aldrin. To do this, an opti-
mal array of antennas and frequencies will be needed. The magnitude of the 
challenge should not be understated. For example, architectural studies have 
shown that in order to receive 100-megabits of low bit-error data from Mars, 
100 to 300 12-meter (40-foot) antennas will need to be arrayed together in 
one location!22 Not impossible but clearly a challenge. Then there is the issue 
of relay and perhaps more importantly, delay. It takes light and radio signals 
anywhere from 3 to 18 minutes to reach Earth from Mars—the exact time 
depending on where the two planets are with respect to each other. One 
might ask, does the information we receive have to be real-time or is it good 
enough to just have the information tell what happened?
Delay-tolerant networking is even today a major issue for NASA (and 
for information technology at large). A simple example would be the case of a 
person using wireless internet access on a bus or a train. As he travels through 
a tunnel and loses his session, he would not want to have to start all over again 
when he resumes the session on the other end. The issue is how to get internet 
standards to evolve to the point where they can reliably cope with delays.
NASA will be busy.
With President Bush recommitting America to human space explo-
ration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has been offered 
an opportunity that was not really all that well formed prior to 2004. With 
that vision comes the opportunity for NASA to take a new look at where it is 
going as the nation’s space agency, and in particular, where it is going from a 
space communications point of view. The two are inextricably tied together. 
In sort of a twist on the popular American Express advertising slogan, those 
who work the networks at the Agency have adopted as their unofficial tagline 
“Space Communications: Don’t Leave Earth Without It” when describing 
the indispensable role that the tracking and communications networks have 
played over the years.23
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Because space communications is not easy, those who build the 
network are really building an enabling capability for the future. Just as the 
MSFN enabled the United States to safely go to the Moon and back, today the 
TDRSS enables the ISS and other data-rich spacecraft to return the amount of 
data that they were designed for. In many ways, as the previous generation did 
for today, those who now work the Space and Ground Networks are setting 
up for what is to come for the next generation.
The story of America’s global spaceflight tracking network is ulti-
mately the story of the men and women who made space communications 
a reality before it became the neat thing that it is today, something that we 
cannot live without. When Apollo 11 landed on the Moon in 1969, 56-kilobit 
connections to ground stations was a big deal. Today, the space agency hauls 
4.5-terabytes (that is, 4.5-trillion bytes of digital data) a day back to Earth at an 
average rate of 100-megabits (100,000,000) per second.24
As one walks the hallways of NASA, whether it be the GSFC, the 
JSC or Headquarters, there are televisions all around showing videos of astro-
nauts working in the ISS, spectacular images of celestial bodies from across 
the galaxy Telescope or live pictures of storm patterns developing on the other 
side of the planet. As Bob Spearing, NASA’s former top official for space com-
munications, put it:
None of that—none of it—would be there without space com-
munications. So when I walk by and somebody is looking at the 
television screen, I ask ‘Do you know how that picture got here?’ 
Most of them say no. Most people don’t have any idea. I’ll then go 
through a little talk about how the picture got here—and there is 
a real appreciation then. From a legacy point of view, there are a 
couple of things. One thing is that communications is ubiquitous 
and it is a capability that we all assume and just move on. We don’t 
give it a second thought until it doesn’t happen. If you look back 
over time, I believe you’ll be hard pressed to find a mission that was 
compromised in any way by lack of communications. So our legacy 
is we deliver the goods and we always have. Every mission requires 
it and we have always delivered. . . . We made it work!25
As the NASA enters the second half of its first century, a new gener-
ation of space probes and human explorers will lead the way back to the Moon, 
eventually venturing to Mars and beyond. As they make these journeys, men 
and women here on Earth will track them across that vast ocean of space.
After all, someone will have to stock the ships for the new Columbus 
and the new Magellan!
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APPENDIX 1
Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary
AA  Associate Administrator
AAA Active Acquisition Aid
AAP  Apollo Applications Program
ACS  attitude control system
ACN Ascension
ACU antenna control unit
AES  Apollo Extension System
AFSC Air Force Systems Command
AFSCN Air Force Satellite Control Network
AGO Santiago
AIS  Apollo Instrumentation Ship
ALT  Approach and Landing Test
CDR Critical Design Review
CDSCC Canberra Deep Space Communication Complex
CSIR Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization
CSM Command and Service Module
CSOC Consolidated Space Operations Contract
DAF  Data Acquisition Facility
dB  decibels
DDMS Department of Defense Manager for Manned Spaceflight
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DF  direction finding
DJS  Dzhusaly, Razakhgtan
DLR Germany’s Deutsches Zentrum für Luftund Raumfahrt
DOD Department of Defense
DOI  Department of the Interior
DOS  Department of Supply
DRSS Data Relay Satellite System
DSN  Deep Space Network
DSS  Deep Space Station
EGOEccentric Geophysical Observatory
EGR Eglin Gulf Test Range
ELVIS Enhanced Launch Vehicle Imaging System
ERS  Earth Resource Satellite
ERTS Earth Resource Technology Satellite
ESA  European Space Agency
ESD  Air Force Electronic Systems Division
ESMC Air Force Eastern Space and Missile Center
EUMETSAT   European Organization for the Exploitation of 
Meteorological Satellites
ETR Eastern Test Range
EVA  extravehicular activity
EUT Eupatona, Ukraine
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration
FCC  Federal Communications Commission
FDR Final Design Review
FM  frequency modulation
FY  fiscal year
Gbps  gigabits per second
GDSCC Goldstone Deep Space Communication Complex
GHz  gigahertz
GLTN Goddard Laser Tracking Network
GMT Greenwich Meridian Time
GN  Ground Network
GOES Geostationary Observational Environmental Satellite
GRARR Goddard Range And Range Rate
GRGT Guam Remote Ground Terminal
GRO Gamma Ray Observatory
GRTS GRO Remote Terminal System
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center
GWM Guam
HAW Hawaii
HDTV high definition television
HEAO High Energy Astronomy Observer
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HST  Hubble Space Telescope
HTV H-II Transfer Vehicle
IAGS Inter-American Geodetic Survey
IBM  International Business Machines
IBEW International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
IDEA  International Space Station Downlink Enhancement Architecture
IGY  International Geophysical Year
IMP  Interplanetary Monitoring Platform
INEN Integrated Near-Earth Network
INTA Spanish National Institute of Aerospace Technology
INTELSAT International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium
IOAG Interagency Operations Advisory Group
IPF  Image Processing Facility
ISIS  International Satellite for Ionospheric Studies
ISO  Infrared Space Observatory
ISS  International Space Station
IUE  International Ultraviolet Explorer
IUS  Inertial Upper Stage
JAXA Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency
JDMTA Jonathan Dickinson Missile Tracking Annex
JPL  Jet Propulsion Laboratory
JSC  Johnson Space Center
JWST James Webb Space Telescope
KHz  kilohertz
KLP  Kolpashevo, Russia
Kpbs  kilobits per second
KPGO Kokee Park Geophysical Observatory
KSAT Kongsberg Satellite Services
KSC  Kennedy Space Center
LAGEOS Laser Geodynamics Satellite
laser  light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation
LM  Lunar Module
LRC  Langley Research Center
LRO Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter
LRV  Lunar Roving Vehicle
M&DO Mission and Data Operations
MA  Mercury-Atlas
MA  Multiple Access
MAD Madrid
maser microwave amplification by stimulated emission of radiation
Mbps megabits per second
MCC Mission Control Center
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MDSCC Madrid Deep Space Communication Complex
MESA Modular Equipment Stowage Assembly
MFS  Manned Flight Support
MGS McMurdo Ground Station
MHz megahertz
MILA Merritt Island Launch Annex
MIT  Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MOBLAS Mobile Laser Ranging System
MOCR Mission Operations Control Room
MOTS Minitrack Optical Tracking System
MRCS Mobile Range Control System
MSC Manned Spacecraft Center
MSFN Manned Space Flight Network
NACA National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
NAR Non-Advocate Review
NAS  National Academy of Science
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASCOM NASA Communications Network
NASDA National Space Development Agency of Japan
NC  Network Controller
ND  Networks Directorate
NEN Near-Earth Network
NFL  Newfoundland
NISN NASA Integrated Services Network
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOCC Network Operations Control Center
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command
NRD Air Force National Range Division
NRL Naval Research Laboratory
NSC  Norwegian Space Center
NSF  National Science Foundation
NTSC National Television System Committee
NTTF Network Test and Training Facility
OAO Orbiting Astronomical Observatory
OCC Operations Control Center
OGO Orbiting Geophysical Observatory
OMS Orbital Maneuvering System
ORR Orroral
OSC  Office of Space Communications
OSO Office of Space Operations
OSO Orbiting Solar Observatory
OSTDA Office of Space Tracking and Data Acquisition
OTDA Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition
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PAL  Phase Alternating Line
PAM Pulse Amplitude Modulation
PCM Pulse Code Modulation
PCR Payload Changeout Room
PCS  Pacific Command Ship
PCU Power Control Unit
PDL  Ponce de Leon Station
PDR Preliminary Design Review
PER  Pre-Environmental Review
PLSS Portable Life Support System
PMR Pacific Missile Range
PMRF Pacific Missile Range Facility
POCC Project Operations Control Center
POGO Polar Orbiting Geophysical Observatory
PPK  Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskaya, Russia
PSAC President’s Science Advisory Committee
QUI  Quito
RCA Radio Corporation of America
RCS  Reaction Control System
RF  radio frequency
RFP  Request For Proposal 
ROS  Rosman
RTG Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
RTHU roll to heads-up
RTLS Return to Launch Site abort
SA  Single Access
SAO  Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory
SATAN Satellite Automatic Tracking Antenna 
SCAMA Switching, Conferencing And Monitoring Arrangement
SCAMP Satellite Command Antenna on Medium Pedestal
SDK  Ussuriysk, Russia
SDO  Solar Dynamics Observatory
SEB  Source Evaluation Board
SECAM Sequential Color with Memory
SECO sustainer engine cutoff
SGL  Space to Ground Link
SGLT Space to Ground Link Terminal
SGS  SvalSat Ground Station
SIRTF Space Infrared Telescope Facility
SITE Satellite Instructional Television Experiment
SN  Space Network
SNIP Space Networks Interoperability Panel
SOMO Space Operations Management Office
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SRB  Solid Rocket Booster
STADAN Satellite Tracking And Data Acquisition Network
STADIR Station Director
STDN Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network
STG  Space Task Group
STGT Second TDRSS Ground Terminal
STS  Space Transportation System
STTCS S-band Tracking, Telemetry & Command System
T&DS Tracking and Data Systems
TAGIU Tracking And Ground Instrumentation Unit
TAGS Text And Graphics System
TAL  Transatlantic Abort Landing
TAN Tananarive
TAT-1 trans-Atlantic telephone cable
TBL  Tbilisi, Georgia
TCS  Thermal Control System
TDRS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
TDRSS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
TDSD Tracking and Data Systems Directorate
TELOPS Telemetry Online Processing System
TEI  Trans-Earth Injection
TIROS Television Infrared Observation Satellite
TLI  Trans-Lunar Injection
TLRS Transportable Laser Ranging System
TM  telemetry
TTS  Test and Training Satellite
TSSG Tracking System Study Group
TT&C Tracking, Telemetry and Command
TWT traveling wave tube
UHF ultrahigh frequency
ULD Ulan-Ude, Russia
US  United States
USAF United States Air Force
USB  Unified S-Band
USN Universal Space Network
USNS United States Navy Ship
USSR Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic
VERLORT Very Long Range Tracking
VHF very high frequency
VLBI Very Long Baseline Interferometry
WART White Sands Complex Alternative Resource Terminal
WECO Western Electric Company
WGTC Working Group on Tracking and Computation
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WRE Weapons Research Establishment
WSGT White Sands Ground Terminal
WSMR White Sands Missile Range
Glossary
acquisition: The process of first finding, either visually or electronically, a 
satellite or spacecraft of interest so it can then be tracked.
antenna feed: The electronic device at the focal point of an antenna through 
which electromagnetic wave transmissions are received, amplified, and/or 
transmitted.
apogee: The high point in a trajectory.
array: The electronic combining of antennas pointed at the same object so as 
to increase the received signal strength.
autotrack: Automatic tracking of a spacecraft by an antenna (or vise versa) 
where the position is continuously and automatically computed.
bandwidth: The range of frequencies occupied by a radio frequency carrier 
wave. The more information there is on the carrier (for example, high-defini-
tion television), the more bandwidth is required to fully transmit that data. 
UHF air-to-ground voice, for instance, is a low bandwidth item.
bit errors: The fraction of received digital bits that are errors in a transmis-
sion. The lower the bit error, the better the quality of the transmission. Bit 
errors, or more precisely, bit error rate, is usually expressed in exponential 
notation such as 1x10-6 (one bit error in a million).
bit rate: The rate that digital bits of data are transmitted in a digital stream. 
The higher the bit rate, the faster the transmission. Bit rates can vary from 
kilobits per seconds (thousands of bits per second) to gigabits per second (bil-
lions of bits per second).
boresight: The focal axis of a directional antenna.
Capcom: By rule, the designated voice contact between Mission Control and 
the astronauts. By tradition, the Capcom is always another astronaut. Others 
may also, on occasion, speak with the astronauts but are never referred to as 
“Capcom.”
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carrier frequency: The selected frequency used to transport radio signals.
collimation tower: A tower, usually located a few kilometers from the main 
ground station antenna, equipped with a radio frequency emitter used as an aim-
point to checkout and calibrate the automatic tracking capability of the antenna.
data rate: The rate of downlink or uplink between a spacecraft and its ground 
station. Usually measured in bits per second. 
demodulate: The removal of the modulation on a carrier frequency using a 
series of electronic filters so as to isolate the data from its carrier.
digital: A transmitted radio frequency signal or scheme comprised only of 
ON and OFF pulses (0’s and 1’s).
eccentricity: The amount of oblateness in a spacecraft’s orbit. A perfectly cir-
cular orbit has zero eccentricity while a high apogee orbit that swings around, 
for example, to the back side of the Moon is of high eccentricity.
electromagnetic waves: Electromagnetic (EM) waves or radiation is a self 
propagating wave in space with electric and magnetic components. Such 
waves carry energy and momentum. All energetic media such as heat, light 
and radio transmissions are part of the electromagnetic spectrum.
elevation: The angle above the horizon. An antenna pointed perfectly at the 
horizon has zero elevation. Ninety-degrees is directly overhead.
equatorial orbit: An orbit which has no inclination or tilt with respect to 
the Equator. Thus a spacecraft in true equatorial orbit will always revolve over 
the Equator.
field of view: The amount of sky that can be viewed at any one time. For 
an optical device, it is what can be seen at any moment with a given aperture. 
For an electronic device like an antenna, it is also the region where a radio 
frequency link can be reasonably detected.
Figure of Merit: Commonly referred to as G/T, or “G-over-T”, a ground 
station’s Figure of Merit is a fundamental quantitative measure of its overall 
capability to enhance the received signal with respect to noise. The higher the 
G/T, the more sensitive the ground station is.
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g: A measure of the equivalent gravitational acceleration experienced by an 
object or a person. A person standing at mean sea level experiences 1 g. Apollo 
astronauts returning from the Moon experienced around 8 g during reentry.
gain: An increase in electromagnetic signal strength due to any of several 
sources, resulting in the output signal being measurably stronger than the input 
signal. Types of gain include amplifier gain due to active electronic components 
such as High Power Amplifiers or Low Noise Amplifiers, and antenna gain due 
to antenna features such as large dish aperture and parabolic shape.
geode: The mathematical, gravitational model of Earth characterizing its 
local variations in shape, size, and mass concentrations, used by computers to 
calculate the orbit and trajectory of a spacecraft.
geosynchronous orbit: A zero-inclination, circular orbit at an altitude of 35,900 
kilometers (22,300 miles) above the Equator. In such an orbit, a spacecraft’s rate of 
revolution round Earth is the same as the rotation rate for a point on the Equator. 
The craft would thus appear to be hanging stationary over a given location. The 
term is often used synonymously with ‘geostationary orbit.’
Go/No-Go: A decision point during a mission when Mission Control has to 
determine whether to proceed or abort.
Ground Network: A network of NASA ground stations organized under 
the Science Mission Directorate of Headquarters. These consist of stations 
in Alaska, Antarctica, Florida, Norway, and Virginia. The Ground Network 
(GN) also includes support from the Network Integration Center located at 
the Goddard Space Flight Center and the GN scheduling and VHF systems at 
White Sands, New Mexico. 
ground station: A location on the ground comprising of electrical, mechani-
cal, and/or optical subsystems used for communicating with and retrieving 
data from space assets.
ground track: The path that a spacecraft traces on the ground.
GSTDN: The original ground elements of the remaining Spaceflight Tracking 
and Data Network (STDN) as the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System 
(TDRSS) was being brought operational in the 1980s.
high inclination orbit: An orbit whose plane is highly inclined with respect 
to the Equator. Such orbits have ground tracks that enable them to pass over or 
observe a greater amount of  Earth’s surface than low inclination orbits.
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high power amplifier: An electronic device usually located at the base or 
the back of an antenna which greatly amplifies its transmitting signal strength 
for establishing command uplink with a spacecraft. 
housekeeping telemetry: Data from a spacecraft used only for assessing the 
performance, health, and status of the spacecraft itself. Typical data include 
voltages, temperatures, propellant tank pressures, etc.
Lagrange Points: The Lagrangian points are five positions in the Earth-
Moon-Sun interplanetary system where a small object affected only by grav-
ity can theoretically appear stationary relative to two larger objects (such as 
a satellite with respect to Earth and the Moon). Such an object would appear 
to be in a “fixed” position (or on a relatively small “Figure 8” orbit) in space 
rather than in a traditional orbit in which its position changes continuously.
launch azimuth: The direction that a rocket is launched in, usually mea-
sured in degrees relative to due North. For example, a rocket launched due 
East from Cape Canaveral has a launch azimuth of 90°.
“Lights-out” operations: A trend in ground station operations in which 
a station operates autonomously in an unattended fashion or with minimal 
staffing. Lights-out can take many forms such as nine to five workday opera-
tions with automated service at all other times. It can also be a centralized, 
fully staffed operations center continuously monitoring a suite of multiple, 
unattended remote ground stations.
line of sight: The straight line between a transmitting antenna and a receiv-
ing antenna. The two can only communicate when a line of sight has been 
established.
multipath: The propagation phenomenon that results when radio signals 
reach the receiving antenna by two or more paths. Causes of multipath include 
ionospheric reflection and refraction, and reflection from mountains, build-
ings, ocean, and the ground. The effects of multipath include constructive and 
destructive interference, errors, and phase shifting of the signal. A common 
multipath phenomenon is ghosting of television images, for example.
“Picket Line”: The seven original primary Minitrack stations located 
approximately along the 75th West meridian, spanning North and South 
America. The picket line had a better than 90 percent chance of capturing 
every pass of a satellite in low inclination, low-Earth orbit.
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polar orbit:  An orbit whose plane is inclined 90° to the Equator. Thus, as 
its name implies, a satellite in polar orbit travels over, or near, both the North 
and the South pole. A great advantage of a satellite in such an orbit is its ability 
to observe the entire surface of the globe over time.
max-q: The occurrence of maximum aerodynamic pressure (q) during a 
rocket’s ascent or a spacecraft’s descent through the atmosphere. Knowing 
when max-q occurs is important as it factors into the structural stress experi-
enced by the vehicle.
parabolic: Surface shape of an object, like an antenna reflector or the objec-
tive mirror in a telescope, based on the mathematical curve Y=X2 which 
focuses incoming rays to a single point.
radio frequency: The number of oscillation cycles per unit time that an electro-
magnetic wave propagates through space at. Frequency is measured in hertz (Hz).
radio interferometry: The use of separate antennas to receive a radio signal at 
slightly different times so as to determine phase differences in the radio waves. 
These differences can then be used to calculate position solutions for an object. 
Radio interferometry had the advantage of yielding highly accurate tracking 
angles and could be used under virtually any atmospheric condition.
Schmidt camera: A telescopic, astronomical camera designed to provide 
wide fields of view, typically used as a survey instrument in which a large 
amount of sky must be covered.
solar wind: A stream of charged particles (plasma) which are ejected from the 
upper atmosphere of a star. It consists mostly of high-energy electrons and pro-
tons that are able to escape the star’s gravity. Many phenomena can be explained 
by the solar wind, including: geomagnetic storms that knock out power grids on 
Earth; auroras, and why the tail of a comet always points away from the Sun.
sounding rocket: A small, usually unguided rocket launched into the upper 
atmosphere for conducting experiments and scientific research.
Space Network: NASA’s constellation of geosynchronous Tracking and Data 
Relay Satellites and their associated ground segment. The ground segment 
consists of the White Sands Complex, the Bilateral Ranging Transponder 
System, the Merritt Island Launch Area TDRSS Relay, and the Data Services 
Management Center. The Space Network (SN) is run by the Goddard Space 
Flight Center under management of the Space Operations Mission Directorate 
at Headquarters.
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state vectors: The set of position and velocity measurements of a traveling 
object as a function of time, particularly those of a spacecraft in orbit or a 
rocket on a ballistic trajectory.
telemetry: Electronic data measurements downlinked or transmitted from a 
spacecraft to the ground.
teletype: A now largely obsolete electro-mechanical typewriter which was 
used to communicate typed messages from point to point through a simple 
electrical communications channel, often just a pair of wires. Later versions 
used a screen instead of a printer. 
tracking: Collection of spacecraft position and velocity measurements so that 
its orbit or trajectory can be determined.
wavelength: The distance traveled by an electromagnetic wave during one cycle 
of oscillation. Radio frequency wavelengths ranges from millimeters to meters.
Wing Station: A support or backup ground station located near the designated 
primary station on a given mission. Deep Space Network sites were often used 
to support nearby Manned Space Flight Network sites in this manner.
yagi antenna: An antenna consisting of an array of linear elements, such as a 
common rooftop television antenna. The antenna achieves a distinct response 
bandwidth determined by the length, diameter, and spacing of all the individ-
ual elements. Its overall gain is proportional to its length, rather than simply 
the number of elements. Yagis can range in size from small (like TV antennas) 
to very large (dozens of feet long with multiple elements).
APPENDIX 2
Maps
Each location has been plotted by the author on blank Robinson 
Projections.
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Radio Frequency Chart

APPENDIX 4
Honeysuckle Station Log for Apollo 11
The actual mission log as recorded at the Honeysuckle Creek 
Tracking Station (HSK) is reproduced here courtesy of  John Saxon. When he 
donated these scans to the Honeysuckle tribute Web site (www.honeysucklecreek.
net) in 2003, John wrote:
It may seem strange, but Apollo support sites were not required 
to keep a formal log. Usually, particular times were reported to 
Houston as they happened or when the action was completed. 
Some times were reported in post-pass teletype messages.
At Honeysuckle we did try to maintain an overall log of mis-
sion events as we observed them, and the operating position on 
the right hand side of the main station Operations console got 
lumbered with the job. This position was also required to moni-
tor anything up to six or seven voice loops simultaneously and 
respond as required. Also, there were two 25 key CAMs (Computer 
Address Matrix) used to control some aspects of the Command 
and Telemetry Computers (send commands to the spacecraft if data 
communications were lost between the site and Houston, etc.), 
operated by this position. So keeping a written log as well was 
sometimes difficult.
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Most sections of the station (USB, TLM, Computer, Comms, 
etc.) also made note of significant times and events, and so this 
helped the main log keeper because they could be reported later 
in ‘easy time.’ Times were sometimes guessed when there was a 
chance to jot them down, so normally they were noted to the near-
est minute unless they were deemed to be very significant!
The log pages presented here were maintained for the entire 
Apollo 11 mission 24 hours per day by my opposite number, Ken 
Lee (otherwise known as “the silver fox”) and myself as we worked 
alternating 12-hour shifts. It should be noted that they were “bor-
rowed” by me at the end of the Apollo program. All the rest of the 
mission files, which contained many other documents on each mis-
sion, were consigned to the local landfill site (Tharwa Tip) when 
we were not looking.
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Acquisition aid: 35, 73, 75; on Gemini, 108, 112
Acquisition-of-signal: 47, 52, 75, 84, 128, 129, 169; TDRS deployment, 167-168
Ada, Joseph F.: 236
Adams, John: 96
Adelaide switching center, South Australia: 64
Advanced Range Instrumentation Aircraft (See Apollo Range Instrumentation Aircraft)
Advanced Research Projects Agency: 29, 67, 208
Aerobee sounding rocket: 2
Agenzia Spatiale Italiana: 337
Air Force, United States (See also Department of Defense and specific test ranges and locations): xxxiii, 
2, 5, 21, 67, 71, 74, 78, 82, 85-88, 94, 116, 117, 120, 122, 131, 137, 149, 154, 206, 208, 226, 
238, 253, 308; Andrews Air Force Base, 77; ARIA support, 159-162, 203; Bonham Air Force 
Base (See Hawaii Ground Station); Department of Defense Manager for Manned Spaceflight, 
94; Eastern Space and Missile Center, 237, 239; Edwards Air Force Base, 59, 162, 223, 232; 
Electronic Systems Division, 161; Hickam Air Force Base, 160; Holloman Air Force Base (See
Tula Peak Ground Station); Kindley Air Force Base, 82; Military Airlift Command, 117; National 
Range Division, 160-161; Patrick Air Force Base, 11, 15, 18, 21, 123, 160, 163; Satellite Control 
Network, 71, 93; Securing the high ground, 93, 253; United States Air Force Museum, 162; 
Vandenberg Air Force Base, 2, 85, 87, 163, 202; Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 161
Alamogordo Bombing Range (See White Sands Missile Range)
Alaska Tracking Station: xxxii, 41-43, 50, 53, 55, 64, 103, 219, 221, 222, 227, 228, 281, 337; Poker 
Flat, 317-319
Albert monkey flights: 2
Aldrin, Edwin E., Jr.: 174, 175, 177, 179, 180, 341
Alice Springs, Australia Northern Territory: 189
Aller, Robert O.: 258, 282, 325, 336
Allied Signal (See also Honeywell): xix, 289
Alouette satellite: 43
Ames Research Center: xv, 28
Anchored Interplanetary Platform: 39
Anders, William A.: 171
Anderson, Clinton D.: 25
Anderson, Michael P.: 334, 335
Angular measurement: 11, 13, 14, 35, 37, 38, 52
Antarctica (See McMurdo Ground Station)
Antenna Control Unit: 46, 47, 52
Antenna operating modes: 52-53, 112
Antofagasta, Chile: 16, 19, 23, 40
Antigua: 114, 136, 138, 203, 204; Apollo support, 117-121, 146, 149, 151, 162, 163, 169; early-ops 
support, 18, 21, 40, 98, 112
Apartheid (See Johannesburg, South Africa)
Apollo, Project: 1B network, 145-146; V network, 145-146; Antenna pattern pull, 136; Apollo 1, 166, 
167; Apollo 4, 131, 147, 156, 158, 166-167; Apollo 5, 147, 167; Apollo 6, 168-169; Apollo 7, 150, 
163, 170-172, 331; Apollo 8, 147, 151, 156, 171-173; Apollo 9, 173; Apollo 10, 173-174; Apollo 
11, xxxv, 120, 151, 157, 158, 174-180, 181, 186, 196, 203, 205, 206, 221, 235, 342, 427-454; 
Apollo 12, 158, 182, 183; Apollo 13, 180-182, 203, 234, 250; Apollo 14, 174, 182, 187; Apollo 15, 
183; Apollo 16, 168, 169, 234; Apollo 17, 182, 183, 185, 306; Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments 
Package telemetry, 182-184, 205; AS-201, 118, 145; Bailout decision during powered descent, 
174; Command/Service Module, 112, 136, 137, 144, 145, 150, 151, 157, 166, 169, 170, 171, 173, 
180, 181, 184, 196, 232, 306, 341; Flight phases, 143-144, 153; Free-return trajectory, 151, 181; 
Implications of moving the launch window, 157-159; Lunar Module, 112, 136, 144, 145, 147, 151, 
152, 166, 167, 168, 173-179, 181-185, 232, 305; Original tracking plans, 145-147; Portable Life 
Support System telemetry, 175, 180; Reentry and recovery considerations, 150-152, 156-159, 160, 
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163; S-IVB transponder interference, 181; Saturn 1B launch vehicle, 118, 154, 167, 196; Saturn V 
launch vehicle, 118, 131, 135-138, 145, 147, 151, 154, 156-159, 166, 186, 187, 224; Trans-Earth 
Injection tracking, 144; Trans-Lunar Injection tracking, 129, 135, 149, 150, 151, 153, 157-159; 
Transposition and docking tracking requirements, 151-152, 158
Apollo Range Instrumentation Aircraft: 158-161, 163, 193, 203, 214; Flight 328 crash, 161-162; Joint 
NASA/DOD responsibility, 159-161; Project Configuration Control Board, 161; Two-ocean 
versus single-ocean support, 158-159
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project: xl, 135, 190-198, 200, 205, 214, 215, 229, 249, 281, 306, 327; American/
Soviet cultural differences, 195-197; Soviet ground stations, 191, 193; Soviet tracking ships, 193; 
Soyuz 16 network rehearsal, 195; Use of ATS-6, 193-195
Application satellites (See also specific satellite names): xxxii, xxxvii, xxxviii, xl, 65, 222, 229, 232, 
234, 249, 273, 304, 306
Applications Technology Satellite (See also Apollo-Soyuz Test Project): 50, 55-56, 156, 193-195, 205, 
206, 214, 215, 219, 227, 248
Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University: 184
Ariane launch vehicle: 238, 239
Argee Corporation: 282
Armstrong, Neil A.: xxxv, 174-178, 180, 341
Army, United States (See also Department of Defense): xiii, 6, 8, 9, 19, 21, 23, 24, 40, 42, 60, 74; 
Ballistic Missile Agency, 29; Corps of Engineers, 7, 15, 31, 236; Map Service, 15; Ordnance 
Department, 6, 7; Project Orbiter, 15; Signal Corps, 15
Ascension Island: xxxii, 2, 98, 114, 116-119, 123, 124, 149, 160, 162, 163, 189, 192, 220, 237-240
AT&T: 101, 196, 244, 246
Atlantic Missile Range (See Eastern Test Range)
Atlas launch vehicle: xxxviii, 2, 69, 81, 99, 106, 139, 145, 260, 295, 297, 299, 306
Attwood, William H.: 127
Australia (See also specific locations in Australia): xiv, xv, xxxiv, xxxv, 4, 19, 34, 39, 44, 45, 48-50, 56, 
83, 95, 99, 110, 113, 114, 146, 148, 150, 174-176, 188, 189, 193, 203, 208, 212, 220, 223, 226, 
227, 232, 233-235, 251, 288-290, 304, 318, 338, 340; Australian Land Information Survey Group 
(See Geoscience Australia); Department of Supply, 21, 44, 45, 115; Department of Territories, 
235; Department of Transport and Communications, 235; Geoscience Australia, 235; Weapons 
Research Establishment, 21, 45, 115
Automated Transfer Vehicle: 335
Autotrack: 39, 40, 51-52, 76, 149, 327
Azusa missile tracking system: 9, 10
B
Badgeless controller: xxxvii, 232
Baghadady, Eli: 37
Baikonur-Tyuratam Cosmodrome: 66, 191, 195
Bailey, Harry: 229
Baker, James G.: 3
Baker-Nunn camera: 3-5, 234, 235
Ball Aerospace Corporation: 66
Bandwidth requirements: xxxviii, 35, 62, 164, 174, 298, 300
Barbados: 120
Barbour, Walworth: 84
Barking Sands, Kauai (See Hawaii Ground Station)
Barnes, G. M.: 6
Barnes, Robert: 185
Baumgartner, A. W.: 134
Bavely, James: 124
Beall, J. Glenn: 31
Beijing, China: 318
Beamwidth: 52, 144, 181, 232
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Bear Lake, Utah: 223
Bell Telephone: 80, 244, 246, 249
Bender, Ed: 96
Bendix: 21, 57, 80, 86, 156, 161, 222, 227, 228, 229, 331-332; Bendix Aviation Corporation, 21; 
Bendix Field Engineering Corporation, xix, xxxvii, 29, 88, 96, 118, 121, 122, 124, 126, 127, 129, 
204, 214, 237, 240; Pay incentives, 57; Transition to Allied Signal and Honeywell, 289
Benson, Cliff: 229, 331
Berg, Wilfred E.: 16
Bermuda Tracking Station: xxx-xxxi, xxxviii, 64, 73, 80, 81-83, 87, 95, 98-100, 102, 109, 110, 112, 
118, 119, 135-138, 144, 146, 149, 151, 162, 164, 168, 192, 220, 305-306
Berndt, Morton: 140
Big Dish (book): xiii
Bit errors and bit error rates: xlii, 118, 217, 313, 341
Blagonravov, Anatoly: 190
Blaha, John E.: 284
Blossom Point, Maryland: 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 55, 58, 60, 203 
Bobko, Karol J.: 270
Bodin, Wesley J.: 31, 40-41, 236, 
Boeing: 223, 270, 298, 299; Boeing-Delco, 184
Boller and Chivens Company: 3
Bolton, John: 174, 181
Borman, Frank: 171, 172-173, 286
Botswana Ground Station: 226, 240
British Cable and Wireless Company: 88, 116, 237, 239
Brand, Vance D.: 196
Brinkley, Randy H.: 299
Brockett, Norm: 127
Brown, David M.: 334
Brown Field (See San Diego Station)
Brussels, Belgium: 196
Buchli, James F.: 284
Buckhorn Ground Station: 224
Buckley, Edmond C.: xi, xviii, xix, xx, xxxiv, 52, 68, 80, 89, 90, 92-93, 116, 112, 123, 127, 131, 136, 
140, 209, 326, 327, 329
Budget discussions: xxxiv, 28, 45, 79, 103, 137, 152, 199, 200, 211, 218, 254, 332; Guam and Hawaii, 
206-207
Buitrago, Spain (See Madrid)
Bureau of Land Management: 228, 317
Bureau of the Budget: 27, 152, 206
Bush, George W.: 326, 341
Bushuyev, Konstantin D.: 197
C
Cadena, Carlos H.: 229
Calibration aircraft: 14, 76-77; High altitude training, 77
California Tracking Station: 95, 99, 101, 114
Call, Dale: 138
Canary Island Tracking Station: xxxi, 88, 94-97, 100, 114, 118, 119, 138, 146, 162, 163, 205-206
Canberra Deep Space Communication Complex: xiii, xxxv, xxxvi, 34, 46, 50, 175, 212, 222, 231, 235, 
288-290
Canton Island Tracking Station: xxxi, 83, 84-85, 95, 114, 121-123
Capcom: xxxi, 95, 100, 164, 171, 271; Communication Technician, 100
Cape Canaveral, Florida: xxxvi, xxxviii, 32, 64, 72, 74, 79, 80, 81, 87, 88, 89, 92, 94, 95, 98, 99, 100, 
118, 119, 137, 146, 163, 182, 215, 306, 317
Carlucci, Frank C.: 127
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Carnarvon, Western Australia: 39, 45, 50, 56, 87, 114, 128, 136, 138, 146, 149, 150, 162, 189
Carpenter, M. Scott: 101
Carrillo Flores, Antonio: 88
Castro, Fidel Ruz: 41
Cellular telephone: xxi, 225, 307, 327, 330
Centaur upper stage: 260, 295, 299, 306
Central Intelligence Agency: 23, 66
Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales: 238, 337
Certification Program (See Training programs)
Chaffee, Roger B.: 166, 167
Chandra X-ray Observatory: 287
Chawla, Kalpana: 334
Chula Vista, California (See San Diego, California)
Cincinnati Observatory: 12
Civil service personnel, use of: xviii, xxxvii, 26, 57, 94
Clark, George Q.: 78
Clark, Laurel: 335
Clarke, Arthur C.: 244 
Clemence, Gerald M.: 22
Clements, Henry H.: 94, 331
Code Division Multiple Access: xxi
Cold War: xxxvii, 1, 105, 140, 171, 195, 198
College, Alaska (See Alaska Ground Station)
Collimation tower: 40, 51, 76, 118, 131, 133, 136
Collins, Michael: 171, 174, 175, 178
Collins Radio Company: 149, 209
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization: xv, 235, 318
Commercialization of stations: xlii, 238, 239, 246, 253, 254, 257, 312, 313, 317, 321–323
Commercial satellite (See also COMSAT and INTELSAT): xxxvii, 65, 244-248, 257, 265, 289; Early 
Bird, xxxvii, 247; Telstar 1, 65, 244, 246
Commercial space transportation: 311
Communication and Navigation Architecture Working Group: 338
Communications blackout behind the Moon: xxxiii, 172, 341
Communications Satellite Act of 1962: 246
Communications Satellite Corporation: xxxvii, 196, 246-247
Compton Gamma Ray Observatory: 272, 285, 286; GRO Remote Terminal System (GRTS), 289-292
Computation and Data Flow Integrated Subsystem: 77
Congress, United States: xxiii, xxxiv, 25, 30, 67, 106, 130, 153, 154, 156, 198, 203, 227, 254-256, 
258, 275, 282, 324, 332, 333; Debate over Johannesburg, 208-213; Establishment of NASA, 27-
28; House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 210; House Congressional Black Caucus, 210; House 
Space Committee, 210; House Subcommittee on Aeronautics and Space Technology, 210
Conrad, Charles, Jr.: 110, 187
Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation: 9
Consolidated Space Operations Contract: xxiv, 323, 326
Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems: xxii
Cooby Creek, Australia: 50, 56, 203
Cooper, L. Gordon, Jr.: 98, 102-103
Cooper’s Island (See Bermuda)
Corliss, William R.: x, xii
Coronal holes: 66
Corpus Christi, Texas (See Texas Tracking Station)
Cosmic Background Explorer: 310
COSPAS-SARSAT satellite project: 236-237
Cost reduction: xxii, xxiii, xxv, xlii, 300, 313, 323; Rising cost of station operations, 226-227
Costrell, James A.: 326
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research: 208, 210-213
Courier, air and surface: 22, 36
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Crew Exploration Vehicle: 340
Crippen, Robert L.: 224
Crough, Ed: 96
Crowley, J. W.: 70
Crustal Dynamics Project (See Tectonics)
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Cunningham, R. Walter: 170
Cushman, Ralph E.: 90, 205
D
Dakar, Senegal: 56, 225, 226, 231, 240
Darwin, Australia: 50, 56, 203
Data Acquisition Facility: 43, 47, 51, 53, 64, 85, 135; Power requirements, 47-49; Staffing and 
operating cost, 49
Data rate requirements: xxxviii, 36, 201, 265, 298, 300, 301, 335, 338
Deep Space Network (DSN): ix, xii-xvi, xix, xxi, xxxv, xli, 33, 45, 50, 52, 59, 80, 109, 117, 123-124, 
128, 144, 146, 147-149, 163, 208, 212, 221, 231, 232, 235, 241, 250-251, 288, 308, 322, 338; As 
Apollo wing-station, 147-149, 232-233; Ground Communications Facility: xiv; Subnets, xiv; 
World Net: 208
Delta launch vehicle: 202, 287, 306
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Department of Defense (See also Air Force, Army and Navy, United States): xxxiii, 2, 12, 27, 94, 115, 
153; Advanced Research Projects Agency, 67; Committee on Special Capabilities, 9
Department of Interior: 84, 111, 123, 281
Department of State: xxxiii, xxxiv, 20, 42, 88, 90, 94, 97, 123, 125, 127, 152, 205, 209, 214, 230, 236
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Dinn, Mike: 179-180, 234
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Dryden, Hugh L.: 26, 90, 106, 131, 205
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Earth Observatory Data & Images archive: 119
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